
Underdevelopment, Development and the Future of Africa



EDITED BY
Munyaradzi Mawere

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List of Contributors

Munyaradzi Mawere holds a PhD in Social Anthropology from the University of Cape Town (UCT) in South Africa. Professor Mawere also holds a Master's Degree in Social Anthropology from UCT; a Master's Degree in Development Studies; Master's Degree in Philosophy; B. A. (Hons) Degree in Philosophy; Certificate in Tertiary and Higher Learning; Certificate in Information Technology; and Certificate in Diplomacy, Negotiation and Bargaining. He is currently Professor in the Department of Culture and Heritage Studies at Great Zimbabwe University. Before joining this university, Professor Mawere was a lecturer at the University of Zimbabwe and at Universidade Pedagógica, Mozambique, where he has worked in different capacities as a Senior lecturer, Assistant Research Director, Postgraduate Co-ordinator and Associate Professor. He has an outstanding publishing record of more than one hundred and twenty pieces of work which include more than twenty-five books and over a hundred book chapters and papers in scholarly journals. Professor Mawere has published extensively on poverty and community development, knowledge studies, political anthropology, science and technology studies (STS), environment and agrarian issues, democracy and African states, coloniality, decoloniality and transformation, African philosophy and political systems, culture and heritage studies. Some of his bestselling books are: *Humans, Other Beings and the Environment: Harurwa (Edible stinkbugs) and Environmental Conservation in South-eastern Zimbabwe* (2015); *Democracy, Good Governance and Development in Africa: A Search for Sustainable Democracy and Development*, (2015); *Culture, Indigenous Knowledge and Development in Africa: Reviving Interconnections for Sustainable Development* (2014); *Harnessing Cultural Capital for Sustainability: A Pan Africanist Perspective* (2015); *Divining the Future of Africa: Healing the Wounds, Restoring Dignity and Fostering Development*, (2014); *African Cultures, Memory and Space: Living the Past Presence in Zimbabwean Heritage* (2014); *African Philosophy and Thought Systems: A Search for a Culture and Philosophy of Belonging* (2016); and *Colonial Heritage, Memory and Sustainability in Africa: Challenges, Opportunities and Prospects* (2016).

Richard Asante holds a PhD in Political Science under the Harvard University (USA) and University of Ghana Split-PhD Programme. Asante is a Senior Research Fellow and Lecturer in the Institute of African Studies University of Ghana, Legon. He previously served as the Head of Department/Research Coordinator of the History and Politics Unit of the Institute of African Studies from August 2014 to July 2016. He also directed that Institute's Quality of Life (QoL) research project which seeks to determine the quality of life of Ghanaians. He is currently a Visiting Scholar (in Residence) in International Relations at Pomona College, Claremont, USA, where he teaches comparative politics of Africa and Advanced course on Peace and Security in Africa. He has special research interest in the political economy of African development, social capital, democratisation and peace and conflict studies.

Thomas Fox is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Sociology at the University of Namibia, and is Honorary Research Fellow at University of Stellenbosch where he undertook PhD research on the topic of actor negotiations of media and identity formation in Windhoek. He teaches and researches in the areas of media cultures, social theory, development studies and political sociology. He formerly taught at Kingston and South Bank Universities (UK), and Birkbeck College (University of London). He has published in Namibia and internationally. His recent publications are *Namibia's Emergent Transculturalism at the African Global Borderlands* (2014), *Ethnicity in Discourse* (2015, with Gerald Stell), *Confronting the Global* (2016), and *War Without End* (2016). He is co-author of the book *Namibia Society Sociology* (2005).

Artwell Nhemachena holds a PhD in Social Anthropology; MSc in Sociology and Social Anthropology and BSc Honours Degree in Sociology. He has lectured at a number of universities in Zimbabwe before pursuing his PhD studies in South Africa. Currently he lectures in Sociology at the University of Namibia. His currently areas of research interest are Knowledge Studies; Development Studies; Environment; Resilience; Food Security and Food Sovereignty; Industrial Sociology; Conflict and Peace; Transformation; Science and Technology Studies, Democracy and Governance; Relational

Ontologies; Decoloniality and Anthropological jurisprudence. He has published in the areas of democracy and governance; conflict and peace; relational ontologies; industrial sociology; development; environment, and knowledge studies; transformation and decoloniality. He has been a CODESRIA Laureate since 2010 and has been participating in the CODESRIA Democratic Governance Institute.

Gertjan van Stam is a Research Fellow at the Scientific and Industrial Research and Development Centre (SIRDC) of Zimbabwe. He holds an MTech (cum laude) from Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (NMMU) in South Africa. Gertjan and his family lived in the rural areas of Zimbabwe and Zambia for over 13 years. His broad academic interests focus on the nexus of society and technology in the so-called periphery with the goal to identify and inspire local talent and engender local capacity for community-led activities.

Mohammed Abubakar Yinusa is an Associate Professor and Lecturer in the Department of Sociology, University of Ilorin, Nigeria. His area of specialization is in Sociology of Development and Social Problems. He has several publications and has attended various conferences both locally and internationally.

Mirjam van Reisen is Professor Computing for Society at Leiden University, Leiden Centre of Data Science and professor for International Relations, Innovation and Care at Tilburg University and chair of the research network 'Globalisation, Accessibility, Innovation and Care' (GAIC). She lectures at Amsterdam University College (AUC). Van Reisen is Director of Europe External Policy Advisors (EEPA) and the Secretary General of the Europe External Programme with Africa. She is a member of the Dutch Government Council on International Relations and the chair of the Commission on Development Cooperation. Van Reisen is a member of the Supervisory Boards of the Transnational Institute (TNI), Philips Foundation and the Dutch Development Organisation (SNV). She has a Masters in Social Sciences from Nijmegen University and a PhD in Social Sciences from the University of Maastricht. In 2012 Mirjam

van Reisen received the Golden Image Award for Peace-Building from President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf of Liberia. Her most recent books and articles include:

<https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/en/news/2016/04/searching-for-the-wanted-and-unwanted-effects-of-innovation>; “Maslow’s Theory of Human Motivation and its Deep Roots in Individualism: Interrogating Maslow’s Applicability in Africa”, In: M. Mawere & A. Nhemachena (Eds.), *Theory, Knowledge, Development and Politics: What Role for the Academy in the Sustainability of Africa?* Langaa: Bamenda; “Money Remittances: Contributing to the Quality of Rural Health Care”; “ICT and Changing Identities”; “ICT-facilitated Human Trafficking (Handbook on Human Trafficking)” in: Van Reisen, M. (ed) (2015). *Women's Leadership in Peace-building. Community, Conflict and Care*, Trenton: Africa World Press; Van Reisen M., Estefanos M., Rijken C., (2014). *The Human Trafficking Cycle: Sinai and Beyond*. Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers. Van Reisen, M, Estefanos, M, & Rijken, C., (2012); and *Human Trafficking in the Sinai: Refugees between Life and death*. Nijmegen: Wolf Publishers; *Sinai Trafficking: Origin and Definition of a new Form of Human Trafficking. Social Inclusion, 3 (1): 113-124*.

Ephraim Taurai Gwaravanda holds a Philosophy PhD from the University of South Africa (UNISA). He is a philosophy lecturer at Great Zimbabwe University where he teaches Advanced Logic, Metaphysics and Philosophy of Law. His research interests are in the areas of Indigenous Knowledge Systems, Globalization, Epistemic Justice, Governance and Legal Philosophy. He has published several articles with international peer reviewed journals.

Primrose Nakazibwe is a PhD holder and senior lecturer at the Institute of Interdisciplinary Training and Research, Mbarara University of Science and Technology, Uganda. I have taught many development courses including; Gender and Development, Rural Development and Civil Society Organisations. My research interest include: Gendered Commodity Chain analysis, Gender analysis and Community Development. I have passion working with rural communities as well as the marginalised populations. If am not doing

professional work, I am into small scale agricultural life enjoying both nature and food science.

Joseph Adesoji Oluyemi is a prospective PhD student in the Department of Sociology, University of Ilorin, Nigeria. His areas of specialisation include Medical Sociology and Sociology of Development with special interests in Adolescent Health, Occupational health, Infectious diseases, Emerging diseases, Sexualities and issues in development.

Takavafira Masarira Zhou is an environmental historian, a Lemba, trade unionist, educationist and Human Rights defender. He is a holder of B.A. General, B.A. Special Honours in History, Masters in African History, Graduate Certificate in Education, and D. Phil in Environmental History from the University of Zimbabwe. He was a Teaching Assistant in the History Department at the University of Zimbabwe (1991-1995), a History Lecturer at Mutare Teachers' college (2002-2004), and a part-time History Lecturer at Africa University (2002-2004). He joined Great Zimbabwe University in 2004 as a History Lecturer and had by the time of his departure in 2008 helped to transform the history subject area into the Department of History and Development Studies. He was a technical advisor (researcher) in Zimbabwe Constitution Select Committee (2010-2011) that produced Zimbabwe's new Constitution in 2013. He was also a member of the National Education Advisory Board (2009-2013) that among other things helped the then Ministry of Education, Sports, Arts and Culture in strategic planning, resource mobilisation and policy formulation during the period of Inclusive Government. Currently he is the president of the Progressive Teachers' Union of Zimbabwe, and treasurer of the Non Aligned Teachers' Unions of Southern Africa (ANTUSA). He has presented various papers at conferences in Zimbabwe, Africa, Europe and Asia. He has also published on African agriculture; white settler farming; environmental impact of mining in Zimbabwe; peace and security in Africa; History curricula changes in Zimbabwe; post-2016 Africa's development; teacher education; and general history and politics of Zimbabwe.

Friday-Otun, Joseph who holds a Doctorate degree in Linguistics, is a Senior Lecturer of Linguistics at the Department of Linguistics and Nigerian Languages, University of Ilorin, Ilorin, Nigeria. His areas of interests include Applied Linguistics, Sociolinguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics. He has taught and supervised both graduate and undergraduate students in the University. He is a member of many professional associations such as Linguistic Association of Nigeria, West African Language Congress, Yoruba Studies Association of Nigeria and Nigerian English Studies Association. Dr Friday-Otun has published papers in local, national and international journals such as Journal of Linguistic Association of Nigeria, Journal of West African Languages, Journal of Language, Discourse and Society and Journal of International Association of Translators.

Raji Abdulateef is a PhD student and lecturer II in the Department of Sociology, University of Ilorin, Nigeria. His areas of specialization include Sociology of Development, Rural Sociology and Social issues.

Costain Tandi is a High school teacher for Advanced level History and Sociology as well as Head of Department (Humanities) at Rufaro High School, Chatsworth, Zimbabwe. He holds a Masters Degree in Development Studies from Midlands State University, Bachelor of Arts 4th year Honours (History) from Great Zimbabwe University, Bachelor of Arts General Degree from the University of Zimbabwe, Graduate Certificate in Education from Great Zimbabwe University, An Executive certificate in Program and Project Monitoring and Evaluation from the University of Zimbabwe and An Executive Certificate in Project Management from the University of Zimbabwe. His research interests include but not limited to Indigenous Knowledge systems, Climate change and Variability, Rural poverty, agriculture and community development.

Odeigah, Theresa Nfam (Mrs) is a holder of B.A (History), M.A. (History), PGDE, PhD (History). She is a lecturer in the Department of History and International Studies at the University of Ilorin, Kwara State, Nigeria. She is an Economic Historian specialising in

the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria. She has publications in scholarly journals in the area of economic history.

Fidelis Peter Thomas Duri is a lecturer in the Department of History and Development Studies at Great Zimbabwe University. He is a holder of a PhD in History from the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, South Africa. He has published a number of books and articles which focus on environmental history, socio-cultural dynamics, subaltern struggles, African border studies and politics in Zimbabwe during the colonial and post-colonial periods. He has also reviewed and edited a number of scholarly books and articles and is also a member of the editorial boards of international journals such as the *Zimbabwe Journal of Historical Studies* and the *International Journal of Developing Societies*.

Ineke Buskens is an independent research, gender and process facilitation consultant, working with (international) NGO's, government departments, local municipalities, universities and research councils in Africa and beyond. She has published on qualitative and emancipatory research methodology, women empowerment, Gender and ICT, women's health, and open development. Ineke obtained her Doctoral degree in Cultural Anthropology from the Rijks Universiteit Leiden in the Netherlands, where she co-designed the country's first major women's studies' curriculum in 1978. During the period 1991-1996, when she was leading the Centre for Research Methodology at the Human Sciences Research Council in South Africa, Ineke designed and facilitated the country's first experiential education programme in qualitative and participatory research methods. Since then, Ineke has designed and facilitated several national and transnational research projects with one of these evolving into the GRACE Network, a collective of 35 research teams in 18 countries in Africa and the Middle East, focusing on women empowerment and Information and Communication Technology. GRACE published two books of which Ineke has been the main editor. At this moment, Ineke is based in Macao, SAR China, where she holds the position of principal research fellow at the United Nations University Institute on Computing and Society (UNU-CS).

Nyasha Madzokere is a lecturer of Biblical Hebrew and Old Testament in the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies at Great Zimbabwe University. He is a PhD student at the University of Botswana. He has published widely on the Bible and its contextual relevance to Zimbabwe.

Okewande Esther Oyeniwe holds Degrees of Bachelor and Master of Science Education in Chemistry. She is currently a Ph.D. student in the Department of Science Education, University of Ilorin, Nigeria. She has been teaching in both secondary and post-secondary schools for the past fifteen years.

Marshal Madambura holds two Master's Degrees in Development Studies (from Great Zimbabwe University) and (GZU) and Peace and Governance (from Africa University). He also holds a Bachelor of Arts Degree from the University of Zimbabwe and a Graduate Diploma in Education from Great Zimbabwe University. His current placement is with the Family AIDS Caring Trust (FACT) Zimbabwe as a Project officer. Madambura also worked as a secondary teacher in Zimbabwe for several years before joining Family AIDS Caring Trust. In his current placement, Madambura has been working with rural people in areas to do with HIV/AIDS and other development projects for the past seven years and this has given him a broad base from which to approach many topics on education, gender and development. His current research interests are in the areas of Education, Gender studies, Peace and conflict studies, and development issues.

Johnson O. Olaniyi graduated from Nigeria's Premier University, University of Ibadan in 1983 where he read Political Science. He obtained a Postgraduate Diploma in Education (PGDE) certificate from University of Ilorin, Nigeria in 1989 and Master of Science Degree in Political Science (with specialisation in Political Theory) from University of Ibadan, Nigeria in 1990. He bagged his PhD Degree in Political Science (with specialisation in Electoral Studies) from University of Ilorin, Nigeria in 2013. His teaching career spans over three decades, first as a Secondary School teacher and later as a University lecturer. He is currently a Senior Lecturer in the

Department of Political Science, University of Ilorin, Nigeria where he has been teaching courses in Political Science since 1992. He is the immediate past Head, Department of Political Science, University of Ilorin, Nigeria. He has authored, co-authored books and published widely in national and international journals. His research interests include party politics, electoral studies and state and governance.

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Africa's Postcolonial Challenge: The Politics and Resilience of Underdevelopment

Munyaradzi Mawere

Introduction

Postcolonial Africa has become home to a plethora of human and natural evils. Many of the evils that haunt Africa have become a gargantuan challenge and an intrepid threat to the continent's security and development efforts. But as many as they are, which could be Africa's most daring threatening challenge in the postcolonial era?

To the question here posed, a number of responses can be provided, depending on one's intellectual, economic, and socio-political orientations and experiences. Nevertheless, it is arguably true with respect to Africa, that underdevelopment and its attendant politics has become one of Africa's biggest postcolonial challenges. This reasoning is based on the experiential logic that most of the woes that Africa has suffered and continue to suffer emanate directly or indirectly from its underdevelopment status which makes it more vulnerable to be preyed upon by many 'privileged' predators. One can think of conflicts, runaway inflations, poverty, diseases, and disasters, which undoubtedly are all exacerbated by Africa's poor adaptive capacity, poverty, and high level of underdevelopment. Wars and terrorist insurgences across the continent have, for instance, been largely a result of Africa's underdevelopment status which 'warlords' and godfathers of terrorism within and outside the continent manipulate to cause stir, rifts, and attritions between and amongst the people of Africa. In a recent report by Africa Monitors (2016), it was revealed that:

Lucky survivors relate terrible stories of how the EU fat-salaried Janjaweed militias stationed by Sudan government at its borders with Libya are systematically killing in situ any border-transitter recognised

as Sudanese. Huge sums of money ranging between \$5000-\$10000 are being extorted from other nationalities, in particular Ethiopians and Eritreans so as to arrange for them not only to cross the border into Libya on their way to Europe, but further escorting them to the human traffickers who send them on boats to Europe after extorting fees similar to that of the Janjaweed. Those who fail to pay are shot dead on their heads in situ. This has made the border-transmitters look for other routes like first crossing the border from Sudan to Egypt and then from there to Libya, or trying directly to cross the Mediterranean to Europe ... A few months ago, the EU reached an agreement with the Sudan government to curb for the surge of the human trafficking business engaged in arranging for the Africans seeking refuge in the EU countries to cross the borders from Sudan to Libya and from there cross the Mediterranean Sea to Europe. The plan was first to crack on the traffickers, and second to patrol the borders so as to block transmitters.

The report furthered to note that:

Hereby, we call upon all Pan Africans and human rights defenders worldwide to name and shame the EU as a salary payer of the Janjaweed militias and as a killer of innocent people fleeing their conflict stricken countries. The EU is doing this for no reason other than enjoying their indoor luxury and wealth that they accumulated not only from slavery and colonialism of yesterday but also from present-day neo-colonialism and exploitation of poor nations, African in particular.

Also, the former Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, at the Tana Tiver Forum held in Ethiopia in April 2016 cited Africa's underdevelopment, extreme poverty, and unemployment as stimulants for violence and terror, especially by the Arab World and the global architectures of the global north (see Annan 2016). Annan states that external forces take advantages of such stimulants. He goes further to point out that 40 % of those who join rebel movements are, for example, motivated by a lack of jobs.

It is clear from the reports cited above that Africa's woes, including its underdevelopment gridlock, are not only a result of internal forces such as corruption, power hungry, geographical location and economic mismanagement. The woes are also a result of external forces. This entails that when dealing with the problem of underdevelopment in Africa, both external and internal forces should be seriously considered.

Understanding underdevelopment in Africa

The apparent resilience of underdevelopment in Africa is a clear manifestation of an economic-political crisis that calls for increased efforts into the understanding of the causes and endurance of underdevelopment on the continent. On this note, it should be underlined that as darkness thrives where there is no light, underdevelopment thrives in the absence of development, justice, and good governance. This understanding opens discussion on the relationship between development and good governance. Broadly, this is encapsulated in the question: How can development be possible in Africa when bad governance prevails across the continent? More specifically, how can development be possible when those we vote for are not made accountable for their mismanagement of their respective countries' affairs?

While it may be an intricate task to unravel the circumstances surrounding the question of underdevelopment in Africa, I argue that an adequate understanding of contextual development is required in order to comprehend underdevelopment in its fullest terms. To me, a clear understanding of what development is, fortuitously leads to crescendos and greater understanding of what underdevelopment is and should be. This is fundamental to development discourse given that development and underdevelopment are two sides of the same coin, for without underdevelopment no one would talk of development. Likewise, without development no one would talk of underdevelopment for everyone would believe that their underdevelopment is what they call development. A lucid and precise understanding of development is therefore necessary as it leads us to subtleties and meticulous conceptualisations of underdevelopment.

Yet, looking it from another angle, the coexistence of development and underdevelopment entails that no country is immune to underdevelopment no matter how rich it could be. Underdevelopment lives with people in the streets, homes, schools, workplaces and other such institutions across the countries of the continent. In Africa, this reality seems to be aggravated by the sad histories and circumstances that the continent has gone through since the advent of nefarious and dehumanising forces of trans-Atlantic slave trade and colonialism. The debate that is opened by this analysis especially with respect to Africa leads to a critical but seemingly rhetoric question: Will Africa ever knows development? If yes, how this will be made possible amidst scores of economic mismanagement, corruption, and poor governance? If no, why?

These and many others related to the future of Africa in view of its development and underdevelopment discourse are the questions that many chapters of this penetrating volume dissect and grapple with.

A journey through the book

The chapters that constitute this volume speak in different ways to the co-existence of development and underdevelopment together with issues of poverty, inequality, and vulnerability, which pervade chronicles in almost all African countries. Though the chapters are researched and written by scholars from different geographical locations around the world, they generally agree that the problem of underdevelopment requires serious unpacking and interrogation given its resilience and the ever-waning politico and socio-economic condition with respect to Africa. The present chapter, thus, is adeptly backed up by thought-provoking and curried chapters that seriously consider the resilience of underdevelopment and its co-existence with development, vulnerability, and inequality in Africa.

The second chapter by Artwell Nhemachena painstakingly examines the “gloomy” futures in Africa posed by the ramifications of humanoid robots, in the context of broader technoscience. Nhemachena’s discussion of the current global epistemological and ontological shifts that are opening spaces for the humanoid robots is

more urgent now than ever given that the humanoid robots are, in the name of technological advancement, currently taking over people's employment across the globe. Nhemachena is apt to note that, unfortunately, some scholars are romanticising the ramifications of humanoid robots as progressive and "developmental"; hence calling for incisive interrogation of technoscience that is currently spreading its tentacles across the world in the name of development.

Chapter three by Thomas Fox perceptively assesses the 'model' that China deployed to rapidly transform itself from a very poor to a relatively rich and successful middle-income industrial nation between 1980 and 2000. Fox notes that the Chinese's successful story came with a lot of sacrifices and indeed met with serious problems. It was, thus, more a revolution of the economy and the industry. Fox thus argues "rapid social and economic transformation in China was not without problems. Success was not guaranteed in the early stages, and the Chinese people made great sacrifices to achieve the position they have now reached. Politics frequently clashed with economics – as it often does in Africa today". It is in this view that Fox argues for the need to understand how China developed is critical for African nations seeking economic success and positive transformation, especially in conditions where human development and freedom remain limited. Thus, for Fox, the Chinese economic success can provide positive insights and lessons for Africa's own industrial and economic progress, especially at this time when many African nations are searching for lasting solutions to its woes and independent framework for their development.

Ephraim Gwaravanda's chapter four creatively grapples with current debates on the African development discourse. While acknowledging that development is a complex phenomenon with many facets, he employs tools of logic, particularly fallacies to argue that uncritical and fallacious reasoning is partly responsible for Africa's [under-]development problems. Yet, although Gwaravanda argues for the need for the recognition of fallacious reasoning as responsible for sluggish economic/scientific/technological development, he is quick and apt to note that there are also many other factors that come into play as far as underdevelopment in Africa is concerned. On this note, Gwaravanda cites external factors

and advances for the need to recognise development as a phenomenon with intertwined facets which should be carefully conceptualised and dealt with in unison if “positive” development in Africa is to be ever achieved.

In chapter five, Richard Asante critically and valiantly reflects on and contributes to the ongoing debates about possible pathways for African development. He notes that in the past, Africa has been casted as poor, underdeveloped, and always in need of the West’s assistance, a description that has largely shifted in the recent years now as a place for investment and innovation. The question that Asante asks is: why this sudden shift and indeed this great flock of foreign investors both from the global north and from the East into the African continent? While Asante acknowledges the role of China in leading the charge and has been largely credited with the change in attitude towards Africa— from basket case to miracle zone, he urges Africa to be careful with its relationship with China.

Nyasha Madzokere’s luminary chapter six adopts what he calls “the recurring topos statement” in the book of Exodus: “Let my people go!” For Madzokere, the topos statement was an imperative and powerful declaration uttered by Yahweh to mark the liberation of the Hebrews from Egypt—the house of bondage. Taking lessons from this topos statement and transpose to Zimbabwe, Madzokere’s chapter becomes a point of departure; a reference situation to the tumultuous and turbulent moment that Zimbabwe is undergoing at the moment politically and economically. Taking such a contextual reading, Madzokere is audacious to argue that “Robert Mugabe who is a true ardent Christian (Roman Catholic) should utilise the message of the book of Exodus to draw lessons on the dangers of dictatorship.” For Madzokere, as a leader of Zimbabwe—a country whose approximately eighty percent population claims to be adherents of Christianity, it is imperative for Mugabe to read the Bible and draw useful lessons and good leadership qualities that God and indeed the people embrace and cherish.

In Chapter seven, Odeigah, Theresa Nfam takes a long reflective pose on the trends of poverty in Africa since the 1980s when the majority of the African countries attained their independence from colonialism. On this note, Nfam uses the case study of the Niger

Delta Region in Nigeria to observe that “the telling result of this is that since the 1980s especially, poverty has not only spread but also deepened in Africa in relative and absolute terms.” Basing on this observation, Nfam argues that extant statistics on Africa’s state of affairs economically and politically does not give much room for optimism. Yet the critical question that Nfam raises is how to get Africa out of its current miasma of poverty, especially considering both internal and external factors that continue downplaying the spirit of development on the continent.

Okewande Esther Oyenibe’s chapter eight illustrates the developmental challenges that Africa is facing today. In fact, Oyenibe grapples with educational development in modern-day Africa, which she believes is one of the keys, with which development of a nation is measured and unlocked. For Oyenibe, given the centrality of educational development in the whole development discourse, any endeavour of humans, science, technology, mathematics, and education should be built on indigenous culture. Basing on this analysis, Oyenibe is of the view that science and technology education curriculum in Africa should be designed in such a way that it satisfactorily meets the indigenous needs of the citizens of Africa before extending to the world beyond. Using Nigeria as a case study, Oyenibe reveals that the content of science taught in Nigeria schools as in many other schools across the country and indeed the African continent, is devoid of local environmental input. To substantiate her claim, Oyenibe gives an example of curricula for primary and secondary schools in Nigeria which was developed by the Nigerian Educational Research and Development Council [NERDC], yet is too theoretical and regimented that it doesn’t serve the developmental quests of the Nigerian society. In view of this observation, Oyenibe argues for the need of the Nigerian curricula to move from a class-based to field-based teaching which she believes will widen students’ horizon and further expose them to science and technology development that instils and foster development in the fullest sense and in context.

In chapter nine, Munyaradzi Mawere interrogates the efficacy of some indigenous mechanisms as strategies for mitigating and adapting to disasters and windows for the promotion of sustainable

development in Africa. Drawing on selected case studies and examples from around Africa, Mawere argues that if properly utilised, indigenous mechanisms could mitigate the tapestry of challenges posed by vicissitude of weather patterns and disaster risks that Africa is facing such as floods, famine (food crisis), drought, storms, and climate change, among others. On the same note, Mawere explores and documents different pathways through which some communities around Africa are coping with a plethora of natural and human induced disaster risks, which for him could act as examples and case studies for other African countries to emulate in the spirit of promoting and enhancing development on the continent. Thus, the core argument for Mawere is that indigenous mechanisms if properly used have the capacity to help Africa to build lasting resilience, mitigate disaster risks and promote sustainable development in the continent.

Chapter ten by Muhammed A. Yinusa, Joseph A. Oluyemi, and Raji Abdullateef delves deeper into the analysis of the primary and secondary causes of underdevelopment in Africa. They use the dependency theory, theories of poverty and the theory of gender inequality to explain the development predicament Africa is facing at the moment. More so, the trio explores the problem of underdevelopment in Africa from pre-historic period to date. The three are however quick to note that the problems of underdevelopment in Africa can be broadly categorised under social-cultural factors, political factors, and economic factors. Noting the controversies surrounding the conceptualisation and causes of [under-]development especially with reference to Africa, the trio more importantly, goes a step further to suggest what they think could be lasting solutions to the highlighted problem in Africa.

In his insightful chapter eleven, Takavafira Masarira Zhou critically examines the continued generation and perpetuation of poverty and underdevelopment in Africa as a result of both internal and external factors. This, for Zhou, is surprising taking place amidst the reality that the African continent is abundantly blessed with natural resources of all kind. Unlike many scholars of development in Africa and the subaltern in general who are singing the same song as classical scholars of development such as Walter Rodney, Zhou

rebutts the Rodney, Baran, and Frank's wailing and attribution of the underdevelopment of Africa to external factors. For him, while he agrees with the trio to the extent that external factors also contribute to poverty and underdevelopment in Africa, he differs with them in so far as he believes that both internal and external factors are at the core of Africa's enduring poverty and underdevelopment. Zhou, thus, calls for "a historical balance sheet which should consider both internal and external factors, particularly in post-colonial Africa's development of underdevelopment and underdevelopment of development". Using the resource curse (the paradox of plenty) theory and a myriad of case studies from around Africa, Zhou proffers his central argument that poverty and inequality in Africa are as much causes of conflict and underdevelopment as they are consequences of conflict and underdevelopment in the continent. Thus, Zhou succeeds in showing the intricate relationship between and amongst poverty, inequality, and underdevelopment, especially with reference to Africa. Besides, Zhou goes a step further to suggest possible remedies to Africa's underdevelopment, which he believes lies largely in a common sense internal revolution.

In chapter twelve, J. O. Friday-Otun critically explores the question of language as an option in forging national integration, unity and development in Nigeria. In particular, Frida-Otun examines the development possibilities and opportunities offered by language in national integration, unity and development. Using a case study of the Nigerian National Language Policy, Friday-Otun argues how the disuse of indigenous local languages in Nigeria has, over the years, affected integration, unity and development, at least at regional and then national levels. On this note, Friday-Otun argues for the promotion of indigenous languages through what he calls "two parallel forms of integration system" as an incentive to development and unity as well as a solution to the on-going language conflict between the speakers of the majority and minority languages in Nigeria.

In chapter thirteen, Dennis Masaka tackles head-on the issue of colonial education in Africa. Broadly, Masaka boldly interrogates and rejects colonial education, which for him continue lingering and haunting the majority of postcolonial African states. One may

wonder why Masaka argues for the need to throw into the dustbin of oblivion colonial education and its attendant systems, when in fact he himself went through the same education system. For him, the reason is very simple: that colonial education in Africa is education for conquest that installed epistemicide and underdevelopment on the continent. Masaka, thus, follows Bewaji (2010) who audaciously argue that the epistemicide that was foisted on the colonised people during colonialism cannot be absolved for the underdevelopment that countries in the colonised world have endured. It is also on the basis of this understanding and reasoning that Masaka points to colonial education as the primary cause for Africa's present development predicament which endures and threatens to plunge millions of Africans into the miasma of poverty despite the continent's rich reserves of natural resources. Masaka, thus, calls for the reverse and dishonouring of colonial education in Africa and a replacement of the said by an education paradigm that celebrates the creative geniuses and innovative potentials of the African people, particularly in view of the continent's development efforts.

Chapter fourteen by Johnson O. Olaniyi dissects into the political parties and their contribution to national development in Africa. Using the case study of Nigeria particularly the "Fourth Nigerian Republic", Olaniyi examines "how Nigerian political parties have fared so far in the area of the argument on development and underdevelopment", in terms of their contribution to national development. He observes that Nigerian political parties, though preach the gospel of development in their Manifestos, have done more harm than good to both the development debates and development practices in the country. For him, though his study focuses more Nigeria, the results obtained thereon could be possibly applied to the whole continent of Africa, where politicking prevails at the expense of "real" development.

In his thought provoking chapter fifteen, Fidelis P. T. Duri explores the legacies of Shona environmental taboos regarding pangolins in post-colonial Zimbabwe. Using this legacy, Duri examines the manner in which the sacredness of pangolins has come to be exploited for political expediency and in a manner that undermines development but in the name of royal gifts to powerful

politicians in Zimbabwe. For Duri, the legacy of pangolin in Zimbabwe undermines security and development of both the pangolins and the people of Zimbabwe respectively, especially considering that the legacy denies some people the right to access to resources in a dispensation characterised by violence and profound poverty. It is on this note that Duri argues for a reverse of the “force” and “power” that some pre-colonial Shona taboos, such as those pertaining to pangolins have, so as to avoid continued manipulations of scarce resources by some powerful politicians.

In their theoretically and practically rich chapter sixteen, Ineke Buskens and Mirjam van Reisen prompt a rethink of the international development project through the lenses of theories of women’s empowerment and gender equality. Drawing on their practical experiences in ICT and the question posed within the area of ICT for Development (ICT4D), an area that has gained increasing relevance in the past decade, the duo recognises the need for a radical epistemological underpinning of the field of development. They argue for the need for an alternative theorising, “in a world where ‘gender equality’ has been increasingly accepted within the framework of a normative and hegemonic cultural rights perspective, but excludes the ontological perspectives of self within the sociality of women, the very women who are often regarded as the object of study, intervention, and purpose”. Buskens and van Reisen’s chapter, is critical in so far as it offers the platform for engagement of theory and practice while calling for the reconsideration and retheorisation of issues of gender equality as they apply to the broader spectrum of development.

In chapter seventeen, Munyaradzi Mawere and Costain Tandi wade into the debate on the role of conflict in initiating and perpetuating poverty in Africa. Drawing from their vast knowledge of and experiences from many countries of Africa, particularly, those in sub-Sahara, Mawere and Tandi argue that due to persistent lurches of conflict, Africa has become a volatile mix of insecurity, civil unrest and underdevelopment, thereby undermining the spirit of development on the continent. This is because, for Mawere and Tandi, the problem of conflict and civil unrest is destabilising the continent’s development process. Basing on their findings, Mawere

and Tandi, advance their central argument that no society that is bedevilled and thronged with civil unrest can be expected to foster positive change and progress for its people. Thus, for Mawere and Tandi, the dire need for peace in the African countries is a matter that calls for great and urgent concern if at all Africa truly quests for development.

Chapter eighteen by Primrose Nakazibwe assesses and bring to the fore the extent to which women participate in, and receive benefits from their involvement in the maize and millet commodity chains, as they attempt to contribute to national development. Using a case study of Mbarara District in Uganda, Nakazibwe observes that there are constraints that limit women's participation in the aforementioned chains such that there is need to explore and understand how women use their agency to manoeuvre and overcome such constraints, at least at the household level. On the same note, Nakazibwe "comparatively traces the participation of men and women in the two chains, explore the benefits and rewards that women receive from the millet chain, compared to the maize chain, establish the obstacles that women face in participating in upgrading in the two chains", in order to establish the options that women have to overcome the constraints they face. In the whole and drawing from her findings in the field, Nakazibwe concludes that women, in Uganda and Africa at large, though encountering a number of constraints and challenges, remain at the centre of the development discourse in Africa such that to talk of development that excludes women would appear like talking of a delicious relish without salt.

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Hearing the Footfalls of Humanoid Robots: Technoscience, (Un-)employment and the Future of “Development” in Twenty-First Century Africa

Artwell Nhemachena

Introduction

Though “development” has recently come to be measured in terms of human security and human “development”, instead of it being merely based on Gross Domestic Product and Gross National Product, these components of development are embattled by developments with regressive effects, in the technoscientific realm. Contemporary scholarship is increasingly engaging in debates on the impending humanoid robots that have already started to take jobs away from human beings leaving them without human security and with depleted human “development” opportunities. Africa, that has already suffered not only enslavement and colonial dispossession but also recent harsh (neo-)liberal reforms, cannot afford to relax in the context of threats of massive loss of employment following “colonisation” and invasions by humanoid robots in the industrial employment sectors. Already theories [that are also ideological machinations] are psychologically preparing humanity for the eventual invasions by spreading the gospels of openness, inclusiveness, cancellation of dichotomies between inside and outside, foreign and indigenous, private and public and so on. Scholars around the world including in some countries that are already experiencing the phenomenon of post-human robots-take-over, are discussing possibilities that the non-formal sectors will offer solace for those whose jobs are taken over by the humanoid robots. The non-formal sectors have proliferated as a result of retrenchments and massive unemployment catalysed by post-independence era introductions of (neo-)liberal reforms imposed on the continent by the Brettons institutions such as the International Monetary Fund

and the World Bank. One of the challenges, for “development” discourses, of the future that is marked by massive global unemployment and massive reliance on the non-formal sector is that this sector does not render itself to the metrics of [conventional] “development”. In this sense, the future arguably threatens to be post-human, anti-human, (post-)“development”, post-nation states and, also in so far as the non-formal sector evades taxation by the states, the post-human robotic future threatens to be without nation-states [and so without the notion of national “development”] on the continent.

This chapter explores the gloomy futures and offers possible lacunae for Africa. Before looking at the ramifications of humanoid robots, in the context of broader technoscience, takeover, I will discuss current global epistemological and ontological shifts that are opening spaces for the humanoid robots, which some scholars are romanticising as progressive and “developmental”.

Technoscience is understood here in terms of Bruno Latour’s (Kastenhofer *et al*, 2011: 61; Bensaude-Vincent, 2008: 2) use referring to what he calls “hybrid entities of humans and nonhumans, of nature and society”. In deploying this term, cognisance is taken of Latour’s characterisation of entangling and disentangling of practices, people, objects and methodologies in scientific activities. The term is also understood in terms of Donna Haraway’s emphasis on “hybrid character of objects in the real world, and to identify a collapse of traditional dichotomies such as nature-culture, machines and humans” (see Kastenhofer *et al*, 2011: 61). Therefore “...technoscience is very generally understood as pointing at a (proposed) convergence of science and technology, of representing and intervening, of understanding and performing and/or of the natural and the artificial (Kastenhofer *et al*, 2011: 63). The underlying assumption that technoscientific activities produce objects with different ontological statuses from the preceding modernist ones constitutes the focus of this chapter; I focus on humanoid robots as one of the objects produced by technoscience with profound implications for human security and human “development” issues on the continent.

One of the greatest challenges for discourses on human security and human development is that they are taking place in a context where what is human is suffering assault from movements on transhumanism and post-humanism. The downside of contemporary liberal assumptions of unbounded inclusivity and hybridity (Nhemachena, 2016a) is that collapsing anything and everything into the human; and emphasising hybridity of humans effectively assaults the essences of humanity and personhood that are central to human “development” and human security. Though there have recently been student movements against the public displaying of statues of colonisers, like Cecil John Rhodes’ statue which statue suffered not only defilement with human faeces thrown at it by University students (Nyamnjoh, 2016), the continent of Africa is arguably facing an imminent invasion by humanoid robots. Viewed by some scholars as imbued with sentience, the humanoid robots are apparently destined not merely to sit in public spaces like the Rhodes statue has done at University of Cape Town; they are destined to also take away jobs and human social-sexual relations away from human beings who are destined to be replaced with “marriageable” sex robots. The critical question here is: how inclusion and hybridity can be conceived as liberating or emancipating when they threaten Africa with new forms of invasions and colonisation via technoscientific entities of which identities are hidden in discourses of hybridity? For the reason that post-humanism threatens to alter humanity beyond recognition, thinkers like Fukuyama (2003), have similarly raised concerns about the progressiveness of the biotechnology revolution.

If transhumanism and post-humanism are understood in terms of post-anthropomorphism, the erosion of human autonomy and sovereignty, then there is need for scholars to question whether such post-humanism and transhumanism are not new logics of retrenching [and re-colonising] African humanity in the same way (neo-)liberal packages have retrenched African workers from formal employment. The fact that much contemporary scholarship supporting transhumanism and post-humanism also call for rhizomatic horizontal engagements; and the fact that technoscientific humanoid robots are replacing human workers necessitate interrogation of the interfaces between logics of the preceding (neo-

)liberalism and the logic of the contemporary discourses. If the contemporary scholarly works privileging action and agency, while demonising organic hierarchies, are interfaced with (neo-)liberal assumptions of action and agency, one notices similarities between them. For those citizen in the Global South that are cast as rejects into the ever-increasing cauldron of nonformal sectors, there is an issue about the progressiveness of Africa in conceptualisations of modes of transformation premised on such flawed assumptions that all what matters for “development” and progress is action and agency. As part of an engagement with theories that privilege action and agency in reference to humanoid robots and human beings, this chapter holds that action and agency alone are not sufficient to conceptualise progress and transformation for the continent. Indeed, suicide involves action and agency but whether such action and agency are progressive and transformational is up for grabs. In this sense, the contention here is that although theories premised on action, agency and participation have proliferated in “development” studies, such theories apply more to (neo-)liberalism for purported liberal actors and agents: they do not apply to modes of “development”, which cannot be confined merely to the (neo-)liberal folds and moulds. The theoretical and fictional (neo-)liberal [individual] actors and agents, that continue to be deliberately replicated in technoscientific theories of humanoid robots, are premised on a fallacious assumption that African persons and human beings have acted as individual agents notwithstanding Western impositions of the (neo-)liberal regimens of the actions/agency. In other words, actions and agency in (neo-)liberal contexts were as much a result of individual volitions as they were of the volitions of the invisible others [at global and local levels] that imposed their nefarious matrices on the continent. Because action and agency are not necessarily reliable companions with volitions, contemporary celebrations of action and agency are not well placed for progress and development. On the African continent, preoccupations with mere action and agency harbour the mischief of celebrating even (neo-)colonial actions and agency. Therefore, mindless celebrations of models and theories on actions and agency in realms of development run the risk of celebrating actions [not only of victims but also] of

colonists, and slave-drivers whose actions and agency continue to animate their victims that have suffered centuries of ideological infusions and machinations. Ideologies and machinations of colonists have historically *zombified* colonial victims into robots that were denied “development” even as they contributed to the “development” of others. *Zombified* into robots, Africans have been denied their own autonomous and sovereign institutions even as they have been converted in order to contribute to “development” of the institutions of others.

The celebration of *zombies* and humanoid robots as actors and agents should not cloud the fact that their actions and agency are not *ipso facto* progressive and “developmental” for themselves and their locales. Indeed *zombies* and humanoid robots are effects of “invisible” hands of the market, “invisible” politics, “invisible” legislatures and “invisible” economies into which they also feed fruits of their actions and agency. Robots and *zombies* essentially clear the way for their owners to move forward while the same *zombies* and robots continue to stand in one place and or fall apart. So, for the robots and *zombies* to assume that their actions and agency are “developmental” and progressive is to misattribute and misrecognise the “development” of their masters for their own. Such misattribution and misrecognition are unsurprising especially where the masters readily engage in discursive dispossession such as they do via the media and academies on the African continent. When the masters are ever preaching inclusion, hybridity and dedifferentiation even to *zombies* and robots, this enhances discursive dispossession for *zombies* that thereby become ready to abandon everything including their identities, materialities, epistemologies, cultures and politics for the gospels of inclusion and hybridity. In colonial Africa, some did not notice that the colonial demonisation of African institutions including families, marriages, politics, cultures, laws, religions and economies were simply colonists’ strategies for discursive dispossession of Africans. While soon after independence in Africa, the West created the figment of the market as autonomously acting to regulate economies, today there has been the creation of humanoid robots similarly deemed to be autonomous actors and agents, but in order to legitimise dispossession of African workers that get replaced

in the interest of profits to enable capital's development. The capture of Africa and its ideological *zombification* for centuries constitutes the genealogy of imperial robotics that are morphing into apparently new forms today, that is into impending capture of the continent using humanoid robots and not merely via the figment of the invisible hand of the market.

Capital has since the colonial era always needed and created *zombies* and robots to which it granted some measures of “autonomy”. Even though currently some scientists prefer scanning and uploading human minds into robots and computers, colonised individuals were on the other hand separated from their indigenous institutions including kin in order that they could be mentally infused and hybridised with colonists’ ideologies so that they act “autonomously” in the interest of colonial systems. Important to note is that in the history of colonialism, some colonised actors and agents helped the colonists in pulling down indigenous institutions. This makes it essential to interrogate the agency and action of humanoid robots, *zombies* and other modes of hybrid objects whose apocalyptic footfalls are increasingly being heard on, in and around the African continent (Bould, 2015; The Herald, 14 April 2007; Kwayedza, 18 September 2014; Nehanda Radio, 23 January 2015; Bulawayo24News, 22 January 2012; My Zimbabwe, 27 March 2015). As Ashis Nandy (1988; 1989) argues, enormous sacrifices and infliction of suffering are being inflicted on the ordinary citizens in the name of science and “development” today. Imperative for African priests and prophets, in both theological and positivist senses, is to examine what kind of “beings” humanoid robotic technology are (Rivers, 2015) and what kinds of sacrificial agency and actions are produced via these apocalyptic hybrid objects or “beings” that technoscience is proliferating on behalf of global capital.

Humanoid robots, transhumanism, posthumanism and “fated development” in Africa

Recent shifts in science and technology studies towards matters of ontology and away from matters of epistemology (Woolgar, 2013) have generated fertile grounds for ontological debates bearing on

humanoid robots, transhumanism and post-humanism. Ontology is the science or study of being or all types of entities, abstract or concrete which are in the world (Ribeiro *et al*, 2013). It is therefore, the science of reality and existence, it is a science of essences and not existences; it is a theory of objects. In conceiving ontologies, some scholars like Latimer *et al*, (2013); Lemke, (2015); Karakayali, (2015) and Abrahamson *et al*, (2015) have reflected arguments against rigid boundaries between humans and non-humans; they have arguments against nature-culture divides, subject-object divides, body-mind divides, individual-society divides and thus they cite scholars like Foucault and Latour that stressed the intrication of human beings and things. In other words, some scholars are increasingly arguing for interdependence between humans and technology; the focus is on technology and nature as actors just as human beings are and since all actors are connected, the argument is that the focus should be on relationalities and assemblages constituted by human beings and other nonhuman entities (Marrero-Guillamon, 2015; Coffey, 2012).

In view of such realisation, Seltin, (2009) argues that the post-human and cyborg have become familiar figures in popular culture and academy representations of “enfleshed” machines. While Seltin, (2009: 43) points out that cyborg and post-humanism appear in a range of academic disciplines as symbols of radical change, signifying a range of breaks with past bodies, past modes of subjectivities and past humanisms, movements for cyborgs and post-humanism are problematic. They are problematic in that they share with a long tradition of Western scholarship like Plato, Kant, Aristotle, Descartes, and colonialism, the antipathy towards biological bodies (du Preez, 2009); and because bodies of colour have historically been loathed by Westerners, cyborgism and transhumanism are not inherently appealing to progressive and decolonial scholarship. Though post-humanism and humanoid robots associated with them are touted as “developmental”, progressive, improvement, evolutionary, liberating and emancipating (Seltin, 2009: 44), this chapter shows that transhumanism, post-humanism and associated humanoid robots are, in many of their logics, in fact regressive “developments”. The chapter links logics of humanoid robots [and transhumanism and post-humanism] such as uploading human

minds or consciousness into computers and robots, and the reengineering of the body (du Preez, 2009) with indigenous Shona and Ndebele epistemologies and ontologies of *zvikwambo* (goblins).

In discussions of humanoid robots, it is imperative to note that during World War 1, Western soldiers anthropomorphised ships, guns, tanks and other technologies that they regarded as individual soldiers helping them fight their [human] wars (Rodenbeck, 1995). So, this is the context in which scholars should for instance, conceive the contemporary anthropomorphisation of humanoid robots by technoscientific scholars who are proponents of “re-establishing” a spiritual understanding of science (Line 1995). The contemporary resurgence of the trope of the robotic [and cyborg] soldiers, like other pieces of technology, hides the power of human beings owners [or controllers] whether at global or local levels (Master 2005: 129). The fact that technology masks the power of human owners [controllers] casts aspersion on claims of the emergence of “smart technologies” and the impending likely marketing of humanoid robots as “smart technologies” or “smart persons/humans”. Besides, the fact that scientists create virtual humans using slices of dead human bodies (The Telegraph, 24 September 2015), speaks less to rationality than it does to logics of witchcraft and sorcery as will be explained and exemplified later in this chapter. The anticipated proliferation of what are called “intelligent household appliances”, the “wearable computers”, “subcutaneous microchips” (Fortunati *et al*, 2003) all have particular underlying ontological reticulations in indigenous epistemologies and ontologies that this chapter will meticulously interrogate.

The idea is not to swiftly and simply celebrate the agency or action of things or even subjects. By creating and deploying humanoid robots and zombies and then celebrating their “nonhuman” and antihuman agency and actions, technoscience makes it possible to destabilise [in a colonial fashion] some humans and their institutions. Such surreptitious destabilisations [often] using proxy technological, humanoid and *zombie* agents and actors validate Seth’s, (2009) argument that technology and science can achieve by “peaceful” means what has previously only been possible through violence. In this sense, conflating human beings and

machines/technology has the effect of making the hapless human beings so conflated dispensable, disinheritable and dismemberable in much the same way any other instantiations of violence do. Eliding the human being with technology has the effects of making the human beings disposable appendages of machines (Kuskey, 2012) and they are denied the necessary autonomy and sovereignty that are imperative for autarkic progress. For this reason, scholars like Murungi, (2013: 104-5) argue that:

given the historical desecration and degradation of the African body by Europeans, there is need to rescue the African body from such desecration and degradation. It is not enough to say my body is not an object, an assemblage of parts, or a conjunction of physiological systems.

Murungi (2013) underscores that anthropomorphising humanoid robots and conflating them with human beings is regressive to Africans who have already suffered long histories of bodily savaging by Western colonists who loathed the African body to the point of failing to distinguish it from animals and machines. Lkening human African bodies to assemblages [like car and robotic assemblages] for instance, presupposes legitimacy to dissemble the parts; it legitimates the ongoing global trade in human body parts particularly from the impoverished in the Global South. Conceptualising human bodies as assemblages also presupposes legitimization of mortification via dissemblages; it presupposes loss of human security and human “development” that are pivotal to contemporary United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) interventions. The colonial settlers and slave-drivers’ failures to distinguish between African human beings and animals, similar as it is with the contemporary efforts to elide the distinction between human beings and humanoid robots, did not bring “development”, civilisation or improvement, but rather atavistic regression. The colonial chopping off of African heads, the digging up of African skeletons and the shipment of these to the West (Nhemachena, 2016b) speak as much to dissemblages and assemblages as they do to discourses of colonial witchcraft and (under-) “development” on the continent. Similarly, the scanning and

uploading of human minds to humanoid robots and computers shares the logics of witchcraft and sorcery discourses, particularly discourses about *zvīkwambo* (plural for goblins) that feature in indigenous explanations of retarded “development” on the continent.

Humanoid robots, (un-) employment, *zvīkwambo* and discourses of witchcraft

A *chikwambo* (singular for goblin) is considered in indigenous knowledge to be capable of fulfilling the owners’ desires for quick money, being lucky, improved yields, influence, popularity and power (Dube *et al*, 2016). Much like in humanoid robots where as I will explain below, human mind and human consciousness are scanned and uploaded onto a robot or computer, African Goblins (2014) cited in Dube *et al*, (2016: 199) point out that: “A Goblin is created when a shaman harnesses a spirit and places it inside the body of an everyday item”. It is further pointed out by Dube *et al*, (2016: 199-200) that in the making of goblins, “...the specialist can choose any everyday vessel to house the spirit, which creates a misleading outward appearance [...] The owner of the goblin has to find them sex partners at appointed times. Sometimes male goblins compete with owner to mate with his wife or her husband. They may also take the owner’s daughters or sons depending on their sex. In that, they possess anthropomorphic features and desires...At face value, therefore, such goblins are innocent phenomena, decorative and admirable”.

While scholarship on humanoid robots simply note that human consciousness and mind are uploaded onto robots and computers, there is need to note the indigenous ontological framing of the logics of capturing, scanning and uploading human consciousness and mind/personalities onto robots and computers. In fact, the Zimbabwean newspaper, *Manica Post* (of 6 May 2015), reported about a man who was murdered and had his spirit/consciousness raised from the dead so that he could be used by some witches. The spirit/consciousness of the murdered man possessed his brother who ran to the chief’s court and when subdued narrated thus:

I have come out chief because I am troubled, I was killed my chief and after they killed me they raised me from the dead and used me for their rituals. It is your wives Shupai ... Your wives keep a clay pot with red cloth tied round it under the bed. Do you know that?

Though *The Sun Newspaper* (of 30 September 2015) celebrates the fact that contemporary technoscientific fetish sex robots for male and female customers [with internal sensors, heartbeat and personality] will appear in ordinary homes in the next decade, in indigenous epistemologies and ontologies, it is terrifying to have sex with something sharing the logics of *chikwambo*. In fact there are many reports in Zimbabwe of women who are terrorised by goblins that demand and force them to have sex with them as will be shown below. The technoscientific humanoid sex robots, costing £6000 to £10 000, that are celebrated as able to know the owner's name, likes and dislikes, carry on a discussion and express her love and friendliness, can listen and feel human touch (*The Sun*, 30 September 2015) are strikingly similar to *zvikwambo*. The fact that some celebrate the expectation that human beings will be marrying humanoid sex robots, constructed with capacity for sexual activity, with some artificial intelligence allowing them to think, able to track where the user's eyes are looking; respond to facial expression, and predict or even initiate actions that user enjoys, learn positions and pressures its user enjoys most, perform emotional work that partners do (*The Sun*, 30 September 2015; Ferguson, 2010; Berger, 1998; *The Guardian*, 13 December 2015; *Mirror*, 6 January 2016): these logics of the sex robots are also similar to those of *zvikwambo*.

In much the same way those humanoid sex robots are being celebrated, in technoscience, as replacing sex between humans, *zvikwambo* have been noted to disrupt human marriages and sexuality such that some fail to marry and to reproduce if they are in possession or under the spell of *zvikwambo* (Schmidt 2013). So, while marriage has constituted a survival strategy for some female heads of households who are not formally employed (Muzvidziwa 2001), *zvikwambo* are known to disrupt not only human employment but also marriages and sexuality thereby creating disorder and conflict in institutions including marriages and families. For these reasons, even

Deleuze warns his readers to experiment with machinic bodies [or bodies without organs] cautiously as they assemble the sets of practices that constitute the “new subjectivities” that are compared by Artaud to suicide (Poxon 2001). The machinic vitalities [bodies without organs] are held to be without parents, to be not born, to be not representations of humans and to be ungodly (Dale 2001) but they are held to be sentient, powerful and suicidal.

The issue here is that in both *zvikwambo* and humanoid robots there is celebration of transgressions of boundaries. If this is understood within the Nietzschean (Hill 2006; Heidegger 1977) daemonic *supermen* [who have usurped the position of God and are now creating what they deemed to be new persons in the form of humanoid robots], boundary transgression becomes daemonic in both instances. Daemonic boundary transgression in this sense includes transgressing the Godly body with organs and converting it to a hybrid body [machinic]. In this sense, daemonic boundary transgression includes assertions by supermen that they are becoming God and presuppositions that now there is no binary between supermen and God. It presupposes the absence of binaries between the inside and the outside, that is, the Heavenly God [outside the earthly realm] and the supermen [that have come to conceive themselves as the gods within]. As indicated below, the sexual transgressions of *zvikwambo* presuppose the absence of the private and the public, with the *zvikwambo* entering households at will and forcing inmates to have sex with them. In other words the logics of *zvikwambo* presuppose openness of the world and absence of distinctions between inside and outside, private and public, nature and culture, humans and other beings.

There are reports that *zvidhoma* (similar to *zvikwambo*) sometimes sexually arouse women including married ones into whose beds they creep so as to ensure that the women lack interest in husbands’ attentions (Bongmba 2012: 520). There are also reports by women that they are tormented through sexual abuse [after which they wake up exhausted and having sexual intercourse fluids] by cloned creatures that are sent to them (Bulawayo24News, 22 January 2012). Some women report being sexually raped everyday by *zvikwambo* such that when they wake up their thighs are swollen and private parts

appearing red (My Zimbabwe, 27 March 2015). Some neglected *zvikwambo* are heard in some locales complaining that they are sex starved and tired of sleeping alone (The Harare Times, September 2013). Thus, Nehanda Radio (23 January 2015) reported: "... the goblins demand sex from women and when turned down, they turn violent. Residents (in a Bulawayo location) also claim the invincible creatures attacked men who refused to take orders to create space on the bed". The reports further note that some men and women beaten by goblins had to seek treatment at hospitals to be surgically stitched.

Although the European Parliament has recently made a recommendation to the European Union to consider transferring human rights to humanoid robots [that they regard as electronic persons next to natural and lawful people] on the claim that they can think and act for themselves (Express, 23 June 2016; Reuters, 21 June 2016; The Times, 4 January 2016). Therefore, much as during the colonial era in Africa when they legitimised witchcraft by banning healers from sniffing them out and prosecuting them (Ashforth 2005; Mittlebeeler 1976), the European Parliament is effectively once again legitimising witchcraft and sorcery which is manifesting in technoscience. *Zvikwambo* are neither regarded as humans or persons in indigenous epistemologies and ontologies. Healers and prophets actually sniff out and destroy the witches and sorcerers' *zvikwambo* (Bornstein, 2004; Engelke, 2007; Masasi eHarare, 7 October 2015). Some of the *zvikwambo* are hybrid and shape-shift and because they are neither persons nor humans, Mawere (2015) prefers to address them as "other beings". *Chikwambo* is according to Bould (2015):

a motley being, an exquisite corpse, hands of a monkey, the legs of a baboon and a torso made of a patchwork of cloth and dried human skins, fur from rabbits and cows....A *chikwambo* is created by *huroyi*, or witchcraft, usually for a businessman looking to get rich.

Presler, (1999: 196) states: "for a woman, being claimed by a *chikwambo* is catastrophe both practically and spiritually ..." In the "manufacturing of *zvikwambo*, there is more than exchange of cash because also often rape, mutilation and even murder are committed though few will ever admit such crimes (The Herald, 14 April 2007).

Therefore, similar to the logics of *zvikiwambo* that demand sexual congress with women and men in the locales where they are planted by their owners, the Mailonline, (20 July 2015) reports that: "... humanoid robots may wake up and demand rights so there is need for rights. Robots increasingly blur the line between person and machine so there is need for representation in congress". Important to also note here is the unfortunate observation, noted by Dube, *et al* (2016) that owners of *zvikiwambo* have duties to ensure they provide their *zvikiwambo* with sexual partners. In essence owners of *zvikiwambo* dissuade other people [via ideologies] from getting married and having sexual relations in formal setups with other humans: this ensures a large pool from which to draw sexual partners for their *zvikiwambo*.

Available reports suggest that *zvikiwambo* can manifest in different races. For instance, while one resident of Bulawayo (see Masasi eHarare, 7 October 2015) stated that: "I woke up at night one day and found my wife acting like she was enjoying sexual activities with someone. I cannot wait for this thing to be removed today"; another resident stated that: "I could dream about sleeping with a white man and when I wake up in the morning it would be as if I was involved with a man". Also, Hannan (1996: 403 cited in Bornstein, 2004) quotes an informant as stating that:

It [*chikiwambo*] is like a person, started as *muti*. It works like a person at night for people who bought them. It is small, the size of a coke bottle, with hands and legs and long straight hair, like you, *Chirungu* [*murungu*] 'person of Caucasian descent' (Hannan, 1996: 403).

There are similarities between the logics of *zvikiwambo* and humanoid robots, particularly in so far as humanoid robots are imbricated in the uploading of human consciousness onto robots and computers. While some thinkers have argued that there is need to scan and upload human brains into computers to keep pace and to ensure the migration of brain to computer (Chalmers, 2014), these technoscientific epistemologies and ontologies are revolting to some indigenous epistemologies and ontologies. Though scholars such as transhumanist thinkers argue that human beings can transmigrate

into machine bodies, with the mind copied into new substrates to acquire digital immortality (Geraci, 2013; Live Science, 17 June 2013), it is doubtful in the light of ontologies on mortality of *zvikiwambo* that human beings can ever acquire immortality by becoming such humanoid robots or computers. Therefore, there is no cause to celebrate the cyberspace that is taunted with possibilities of disembodiment facilitated by virtual systems to the extent that the mind can leave the body-pure data; neo-Cartesian metaphysics (Richardson, *et al* 2001) entails death.

So, technoscientists' calls to upload, transfers human minds and identities from biological brain to nonbiological computers (Express, 15 April 2016; Agar, 2012) is in fact a call to mortification, rather than a call to immortality. Although the impending apocalypse of humanoid robots may appear farfetched to some, The Guardian (22 February 2014) reports that Google is "...assembling what looks like the greatest artificial intelligence laboratory on Earth: a laboratory designed to feast upon our resource of a kind that the world has never seen before: truly massive data: our data; from the minutiae of our lives". In fact Bruce Duncan of the Research Foundation, that aims to transfer human consciousness to computers and robots, is quoted by Technocracy (16 March 2016) as saying: "...Artificial Intelligence experts predict that humans will replace dead relatives with synthetic robot clones, complete with a digital copy of that person's brain". "We don't stuff humans but this is a way of stuffing their information, their personality and mannerisms".

Besides, a firm called Terasem Movement is noted in Technocracy (16 March 2016) as having already created thousands of highly detailed "mind clones" to log the memories, values and attitudes of specific people. Using the data, scientists are noted as having created one of the world's most "socially advanced robot", a replica of Tera Movement founder Martine Rothblatt's wife, called Bina48, which sells for roughly \$150 000.

The logics of humanoid robots do not appear to be as new if we interface it with the logics of *zvikiwambo* in realms of witchcraft and sorcery. However Deane-Drummond, *et al*'s (2010) depictions of humanoid robots suggest that there is some developmental evolution

from one stage to another. Deane-Drummond *et al*, (2010: 19) note thus:

The postulated sequence goes something like this. First, Artificial Intelligence (AI) researchers will simulate human intelligence in a computer, in a robot. Second, humans and machines will merge step by step, replacing portions of our brains with mechanical parts. Third, AI researchers will reduce existing human intelligence to a pattern of information processing and download this into a computer or a robot. This will constitute an evolutionary advance, actually a leap forward that could lead to cybernetic immortality.

The foregoing arguments underscore the need to place interpretations of discourses of progress, development, change and evolution within the contexts of one's cultural, epistemological and ontological gamut. The arguments underline the similarities of logics of humanoid robots and *zvikwambo* that are manufactured by witches and sorcerers and then bought by owners so that they work for them and bring wealth home. They also underscore the similarities in the processes of manufacturing them as well as in the ways in which owners expect to grant them rights, including sexual ones, even if by fiat. The discourses about *zvikwambos'* accountability for human suffering, including illnesses, death, misfortune, unemployment and poverty dovetail with discourses about humanoid robots and post-humanism/transhumanism that eliminate human workers. Also the arguments underline ways in which both *zvikwambo* and humanoid sex robots disrupt human sexual/marital relations, society, cultures, and mores. The arguments also indicate that while some western scholars celebrate the emergence of what they call "intelligent household appliances" and sex robots, in indigenous ontologies and epistemologies, household appliances are not expected to be intelligent unless *zvikwambo* are present in the particular [afflicted and infested] household. The logics of *zvikwambo* and humanoid robots belie a fallacy of linear time that has for long been assumed in evolutionary notions of "development" and in assumptions that the West is modern and Africa is traditional and backward.

Applebaum, (2013: 2, 5) draws on Charles Mills' "The Racial Contract" to render attention to how, on matters related to race, there exists an inverted epistemology in which a particular pattern of localised and global cognitive dysfunction (which are psychologically and socially functional) protect the privileges of the racially dominant group and shield such privileges from contestation. For Charles Mills, (1997) the epistemology of ignorance is part of a supremacist state in which the human race is racially divided into full persons and sub persons. For Applebaum, (ibid) strategic use of ignorance is made possible through ambiguity, multiplicity and dissembling. Similarly, Taylor, (2007: 136) argues that:

All sorts of institutions and agents invite or pressure us to accept doubtful propositions as true, to ignore the actual effects and conditions of our conjoint conduct, to neglect the institutions by means of which we might conduct meaningful social inquiry, and to act on the basis of tendentious pictures of the social world.

Humanoid robots are not only threatening to disrupt formal marriages and human sexuality but they are also threatening to disrupt formal employment in factories and industries. While recent uprisings in North Africa including Mali, Egypt, Tunisia where partly inspired by economic challenges including lack of formal employment and by struggles against what are termed "long time dictators", domination [global and local] via technologies of subjectivation, including humanoid robots, is seldom recognised in discourses of dictatorship in Africa. For this reason, Herbert Marcuse (see Oday, 2010) appears to have insightfully argued that technology can also be a tool for social control and domination especially under capitalism, leading to self-destruction. Besides, Oday, (2010: 57) argues: "In advanced industrial society technology has become a new form of social control which demands total submission to the prevailing social order and which reduces the individual into mere biological machines that respond to technical processes of life". So, as far as this chapter is concerned, the celebrations of humanoid robotic technology dissolves all critical historical thinking about ways in which Africans have been dominated, zombified and exploited as

appendages of machines. The celebrations of humanoid robots also dissolves all critical thinking about ways in which it often replicated old logics employed by sorcerers and witches in manufacturing *zvikwambo*. Further the celebration of humanoid robots dissolves all critical thinking about ways in which the human manufacturers, in Nietzsche's (Hill, 2006) sense of superman, have arrogated the power and role of God to create entities that they deem to be equivalent or similar to human beings created by God. The celebrations of humanoid robots also dissolve all critical thinking with respect to dangers, as exemplified in *zvikwambo*, inherent in mixing essences of things. Besides, celebrations of humanoid robots dissolve all critical thinking with respect to the dangers of consequent massive unemployment for Africans that have already historically suffered colonial disinheritance and expropriation as well as the dark side of Brettonwood institutions' neoliberal austerity, including retrenchments.

Across the world, humanoid robots are posing threats to human jobs as more and more jobs will be impacted, human workers are being eliminated and deskilled (Ford, 2015). Thousands of British jobs have already been replaced by machines and millions of middle class roles are at risk (The Telegraph, 12 September 2015). Millions of jobs such as accounting and auditing will be replaced with machines that are cheaper, effective, do not require salaries, holidays or sick pay-while administrators, teachers, lecturers, drivers, pharmacists, legal assistants, paralegals and bank clerks will also be hit hard (The Telegraph, *ibid*). It is noted in The Telegraph, (12 September 2015) thus:

Analysis shows that over half of all secretarial jobs in the United Kingdom (UK) have already disappeared over the past ten years, and while there are over a million call centre employees in the UK today, advances in speech recognition software and other technologies mean that many of these jobs are also predicted to disappear in the next decade.

With advances such as the emergence of self-driving cars, robotics in the stock markets, robotic soldiers, robotic pharmacists,

robotic teachers and lecturers and sex robots, all of which retrench humans from their institutions from marriages to employment institutions, some have predicted the rise of a useless class of human beings. The Guardian, (24 May 2016), for instance, notes that some predict the rise of a useless class of human beings who cannot work. One Robin Hanson is noted by The Guardian, (24 May 2016) as advocating for taking the best and brightest 200 human beings on the planet, scanning their brains to get robots that are to all intents and purposes indivisible from the humans on whom they are based. He further suggested that these robots, being superior at everything and having no material needs, will undercut humans in the labour market, and render us totally unnecessary. He added that we will all effectively be retired and that we may be put out to a pleasant pasture or brutally exterminated.

Despite Marcuse's (see O'Casey, 2010: 58) argument that: "Technological rationality dissolves critical thinking and replaces it with the idea of compliant efficiency, which results in the individual's submission to the apparatus without any form of mental and physical opposition", other scholars write about technology favourably. Levi (2014: 13), for instance, argues that studies have shown that humanoid robots can help students "develop" problem-solving abilities and learn computer programming, mathematics, and science. Levi (2014: 13) states that "Using robots to support teaching and learning, from secondary school to undergraduate courses to graduate education, has become a popular research topic in recent years...." While robots are noted as useful for learning language, science or technology education, and that they can take the roles of tutors, peer learning and teaching assistance (Mubin *et al*, 2013; Meghdari *et al*, 2013), in Shona and Ndebele indigenous knowledge systems, *zvikiwambo* with similar logics have been noted to terrorise students. In 2012, for instance, a school called St Sebastian Secondary came under investigation by the Zimbabwean Ministry of Education after several traumatic weeks when teenage girls ran away screaming that they had been attacked by goblins manifesting as dwarf human beings that transformed into baboons (The Telegraph, 21 February 2012).

Such terrorism using (goblins) [often manifesting as animals and birds and hybrid creatures] is not exclusive to the African continent: as Elgan, (2015) and Hediger, (2013) note, dolphins, pigeons, hyenas, jackals etc. have been historically used by various militaries, including United States of America and Russia. Elgan, (2015) further notes that many animals have been recruited to serve in western armies: dogs sniff at bombs, some animals helped mountaineers carry their loads, goats are noted as having been full members of battalions, there has also been use of horses, and rats are stated as having, in the past, been used to terrorise Arabs while leaving Jews alone. This means that the logics in the manufacture of humanoid robots with abilities to smell their surroundings, perform jobs, smell leaks, conduct underwater surveillance, sort boxes by shape and colour, toss boxes into warehouses (Niiler, 2013) is neither entirely new nor is it necessarily liberating or transformative. The contemporary efforts to manufacture and deploy humanoid robots, made through human consciousness that is transformed into virtuality, is not entirely new in its logic even though the Mailonline, (18 December 2014) notes some scientists stating that: “We support practical approaches towards what we descriptively term “advanced substrate-independent minds (ASIM) that is transferring mind functions from the biological substrate to another substrate on which those functions can be performed”.

If some contemporary scholarly works [premised uncritically on assumptions of absence of dichotomies] on decolonisation are interrogated sufficiently critically, it becomes clear that in fact they have foundations in the logics of coloniality. Decolonisation interpreted simplistically as deconstruction of the human, including deconstruction of institutions that offer human security and development is in fact a continuation of colonial deconstruction of African institutions (Nhemachena, 2016a). If we contextualise some contemporary scholarly works that argue against anthropocentrism in the foregoing, it becomes clear that the alternative world that they want to create will be populated by humanoid robots, animals and birds some of which are deliberately infused with human consciousness in the logics of *zvikanambo*. The contemporary scholarly gospels about the need for the Global South to demilitarise should

be understood in the context of a world envisaged by some scholars that will be dominated by deployed humanoid robotic soldiers and other *zombies* doing the bidding of their masters. The masters deploy humanoid robotic soldiers and other zombies while enjoying the privilege of acting at a distance, deploying *zombies* and humanoid robots to torment and terrorise the planet which is thereby denied autonomy and sovereignty. It is in this context that the calls for debordering, for the creation of an open borderless world [but full of transgressions by controllers and masters of humanoid robots] where there are hopefully no distinctions between private and public, inside and outside, human and nature find some scholarly favour by those that see progress in the kind of “New World Order”. But as argued in relation to *zvikwambo*, their terrorisation and raping of women are in fact premised on logics of debordering, openness, inclusivity or inclusion and erosion of distinctions between the private and the public. In fact contemporary theories that assume that Cartesian binaries are the overarching scholarly problem are effectively meant to dedifferentiate between humans and humanoid robots and open up spaces [floodgates] for humanoid robots and other kinds of zombies onto the continent. They are meant to instantiate inclusive [non-autonomous and non-sovereign] bodies without organs, bodies that are traversed by spiritual and affective invasions by motley of vitalities.

The impending post-human human robotic future is one that can be characterised in terms of Hardt and Negri’s, (2000) notion of the empire’s multitude or a new political subjectivity that opens out to the transnational framework. It can be explained in terms of the proliferation of technoscientific fetishes such as humanoid robots [machinic vitalities] that like humans are infused with the imperial vitalities that are pictured by Poxon, (2001: 45 as powerful traversing nonorganic AntiChrist vitality in a world that will be antitheological, AntiChrist and against the judgment of God. It is a future in which human beings are sadly encouraged by some scholars to become machines, computers and robots [to upload their minds and consciousness to robots and computers] so that they hopefully evade the judgment of God by becoming bodies without organs that are impossible for God to identify (Poxon, 2001; Dale, 2001). The post-

human future is a world where possession of Africans by *zvikwambo* is considered by some Western scholars to be means and opportunities to re-negotiate relations, even if it disrupts human sexual, marital, employment and other relations (Epprecht, 1998: 643). In this sense, it is an antidivine order where bodies are expected by some scholars to be captured by antidivine souls (Poxon, 2001: 44) and so those possessed are expected [by the Nietzschean superman] to dance anarchically inside out [which is side out] as in ecstatic delirium (Dale, 2001: 132). For purposes of this chapter, it is necessary to stress that it is envisaged as a world where action and agency [such as the ecstatic delirium dances described by Dale, 2001] will be all that is stressed even if the action and agency lead to the destruction of bodies, the self, personhood and the world in AntiChrist ways. In other words, it is a world that is not only antihuman, against human security and human development] but it is a world that is AntiChrist and AntiGod, antidivine and anti-judgment of God. But it is a world that post-humanist scholars and technoscience celebrate as populated by new publics or new humanoid persons created by the antidivine *supermen* that believe they have replaced the transcendental Heavenly God, who as Heidegger, (1977: 58) notes, they have pronounced dead.

The upshot of the above is that not all that is deemed to be technological is unequivocally advanced and progressive. Sometimes what are called technoscientific inventions in fact originate from what some societies consider to be revolting and repugnant. This is why some Western scholars like Nietzsche (Hill, 2006) have written about the need to conceal and mask, the evil so that it becomes acceptable to humans that would otherwise find it revolting; there has also been advocacy to think beyond binaries like good and evil, the moral and immoral, ethical and unethical. The denials of existence of witchcraft and sorcery by colonists purporting to be ushering in enlightenment scientific rationality (Jeater, 2007; Ashforth, 2005) served to deliberately produce ignorance among Africans about the ways in which some colonial epistemologies and ontologies relied on the same logics of sorcery and witchcraft. It is the logics of sorcery and witchcraft that not only featured in the barbaric exterminations, capture, exploitation of Africans; and it is the same logics of sorcery

and witchcraft that one finds apparent in some of what is termed advanced sentient technology in robotics. As argued by Nhemachena, (2016b) the fact that from the early colonial era, colonists chopped off African heads and subsequently shipped the skull back to the West raises questions about the rationality that colonists claim to have brought to Africa. The fact that colonists enacted legislation, protecting witches and sorcerers, such as Witchcraft Suppression Acts across the continent (Chavunduka, 2001; Geschiere, 1997; Mittlebeeler, 1976; Ashforth, 2005) was therefore less about rationality than about protecting witches and sorcerers, including those that colonists hired to dig up African graves and loot the jewellery and skulls of the dead (Nhemachena, 2016b). To surface and foreground the logics of witchcraft and sorcery, such as in contemporary technoscience, and then beautify them by calling them “development” and progress is the greatest chicanery that has ever been experienced on the continent. Arguably, the denial of the existence of witchcraft and sorcery was effectively meant to produce credibility of colonial logics that masqueraded as scientific progress. As Applebaum, (2013: 391) argues:

a persistent epistemic arrogance and presumptions of excess credibility to members of dominant social groups as well as attributions of credibility deficits to members of marginalised social groups are among the effects of such ignorance and support white denials of complicity.

If science and technology are based on the Nietzschean belief that God is dead and that there has been the emergence of amoral *supermen* whose God is dead, who presume to be God himself or rather a daemon beyond good and evil (Hill, 2006: 88), the question is what kind of a being is the technology that is produced by amoral superman that have arrogated the position of God. As Hill, (2006: 85) notes, it is such “superman” scholars that wrote about:

the need to beautify, adulterate, doctor and camouflage what is naturally offensive, repulsive, horrible, dangerous in order to make presentable, palatable, digestible, appealing and tempting so as to entice

people into the realm of a new logic that seems to promise release from well-trodden, all too familiar, realities and rationalities, from the well-trodden, all too familiar notions about good and evil.

For this chapter, the moral repugnance of the logic of manufacturing *zvikwambo* and purporting to be creators of persons deemed similar to Godly created human persons points to Nietzsche's quest to make what is execrated attractive and to his motive to make vice attractive so as to stir up fantasies, produce fascination, makes evil alluring and enhance evil's ability to seduce (Hill, 2006: 78).

The belief that humanity can become immortal by uploading their consciousness and minds into humanoid robots and computers similarly speak to the assumptions of Nietzschean superman bent on trying to defeat God that has been pronounced dead by technoscientific presuppositions of immanence. The erroneous underlying assumption in technoscience is that human beings can hide from and evade God's judgement by *becoming* immortal technology or machines such as humanoid robots and computers. The assumption is also that there is nothing called Heavenly God where human souls can go to [instead of becoming an earthly machine or a robot] after death. The contemporary scholarly gospels about the flatness of the world and absence of hierarchy in fact derive from Nietzschean pronouncement of the death of God and along with Him, that of Heavenly hierarchies. These assumptions of immanence and their corollary denial of Godly Hierarchies have traditionally been used to demonise Africans that were deemed by westerner thinkers like Hegel to possess unfree minds that were imprisoned in natural bonds; the assumption from Hegel was that the more liberated from nature, the greater the spiritual progress. It was thus contented that African mentality was imprisoned in nature so there was no spiritual progress; their nature was deemed to be still compressed within the self (Boneto, 2006).

If assumptions of immanence were used historically to deny Africans progress, liberty, civilisation and development, the question is whether contemporary gospels of immanence can bring development, civility and progress to Africa. If, as Hegel assumed,

immanence of mind and spirit translate to life in the bonds of nature or confinement, what is it that would be liberating, progressive and developmental for Africa if the continent accepts the contemporary scholarly gospel of immanence that is being foisted on it? If even the spirits of the dead, as indicated in the preceding sections of this chapter, refuse to be captured and kept imprisoned in clay pots and other devices, why then must Africans rejoice in the notions of immanence and the bondage that they imply? If human bodies have become disposable and the human consciousness has become prized for infusing into humanoid robots and computer immortality, what will continue to motivate humanity to care for other human beings? If human beings can profit from selling minds of others used for making sentient beings [using human consciousness and minds], human mortality in fact becomes valuable and prized in that kind of world.

The massive formal unemployment, suffering and death in circumstances where some human beings find it difficult to move through stages of life such as marriage (Bhebe *et al*, (2015) are in fact part of manifestations of bonds of immanence in the (neo-) colonial world that has long pronounced the death of God even as it also pronounced the emergence of superman to replace God. The African continent has suffered bonds of immanence that characterise the resilient (neo-)colonialism that is also perpetuated through technological proxies of indirect rule. Whereas colonial settlers often directly expropriated resources from Africans, currently (neo-)imperial technoscientific fetishes serve to disinherit Africans of their freedom, of their autonomous social institutions, of their humanity [that is being supplanted by post-humanism and transhumanism]; the technologies disinherit Africans of their families, sexuality and marriages that are threatened for instance by gospels promoting human to marry with humanoid robots. As The Guardian (24 May 2016) reports, there are predictions of the rise of the useless class, that is:

humans who don't know what to study because they have no idea what skills will be needed by the time they finish, who can't work because there's always a cheaper and better robot, and spend their time

taking drugs and staring at screens...All the predictions lead to the same place: the obsolescence of human labour [...] raising the spectre of leagues of unemployed.

The spectres of unemployment can be gleaned through the following pictures.

Figure 1: Unemployed graduates in Harare CBD soccer protest: Source NewsDay, 29 July 2016



Development challenges such as those that manifest in widespread unemployment in the Global South are often erroneously attributed mainly to inappropriate inherited government structures including the nation-state (Kheir, 28 January 2010; The Washington Post, 5 August 2016; Horsman *et al*, 1994). Development cannot possibly happen without the existence of states that can coordinate and guarantee peace, autonomy and sovereignty (Momani, 2014; Maher, 2011; The Guardian, 24 January 2014; Gartenstein-Ross *et al*, 2015; Africa News Agency, 26 May 2016; Laremont, 2013;

Independent, 15 March 2014; Escribano, 2013). While the terms “autonomy” and “sovereignty” have their origins in the West, Africans obviously prized and practised autonomy and sovereignty. Shona terms such as *kuzvimirira* (autonomy) and *kuzvitonga* (to be sovereign) underline the existence of autonomy and sovereignty among precolonial indigenous people who have since the colonial era been denied these by the West. Also, African cleansing rituals that were designed to exorcise interfering (*mashavi*) foreign spirits (Gelfand 1959; Bullock 1927; 1950) for instance were in essence premised on logics of, and African wills to, autonomy and sovereignty. If Africans survived autonomously and without dependence on the West for centuries before colonisation, it follows that problems of underdevelopment in Africa should not necessarily be looked for and explained in terms of presence of autonomous and sovereign African institutions. The problems of underdevelopment and dependence in Africa are in fact worsened by absence of autonomous and sovereign African institutions. Yet, the sovereignty of African institutions is battered via global technological domination, including impending humanoid robotic takeover. Marcuse (Ogay 2010) has for instance persuasively argued that there is also domination through technology that stifles critical reasoning, innovativeness. Marcuse (Ogay, 2010: 59) argued thus:

The idea of compliant efficiency perfectly illustrates the structure of technological rationality. Rationality is being transformed from critical force into one of adjustment and compliance. Autonomy of reason loses its meaning in the same measure as the thoughts, feelings and actions of men are shaped by the technical requirements of the apparatus which they themselves have created. Reason has found its resting place in the system of standardised control, production and consumption.

Africans began to suffer acutely when post-independence African sovereignty and autonomy were wrenched away by IMF and World Bank insistence on the agency of the invisible hand of the neoliberal market that afflicted not only the state, economy, education but also the families and marriage systems. Today, African

adversities are set to become even more acute as humanoid robots retrench Africans from marriage and sex [as humans are anticipated to marry sex robots rather than fellow human beings], employment and from their cultures, politics, states, religions and spirituality. So, institutions that would otherwise render human and societal security to Africans are suffering invasions by invisible hands of the “market” as well as by the visible hands and phalluses of humanoid robots. Yet, the West paradoxically displaces the African subjects into transnational capitalist frameworks [and away from their states and continent] so that often the struggles by Africans are against their states and continent than against invasive global capital and its technologies of subjectivation. Africans have therefore often come to constitute the empire’s multitude or a social force, [acting on behalf of empire and] in the case of the picture above as well as in Karavanta’s (2008) terms, generated by the transformation of labour and its new immaterial conditions.


Global capital that is increasingly keen to see the continent of Africa stateless, so that it can be absolutely free to exploit African resources, is also keen to replace African human workers with cheaper and more compliant humanoid robots in occupations including driving, pharmacy, medicine, legal assistance, military, policing, teaching and lecturing. As the picture below shows, teachers are already being replaced by humanoid robots in parts of the world.

In the light of the increasing and unprecedented replacements of human workers with humanoid robots, some scholars like Harari (The Guardian, 24 May 2016) foresee a world in which human beings that are replaced by humanoid robots will constitute a useless and devious class when they become unable to find work. Besides Harari’s observation, it is germane to note that human beings also become culturally and socially “useless” when they heed the calls by transhumanists and post-humanists to become machines, rather than remain social and cultural beings. The post-human/transhuman epoch, as foreseen by the scholars, is one where society and cultures are trampled upon and so professions of sociology, law, law enforcement, pharmacy, education, social work, and cultural anthropology and so on are threatened with irrelevance in a post-human, post-social world.

Figure 2: Kudan Primary School children touch the cheeks of Japan's robot teacher Saya: Photograph: Koji Sasahara/AP: Source: The Guardian, 8 May 2009)




Figure 3: The rise of the useless class of humans who are replaced by humanoid robots: Illustration by Matt Kenyon (The Guardian 24 May 2016).



The contentions that the world is becoming a machine-world or a cyborg [human-machine] world, make it necessary for scholars to consider the impending fate of society in a world that is invaded by humanoid machinic robots taking over not only jobs but also taking over and replacing human sexual and marital relations. The fate of social “development” in a world where cyborgs are increasingly getting precedence falls for critical scholarly interrogation on the continent.

Figure 4: Robots replacing humans (Photo: Warner Br/Everett REX): The Telegraph, 12 September 2015



Having prepared the world to embrace humanoid robots by first preaching ideologies of cultureless socially disembodied liberal individual and by preaching neoliberal democracy [that purported to be inclusive for human beings when in fact they were meant to prepare humans to include humanoid robots], humanoid robots are now being ushered in. The African continent is expected by the west to happily embrace, under the banner of inclusive liberal democratic human rights, the “new beings” that the Nietzschean (Hill, 2006) unGodly *supermen* have created to dominate and possibly *replace nature, including the “natural human persons”*. The contemporary scholarly discourses about seeking the erosion of binaries between nature and culture, natural and artifices are already serving to psychologically prepare the world for the retrenchments and replacements of natural

human persons by what are coming to be understood as “artificial persons” The liberal human rights have already prepared the world for human rights without human duties and that is suitable for humanoid robots granted rights without correlative duties to hapless human beings threatened by the technoscientific robotic apocalypse.

Figure 5: Robots could be given citizen rights under bizarre EU suggestion; source Jon Austin, 23 June 2016



As hinted above the fact of scanning and uploading human consciousness onto robots and computers raises worries when viewed in relation to indigenous ontologies where *zvikwambo* production is considered number one witchcraft activity which involves trapping, capturing and using human spiritual essences. But of course to become a *chikwambo* is not necessarily to become immortal and invincible; a *chikwambo* is not necessarily treated as a person or human being with rights in indigenous ontologies such as the Shona where it is referred to as *ichi* (this), or *icho* (that); rather than *uyo* (that) or *nyu* (this) used for a person or human being.

Although some scientists including transhumanist and post-humanists celebrate the manufacturing of humanoid robots or cyborg hybrid objects, in indigenous ontologies and epistemologies

of South Africa and Zimbabwe, for example, the equivalence of human robots called *zvikwambo* are captured and destroyed rather than celebrated or glorified.

Figure 6: Scientists upload minds to computers: Source Sean Martin, 15 April 2016



Figure 7: Goblin captured in Harare, Zimbabwe



In Zimbabwe and South Africa, *n'anga* (healers) and *sangomas* (healers) respectively capture and destroy *tokoloshe* equivalence of humanoid robots. They are not necessarily treated as human beings or persons.

Figure 8: A South African Sangoma kills a *Tokoloshi* (*Chikwambo*): Masasi eHarare, 9 October 2015



In the context of these challenges of a future infested with humanoid robots taking over and replacing human workers, scholars are thinking through what are called sharing economies. In “The Sharing Economy: The End of Employment and the Rise of Crowd-Based Capitalism” Sundararajan, (2016), writes about the mix of “gift” and “market” in sharing economy market. The sharing economy converges around activities facilitated through digital platforms that enable peer to peer access to good and services (Richardson, 2015) but as reported in The Guardian, (24 September 2015):

The question of how to distribute wealth in the future curves back round to meet a conundrum raised by the past: how do we remake the social safety net so that it embodies solidarity, generosity and trust, rather than the welfare state of the present...

These ideas about sharing economies pose challenges in a world where the biological bodies are being decentred and condemned by the missionaries of the cyborg epoch that as Braidotti, (2006) observes is also poststructuralist, post-human and post-anthropocentric. The paradox and hypocrisy are that in a post-anthropocentric world where human consciousness and minds become resources for the manufacture of humanoid robots, the challenge is that human lives become devalued and so the mantra about exigencies of sharing economies becomes vacuous. In fact, sharing may increasingly involve trading in human consciousness and brains in ways that replicate and exacerbate the contemporary existing global traffic in human body parts. The possibility of sharing economies in a world where human beings spend money and other resources buying and maintaining humanoid robots for employment and for marriages and sexual partnership is in fact very low. Furthermore, the possibilities of sharing in contexts where marriages, families, societies, cultures, mores and human ethics are shattered by the technoscientific cyborg or proxy humanoid robotic invasions, are slender. Furthermore, there is current resistance to biotechnological genetically modified food [some of which is being donated to the poor in the world] that is deemed to be adverse to health and biodiversity (Shiva, 2004; Omamo *et al*, 2005). This entails the need to interrogate the nature or the quality of that which will be shared in the world and how trust can be assured particularly in a context where human life is increasingly devalued and retrenched by the emergence of posthumanism and humanoid robots.

Although scholars like Satgar, (2014) argue for the solidarity economy as an alternative economy that “reinvents” the global political economy from below, the challenge as far as this chapter is concerned is that the African grassroots have themselves been already adulterated by (neo-) colonial [global] capitalism for centuries. African marriages, families, communities, grassroots economies and

cultures have all suffered desecration for centuries since the inception of colonialism: therefore it is ambitious to hope that [grassroots] solidarity economies alone can bring about emancipation and transformative grassroots organising practices, movement-building approaches and activist tools. It is equally ambitious to hope that transnational activism [without African states, regional and continental interventions] will effectively assist African citizens withstand and ward-off [global] capitalism. Global capitalism deploys its humanoid robots while paradoxically also funding some civil society organisations to pretend to be genuinely opposed to and in activism against the same invasive capitalism that also manifests as proxy human zombies, proxy humanoid robots and proxy invisible hands of the “market”, hands of “civilisation” and “development”.

Conclusion

It is imperative for African scholars and priests to listen carefully to the footfalls of humanoid robots. Their arrival poses challenges of apocalyptic futures in African progress and “development” in various sectors such as the demise of employment, the demise of human sexuality, families, marriages, politics, education, nation states and beliefs in God [religion]. If the future gets to privilege machinic post-human bodies in which human minds and consciousness are scanned and uploaded, the post-human antihuman world promises to be not only antidevelopment but also to be apocalyptic in the sense of being antihuman, at least for sections of humanity without control over the technoscientific humanoid robots. It is a future that promises to be devoid of human security, social security, state security and human “development”. Therefore, it is a future that gets rid of the human as it also does of society in a way that cancels the binaries between human individual and society; it is a future that also gets rid of human individual and the state in ways that cancel out the binaries between human individual and their states; it is a future that cancels the binaries between the private and the public in ways that enable virtual humans to enter private spaces and private sexual domains and share virtual sex with humans. *A fortiori*, it is a future in which dichotomies and hierarchies are cancelled including possibly the binaries between

life and death, and therefore ethics, laws and morality that secure life [against death] will all be cancelled. In short, the future we are being prepared for is a post-development, post-human and antihuman world. Theoretical trajectories, from Western academies, on the posts have, already, for decades been modelling our minds towards such a future that has been moving forward slowly but surely. Africa needs to think through this future if the apocalypse is to be evaded.

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China for Africa, Africa for China or Africa and China for Each Other? Assessing Chinese Development Collaboration for African Transformations

Thomas Fox

Introduction: China and Africa

The economic ascent of contemporary China following the launch of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1980 under President Deng Xiaoping is globally recognised as one of the most extraordinary events in recent world history. Yet the reasons for its success are not well-understood by the global public or governments outside academic and business circles including the public sphere in Africa. China is now the world's second largest economy after the United States (US), and the most prolific exporter of manufactures ahead of the US. Recent and relatively rapid Chinese business investments into the African continent, notably from the first decade of the Millennium, have heightened African awareness of Chinese development breakthroughs, and the Chinese economic model itself. There is a positive desire to build further on existing working relationships with China for reciprocal success, although African nations themselves are frequently unclear and unfocused regarding what the nature of this relationship should be. At the same time, in an understandable eagerness to benefit quickly from direct Chinese investment into infrastructural development, new business start-ups and mineral extraction initiatives, African governments potentially miss the relevance of China's development model, and ways in which its core institutions, principles and ideas might be applied for their own economic planning. There is in policy terms important economic and political issues about what the associational character of Africa's interactions with China should be for both sides, specifically noting who ultimately is benefiting in existing partnerships, and how African countries could profit further. This

raises an important question, one that is essentialist in terms of both aspirations and the practical need for development in a continent that continues to be absolutely and relatively poor: what is the nature of Africa's emerging economic relationship with China, and how might this be redirected to benefit its own development?

This chapter assesses the 'model' or plan that China used to rapidly transform itself from a very poor to a relatively rich and successful middle-income industrial nation between 1980 and 2000. The main principles and pillars of Chinese development will be delineated and critically established. Rapid social and economic transformation was not without problems. Success was not guaranteed in the early stages, and the Chinese people made great sacrifices to achieve the position they have now reached. Politics frequently clashed with economics – as it often does in Africa today. The need to understand how China developed is a crucial one for African nations seeking economic success and positive transformation, in conditions where human development remains constricted. Chinese economic success can provide positive insights for Africa's own industrial progress. It is significant that thirty years ago a vast majority of ordinary Chinese citizens experienced similar levels of poverty to a majority of Africans today. How the Chinese government and people reversed this negative situation provides valuable lessons for the African continent. As economic and business relationships open up between Africa and China, critical reflection is needed as to what type of benefits can be gained from such cooperation. How far can the China-Africa relationship be taken, and is it sufficiently progressive and 'developmental' currently?

This chapter suggests that Chinese direct foreign investment (FDI), official development assistance (ODA), and existing business partnerships – with some exceptions – signify limitations rather than maximum opportunity-seeking in their present form. It is argued that this represents a considerable missed opportunity. The initiators of one of the most successful industrialisations in history, one directly relevant to African nations, now have a firm presence on the continent. Yet there is only limited intention on the part of African governments and planners to understand and potentially apply and adapt the Chinese development model in their own growth strategies.

The chapter investigates this ‘limitation problem’ and look for ways African countries can overcome it. How can the Chinese development model help Africa?

A central aim of the chapter is to critically assess the core factors behind the ‘Chinese Miracle’. It examines the importance of experimentalist informed state guidance, and the fostering of an entrepreneurial culture, open-mindedness to external idea, and learning from mistakes. State nurturing and funding of higher education, banking and finance for growth, and the pragmatic recognition of a need to work with external (foreign) corporate partners through the Open Door Policy all contributed to the effectiveness of China’s growth model. A further most pressing interest is to understand the nascent, and controversial, China-Africa relationship that evolved from 2000, and to determine what is ‘in it’ for each side. As the title of this chapter asks: is it a matter of China for Africa, or Africa for China or reciprocally, Africa and China for each other? This means to inquire if one side or both are gaining from existing partnerships. It also investigates if the central tenets of Chinese development are being unwisely neglected by African political and business leaders. Are they favouring short-term gains of Chinese-built infrastructure and aid, in return for Chinese access to raw materials? A fundamental question is therefore: does African development policy require reorientation toward a new relationship based on understanding and emulating China’s successful development?

Africa and China: An emerging relationship

How did China come to Africa? A Chinese economic presence was certainly already in place in the 1960s following the demise of colonialism, but this was very small in scale and confined to a handful of African countries (Drummond and Liu 2013). At this time, Africa saw a period of respectable economic growth supported by strong Western rather than Asian investments. China was then struggling with its own economic and political problems, with very limited focus on the Africa continent. Positive African economic development dramatically reversed in the 1970s, and growth fell or stagnated well

into the 1990s. The reasons for this are complex, but generally relate to civil conflict and a serious political deterioration in many African countries, accompanied by a withdrawal of foreign investment; but also coinciding with a long crisis in the Western economic system triggered by accelerating oil commodity prices (Bratton and De Walle 1997). South Africa, which had industrialised from 1920, alone showed economic resilience accompanied by further levels of economic expansion after independence from 1994 onward. Africa's general problem has been its marked lack of industrialisation, and it remains one of the last continents without a significant manufacturing base. It is the second least industrialised continent after the oil dependent economies of the Middle East. Its share of global manufacturing GDP was 11.2 percent in 2011. If a significant industrial economy like South Africa were excluded, its share would be only 8 percent, making it the least industrialised region in the world (Ancharaz 2013). The causes of this are outside the concerns of the present chapter; but lack of investment, poor organisational capacity and limited economic creativity on the part of state and the private sector, along with what might be termed 'bad politics', have been blamed for the lack of industrial development (Bratton and De Walle 1997). As an investment destination Africa was mostly regarded as an uncertain and unstable environment to do business in. In addition to limited agricultural investment, its mineral primary extraction potential was its traditional economic attraction, but remained poorly utilised. Even here, it rarely engaged in value-added processing of its raw materials, especially metals. Since independence primary industries had been languishing in decline due to ineffective state intervention and poorly instituted nationalisation policies (Sandrey and Edinger 2011).

At the turn of the Millennium in 2000, China's business community assisted and facilitated by the Chinese state actively sought out commercial relationships and initiated substantial investment projects within Africa's economies through its state industries. The forging of a "new" China-Africa relationship established itself relatively rapidly. China's government has been practical enough to recognise that Africa, particularly Africa south of the Sahara, was generally wide open to investment potential and

opportunity. Following the fall of colonialism from the 1960s, Africa's problems of slow development and chronic underdevelopment, were widely viewed by African leaders as a consequence of postcolonial exploitation, usually by European or Western countries who had been former colonisers. China interpreted the problem differently as one of under-investment and under-exploitation (Large 2008). Specifically, Africa had suffered from economic neglect rather than exploitation by global corporations. Even former Western colonising nations had tended to maintain similar or sometimes lower levels of investment than during colonial rule, rather than ratchet up exploitation in the postcolonial era, and other international players simply stayed away (Sandrey and Edinger 2011). This situation ran contrary to Dependency Theory, quite popular in Africa until relatively recently, which argued that Third World surplus or national wealth was being extracted by rich Western metropolitan nations from poorer satellite and peripheral states. Africa was allegedly trapped in an international division of labour which saw its primary mineral resources pillaged by capitalist multinationals (Frank 1968; Wallerstein 1979). The reality seemed different, as few exploiters actually came – perhaps a more telling cause of African underdevelopment. Contrary to the dependency theorems, from the late 1990s a lower-middle income semi-peripheral nation sent its entrepreneurs to do business in sub-Saharan Africa. China cannily viewed the inexplicable Western neglect of African economies as a considerable opportunity, providing unlimited advantage for its own development needs (Springhall 2001).

China's entry into Africa was accompanied by the so-called 'win-win' principle which had arisen in the context of diplomacy and trade with its fellow Asian economies in the 1990s. This 'good neighbour' policy had encouraged the rapid growth of economic ties based on mutual and reciprocal advantage. Where it had worked well in Asia, why would it not do the same in Africa?¹ Win-win was closely aligned

¹ This good neighbour policy appears to have broken down in Asia, as China makes oil and mineral claims in the South China Sea and attempts to establish sovereign enclaves in disputed waters (Womack 2013). The International Tribunal

to China's other policy of non-interference: wherever it did business, it intended to keep out of the host nation's politics and adopt a neutral stance (Womack 2013). However, this raises serious issues where human rights are at risk, and it has been argued that many Chinese companies now operate relatively independently from the Chinese government and its policies, and tend to undermine mutuality agreements in terms of breaking labour law, acting environmentally irresponsibly, and not abiding by deals with African governments (Alessi and Xu 2015).

Yet China's trade with Africa has been successful under this new relationship. In 2009 China became Africa's biggest trading partner with around 20 per cent of all imports coming from China by 2015; in 2000 it had been just 4.3 per cent. Total two-way trade was worth over US\$170 billion in 2013 and generally rising, although some put it as high as US\$200 billion (Pigato and Tang 2014). China is now Africa's main export market for minerals, metals and agricultural produce with nearly 85 per cent of exports to China being minerals and commodities particularly oil. Some African countries have become heavily dependent on the Chinese market. Sixteen African nations sent more than 20 per cent of their exports to China in 2015 and for seven, including Sierra Leone, Eritrea, Republic of Congo, Angola and Sudan, China accounted for 40 per cent of their total exports. (Financial Times, 3 December 2015). In return, China sells mainly manufactured products to Africa. While China imports into Africa are rising, Africa exports to China fell in 2015 as China's own economy contracted (BBC News, 16 January 2016).

Chinese foreign direct investments into Africa were US\$28 billion in 2014, although this remains relatively small at less than 3 per cent of total FDI into Africa, for around 4000 projects (African Development Bank 2014). The US, France and the UK remain still the biggest FDI investors (N\$178billion jointly). There is limited Chinese investment into manufacturing in Africa as it tends to favour construction, services, and primary industries. However, Ethiopia and Uganda have been striking deals with China and other investor nations to focus more heavily on manufacturing projects (Brautigam

in The Hague ruled in July 2016 that China's claims to territory have no legal foundation.

2011b). Yet the Chinese quest for raw materials has had a positive effect, in that prices for oil, minerals, metals and other primary commodities such as timber and cotton have risen sharply in demand terms as a consequence of the Chinese entry into African markets. This led to significantly higher earnings for African countries than at any time in the past, and the era of low income from commodities appears to be over (Drummond and Liu 2013; Ademola, Bankole and Adewuyi 2009). Improved price gains partly solve the traditional problem of a lack of capital for industrial development that developing countries face, although it remains to be seen whether or not industrial investment is emerging as a genuine priority for African states. Yet at this point it may be said that there appear to be more positives than negatives arising from the coming of China to Africa.

The China-Africa relationship: Critics and supporters

The subsequent acceleration of Chinese business investment into Africa has been heatedly accompanied by a debate about China's real intentions for being there. Some contend that China's arrival on the scene is but a new form of imperialism intended to secure a monopoly of raw materials, extracting surplus wealth and undermining local worker's rights, while exerting political pressures to comply with China's own international foreign policy agenda (Southall and Melber, 2010; Baah and Jauch, 2009). Melber (2007: 6) has bluntly argued that "the Chinese penetration only presents the ugly face of predatory capitalism and the imperialist nature of Chinese expansion into Africa". Such critics come close to the old Dependency Theory position in their arguments, yet Western liberal commentators have been equally vociferous. French (2015) has recently called Africa 'China's second continent' due to the one million Chinese who moved to Africa since 2000. French argues that it is the Chinese rather than Africans who are bringing about limited economic change in Africa, and the Chinese government itself is encouraging migration to Africa for imperial purposes. China allegedly has long-term plans for Africa in terms of mineral and primary commodity access, as well as for future agricultural supplies given China's own lack of food surplus back home. French (2015)

believes that this cannot be beneficial for ownership of Africa's own development. Biggeri and Sanfilippo (2009) similarly see China's true policy to be the pursuit of abundant raw materials and flooding Africa with its export manufactures, with little interest in genuine industrial development. The criticism comes not just from Western voices. Former Nigerian central bank governor, Lamido Sanusi, recently wrote in the *Financial Times* (2 March 2013):

In much of Africa, they [the Chinese] have set up huge mining operations. They have also built infrastructure. But, with exceptions, they have done so using equipment and labour imported from home, without transferring skills to local communities. So, China takes our primary goods and sells us manufactured ones. This was also the essence of colonialism.

Others more positively stress the reciprocity potential between China and Africa which can only be good for African economies. China is seen as able to supply the continent with scarce capital, improve chronically degraded infrastructure, and stimulate local business culture (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2009; Kitissou 2007). Whatever the merits or weaknesses of either of these positive or negative positions, there tends to be a 'blind-spot' in the discussions: an understanding of how China has achieved so much in just thirty years, moving from the situation of one of the poorest countries to increasingly one of the richest. Even how it is able to cross the globe and come to Africa in the first place.

What are the lessons for Africa in this remarkable economic advance, and how might China's development model be used to shape an African one for purposes of rapid economic development? Can Chinese current FDI be crucially supplemented by a symbiosis of ideas-transfer that potentially informs a new African model for social and economic transformation? Seeing China's relationship in these terms would transcend negative debates about China's motivations for its growing presence, and take discussions to a more fertile plane. It raises possibilities for making China's developmental success directly central to Africa's own aspirations; currently this is not the case. Yet this possibility and potential first requires two preliminary investigations: establishing exactly what the China 'model' of development actually is; and careful consideration of

China's current economic intentions within Africa, including how far it intends to, or is indeed capable of, contributing to large-scale development of the continent in the coming years.

One way of assessing the value of the Chinese economic presence in Africa is to focus on the scale and the intentions of both its investments (FDI), including its special economic zones (SEZs) in Africa, and its official development assistance (ODA). These are examined in the next sections.

Foreign Direct Investment in sub-Saharan Africa: China's investments

Until 2000, FDI flows into African economies had remained relatively modest across most countries. The arrival of China's businesses in Africa significantly changed this from 2000. The turning point was China's policy of economic engagement with Africa in 1996 that effectively began to be implemented at the start of the new millennium. The rationale for engagement was driven by a recognition that the continent had enormous natural resource potential which could meet China's growing energy shortfalls that were arising from its rapid industrial expansion at home. China tends to be resource-poor comparative to its large population and geographic size. China's 2006 'Go Global' policy has further stimulated China's relations with sub-Saharan Africa in investment terms (Mohan and Lampert 2012).

A first important point is that at end-2012 China's share of the total stock of FDI in Africa was only in the order of 3 per cent – far below the level of other nations, and at odds with sensationalist reports stating higher figures which have recently been coming out of the Western media (Brautigam 2011b). While its investment may be growing rapidly, China is still a small player in this respect, and the vast majority of FDI into Africa comes from Western sources (Chen, Dollar and Tang 2015). China may be top in trade terms, but this is not the case with its FDIs. Chinese investment into Africa was US\$45 billion in 2013, but what is most relevant is that FDIs from China have been shifting slowly from extraction industry activities to services, construction and manufacturing. This change has in recent

years had a strong South-South (rather than Western) character as new partners led by China, but also India and Brazil, have entered the economic stage. South Africa, the continent's second largest economy after Nigeria, is also a significant investor – ahead of China in FDI. Manufacturing FDI reflects similar diversification patterns, and some African countries such as Ethiopia are building up manufacturing bases by attracting investments from new partners, India and China being keen to support such aspirations.

Where Africa falls short in gaining collaterally from its FDI relationships is in maximising benefits from skill and knowledge transfers and other spill-over effects for the domestic economy, as China and the South-East Asian economies did mainly from Western companies in the 1970s and 1980s. The recent shift in sub-Saharan Africa toward manufacturing has significantly enhanced job creation in countries such as Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, and Ethiopia. According to OECD (2015) FDI data, the manufacturing sector in Tanzania accounted for 43 per cent of total jobs created in 2014, three times more than jobs created in agriculture. Manufacturing FDI also achieved the largest job creation in Uganda in 2012, amounting to 30 per cent of the total FDI-driven jobs (Chen, Geiger and Fu 2015). Industrial growth and job creation might have been greater had it not been held back by poor logistics including erratic electrical and water supply, poor transport and supply chain bottlenecks. There is a lesson here for African governments to prioritise infrastructural development particularly in energy supplies. China's greatest FDI contribution has in this respect significantly been its FDI construction focus in improving infrastructure in low-income countries such as Nigeria, Uganda, Zimbabwe and Zambia. Chen, Dollar and Tang (2015: 9) give examples where China has done this, such as the Standard Gauge Rail project in Kenya, the Karuma Hydroelectric power project in Uganda. In addition, China has signed deals to build infrastructure across the DRC allegedly to the value of US\$200 billion over 25 years (OECD 2015). Such FDI has sizeable positive development contributions to the host economy. China's involvement in terms of infrastructural investment exceeds that of all other investors, and it is surprising that Western countries have by comparison done so little in this area. China accounts for at least 34

per cent of all African infrastructural funding at present, although it may be higher than 50 per cent (Lin and Wang 2014: 13). The argument that FDI into infrastructure or other areas is frequently given in exchange for raw materials, is criticised as untrue by Brautigam (2015) whose research was unable to find a single case where investment and aid were exchanged in this manner. African infrastructure is built by Chinese companies as joint ventures with the host nations, and resources tend to be used only to secure commercial or low-interest loans in countries with a poor credit history. This might be argued to be a positive and well-focused use of natural resources that directly supports national development.

Manufacturing and industrialisation has become a core focus of FDI. China, along with India, is strengthening linkages between domestic material input and foreign manufacturing investment. Ethiopia is now the largest FDI African nation in textiles, footwear, clothing and leather goods, where all materials derive locally. It has seen the growth of 2,510 manufacturing businesses in these areas; and 1290 food, beverages, and tobacco projects between 2003-2014 (Lin and Wang 2014). Rising labour costs in China appear to be transposing labour-intensive manufacturing elsewhere, and Africa may be directly benefiting. The bulk of FDI inflows to the manufacturing sector were from new partners and intraregional partners, led by China, India, and South Africa. The major fields of investment are textile and clothing, and leather and footwear. Motor vehicles and transport equipment involving FDI from both India and China are growing in importance; Nigeria is developing a motor industry with Chinese and Indian assistance (Lin and Wang 2014). Foreign firms are found to be mainly driven by the desire to access either directly the national market, or indirectly the regional or international market through the host country. FDI manufacturing has led to significant job creation in sub-Saharan Africa. In Tanzania, the largest job creator among African sectors over the period 2008–2009, it averaged 36,303 jobs per year and accounting for 43 per cent of total jobs created by FDI; and was also the highest job creator for Uganda, and 28 per cent of all job creation in Ethiopia (Chen, Geiger and Fu 2015).

Different African countries specialise in manufacturing activities as follows: Ethiopia has made its main focus textiles, clothing, leather and footwear; Kenya on food, beverages, motor vehicles and transport equipment; Uganda specialised in metal products, food and beverages; Tanzania in non-metallic mineral products, and food and beverages; Rwanda in chemicals and pharmaceuticals. Research shows that foreign firms demand more trainable unskilled labourers than skilled ones, as lower wages tend to be an important factor in coming to Africa – perhaps a worrying aspect of current FDI intentions. Turkey and India, not China, are the biggest investors in Ethiopia, but China tends to have the largest number of greenfield start-ups across sub-Saharan Africa after Turkey (Lin and Wang 2014). FDI has proven useful in the past to advance economic development and foster structural change toward manufacturing in host countries. Traditional sources of manufacturing FDI (Western countries) are shrinking, but still account for large stocks. The share of investment from China and India has increased rapidly, gradually taking over the proportion of investment originating from the EU and the U.S (Chen, Dollar and Tang 2015).

The main recent trend is that new foreign direct investments from China and elsewhere appear to be shifting away from the primary extraction industries toward manufacturing activities since around 2009. Critics such as Southall and Melber (2010) are simply wrong in arguing that FDI is purely to take out raw materials to the exclusion of all benefit to the host African countries. In summary, three trends have been noted that are positive for sub-Saharan Africa in relation to its industrialisation aspirations. First, FDI into Africa is slowly shifting from extractive sectors to services and manufacturing sectors. Second, FDI reached a much more diverse range of African countries from 2010-2014, with increasing shares shifting toward southern and eastern Africa rather than mainly West Africa (especially Nigeria) and North Africa. Third, there is a significant increase of South-South FDI from countries other than just China, including new partners such as India and Brazil, and intraregional partners led by South Africa which remains a major FDI investor in Africa. Manufacturing FDIs reflect similar diversification patterns, and some African countries such as Ethiopia are building up their

manufacturing bases by attracting FDI from new partners (Chen, Geiger and Fu 2015).

While China, contrary to what is often asserted by journalists, is far from being the most significant FDI investor, its investments are constantly expanding. While half of these investments are currently in the primary extraction mining industries (including quite positive resource exploration), it is significantly moving its interest in the direction of services and manufacturing in sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore, the arguments that China is overwhelmingly in Africa for raw materials looks a weak one, and may further become so. Banking and finance, as well as value added manufacturing, are becoming more important for Chinese businesses. For example, China's main activities in Nigeria are overwhelmingly in banking finance, construction, factories producing building materials, electrical products and steel. In Nigeria China signed FDI contracts worth US\$70 billion in 2014 alone (Brautigam 2015). The rising presence of India in Africa, providing significant FDIs into manufacturing, appears to be encouraging a competitive positive rethink on the part of Chinese business (Chen, Dollar and Tang 2015). It is not all about oil and minerals alone, and China tends to be less interested in these than most Western investors.

China's aid assistance to sub-Saharan Africa

What is the situation with Chinese aid to Africa where it has been equally accused of leveraging this for hegemonic advantage? First it must be said that China is reluctant to disclose its overseas aid development activities or clearly make available data and statistics. This makes it difficult to gauge both the size and the effects of its overseas development assistance (Deher *et. al.* 2015). China increased economic aid to many countries from the 1990s. African nations have benefited since 2000 as part of its 'going global' strategy. Economic aid represents a pillar of China's engagement with other nations, which includes grants, loans, state and private FDI. Brautigam (2011) states that the most widely used definitions of aid and the most commonly applied instruments are established by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic

Cooperation and Development (OECD)—a group of countries of which China is not a part. Aid is called official development assistance (ODA). Aid must be ‘concessional’ in character and go to developing countries with low per capita incomes, and involve a genuine subsidy of at least 25 per cent in the form of a grant element. In theory aid is meant to establish a positive advantage for the receiving nation which gains in development or welfare. Military aid or loans at commercial market interest rate, do not count as ODA, but as other official flows (OOF). Aid giving generally tends to be tied up with seeking economic or political advantage that benefits the giver country. This is called tied aid – being tied to the giver. Western studies and news stories tend to argue that Chinese aid (along with its FDI) is given purely to access African raw materials and energy supplies such as oil and gas, or as an attempt to make Africa China’s ‘second continent’ (French 2015)

Chinese ODA is given through three instruments: grants, zero-interest loans, and concessional (fixed-rate, low-interest) loans. These fund educational scholarships for African students, infrastructure construction including transport and telecommunications, export credits, technical assistance, human resources training, and so on. China’s Eximbank and the China Development Bank, established in 1994, provide the bulk of foreign investment finance, but aid money is but a tiny part of its activities; its focus is formally on meeting China’s continued development needs. While 40 percent of Chinese aid is in grants, the bulk of aid is distributed as interest-free concessional loans (Brautigam 2011a: 3). The China-Africa Development Fund disburses loans to Chinese companies, but this does not count as ODA. In 2010-11, US\$2.79 billion of African zero-interest debts were written off by the fund. In sub-Saharan Africa Chinese concessional aid loans were worth US\$1.5 billion in 2007 for eighty-seven development projects, but this is only the equivalent of one fifth of aid over the same period from the United States (at US\$7 billion).

China links much of its aid giving in complex ways to agreement packages, as part of its win-win reciprocal policy, whereby Chinese companies gain business and an economic foothold and African nations gain development benefits. Examples of this are Ghana’s Bui

Dam project built by China's SinoHydro Construction state corporation, with Ghana's cocoa bean resources used to secure the construction soft loans (at 2 per cent interest), and commercial loans. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), a deal was signed in 2007 for rail and hydro-electrical projects with the China Railway Engineering Corporation and SinoHydro for a large development package. Chinese banks agreed a line of credit for US\$3 billion (again, a mix of soft and commercial loans) which would be used to reconstruct the country after its civil war. Chinese aid credit was secured against the DRC's cobalt-copper mines which would be taken over by Chinese mining companies. This later caused concern in the country due to a perceived sovereign takeover of national resources, and because the aid grant element appeared quite small. After protest, the resource sovereignty aspect was dropped by the Chinese, and the interest rate was capped, freeing the DRC government from unexpected future interest rate increases. The DRC deal, which is still underway through massive construction activities across the DRC, involves (Brautigam 2011a: 11):

3402 km of paved roads, including an auto-route and bridges connecting the main cities of the DRC (Lubumbashi, Bukavu, Goma, Kisangani) and construction and repair of 450 km of roads within the capital district of Kinshasa; 3213 km of railway construction or rehabilitation; construction and equipping of 145 health centres, 31 hospitals, 5000 units of low-cost housing, and two universities. A later list included rehabilitation of two airports and two electricity distribution systems, and the construction of two hydroelectric dams.

Once again, as with the FDI examples, the development benefits were positive and considerable, although actual aid components were surprisingly small (Brautigam 2011a).

Do these examples count as aid? Not in terms of the OECD instruments which require a clear concessional grant element and zero-or-low interest rates. While China's ODA has been rising sharply in recent years, it does not de-link aid from its commercial practices. As was argued earlier, it enmeshes its FDI and aid practices in ways that make it difficult to distinguish them. In this respect, it

gives less aid than the West, but its practices are the same as the West by largely making aid of the ‘tied’ variety – despite professing to be mutually beneficial. There is some evidence that China’s aid to Africa (as opposed to its FDI) is only partly linked to the pursuit of commercial interests, and its aid giving reveals certain humanitarian concerns, as aid goes almost exclusively to poor countries. But aid along with FDI flows, also reflects China’s foreign policy alignments, in that both go in certain instances to African nations not favoured by Western democracies due to governance and human rights concerns (Deher *et. al.* 2015).

Chinese aid tends to link both commercial and foreign policy in complex ways – although heavy Western criticism comes its way due to this. There is a negative side here. For example, Swaziland currently receives no Chinese aid, and little investment, because it officially recognises Taiwan, to the disapproval of Beijing. Only withdrawal of diplomatic ties with the latter would bring it in line for ODA from China – as Namibia did in 1998, resulting eventually in strong investment interest from China (Guardian Newspaper, 9 April 2015).

In assessing the aid factor, China-Africa relations look relatively unimpressive. China’s aid giving may be mainly disconnected from making political demands on African states (excluding Swaziland), but the levels of aid it gives are small compared with Western nations. It also unduly complicates matters by mixing loans, FDI and grants in ways that look suspiciously like disguising loans incorrectly as concessional ODA. China could remedy the suspicion about its aid-giving by making its genuine aid flows more unambiguously transparent, statistically speaking (Dreher 2015).

SEZs and manufactures in Africa

Special economic zones (SEZs) are directly linked to FDI flows previously discussed. SEZs have a special place in the China-Asia development model, and arguably a special status for application to sub-Saharan Africa. To date, sub-Saharan Africa has been pigeon-holed in the global economic division of labour as primarily a mineral-energy extraction continent. Despite Chinese investment

and aid initially being attracted to Africa due to its extraction potential, there is the contrary evidence mentioned earlier that developing countries such as China and India are shifting investments toward manufacturing and human resource capacity building, as was noted particularly for Ethiopia.

Since the coming of China to Africa, there has been a tendency for Africa to benefit economically rather narrowly until recently from its oil, metal ore, cotton, timber and agricultural commodities (Ademola, Bankole and Adewuyi 2009). Oil and minerals accounted for 60 per cent of all exports from Africa to China in 2012, while oil alone represented 45 per cent. In return, China imports to sub-Saharan Africa are adversely and overwhelmingly manufactured products, machinery and chemicals. China's manufacturing investment has been very small since its entry in 2000. Cheap Chinese imports often of poor quality have caused significant damage to local traders, and local production in the textile and footwear industries declined as a form of de-industrialisation in countries such as Zambia and Mauritius. The latter saw a collapse of its textile industry and a loss of 25, 000 jobs by 2005 (Ancharaz 2013).

China appears to recognise the effects its trade is having on indigenous African businesses, as this has led to investment initiatives in manufacturing through the recent setting up of SEZs across Africa. Its 'Going Global' policy of 2006 promoted the idea of economic and trade cooperation zones, but China was at first slow to promote these in Africa. Since 2009 it announced plans to begin by funding and creating fifty special economic zones (SEZs) based on the model that China used in its own Open Door policy (which will be discussed shortly). These are meant to be joint ventures with majority Chinese funding, between governments, local entrepreneurs and other local partners. Ancharaz (2013) investigated whether these zones could be incubators of industrialisation on the African continent. He argues that they can be, first, because Chinese SEZ investments spans modern commercial agriculture, manufacturing and services which are new to many African countries. Second, because SEZs are intended to integrate with and stimulate the domestic economy - as they were designed to do in China's development from the 1980s; and they can have a powerful knock-

on incubator effect for passing on skills, knowledge and technological know-how. The 2009 Forum on Africa China Cooperation (FOCAC) established an initial US\$1 billion fund to develop businesses through the SEZs. So what is the progress on this particularly innovative China policy?

Ancharaz (2013) states that several SEZs have already become operational in Africa. But the chief problems so far experienced are in financing them and overcoming local policy incoherence. Construction has been delayed by poor disbursement of grants and loans from China's government; while on the African side local developers have had poor support from financial institutions including their own state:

host-country governments have encountered financial difficulties in providing off-site infrastructure or in refunding zone developers the agreed share of infrastructural costs, as in Ethiopia. [There is] a lack of political will and a lack of an incentive framework to support the SEZs (Ancharaz 2013: 6).

Shortfall of full commitment from the local (particularly government) level is a critical disadvantage, as is reluctance of the local African banking sector to provide for the financial shortfalls in the partnership. This is not entirely a Chinese problem but an African one. However, despite the enthusiasm of China's government for the SEZs, the unwillingness of Chinese firms on the ground to favour joint ventures does much to undermine the plan; these tend to turn to their own networks and their own private industrial zones that have no connection with Chinese or African governments. Private zones are particularly strong in South Africa and Botswana, but their disadvantage for Africa is their *disconnection from the domestic economy*, which the SEZ strategy presupposes as core. The other problem is the lack of value added activities in the current SEZ activities. Chinese copper smelting in Zambia's Chambishi economic zone is an exception, but one which is arguably only an extension of primary extraction. There is no indication yet that the SEZs will produce televisions, consumer electronics including cell phones, or the manufacture of motor vehicles and trucks (Ancharaz 2013).

The way forward for what is undoubtedly a valuable SEZ initiative, points to both African and Chinese players taking certain partnership responsibilities seriously. Other investors including European companies could be part of this, as this would stimulate FDI and other competition. First, offering incentives to Chinese investors to set up in the zones needs to be supplemented by offering similar benefits also to African entrepreneurs. African governments often tend to discriminate against their own potential investors, excluding them as irrelevant. This points to governments needing ‘full ownership’ of new SEZs and being responsible for establishing regulatory frameworks which integrate them into local economies and African development strategies in general. Skill and knowledge transfer are necessarily a part of such frameworks – or else who benefits? These elements are often absent when governments deal with direct foreign investors. Second, host-country governments must have an equity stake in the zones where they gain materially for providing land, tax benefits, infrastructure, irrespective of who put up the most investment money. The operations of Ramatex, a Malaysian-Chinese textile company which operated in Namibia from 2002-2006, is a warning lesson: it was granted by the government free land, free water (representing 20 per cent of Windhoek city’s supply per annum) for its dying processes, and allowed to bring in 2000 Chinese workers. It ignored local labour laws by working staff up to twelve hours each day. Then it secretly left Namibia at the end of the agreed five-year period when it was due to start paying for taxes and water costs. Workers’ wages were unpaid, along with the legacy of a poisoned gift of environmental pollution from dumped chemicals at its former premises. The Namibian economy had little positive to show for this SEZ venture (Jauch 2008). A better equity stake would have seen the Namibian government overseeing the activities of Ramatex more keenly, and ensuring real developmental returns. Third, African governments need to set up their own generous incentives schemes, and choose the right partners for FDI relations; the presence of Chinese (or any other) private zones that exist outside of national or regional development plans, and which employ large numbers of non-indigenous workers, seems regressive and counter-developmental. Fourth, as Ancharas (2013: 8) points out, “the

industry focus of SEZs must be negotiated between the host-country government and the Chinese stakeholders, rather than being imposed by the latter”. There is a need to ensure that SEZ activities align with both the country’s industrial strategy and the upgrading of skill training needs, especially where African workers are at present low or semi-skilled. These aspects need to be supported by better organisational capacity of the state and private sectors, with supporting investment into local university and research institutions to strengthen the knowledge base for SEZ development. China and African governments can do much here in both investment and knowledge transfers.

Understanding China’s rapid industrial development: Unravelling the China Model for African contexts

From the preceding discussion, it is clear that sub-Saharan Africa benefits from Chinese foreign direct investment, and increasingly from its initiative to set up SEZs, much more than it does from aid flows. But one central aspect of China’s presence that African governments inexplicably neglect in the new relations with China, can be put here as a question: Why do African politicians talk so little about the rationale behind China’s extraordinary and rapid modernisation; or the fact that China developed successfully from the same disadvantageous economic foundations that Africa finds itself in now? Why is there so little focus or debate on the ‘China Model’ of development in African conversations?

Current relations between China’s government or its businesses, and host African countries, tend to focus mostly on what Africa can gain in the short-to-medium term from China – as though the simple establishment of Sino-African relationships can of themselves develop Africa without Africans engaging in the main actions. This ignores that there must be African ‘agency’ that involves African actors in the pursuit of development (Mohan and Lampert 2012). Alternatively, as was seen, other discussion is around perceptions that China might be deriving too much undue advantage from the continent, and giving back too little. Dialogues about and with China miss more obvious questions that require answering: Can Africa

emulate China's success story, and what indeed is that story? How did China implement the transformation of its former chronically backward economy? Understanding Chinese development provides important insight into possibilities for African transformations. The story of China's reforms is critically considered in some detail in the next sections of this chapter.

China's development success story

What were the key factors behind China's industrialisation and economic transformation, and how can the China model potentially inform African development planning? In 1970 the Chinese economy was smaller than that of the United Kingdom. By 2011 it was six times larger (Mann 2013). Using the same dates, in 1970 China was placed 100th in terms of global size, but moving over the next 40 years to second place. Per capita income was as little as US\$175 in 1978, making Chinese citizens among the poorest in the world, but by 2000 this had risen tenfold and pulled most of China's population out of poverty (Hofman and Wu, 2009). This represents one of the fastest industrialisation processes in history, certainly briefer and greater in scale than the first industrial revolution in England from 1760 to 1850.

China's development rise can be traced to policies that emerged after the Chinese Revolution from 1949, but much more significant is the stage from 1980 which saw the launch of the New Economic Policy (NEP), four years after the death of Mao Zedong. China's development path can be divided into three periods. First, economic policy and planning under Mao, the first leader and founder of the People's Republic, which had a strong ideological character, and which produced mixed economic results. Second, the era of the New Economic Policy (NEP) guided by Mao's successor Deng Xiaoping which represented a radical departure from previous economic planning. The third period that followed this from 1992 represented an extension and major readjustment of former NEP policies, producing a marked shift toward a market economy. This third period is primarily responsible for the successful position of China in the world economy today. A fourth stage may currently be underway

since 2014 under the new president Xi Jinping, a new distinct phase of economic adjustment to reign in rogue bureaucratic interests and corruption that had emerged in the earlier periods.

(i) Ideology and development: Mao's economic legacy 1949-1976

The beginnings of economic restructuring and proto-industrialisation followed the victory of the Chinese Revolution in 1949 after the defeat of the former corrupt Kuomintang (KMT) government which had fled and transplanted itself overseas off China's mainland on the island of Taiwan. Land was forcibly taken from the old landlord class and redistributed to the peasantry who made up nearly 90 per cent of the population. After a five-year period of what Mao termed 'class struggle' which saw two million landlords, rich peasants and officials from the old KMT regime perish and another four million imprisoned, efforts began to reform and build the non-agricultural areas of the economy (Mann 2013: 219). At first, Soviet planning models were implemented based on socialist five-year plans that involved target indicators for factory and power construction, increased production in agriculture and industry, but also hospital construction and healthcare, and educational infrastructural development. The first plan of 1953-7 saw impressive GDP rates of 9.2 per cent per annum. While a soviet model was applied, this at first took place within a mixed economy where peasants were free to organise their own production, with the proviso that they sell produce direct to the state at low prices. This made food affordable for industrial workers, and excess production sold into the market at higher prices served as a surplus for development investment. In other respects, peasants were not free, being banned from moving from their farms to ensure the constant availability of farm labour and deter migration. In industry where the state had complete ownership, large-scale heavy production was favoured along with big construction projects such as dams and electrification. Labour was organised through production brigades under the control of party cadres who were themselves answerable to government officials directly involved in the plan targets. This ensured that production quotas were met (Chen 2001).

Despite the initial successes of the first plan, Mao radically changed track in the second five-year plan through a mass mobilisation social levelling policy that involved the large-scale collectivisation of peasant farming from 1956, creating units of one hundred household agriculture producer cooperatives (APCs) under party cadres similar to industry. On behalf of central government, the cadres further lowered prices paid to peasants for farm produce, while demanding increased production (Chen 2001). Private livestock and farm tools were made the property of mutual aid teams (MATs), and communal domestic living arrangements introduced whereby peasant families were made to share mass militarised living quarters away from their former private households. This effectively overturned the benefits they had gained from land reform and reversed access to limited private property rights – an unpopular move (Mann 2013). The Communist Party (CCP) then abruptly abandoned soviet central planning for a decentralised development policy, labelled the ‘Great Leap Forward’. This entailed a ‘spontaneous’ planning approach intended to de-bureaucratise economic development, and directly involve the people. The distinction between party and masses, industrial and agricultural workers would be broken down through mass campaigns designed to speed up the development of the economy. The masses were to be brought firmly into the economic transformation of China.

The launch of the Great Leap Forward was meant to express this new thinking of mass involvement. Peasant APCs and MATs were removed from purely agricultural work to engage in iron and steel production. Mao intended to industrialise the countryside rapidly by involving peasants in non-agricultural economic growth, radically supplementing the industrial workforce which remained in national terms relatively small and confined to the towns and cities. Peasants were organised into work teams to look for metal ore supplies, and were then expected to smelt the acquired resources in so-called backyard furnaces; thereafter, the stock would pass into the wider economy and boost development. In reality, the peasants’ own metal goods such as pots and pans were melted down in a feverish rush to meet the plan quotas. The policy proved disastrous and led to the neglect of crops and grain and food production generally. Mao’s

statement of “three years of hard work and suffering and a thousand years of prosperity” instead resulted in mass famine between 1959 and 1962 killing up to thirty million peasants, and reversing many of the gains of the first plan across both farming and industry (Dreyer 1998; Riskin 1987).

Further setbacks took place as a consequence of the Cultural Revolution from 1966-8 as China and its political system wrestled with how to implement economic change while adhering to socialist principles. The failure of the Great Leap Forward and its terrible aftermath had side-lined Mao’s authority, and party reformers were free to experiment with economic ideas more akin to elements of the first five-year plan, combined with a less state-centred decentralised policy that gave relative freedom and initiative to agriculture and state industry. In the countryside, agricultural producer cooperatives were relaxed, and in several areas household family production re-emerged – this was effectively a move back to private farming. These early economic reforms coincided with damaging power struggles among entrenched interests within the CCP. Mao used the opportunity to launch his comeback in 1966 (Dreyer 1998). He mobilised his strongest base of support to return to power, the student Red Guard organisations which had emerged through the expansion of the universities, and who passionately supported him. Their large numbers and zeal were used to violently purge political opponents, economic reformers, even specialists such as engineers and managers, but especially so-called bureaucrats in party and national economic structures; the latter particularly offended Mao’s class levelling principles. The ‘cultural’ side of the revolution was expressed in attacks on Western and Soviet cultural influences.² This included the elimination of ‘decadent’ music, dress, theatre and film. ‘Revolutionary’ culture replaced it. Ultimately, the Cultural Revolution spun out of control, releasing a Pandora’s Box of conflict and chaos that halted production as workers joined the struggle. Eventually it had to be reined in by the police and army, and order was restored by 1970.

² China’s diplomatic and technical relations with the Soviet Union had broken down in 1960, and were not to be restored again until 1989.

Entrenched political ideology cannot be ignored during this particular period when assessing developmental successes and failures (Mann 2013). Economic growth advanced, then was abruptly halted or reversed, whenever Mao decided to reintroduce his policy of class struggle and attack the forces both in the party and country whom he perceived to be undermining the revolution. Future reformers in the CCP came to realise how intra-party political and ideological struggles could potentially undermine economic and social progress at any time. As a consequence of the Cultural Revolution, the reformers (or capitalist roaders, as their opponents called them) lost both the argument, their political positions and in some cases, their lives. Deng Xiaoping, later president and the father of the present economic advances of modern China, was purged, tortured and imprisoned in 1967, being released only at the time of Mao's death in 1976. With Mao gone, Deng experienced rapid rehabilitation becoming the natural leader for more pragmatic and bold economic change. Writing of the Mao era, Dreyer (1998: 135) said that:

If the Great Leap Forward had been antithetical to modernisation, the Cultural Revolution was still more so. Its attacks on specialisation and routinisation of procedures [for development] ran counter to the modernisation paradigm.

Making a parallel with contemporary Africa, a strong ideology of anti-colonialism still prevails both among state leaders and the public in many countries. Foreign investing nations and their companies, especially former European ones implicated in past colonialisms, are distrusted. There is frequently a reluctance to allow foreign direct investment or to collaborate or work with foreign businesses. This can be said to be Africa's ideological anti-modernisation sticking point, and a problematic position that can be said to have arisen in the context of the growth of China-Africa economic relations. We will return to this important aspect later (Asongu and Aminkeng 2013; Southall and Melber 2010).

Despite these cataclysmic events, this first period surprisingly managed to establish a firm economic base from which key economic

reform policies could later build after 1978. Despite negative growth between 1957 and 1965, GDP averaged 4.9 per cent per annum from 1966 to 1978; the share of industry in GDP rose to 35 per cent by 1978, and agricultural land under commercial production tripled after 1949. Advances also took place within Chinese society as a whole. Life expectancy rose from 35 years in 1949 to 65 years by 1980, and mortality rates halved by 1970 due to overall improved food supplies (despite the famine period) and the expansion of healthcare through mass training of a large core of doctors and nurses (Mann 2013: 221-3). By the time Deng's economic reforms started, China had become a very different country to what it had been in 1949 despite major setbacks and political turmoil.

(ii) The Chinese development 'Model': NEP and beyond 1978-1992

With this legacy to build on, as well as a practical capacity to learn from past mistakes on the part of the main state players, there was a determination to pursue pragmatic and rapid economic change immediately following Mao's death. Coase and Wang (2013) refer to this as the unique beginning of an 'experimental phase' of China's economic history. There was no real 'model' of development as such at this stage. The reformers including Deng were unsure how to go forward. Therefore, they began a long phase of trial and error policies – promoting ones that worked, discarding ones that did not. This was called the New Economic Policy (NEP), officially launched in 1980.

Both at the beginning of NEP and at the end of its first phase by 1992, it is hard to state that China's development had any specific 'model'. The very concept of a development model implies a set of rationally designed pre-constructed principles, combined with definite objectives that come to shape and transform reality by bringing about large-scale intended changes and outcomes. Models come across as real and more convincing after the event, once they have achieved the aims of their initial development goals. While specific policies and programmes were put in place by 1980, in practice Chinese development was constantly evolving, correcting itself and bringing to the fore new initiatives. So if it had a model, this was a flexible, adaptive and practically transformative one. China

may be said to have had many models in this sense. So, what principles and policy steps did Deng and his economic planners establish in this core phase between 1980 and 1992? These were laid out first in the famous Communiqué relating to the core policy of economic decentralisation which came out of the historic meeting in Beijing of the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in 1978. The Communiqué stated:

One of the shortcomings in the structure of economic management in our country is the over-concentration of authority, and it is necessary to boldly shift it under guidance from the leadership [CCP] to lower levels so that the local authorities and industrial and agricultural enterprises will have greater power of decision in management under the guidance of state planning. [This will] invigorate all branches and links of the socialist economy (Quoted in Coase and Wang 2013: 37-8).

As the Communiqué further noted, this would bring about the ‘growth of the productive forces’ and improve the livelihoods of the Chinese people. The surging success of other Asian economies such as Japan, Malaysia, South Korea, and the old enemy Taiwan, were firmly concentrating the minds of the CCP toward catching up. The Communiqué did not itself implement the start of the reforms, but rather confirmed a process already underway since 1976. It even revived the idea of the Four Modernisations (of agriculture, industry, technology and military defence) first proposed by the popular party leader Zhou Enlai as early as 1964, but shelved in the face of the opposition of Mao during the Cultural Revolution. The CCP was self-consciously and officially presenting itself as a developmental state with a dual role: decentralising its controlling character to release creativity and increased production in the main areas of the economy, while retaining a ‘guiding’ role. This meant a monopoly of the right to appoint industrial and agricultural managers based on skill and merit, controlling the financial instruments of the economy, while coercively dealing with any undesirable effects – both economic and political. The goal of eliminating once and for all

conflicts similar to those that took place under Mao and avoiding chaos was an unspoken element underlying NEP.

(iii) Agriculture and NEP

One of the great failures of the Mao era was agricultural development. This was the first area of reform implemented by Deng. Under Mao, the communes were intended to produce food and other crops in abundance, and reverse the country's inability to feed itself without relying on costly food imports. Subsequent surplus production was additionally supposed to generate surplus capital from crop sales for investing in industry. In reality, production stagnated or declined (dramatically during the Great Famine) and little industrial investment was gained. The agriculture producer cooperatives were blamed by Deng's government as primarily responsible for this failure. Many peasants never embraced collectivism, and bitterly resented the suppression of private family-based production (Riskin 1987). NEP revived the household responsibility system, an experiment briefly attempted after the failure of the Great Leap Forward, and revived under the Deng reforms. The logic was that peasant farmers would greatly increase production where they materially gained from their labours (Mann 2013). The state would set prices paid to farmers, and these were progressively increased; peasants rapidly benefited from this, being motivated to increase production year-on-year. The agricultural communes (including the APCs and MATs) were gradually disbanded, private family farming becoming legal again by 1982. This was accompanied by the emergence of large scale production farms under municipally controlled town and village enterprises – one of the big successes of NEP, which were also successfully used for expanding industrial production. In line with Deng's experimental approach, which Coase and Wang (2013: 46) have indicated as core to the logic of NEP, the privatising of agriculture was first secretly tried out on a limited basis at Small Hill Village Commune in Anhui Province in 1976, and later at Nine Dragons Hill Commune in

Sichuan in 1978.³ Small Hill had previously been known as the “village of beggars”, but peasant earnings from the experiment were so high after one year that neighbouring villages scrambled to join in (Coase and Wang 2013). Private farming resulted similarly in impressive countrywide production increases as a consequence of this ‘freeing up’ process. Households came to be the “only actor in farming” (Coase and Wang 2013: 50).

Private agriculture was not unopposed by veteran leaders in the CCP who condemned reform as a move toward capitalism. In response, Deng undertook wholesale retirement of the bulk of the old guard of the 1949 Revolution as soon as he took power, replacing them with a new generation of university-educated leaders and technocrats appointed on meritocratic principles – the so-called Red Engineers. He effectively established a new class in China which would entrench itself and steer and invigorate the drive for development in all areas of the economy (Andreas 2009).

(iv) Industrial manufacturing and NEP

The second revolution of NEP was industrial, but without the urban bias familiar to previous socialist countries. Industrial revolution was inevitably the main priority of NEP given that no country had yet succeeded in mature development without a well-established industrial base. A dual two-track policy was attempted. The first focused fundamentally on the rapid expansion of dominant state owned enterprises (SOEs) which were heavily encouraged and funded by the state, and principally expected to drive the modernisation process in the economy – a reflection of the degree to which socialist principles continued to rule state thinking at this point. While SOE managers were both appointed by the state and expected to show initiative and entrepreneurship, managers were answerable to the state plan and its directives. This lack of independence proved a burden in terms of actual performance, and no serious attempts to privatise SOEs occurred in this first phase of NEP up to 1992 (Mann 2013: 228).

³ This secrecy was due to ongoing political opposition in the CCP, especially from the old Maoist leaders.

The second track of NEP industrial strategy from 1980 was the establishment of innovative town and village enterprises, ironically reflecting the central mass mobilisation tenet of the Great Leap Forward whereby rural areas were to instigate industrial as well as agricultural change – this time on a more rational and firmer footing. The town and village enterprises (TVEs) were organised under the auspices of local and regional government, but run by educated technocratic officials rather than municipal politicians, and appointed on merit by central government. Deng as far as possible sought to ensure that unqualified personnel or cronyism were never allowed to disrupt the course of NEP progress (Naughton 1995). TVEs were eventually operating like private entities by the 1990s. Unlike the state favoured SOEs, these were forced to manage scarce resources due to great difficulty in obtaining investment credit which was strictly controlled and distributed by state-owned banks (Coase and Wang 2013). TVEs therefore had to be well-organised, more disciplined than the SOEs, and more entrepreneurial. Bribery, or the ‘price premium’, was necessary to persuade banks to favour their business and provide capital (Naughton 1995). TVEs had the flexibility and freedom, largely outside the plan, to focus on high-demand production and to manufacture for unmet needs in the consumer economy. SOEs did not, given that they made what the state planners told them to make, thereby providing the other private sector side of Chinese industry with a strategic advantage. To some extent, this forced many state industries to emulate this rival sector, even to seek more autonomy from the state and try to match its impressive performance. It was town and village enterprises which introduced real competition into China’s economy.

Town and village enterprises accounted for half of the rural economy by 1984 and a quarter of all industrial output. They were employing 135 million people by 1996, up from 28 million in 1978 (Coase and Wang 2013: 54-56). TVEs were able to expand so fast because they incorporated a multiplicity of small start-up businesses which emerged from the first period of NEP. Self-employment became possible from 1981 when the long ban on it was lifted in the face of high unemployment, especially among youth. Deng’s planners called this the ‘individual economy’. Many Chinese took the

opportunity to become entrepreneurial, some to start what were to be major enterprises responding to Deng's call to 'get rich'. There are many examples of rags to riches, representing considerable social mobility (Coase and Wang 2013). This swelled the new class that Andreus (2009) writes about, expanding at state and private level into the wider economy. Of course there were many losers; not everyone benefited immediately from the reforms. But the emergence of the individual economy proved to be far reaching in terms of economic growth.

Central to NEP and industrialisation itself was China's Open Door policy, a side of the reforms that are directly relevant by way of example to African development and industrialisation. The significance of a rational open door approach for Africa, and China's own contribution to this, will be discussed separately later. The global 'opening up' of China to foreign business was a stark recognition by Deng Xiaoping and his government of the backwardness of China at that time. Technology and modern industry could not match the Asian Tiger Economies which were rising around China, nor the advanced industries of the United States and Europe, especially Germany. The Open Door policy was about "learning from capitalism" (Coase and Wang 2013: 63). Once again, experimentation was tried cautiously but quickly, and major foreign firms were invited to set up production. Shenzhen in Pacific coastal Guangdong province became a testing ground for new industrial parks, named as Special Trading Zones (STZs) and Economic Processing Zones (EPZ or SPZ). The first and subsequent industrial experiments were both encouraged and personally approved by Deng Xiaoping as early as 1979. Deng had visited Japan the previous year in 1978 and been deeply impressed by the Nissan automobile plant, then considered one of the most technologically advanced, organised and productive industrial units in the world. He realised that Chinese industry was far behind Nissan's achievements, and he determined on a policy of inward direct investment involving only the most advanced manufacturing companies of the world economy (Coase and Wang 2013). This foreign direct investment (FDI) was to be fundamentally export orientated at first rather than producing for Chinese consumption. China would benefit from large-scale exports to the

advanced nations and thereby gain from the strategic advantages of market access, while also profiting from immediate integration into the global economy for the first time (Mann 2013). Mutually beneficial partnerships with foreign firms would involve training of Chinese personnel, especially managers who would learn the latest managerial methods and techniques of industrial organisation. Technology transfer was another requirement for the privilege of manufacturing within China.

The SPZs and EPZs were a success story, with the focus on export production and trade providing significant rapid returns for GDP growth. After Shenzhen, these were extended to four other areas of maritime China by 1984, then fourteen more by 1988. Thereafter, they spread into the interior of the country away from the Pacific coast. Most recently, the new city of Binhai in Tianjin in 2006 became a processing and trading zone, followed by Kashi in Xinjiang in 2010. Key to their achievement was that the state played an active investment role in setting them up, providing land (that continued to be state-owned rather than private), water and electricity services, but also legal and government services. They were partnership joint ventures, but self-sufficient economic entities where foreign capital could operate relatively independently, if under the eye of the state (Coase and Wang 2013: 64). Major global industrial players entered China from both Asia and the West including the initial inspirer, Nissan, also Toyota, Sony, Panasonic, Ford, Chrysler, BMW, Mercedes, Volkswagen. Later came the IT companies such as Microsoft and Apple. This was high-end state-of-the-art production, but focusing chiefly on manufacturing high-value goods that the both the state-owned and town and village enterprises could not then emulate. The Chinese state struck careful and tight agreements with the newcomers that were nationalistic, ensuring substantial earnings for the China State. China has been an exceptional 'deal-maker' in its domestic and foreign investments (Hofman and Wu 2009). This represents another lesson for African nations currently seeking economic partnerships.

Where direct foreign investment into China had been just US\$2 billion in 1980, mainly from Hong Kong and Taiwan, by 1995 as a result of the Open Door strategy it had risen to nearly US\$60 billion.

This policy fundamentally kick-started the reforms and laid a modern industrial base from which indigenous Chinese industry itself could later rise (Mann 2013). It is doubtful that development would have succeeded in the country to the extent that it did if it had spurned foreign investment partnerships and tried to ‘go it alone’. This is another lesson for Africa.

(v) NEP and the strategic role of finance

NEP industrialisation policies would not have flourished without the provision of finance and the Chinese state’s parallel macroeconomic policy. Together these drove the growth of state and private enterprises. Up to 1978 China had only one bank, the People’s Bank of China which later became the Central Bank of China. This was ill-suited to service the economic transformation of China. NEP led to a reorganisation of the banking system initially into four more banks: The Agricultural Bank of China, for providing credit and loans for rural businesses, including town and village enterprises; The Bank of China, for foreign trade and investment, including provision of services to foreign companies that had come to China; The People’s Construction Bank for funding large capital infrastructural projects, being under the auspices of the Ministry of Finance; and lastly The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China which dealt with general services not covered by the other institutions. From 1984, more banks were created and these were given limited autonomy from the state, without actually breaking from state control. Each bank had different customers designated by the state, but they competed for deposits from businesses and individuals allocated to them. From the start, the banks serviced NEP-directed growth in particular ways. Macroeconomic policy was rooted in the Ministry of Finance’s Credit Plan. This worked in the following ways (Hofman and Wu 2009: 30):

In the early stages of reforms, the Credit Plan remained the dominant policy instrument. The plan allocated individual credit according to the state’s investment priorities, at state set interest rates that varied per sector, leaving little discretion to the banks themselves. The credit plan gradually was relaxed, first by allocating credit per sector within an overall credit limit, leaving it to banks to allocate individual loans. Directed lending was refinanced by the

central bank. After the passage of the Banking Law in 1994 and the abolition of the credit plan in 1995, banks were in principle free to lend to whomever they wanted. In practice, however, government influence, notably local government influence on banks, remained significant.

This policy of tying the financial sector firmly to economic growth and industrialisation at the first stage of the reforms dealt with the initial shortage of investment. Direct foreign investment and the returns from the early successes of this, and also agricultural reform, came to fund later agricultural and industrial expansion. In turn, this started to generate a 'critical mass' of credit which banks could lend out for further economic development. By the 1990s, deposits from business earnings had risen dramatically, private household savings perhaps accounting for as much as fifty per cent of total banked savings, while in 1978 it had been little more than three per cent (Riedel, Jin and Gao 2007). This is some indication of the impact of the reforms in just the first ten years.

However, an investment 'hunger' prevailed in the first phase of NEP, itself caused by the very successes of economic growth expansion, as emerging new businesses scrambled for credit for their activities. Town and village enterprises (TVEs) along with local government put great pressure on banks to fund industrial and agricultural development, including infrastructural projects. Yet it was the State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) which were constantly favoured by the banks (Riedel, Jin and Gao 2007). The TVEs were discriminated against in credit terms because they represented the private sector rather than the 'socialist' economy, and socialist development remained the official ideological goal. Therefore, TVEs were forced to be entrepreneurial with scarce resources, and to generate investment direct from sales. This they did successfully. TVEs managed to expand rapidly, relying much less than the SOEs on banking finance. SOEs on the other hand were unimpressive in their performance during this time, and most survived on state subsidies which by 1990 represented one-third of all state expenditure, something of a loss of scarce and much-needed capital resources which might have been deployed in the other more

dynamic areas of the economy (Coase and Wang 2013: 92). NEP was working, but not in the state industrial sector.

In the first phase of NEP, inward foreign capital investment proved crucial, as did the rise of the private sector in agriculture and rural industry through the TVEs. Rural areas themselves began to urbanise as a result of the growth of industry, attracting migrants from poorer areas. In addition, making self-employment legal freed up many Chinese citizens to set up a huge number of businesses.

(vi) NEP transformed 1992-2014

In 1989-1991 the reforms hit a serious economic recession, and credit scarcity and over-demand created price inflation. This coincided with a major political crisis when in 1989 students occupied Tiananmen Square in Beijing demanding parliamentary democracy. While the political crisis was ruthlessly put down⁴, the economic problems revived the confidence of more conservative albeit socialist elements within the Chinese Communist Party, notably premier Li Peng, to stall and reverse the ‘capitalistic effects’ of NEP. There emerged a deadlock between market and socialist planning (White 1993).

All the private elements of the economy which had been slipping from the control of the CCP planners were criticised. Taking into state ownership both the foreign companies and the town and village enterprises was seriously considered. The campaign had support of industrial workers in the cities who mistrusted the decline of state protection for their jobs and welfare, and the market discipline increasingly being imposed on them. It seemed to many both inside and outside China that another political earthquake similar to the Cultural Revolution was under way. But this did not

⁴ Tiananmen Square was occupied by up to one million students and workers in April 1989. The urban population quickly supported the students’ call for democracy and an end to state corruption. Sections of the Beijing military showed equal support. This alarmed the CCP leadership of Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, who sent in loyal armed units from outside Beijing. The troops attacked on Sunday June 4th, opening fire and smashing barricades with tanks. Three thousand people were thought to have died. The incident was used by veteran party leaders to claim that the NEP reforms were responsible, and needed to be reined in (Dreyer 1998: 168).

happen. Deng and the reformers suffered a loss of confidence and self-doubt in the face of fierce opposition; but they quickly recovered (White 1993). Deng warned the opposing CCP leaders that: “we must never turn China back into a country that keeps its doors closed [...] This would be greatly to our disadvantage. And on no account must we go back to the old practice of keeping the economy under rigid control.” (Deng, quoted in Coase and Wang 2013: 110). He stressed the need to learn from capitalism, avoiding its negative elements, rather than becoming capitalist, and abandoning socialism. For the first time he asserted the need for a socialist ‘market economy’ at the 14th Party Congress in 1992, defending his view that large-scale private businesses must now be built, to operate on capitalist principles in order to compete with global foreign competition (Mann 2013: 231). This seemed to work, and the reforms were saved. It has been argued that if NEP had been allowed to stall or be reversed, economic growth and success would not have achieved the heights we are now familiar with (Hofman and Wu 2009). Further economic restructuring was prepared; NEP was to move up to a new level representing a take-off of growth.

From 1992, partial or complete privatisation of both SOEs and TVEs began, even though the latter had in practice moved from the sphere of the state in the earlier phase, having been forced to do so by lack of state support, which made them self-reliant. Government favoured up-scaling of both industry and agriculture into larger units to benefit from economies of scale. In consequence, the number of workers employed by the state fell dramatically, and the private sector grew (Yang 2004). By 2000, industrial production levels had accelerated to the fastest rate of any known industrialisation, coming to constitute more than sixty per cent of GDP (Wu 2004). This aligned China firmly to the global economy, and made it reliant on it thereafter.

As part of further reform, the previous inflexible relationship between the state enterprises (SOEs) and the state ministries was loosened, and flexible standardised contracts introduced between the two. There was in reality a two-track dual system, which left some state companies deemed to be producing essential products as slaves to the plan, while others were free to operate outside it. The overall

effect was to open up at least half of SOEs to market forces which made them more efficient, productive and able to compete with the foreign ‘open door’ sectors of the economy. Workers lost their ‘job for life’ benefits, and could now be dismissed for poor work and performance. However, SOEs seen as ‘essential industries’ involving oil, gas, minerals and construction (some of which operate now in Africa) remained protected, and continued to make losses and require heavy state subsidy; as much as forty per cent of this sector remains insolvent and loss-making. Poor management, lack of product innovation, and product duplication where too many factories make the same things, have been indicated as the source of state industry weaknesses and failure (Coase and Wang 2013: 134-7). Yet the feebleness of SOEs was more than made up for by reinvigorated private industry especially TVE sector during NEP 2.

On the financial front, tax reform took place from 1994 making taxation more stable, predictable and less predatory. Tax reforms for the first time favoured TVEs, placing them on an even footing to SOEs. This finally represented official recognition of their economic importance compared with the less efficient state sector. From 1998, TVEs were for the first time allowed to raise stock capital from the Chinese Stock Exchange which had been established in 1991 and this, along with easier access to bank credit, boosted both their size, output and innovation potential. Previously only state companies had been allowed to float their assets on the Exchange. Collective and small-scale enterprises were the losers now in access to state credit, given that policy had shifted to large private firms (Mann 2013).

Successful Chinese economic change of the sort that we take for granted today, was not a forgone conclusion. The reforms might have failed or stalled, resulting in the emergence of a large but not particularly impressive middle-income nation. Achieving the status of one of the world’s richest and biggest manufacturers was not an inevitable outcome of the reforms as late as 1995, and Deng’s policies and experimental initiatives were opposed from the start by strong factions and other leaders in the CCP (Coase and Wang 2013). As was seen, the economic reforms were nearly halted between 1989 and 1991 by a campaign to ‘get back to socialism’. NEP 2 put China

irreversibly back on track, its economy largely decentralised, now with a large private sector, stronger than ever before.

China has arguably entered a renewed stage of economic adjustment, this time with a strong political impulse. In 2014 China elected a new president, Xi Jinping, who has been accused of reversing de-centralisation and accruing central power, as previous Chinese leaders attempted to do. Jin (2016) argues that Xi's policies are not a return to the days of Mao and dictatorial leadership. There may be another side to this, being one that is intended to save the reforms. The problem the new president is addressing is the substantial autonomy that the municipal authorities and provincial governments have gained under NEP. They have considerable freedom to attract foreign and local investment, control development resources and monopolise the reforms, but not necessarily for the national benefit. They control enormous capital resources, accounting for 71 per cent of total public expenditures (Jin 2016). While being a cornerstone of China's reforms, decentralisation has prompted corruption and cronyism on a massive scale within factions that challenge central government itself. Powerful local, regional officials and business elites have emerged, representing hitherto untouchable cliques who divert substantial development resources into private hands, and starve genuine businesses of much-needed investment, and keep down wages for the majority of Chinese making them relatively (rather than absolutely) poor. Less influential Chinese citizens have had land and businesses forcibly taken from them by this new class.

Xi Jinping therefore sees the reforms as critically under threat, and is reverting elements of regional and local power back to central authority, accompanied by a far-reaching anti-corruption campaign. Several powerful regional party figures have been arrested and sentenced. Mann (2013) supports Jin's analysis, stating this to be a serious problem for the regime. It is undermining public trust in the CCP, even its legitimacy in the eyes of the Chinese public who tend to be victims of illegal land seizures and patrimonial practices by corrupt officials (Mann 2013: 240). Mann indicates that this represents a well-entrenched and parasitic 'rentier capitalism' where officials and their networks squeeze wealth from state, private

business and ordinary citizens, to the detriment of investment and national economic health.

Jin (2016) argues that the campaign against these factions is a positive thing, and once the system has been cleansed China will enter a new resurgent phase of dynamic and sustainable economic growth. Resources will be diverted back to development, worker's wages can rise, and trust in the CCP can be restored. However, there is opposition to the zeal with which Xi Jinping is pursuing anti-corruption measures, even from within his own government. It remains unclear yet if he will succeed, or even survive as China's premier (Guardian Newspaper, 8 July 2016). If this happens, the reforms may go off-track and social unrest may develop as elite factions seek maximum personal, and corrupt, rent-returns rather than economic growth.

Reform, State planning and organisation: The secret development factor?

Summarising the key points of the Chinese 'model', it can be said that the reforms promoted the following. First, they freed up agriculture from the constraints of collective organisation, and released the creative energies of the peasants in commercial farming. Production rose significantly, and released resources for industrial investment. Second, the establishment of town and village enterprises (TVEs) created a relatively autonomous and dynamic manufacturing sector that outstripped the cumbersome state sector (SOEs). By the 1990s TVEs were the most productive manufacturing sector incorporating both foreign and local firms which were exporting into the world economy and returning considerable wealth back to China that enriched the government and led to further economic reinvestment – a virtuous cycle. Third, this connects with an overruling principle: that the economy manufactures primarily for global rather than local consumer demand. This has made China the biggest exporter of goods on the planet. In recent years, Chinese people have begun to materially enjoy what they work hard for and make.

A fourth factor was state banking (there are no genuinely independent private banks in China) which directly serviced and

funded the development of industrial, agricultural and infrastructural capacity. Banking only worked successfully in phase two of NEP once the state owned enterprises ceased to monopolise and be favoured for credits, and when the TVEs were allowed to escape state-imposed 'credit hunger'. The banks were also central for China's large-scale infrastructural projects of road building, electrification, water conservation, transport and city building that swept over and transformed China after 1980.

Fifth, the conscious state promotion of Andreas's (2008) 'new class' of technocratic engineering and business leaders was crucial. Deng Xiaoping's leadership replaced, on merit, old 'political' managers with graduates emerging out of the new universities (where considerable investment and expansion also took place). These possessed the industrial and managerial skills the economy required, and they administered and led the reforms both from inside and outside the state, creating institutional capacity which quickly grew into a critical mass of knowledge and experience. Finally, at the root of NEP was the Open Door policy. It substituted and overcame a chronic shortage of capital, and poor managerial and lack of technological expertise in China's economy by inviting in the world's most successful manufacturing companies. The state courted them in providing EPZ and SPZ centres of operation where sophisticated modern infrastructure was provided, and an inexpensive (some might argue 'cheap') workforce. But this was on strict conditions of collaboration and partnership whereby skills and technology transfer took place. Shrewd and highly educated state negotiators from China's 'new class' proved exceptional host negotiators with foreign capital, ensuring that full benefits accrued to the Chinese State. From these axial partnerships, China's own local industrial capacity grew and accumulated. In its dealing with foreign business and other nations, the Chinese State has been exceptionally shrewd and nationalistic.

Understanding the organisational factors behind these reforms requires insight into the Chinese state itself, and how it positioned itself to undertake industrial development post-1980 – an aspect not so far discussed. As Mann (2013) has argued, the CCP fiercely valued and generously rewarded education and talent. While it cherished

loyalty among party personnel, other ideals were paramount. Mann (2013: 232) states:

The party was in its own way meritocratic. The main criteria for promotion were a proven ability to foster growth, to create employment, to attract FDI, to control social unrest. Local officials who promoted growth were allowed to keep much of their surplus for reinvestment, while success at the local level was rewarded with promotion into the [central] government hierarchy.

Mann's comments emphasise the profoundly practical and goal-orientated mind-set of contemporary Chinese government rule, which offers much that African governments pursuing the economic transformation of their own societies can learn. Primary state developmental institutions further support this thinking, representing the organisational imperative that holds the development model together.

Two state institutions direct China's development. The CCP's *Organisation Department*, and its economic body the *Communist Party Leading Group on Economics and Finance*, both jointly guiding development growth. The Organisation Department combines both political and economic direction. It has a major personnel role in appointing regional governors, mayors, the heads of the largest state companies, judges, even heads of the universities. As was said above, education and the capacity to deliver and achieve economic or managerial success are the main selection criteria; in other words, managers are chosen on merit. It ensures that the right people fill the key positions in both state and economy (McGregor 2010). On the other hand, the role of the Communist Party Leading Group is primarily to bring together state and economy through several Leading Small Groups of ministers, experts, company managers and regional officials. The main leading group is headed by the president himself. It monitors the financial sector to ensure that capital funds are used properly, deters banks from over-lending, controls inflation, and tells the Central Bank of China how to set interest rates. It is the macroeconomic centre of the development model. It controls the stock exchange where the state monopolises 70 per cent of shares

and, indirectly, Chinese bonds held by the banks (Walter and Howie 2003). The Communist Party Leading Group retains a pragmatic guiding role in terms of the reforms, encouraging further innovation, dealing with structural imbalances, courting new foreign investors, and suppressing any threats or challenges to the economy that may arise.

Mann (2013) says that this does not seem like capitalism. So what type of state is the Chinese one? Under Mao, capitalism was firmly suppressed and tended to look like state socialism, albeit one that constantly undermined itself. Under Deng, the reform period produced a more or less pragmatic and technocratic state socialism. After his death in 1997, and as an unintended consequence of NEP, a dynamic state market economy emerged, with socialist characteristics confined to the SOE sector (Mann 2013: 229-30). It has been called 'state capitalism' (Anderson 2010) or elsewhere 'authoritarian capitalism' (Halper 2010). Coase and Wang (2013) are critical of these statist labels arguing that they only applied in the early stages of NEP, insisting that China now represents mostly market capitalism. For the Chinese government, they say, this is an unintended outcome of the reforms. They contend that the guiding organisational role of the Chinese Communist Party has in recent years been exaggerated. China's economic success came down largely to a freeing up of entrepreneurial forces that were waiting to be released, and to gradual state withdrawal:

Time and again, the Chinese government was taken by surprise – when starving peasants proved the superiority of private farming and township and village enterprises; when formerly unemployed city residents earned higher incomes than [protected] state employees; when Shenzhen was quickly transformed from a fishing village to an urban centre in South China and a hub of capitalism. China's transformation into a rising economic power certainly did not come about through the deliberate and patient designs of an omniscient government (Coase and Wang 2013: 175).

Yet this stark neoliberalist argument is inexplicable in dismissing state guidance behind NEP and later policies, and is hard to accept.

Chinese development and its rapid pace cannot be understood without reference to the highly practical and intelligent state guidance underlying it. Yes, there has been partial state withdrawal from areas of the economy where success is entrenched; but the state has undoubtedly been instrumental in China's development success, and it has ensured continued economic progress in difficult circumstances even in the face of the global economic downturn from 2008. It has a committed and highly educated state elite which ensures the highest economic investment rate of any global economy. The Chinese state also provides order in a huge and potentially volatile nation, an important commodity during an often disruptive phase of modernisation, and markets do not automatically provide this (Mann 2013). Statism speeded up and aided recent economic development, allowing China to catch up rapidly with other global economies – an example for Africa which faces the same socio-economic challenges China faced after the death of Mao in 1976. China appears to undermine the wisdom of neoliberal economists who argue that the state is an anathema to economic growth. China's skill is in managing a dynamic balance between political state guidance and private sector creativity. Of course, China is not democratic yet. The people do not choose their leaders, the CCP does, and citizens continue to see their living standards held back by a macroeconomic policy bias toward investment rather than domestic consumption as part of the Chinese state's financially repressive export-led strategy. Per capita income has risen only moderately in recent years, and remains below US\$8000 per annum – comparable to middle-income African countries such as South Africa, Botswana and Namibia (Financial Times, 22 January 2016). The central role of the state might mean that authoritarianism persists or worsens, but there is little evidence of a move in this negative direction at present (Jin 2016).

What are the lessons of all this for African countries? We turn to this next.

Applying the Chinese development model: China-Africa industrial development strategies

Can China stimulate industrial growth and achieve prosperity for Africa? Some of its collaborations, state engagements and business projects indicate it potentially can. China's presence in Africa and its investment practices have been admittedly highly uneven, with good practices and bad – no different to Western nations in this respect (Brautigam 2015). Yet fundamentally, its own extraordinary industrial model offers the greatest lessons and potential for African states. Of course, the China development model is not automatically exportable to sub-Saharan Africa in an unadjusted or un-adapted form (Naughton 2010). China signifies markedly different geography, culture, politics, even national psychologies than those found across the diverse states of Africa. That said, the China industrial strategy undertaken between 1980 and 2000 offers invaluable insights for African transformations, given that China in 1980 faced similar levels of poverty, underdevelopment and lack of industrialisation as sub-Saharan Africa does today.

How might Chinese development principles and planning assist industrial development on the African continent? The China model presents several areas of interest for sub-Saharan African development, but ones that imply challenges and a change of thinking and institutions. Naughton (2010), Lin and Wang (2014), and Matunhu (2013) propose ways forward here.

Naughton (2010) offers six conjectures for other nations seeking a similarly rapid industrial path based on China's recent development. A preliminary conjecture is suggested, that adaptability and flexibility are keys to development success. Deng Xiaoping coined the term "crossing the river by groping for stepping stones" which expresses an experimental approach; national leaders learn from mistakes, and are prepared to make correction in the course ahead (Naughton 2010: 439). This involves self-criticism and admissions of policy failure. Naughton's main six conjectures then follow. First, *public ownership can be reasonably efficient, and a mixed economy is a decent model of industrial organisation*. This goes against neo-liberal orthodoxy which promotes free markets and minimal states, but Naughton argues that

privatisation has not in the past worked well for continents like Africa. Certainly, in the early stages of development, mixed economies and planning can work well so long as states and their governments develop reasonably disciplined frameworks of effective administration for civil servants to operate within, and to develop policies that guide economic growth. Africa would need to establish strong organisational and creative state structures for this. This is not an argument against privatisation, but for restraining monopoly power; dealing with market failures and inefficiencies; fostering education, training and human resource development; ensuring national security in times of difficult modernisation; as well as ensuring that important areas of national interest such as public services, energy and water supplies are protected – although state services must be efficient and competitive in line with the rest of the economy. China maintained macroeconomic planning and stability through public ownership of certain key economic areas, and this could work for African countries under the right administrative instruments.

Naughton's second conjecture is that *competition is more important than ownership*. Africa requires a more competitive economic environment as a driver of behavioural change where there are as few restraints as possible on potential wealth creators. This is an 'early stage' lesson. China has shown that the old Western theorem that economies first and foremost need large-scale private individual ownership is false, competition being the central driving factor for development. Competition is also essential for state sector economic activity, and the Chinese state ensured that state owned enterprises were forced to compete with each other in the same areas (in services as well as industry) to overcome stagnationist monopoly practices. It is possible for the state, including African ones, to "achieve public objectives and maintain a light touch on the market itself" (Naughton 2010: 444). Competition, within certain restraints, is one of the main pillars of China's success, and can be so for Africa. Countries like Nigeria tend to have this already in addition to a strong competitive spirit – the reason why it is now Africa's largest economy. Other African countries have it much less and monopoly and special (sometimes corrupt) interests hold back development.

Third, *public ownership can be used to exploit market power and generate investment revenues*. Chinese growth points to oligopolistic markets as more profitable than either monopolies or totally open competition. This however misses that Chinese SOEs are often the weaker sectors of its economy; but they ensure control over important areas of key economic activity. Can this be significant for Africa? Africans have supported and promoted this point, viewing African state owned enterprises (ASOEs) as significant: “If African SOEs are commercialised (they remain state-owned but are run like private corporations), they can generate profits for national development. SOEs should, therefore, play an active role in the exploitation of Africa’s vast natural resources to ensure that the profits derived from such activities benefit the citizens” (New Africa Magazine, 11 November 2014). Naughton himself is unconcerned by the critiques of Western economists like Coase and Wang (2013) who dismiss China’s SOEs as the weak link in the China economy. On the contrary, they plan for the long term as significant investors rather than seeking short-term profit.

Naughton’s (2010) fourth conjecture follows this last point, stating that *a strategy of investment-led growth is essential, and investment should go ahead of growth*. Private and state businesses – and indeed the state itself – invested heavily in China’s economy and ensured speedy development. Africa must do the same, investing substantially by whatever means into present and future growth, but avoiding predatory rent-seeking taxation by the state which undermines general development investment. China’s extraordinary growth since 1994 validates the importance of a high investment policy as a means to build industrial capacity and infrastructure, and to avoid developmental bottlenecks (Naughton 2010: 450). Both public officials and private entrepreneurs can contribute to growth in a dual state-private sector investment led push. Fifth, *for a state-orientated polity, the state sector can be used aggressively to create growth*. China has rarely respected the dividing lines between public and private, or state and private economy. China’s government invests for the payoff benefit to both sides. State rather than private sector has developed infrastructure well ahead of the private economic sphere. Unlike in Africa, the state in China could not rely on or wait for private

business to develop its infrastructure; and growth was pushed ruthlessly for increased social and economic capacity. This principle can be easily transferred to Africa where there can be successful spin-offs from public expenditure. Chinese state companies in Africa (their SOEs undertake most infrastructural development on the continent) are already setting an example in the DRC, Nigeria, Uganda and Angola. African states can use revenues to speed up the process, including in quickly expanding the currently small number of SEZs – again an initiative of the Chinese. Not everything can be left to Chinese investors; but they can help Africans plan this given their own successful experiences. This will have an automatic benefit for the private sector in Africa. Sixth, and last of Naughton's (2010) conjectures: *Managers of publicly-owned corporations can be motivated by tying their compensation to their company's performance in maximising asset value.* China has motivated state and private managers to deliver on developmental performance from NEP onward, making them think in terms of their economic assets having real value, and seeing resources (and investment) as scarce. Efficiency and good management is the lesson here. The Chinese state recognised that to achieve this a system of rewards must be in place using three-year performance contracts which included a points system of performance measured through profits, asset management and equity value. This strikes a “reasonable balance between efficiency, growth, profit and value” (Naughton 2010: 453). Incentive payments are linked to all three. Naughton says that this can be applied to many developing countries, and is probably essential among African (or other nation's) state sector managers to ensure effective management of development. These conjectures or principles can be constructively applied to African development, but would require new forms of state organisation and management – and often new personnel, meritocratically appointed.

What other lessons can be readily transferred? Lin and Wang (2014) emphasise the importance of SEZ development and the Open Door policy which worked spectacularly well for China's advance. This was extensively discussed earlier, and indicated to be an important area for any African development model. It is extremely important that African governments work both with Chinese, but

also a broad range of other investors, including Western ones; they cannot limit economic cooperation solely to China – as some try to do. Asian development, including China's, was open to all; even old colonisers like Britain, but under close scrutiny to ensure national interests were met. Strong links with other African economies in the sub-Saharan region needs to be built, so as to not rely on the West or others and become dependent (Matunhu 2013). This could be in the form of a continent wide 'common market' like the European Union.

Education and training must be a further priority. Higher education development is institutionally crucial for Africa for international and indigenous knowledge transmission among African populations. China invested heavily in higher education and technical training to produce its own new development class, and Africa must value and invest similarly. African education is rarely an object for Western aid and investment, yet China has made school and university building, along with technical training and human resource growth, a priority in its dealings with Africa (Chan 2013). Africa must do more, and help teachers and learners to experience levels of investment that would make the teaching and acquirement of practical and theoretical knowledge easier than at present through virtuous resource support and funding. A university degree in Africa is for many a way out of ignorance and poverty, and confers great confidence on the achiever to socially and economically perform (Chan 2013).

Africa's persistent economic weakness since colonialism has been its failure to benefit from its abundance of land. China's New Economic Policy may have had to address a different situation whereby crop production was held back by land shortage and bureaucratic collectivism; this is not found in contemporary Africa. The lesson from China's NEP agriculture experiences are rooted in the creation of motivated commercial farmers with ownership of production and competitive motivation to produce. As a recent article argued, "Africa can make agriculture a key driver of its economy by being involved in the entire value chain" from sowing to harvest to value-adding via processing (New Africa, 11 November 2014). Full commercialisation and utilisation of agriculture beyond its present predominant subsistence structures, would generate

industrial and infrastructural investment capital, overcome African food dependency, and have a positive spill-over effect for African economies.

Last, and vitally important, as Sandrey and Edinger (2011: 27) have said, “is that Africa’s economic policies, governance and institutions have been far weaker than in many successful Asian economies.” Many African state systems would require total reform and transformation, and would need to develop what Mann (2013) has called ‘organisational power’, capable of extensive and intensive capacity, to regulate and lead national development. It will also require a new and highly educated generation of leaders – an African ‘new class’ – to lead the reformed government structures. The Chinese State managed to free-up and reform itself after 1980, and become a quintessential development state with enormous capacity to shape and direct a nation of one-fifth of humanity, covering a vast geographic space. State craft and government reform tends to be an area that China is well-placed to advise on. Perhaps they are better-positioned than Western states today, currently in thrall to neo-liberalism and free markets, where the state has become minimal. A Western state model, aloof from its traditional role of keeping order and providing leadership, would be less suited than a Chinese one for African conditions of modernisation and change. Markets alone cannot ensure social and economic stability as the state withdraws from its old responsibilities. Yet China’s state, despite the authoritarian excesses of Tiananmen in 1989 and its current paranoia regarding social dissent, has been markedly successful in avoiding serious social and economic breakdown. African leaders have much to learn here. As the Nigerian author, Chinua Achebe, once said of his own country, “the Nigerian problem is the unwillingness or inability of its leaders to rise to the responsibility, to the challenge of the personal example, which are the hallmarks of true leadership” (BBC News, 30 November 2015). Maybe China’s new class can show Africa’s rising new class how this might be done.

Concluding remarks: Changing China-Africa relations

As Naughton (2010) has stated, the Chinese system of development will continue to evolve flexibly and experimentally. So

too will sub-Saharan Africa's own search for prosperity and independent development. China can be a valuable partner and a key player, but it cannot be the only development player, and Africa must adopt an equivalent of the Open Door policy. Yet China is well-placed to further invest materially in Africa's emergent development, and its influence is already firmly in place in nations such as Angola, Nigeria, and Uganda to name those where its presence is currently strongest.

Certain areas of China-Africa collaboration need to be carefully managed by African governments. These are: dealing with Chinese urban small-trader activities in large numbers where they undermine local traders through under-selling and artificially depressing local price structures; curbing large Chinese state companies importing their own workforce and minimally employing African workers; ensuring that labour law is observed, along with environmental safety; ruling out corrupt practices whereby Chinese businesses pass on illegal benefits to politicians and their client networks in return for business rights or tenders; allowing Chinese (or any other) citizens to stay on in Africa when Chinese companies leave, without checking that their stay involves definite benefits to the African country in question; favouring only China investments to the exclusion of other genuine and provably beneficial investor nations (Dollar 2016).

Beyond these drawbacks, there are real and tangible benefits to be gained from a reformed collaboration with China. Africa does well from the existing relationship – contrary to unreasonable sensationalist pronouncements of Western journalists. Things can change further from China's side. It can help further with infrastructural development: new roads, rail, ports, electricity stations, more hospitals and universities – but working with local partner companies much more than at present. It can extend its investments into health and education to greater degrees to alleviate the physical effects of African poverty and to raise intellectual capacity. China can be instrumental in enhancing African manufacturing to bring it in line with levels of industrialisation in other developing nations, with increasingly less emphasis on mineral extraction – this would silence its fiercest critics. China can help African business management practices (state or private) to reach

levels of efficiency best suited for development success. It can ensure that its focus is increasingly on benefiting African citizens in its investments much more than private political or business elites. An equal and respectful partnership can thereby emerge with China, and there is much to learn from their model of socio-economic change.

A mutually beneficial China-Africa relationship is possible if investors and African political leaders re-orientate current thinking. The Sino writers Lin and Wang (2014: 23) express present drawbacks as follows:

China needs to learn to become a better development partner, by listening to the voices from Africans and interacting with partner governments, NGOs, and civil societies, and China needs to be more open and transparent in providing accurate data on international development financing activities.

China does not always help its own public image in this regard. Yet despite public relations lapses, China seems no worse than Western investors as a development partner. In many respects, it is a better partner, and sees acutely the continent's development gaps and how to pursue the opportunities that will improve Africa's economies. It is a pity that Western economic players, their governments and journalists cannot always appreciate this. So, is China beneficially 'for' Africa, or is Africa for China, in the sense that China alone benefits from investment relationships? The answer is complex, involving good relations, occasionally bad relations; but ultimately the partnership is a valuable one that can be built on further. It can be 'China and Africa for each other' rather than merely giving substantial advantage to one side alone.

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Logical Fallacies in African Development Debates

Ephraim Taurai Gwaravanda

Introduction

This chapter examines current debates on African development discourse and argues that uncritical and fallacious reasoning is partly responsible for some of Africa's [under-] development problems. Firstly, the chapter explores the fallacy of composition where parts (in this case economic/ scientific/ technological development) are erroneously concluded as the whole (in this case to represent development in general).

Development is a complex phenomenon with many facets yet economic development is often identified with the whole notion of development. In addition, scientific and technological developments are also understood as identical to development itself. The fallacious reasoning involved often sidelines moral and religious development, among other important dimensions, in conceptualising development. It shall be argued that all key facets of development are intertwined and overemphasis of one dimension at the expense of others results in problems. For example, if economic and political developments are overemphasised at the expense of spiritual and moral development, the result is corrupt and immoral society.

Secondly, the chapter examines the impact of the fallacy of hasty generalisation in the African development thinking. While Africa is a continent made out of fifty-four countries, development failures in a few of the fifty-four countries results in rushed and generalised conclusions about the whole of Africa as a continent. It may be important to group nations in carrying out studies, the richness and diversity of African states is lost in the process of generalisations. Such reasoning fails to take account of real differences between and among African states thereby distorting and exaggerating the problems in the African continent.

The third fallacy often committed in attempts to think about African development is the fallacy of false dichotomy. The false dichotomy is often characterised in ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ and this fallacy results in dualistic thinking that gives the contrast between backward and advanced, undeveloped and developed. This kind of flawed reasoning undermines African indigenous notions about development and endorses Western mentality about development. The falsity of the dichotomy is also seen in attempts to create dualisms in metaphysics, epistemology and ethics resulting in a false and fragmented reality of development.

The fourth fallacy to be examined in this chapter is the fallacy of false cause. Attempts to examine the causes of African underdevelopment often leads to continued blame of colonialism and its ills. However, the fallacy of false cause occurs when African states continue to blame the West even in cases where failure is a result of ill-conceived internal policies and other such problems detached from colonialism.

Fifthly, the fallacy of irrelevant appeal to authority is committed in attempts to think about African development. The authority appealed to can be either external or internal to African conditions and realities. The appeal to foreign economic theories, for example, to justify economic structural adjustment programmes for African countries has resulted in harmful consequences to African populations. Africa requires home grown and indigenous theories of development and not foreign based theories. Internally, some African leaders appeal to the authority of liberation struggle fighters even in cases where liberation fighters’ ideas have to be revisited, criticised and evaluated for the sake of progress. The fallacies identified may individually and jointly block critical thinking that is necessary for initiating and propelling African development.

Conceptual Analysis:

Africa

The term “Africa” is philosophically problematic and it cannot be taken for granted because of inherent complexities and contradictions involved in the term. Wamba-dia-Wamba (1991:10)

traces the etymology of the term “Africa” from the Greek “Aphrika” meaning “not cold”, from Latin “Aprica” meaning sunny and from “Afriga” meaning the land of the “Afrigs” the Roman term for the people living south of the Roman empire. Wamba-dia-Wamba (ibid) argues that “Africa is a term which comes from comparative awareness of differentiation from a European point of view.” It is a European attempt at grasping an un-European difference. European philosophy has been theorising this difference not as positive other but as a colonisable target.” Ramose (2003:114) argues that the origin of the term “Africa” depicts weather elements and it fails to be a self-category among Africans themselves. Ramose’s observation entails that the term “Africa” is not a product of self-understanding by Africans but it is a result of European attempts to understand difference.

The question of African development is linked closely with issues of African philosophy. Philosophical thinking about Africa influence developmental conceptions of “Africa” in the sense that Western assumptions, prejudices and misconceptions about Africa are responsible for current levels of African [under] development. Mudimbe (1998) argues that the notion of superiority of Western philosophy over African modes of thought is part of a wider Western ideological plot rather than a fact. The debate on African philosophy is part of a wider and more complex discourse invented and maintained by Europe as an aspect of the epistemological order through which Europe has aimed at affirming itself in opposition to others. Knowledge is the epitome of European power against which all other people should be compared and judged. Rationality is defined and based upon the Western epistemological code and used as a yardstick of judgement against others. In order to justify and maintain the hegemony of power, the West invented the image of “primitive” Africa. The “primitiveness” is not a factual reality, but a myth or fiction created for epistemological domination and power. Out of the project, anthropology as a study of primitive societies became a historical necessity.

Palmberg (2001:198) argues that the term “Africa” is an ideological construct born in Europe and is as old as European penetration and exploitation of Africa. As an ideological construct,

the term “Africa” fails to meet the self-understanding of Africans themselves. The name Africa, however, was chiefly applied by Europeans to the northern coast of the continent, which was in effect regarded as a southern extension of Europe. Zeleza (2006:14) sees African identities as “existential and epistemic” constructions. Zeleza’s observation points to the fact that while there is an extent of reality contained in the term “Africa” as shown in the adjective ‘existential’ there are also knowledge based conceptions that are captured by the word ‘epistemic’. The origins of the term “Africa” is foreign in derivation and the term is not derived from the self-understanding of the indigenous people themselves. The term started to be used from the Roman times to refer to “North Africa” (ibid). By the end of the first century before our era, the term “Africa” was extended to the rest of the continent (ibid). The name was a European imperial construct which was contradictory in nature because it was extended to the rest of the continent that for them was supposed to be divorced from each other. The epistemic sense of “Africa” arose out of “the emergence of Eurocentricism following the rise of modern Europe” (ibid). The racialised view of “Africa” sees the continent as consisting of North Africa and Africa south of the Sahara or black Africa. “Africa is seen as biology or the black continent” (ibid). The conception of Africa as black rests on the metaphysics of difference (ibid). The metaphysics of difference is a quest for “cultural ontology of blackness” (ibid). North Africa is surprisingly attached to Europe where history, philosophy and culture is erroneously believed to exist. Hegel sees Africa as undeveloped and unhistorical (ibid). The racialised cartography of ‘sub-saharan Africa’ is not only confirmed by Western scholars but by some mistaken African scholars as well and this gives problems in understanding the development of Africa (Ibid: 16). “Africa is seen as a fiction in relation to the reality of Europe, Whiteness, Christianity, Literacy, Development and Technology” (ibid). The continent is reduced to particular images, to a state of lack. Africa is also understood as a historical geography-the intersection of both geography and history (Zeleza, 2006:17). Landscapes are not only important aspects of culture, but are products of historical processes (ibid). “Appiah as cited by Zeleza (2006:17), seeks to demolish

essentialist conceptions of Africa and show that Africa is not only primordial fixture, but an invented reality and Africans are not moulded from the same clay of racial and cultural homogeneity.” This view of Africa is a celebration of complexity, richness, hybridity and contingency of African identities. It attacks the duality of both European imperialism and African nationalism. For the purposes of African development, the richness and diversity of Africa ought to be acknowledged the narrowness of prejudices about Africa should be challenged.

Development

Thomas (2004:1-2) asserts that “development is contested both theoretically and politically and it is inherently both complex and ambiguous.” The “complexity” of development is revealed in the multiplicity of factors that can be used to determine development. These include, among others, economic, political, social, cultural, religious and technological factors. The “ambiguity” of development is seen in several meanings that the concept of development entails. Gyekye (2013:31) identifies the following lexical definitions of the verb “to develop”: (1) to set forth or make clear degrees or in detail; to make visible or manifest (2) to work out the possibilities of (3) to promote the growth of (4) to cause to unfold gradually (5) to acquire gradually (6) to expand the process of growth. Though lexical definitions may appear narrow for philosophical considerations, they also contribute to the credibility of philosophical definitions. Philosophy should be in agreement with the usage of words in daily life before it can develop technical terms. The term ‘development’ is generally understood etymologically to mean “expansion by a process of growth’ or ‘growth and differentiation of some entity along lines natural to its kind” (Keita, 2011:115). Gyekye (Ibid: 32) finds problems in equating “growth” with “development” because interchangeable use of the two terms implies conceptually equating them. “Growth” is a physical and sensory concept measured in quantitative terms while “development” is a behavioural concept (ibid). Development goes beyond mere growth and it should be seen in terms of “adequate responses to the environment in all its complexities” Gyekye (Ibid: 35). The “environment” does not just

point to physical surroundings but “the whole gamut of socio-cultural conditions which impinge on the life of the community, the complex of existential conditions or circumstances in which humans beings live, move and have their being” Gyekye (ibid). The conditions would include “social, cultural, economic, political, technological and moral conditions” Gyekye (ibid). Adequate responses refer to “the ability to face squarely the problems and challenges generated by those complex circumstances and to deal with them effectively. Gyekye’s conception of development has the advantage of multidimensionality and as a result, the problems of development are pluralistic in nature. This opens up for three key implications of development.

Firstly, development is based on the exercise of rationality “it is a directed and purposive activity” (ibid: 41). It also implies the need for a human agent to do the development as such. The indicators of development such as high industrial output, high levels of food production, viable political systems and technological advancements are thought of, deliberated upon, planned and produced by human beings. This points to the rationality and creativity of development. It involves the use of mental powers by human beings and the effective use of “strategies, methods and systems” (ibid: 42). Ideas begin with individuals but the participation of others brings the ideas to realization. Political, economic and social institutions must be open and accessible to all members of the society. The second implication of development is that development has an ethical character. Linked to the lexical definitions, development involves progress, advancement, forward movement. Each of the terms implies a goal or direction because one can only progress or advance towards a goal or direction. Development must be “guided and underpinned by a set of goals rationally and consciously defined” (Gyekye, 2013: 42). These goals are “values cherished by society” Gyekye (2013: 42). The rational pursuit of a goal presupposes a value judgment because goals are judged to be worthwhile, valuable or desirable. The statement that ‘a nation is developing’ is a “concealed moral statement and derives from the moral appreciation or assessment of what may be seen as achievable regarding the conditions of people in society. The ultimate goal of the development

of every human society is well-being, or satisfaction of the basic needs of its people. The purpose of development lies in improving human lives. UNDP (1996) maintains that development should be linked to humankind. Human development measurements are life expectancy, adult literacy, access to education (primary, secondary and tertiary) and improved average income, which is a necessary condition for freedom of choice. Development therefore aims at overall wellbeing of society. For UNDP (1996: 10), “human development is the end and economic growth is the means. So the purpose of development is to enrich people’s lives.”

Thirdly, the framework of development must be the culture of a people (ibid: 44). This means that attitudes, habits, behaviour patterns, mental outlooks, values, institutions and social practices are important considerations in development. The framework for development is the culture of a people. Development should fulfil the socio-cultural needs of individuals in society.

Ajei (2007: 22) identifies three related but distinct aspects of development. The first is a development concept that contains the answer to the question ‘what is development’. The focus of a development concept is on what ought to be understood in development. The ‘ought’ points to the value-laden nature of the concept. The second aspect is development theory “that determines how development objectives can be promoted” (ibid). A development theory examines conditions that can either facilitate or reduce progress. A development strategy consists of “actions and interventions” (ibid) that can be used to promote development objectives.

A number of scholars link development with overall wellbeing of members of the society. Todaro (1997:16) maintains that development is about enhancing the power of people to secure three basic values of human development, namely, life-sustenance, self-esteem and freedom from servitude. Life-sustenance is “the ability of people to provide basic needs such as food, shelter and health protection” (ibid.). Self-esteem gives individual confidence in realising one’s potentialities and talents. Freedom provides individuals with unrestricted choices and alternatives. These factors may appear psychological but they are important in development

since economic, social, cultural and religious factors must translate to human development in the ultimate analysis. Wetmore and Theron (1998: 92) take human development to community level and argue that development should provide community capacity and empowerment in terms of self-reliance and control over economic resources. Community capacity is very important because it translates to the benefit of individual members. Swanepoel and De Beer (2006: 26) identify happiness, dignity and self-reliance as psychological aspects of human development. This means that economic, political, cultural, scientific and technological dimensions of development must be taken as means to enhance individual well-being. For Todaro and Smith (2006: 17) development is a process meant for equitable social and economic transformation of the society through institutionalized social structures and people's positive attitudes for an accelerated and increased growth and poverty eradication. The point is that development should meet ethical demands of justice and fairness for the wellbeing of members of the society.

Fallacy

Irving Copi (1961: 52) defines a fallacy as “a form of argument that seems to be correct but which proves, upon careful examination, not to be so.” The examination of arguments reveals both inductive and deductive flaws. Failure to meet correctness is a result of deductive invalidity where the conclusion does not follow necessarily from given premises. It also entails inductive weakness where too little evidence is used to establish a conclusion. According to Hurley (1985: 118), a fallacy is a defect in an argument that consists in something other than merely false premises. A fallacy is a result of a mistake in reasoning or the creation of some illusion that makes a bad argument appear good (or both) Hurley (ibid). Informal fallacies are those that can be detected only through analysis of the content of the argument (ibid: 119).

Fallacies can be classified along several lines, *firstly*, they can be classified as either formal or informal. According to Dowden (2016:1) “a formal fallacy can be detected by examining the logical form of the reasoning, whereas an informal fallacy depends upon the content of the reasoning and possibly the purpose of the reasoning.”

Secondly, Dowden (ibid: 2) maintains that fallacies can be “deductive or inductive, depending upon whether the fallacious argument is most properly assessed by deductive standards or instead by inductive standards. Deductive standards demand validity but inductive standards require inductive strength such as making the conclusion more likely.” *Thirdly*, “fallacies can be divided into categories according to the psychological factors that lead people to use them, and they can also be divided into categories according to the epistemological or logical factors that cause the error” (ibid).

Fallacy of composition: Conceptualising development as exclusive economic or scientific growth

As highlighted in the introduction of this chapter, the fallacy of composition is committed when the conclusion of an argument depends on the erroneous transference of an attribute from the parts of something onto the whole. In other words, the fallacy occurs when it is argued that because the parts have a certain attribute, it follows that the whole has that attribute too and the situation is such that the attribute in question cannot be legitimately transferred from parts to whole (Hurley, 1985: 167). The fallacy of composition is indeed an informal fallacy. It cannot be discovered by a mere inspection of the form of an argument, that is, by the mere observation that an attribute is being transferred from parts onto the whole. In addition, detecting this fallacy requires a general knowledge of the situation and of the nature of the attribute being transferred.

According to Gyekye (2013: 29), the Western epistemological paradigm sees economic thinking in terms of exaggerated emphasis on measurable indexes of wealth and identification of economic development with the capacity of national economy to generate an annual increase in its gross national product of above 5%. Principles and categories of Western epistemological paradigm are used. The above Western views are described by Gyekye (ibid) as “economism.” Economism denigrates the values and knowledge system that sustain African indigenous economic organisation (Ibid: 30). Gyekye sees economism as misplaced and narrow because it overlooks historical, cultural and economic situations in the

philosophical conception of economic development (ibid). Economism falsely categorises people into wealthy and poor, developed and underdeveloped that are misleading in the African economic worldview (ibid). Gyekye sees the divisions as false because they leave out a third category of 'average wealth' and 'developing' in each category respectively. For Gyekye (ibid) economism is lopsided, inadequate and unrealistic because it fails to accommodate the complex nature of human society and culture. "Economism is fallacious because it identifies economic development with development yet a species cannot be identical with its genus" (ibid). According to Mawere (2014:14) "there are many examples of nations in the world whose economic growth was never followed by human development in terms of improving their quality of life." Mawere's observation is important because it shows the limitation of exclusive economic growth. Development should be seen in the context of the overall well-being of individuals within the society. Development should be subjected to moral evaluation. If development does not meet the needs of the people, then it becomes lopsided and inadequate. Economic growth may bring about material gain to the people, but development is much about enrichment of the lives of the people in the society (Edwards 1993: 80). This shows that development transcends mere economic wellbeing. The unrealistic assumptions, the narrowness and fallacies of economism justify the need for an African philosophy of development that meaningfully accommodates the African paradigm, historical and cultural circumstances that are necessary for an adequate conception of African development thinking.

The second tendency that commits the fallacy of composition is to measure development in terms of scientific or technological advancement. Okere (2005: 22) identifies three distinct definitions of science. The first is "a special activity or mode of being where human beings relate to reality from the perspective of truth" (Okere, 2005: 22). This conception of science is a definition of knowledge. In the second definition, science is understood as "the building of bodies of systems of truth about specified regions of reality following well defined methods" (ibid). The third understanding sees science as the study of matter using mathematical applications (ibid). The third

definition is the most restrictive and it has gained the greatest prominence. In the third definition, science is restricted to a fraction of reality and to one pathway of human knowledge: science is understood as plural and not one (ibid). While the restricted conception of science has produced technological success, it becomes “more of a science of the materially useful and less a science in the quest for truth, it becomes a know-how rather than a knowledge” (ibid). The restricted understanding of science is used for measuring the development levels of cultural groupings while neglecting their moral and spiritual attitudes towards developmental thinking. The marginalisation of metaphysical and epistemological perspectives in development justifies the need to critique the narrowness of scientism in conceptualising development. Science or technology is part but not the whole of development. It is, therefore, fallacious to identify a part with the whole. The goal here is to appraise the issue of development holistically, not only in terms of science, but also in terms of the history of ideas, political theory, sociology, social and political philosophy, and political economy (Keita, 2011a:xiv). Having seen the problem of the fallacy of composition, the chapter proceeds to the fallacy of hasty generalisation.

Fallacy of Hasty generalisation about African conditions and situations

An inductive generalisation is an argument that draws a conclusion about all members of a group from evidence that pertains to a selected sample. The fallacy of hasty generalisation occurs when there is a reasonable likelihood that the sample is not representative of the group. “Such likelihood may arise if the sample is either too small or not randomly selected” (Hurley, 1985:142). The most extreme form of the fallacy is proceeding from *one* individual to *all*. Africa is treated differently from other parts of the so-called Third World that is, South East Asia and Latin America. Africa is seen by the West as the most primitive and the most underdeveloped, the most miserable and the most incapable and the continent with the least culture (Palmberg, 2001:198). Africa is a continent with 54

countries, nearly 2000 languages and more than 750 million people (ibid). Cultural variety varies from the nomads in semi-arid lands to those permanently settled in the cities (ibid). Customs and habits of the people of Africa vary from Tunisia in the north to the kwaZulu of south-east South Africa (ibid). What is called traditional African religion means different rites for different communities (ibid). Africa is talked of as if its parts are interchangeable. Although one must concede that generalisations sometimes have to be made, neither the standards of language nor the need to summarise and be brief can be used to defend the sweeping generalizations about Africa (ibid). Europeans saw sameness in Africa yet Africans saw it as all difference. If the concept of Africa is not dissolved into smaller parts, it will be difficult to encounter culture in Africa. Generalisations are to the extent that “one African is all Africans” (Ibid: 199). Such a sweeping generalisation is not only untenable but it is also false and misleading. A picture of one Africa stands for all Africans with neither name nor place (ibid). Such a generalisation is sweeping and disingenuous. A well in the semi-arid areas of Mali becomes a waterhole in Africa and a Tanzanian woman working in the Savanna soils becomes the African peasant (ibid). Paradoxically, the pictures of the pyramids in Egypt are labelled Egyptian and not African. Shivj (1992: 36) warns against generalizations in writing about Africa when he asserts, “the term ‘Africa’ is symbolic in the sense that specific writings about Africa do not apply to the whole continent. Africa is complex and different countries have different problems. It is difficult to generalize about Africa. What can be discussed are broad trends as seen in the practice and experience of some African countries.

Due to such sweeping generalisations which are damaging and misleading, difference and diversity are given less space. The diversity of Africa is manifested in terms of language, social organization, religion, environment and cultural expression (Nugent, 2012:1). The instances cited in the fallacy of hasty generalisation above are not only against the laws of reasoning but they are also against scientific and statistical reasoning as applied to issues of development discourses around Africa. The fallacy of hasty generalisation blocks the ability to perceive differences in the African development debate. Failure to

see differences results in a false picture of reality. The false picture about the reality of Africa leads to failure to recognise the developmental needs of Africa. Development should be seen in terms of the economic, political, cultural, religious, moral and aesthetic conditions of each country without the empty generalisations. Suffice to look at hasty generalisation, the chapter focuses on false dichotomy in the next section.

Fallacy of false dichotomy: Tradition versus modernity

The fallacy of false dichotomy is committed when one premise of an argument is an “either . . . or . . .” (disjunctive) statement that presents two alternatives as if they were jointly exhaustive (as if no third alternative were possible). One of these alternatives is usually preferred by the arguer. When the arguer then proceeds to eliminate the undesirable alternative, the desirable one is left as the conclusion. Such an argument is clearly valid; but since the disjunctive premise is usually false, the argument is almost always unsound. Of course, not all unsound arguments are fallacious. “The fallacious nature of false dichotomy lies in the attempt by the arguer to delude the reader or listener into thinking that the disjunctive premise presents jointly exhaustive alternatives and is therefore true by necessity” (Hurley. 1985:161).

The modernity-tradition dichotomy arises out of Western attempts to understand non-Western cultures in general and African cultures in particular. The context of the dichotomy lies in the thinking of “open/closed” whereby the West is seen as having open and modern societies and Africa as having closed and traditional societies. Peter Amato (1997:75) dismisses such dichotomies within the Western intellectual thought as simply rhetorical and having a tendency to undermine African philosophy while allowing Western culture to subsume others in a “homogenous, self-serving narrative.” The main pitfall of this discourse, he argues, is its failure to acknowledge the role and contribution that different intellectual cultures may play in producing overlapping conceptualisations of social reality and human nature. Hence, there is a need for a shift from putative universal horizon to differentiated horizons of

different cultures and writers, which allows for a mutually free discourse (ibid).

Reinforcing the previous point, (Aigbodioh, 2011:78), argues that the modernity-tradition dichotomy is false because ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ are seen as absence and possession of modern science, respectively. The contrast between modernity and tradition does not reflect actual conditions in Africa (ibid:80). It is dualistic reasoning that suggests a contrast between modernity and tradition and it owes its roots in early anthropological writings (ibid). It endorses a one-sided rationality that undermines African socio-cultural realities (ibid). “The falsity of the dichotomy is seen in the attempt to evoke a fixed contrast between two metaphysical, ontological or epistemic poles where none exists” (ibid). The consequences of the dichotomy are as follows: first, it is believed that scientific culture is a Western creation (ibid). Secondly, it arbitrarily disassociates and disowns from Africa, those traditions labelled modern (ibid). Thirdly, the dichotomy is a result of propaganda that accords supremacy to scientific claims and methods of validation and delegitimises all rival systems of positing conjectures and warranting beliefs (ibid). Fourthly, the dichotomy gives the false impression that only tradition has the feature of authoritarianism ignoring the fact that scientific inventions and products have their authoritarian control (Aigbodioh, 2011:78). Fifthly, the dichotomy carries the mistaken assumption that the West and Africa are mutually exclusive forms of life (Ibid: 80). Worldviews are neither isolated nor static. Beliefs share “interdependent coherence” and are subject to modification. Sixthly, the contrast between tradition and modernity does not express a contrast between two types of character, worldviews, culture or knowledge but rather between observed empirical facts we face daily versus normative ideals we hold as goals to pursue” (ibid). African problems must be seen as human and real life problems and as such habits of thought that categorise reality should be abandoned because they obscure developmental needs. The next section explores the fallacy of false cause.

Fallacy of False cause: External versus internal development problems

The fallacy of false cause occurs whenever the link between premises and conclusion depends on some imagined causal connection that probably does not exist (Hurley, 1985:143). False cause fallacy, and one that is probably committed more often than either of the others in their pure form, is *oversimplified cause*. This variety occurs when a multitude of causes is responsible for a certain effect but the arguer selects just one of these causes and represents it as if it were the sole cause (Hurley, 1985:144).

According to Akunde (2007) the base line of most theoretical explanations of state collapse in Africa is bad governance. To correct the situation, Akunde argues, the promotion of good governance and democracy has become a critical pillar of development policy. The major problem with the promotion of democracy is that there is no generally accepted theory of democratisation to guide the process. Whereas the liberal dominated international development institutions and scholars stress the promotion of human rights and democratic principles as the panacea to underdevelopment, history teaches us otherwise. In the African experience, bad governance is not simply the cause of state collapse; rather, bad governance and state collapse are secreted in the interstices of the above-described trajectory of the emergence of the modern African state. Governance has been defined as the ‘manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development’; and bad governance implies the management of power in a manner that does not promote human development.

Failure to promote human development is basically premised on state failure. State failure is a key cause of development failure in Africa. State failure can be understood in two senses. In the first sense, state failure the inability of state institutions to control actors and processes within a given territory. Rotberg (2004:3) maintains that “failed states cannot control their peripheral regions, especially those regions occupied by out-groups.... plausibly, the extent of a state’s failure can be measured by the extent of its geographical expanse genuinely controlled (especially after dark) by the official

government.” Failure is also commonly used in a second sense to highlight the ways in which states, either because of a lack of capacity or a lack of political will, fail to provide public goods to their entire population rather than favouring one or other particular segment of it. State failure negates the translation of economic, social, and cultural benefits to individual wellbeing.

Di John (2016) identifies three main theories of state failure in Africa. The first theory is political patronage whereby ruling parties appoint leaders in key sectors of the state such as industry, urban areas, judiciary, trade unions and public administrators. This means that individuals who are seen as politically correct are given the key posts. The appointments are done at the expense of merit and competence. These individuals see themselves as “immune” from prosecution and they practice all forms of corruption for personal gain. The second theory to explain state failure in Africa is the use of “disorder as political instrument” (Chabal and Daloz, 1999). This refers to the process where political actors deliberately create confusion for the purpose of gaining power and control out of the chaos. The confusion is created along ethnic lines, religious affiliations, political parties and economic standings among others. The disorder takes the form of shifting the blame for the causes of problems in the country to individuals, opposition political parties, religious affiliations and ethnic groups. In the confusion, rulers take advantage of the shift of focus from the “real problems” to the “imagined problems” to accumulate capital and enrich themselves. The disorder results in reduced developmental benefits to members of the general public. The third theory surrounds the creation of a ‘shadow state’ in terms of economic and political liberalisation. This route generates economic growth and revenue for the state. Rulers find effective means of controlling markets and they derive individual wealth out of state resources as what happened in Angola, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

Turning to a focused analysis of Zimbabwe, Raftopoulos (2016) gives a historical account of Zimbabwe’s developmental failures in terms of both internal and external factors. “In the early 2000’s a series of ‘targeted measures’ were introduced by the EU, US, and later Australia, New Zealand and Canada, against the movement and

assets of particular individuals in the Mugabe regime” (Raftopoulos, 2016:1). These targeted measures can be understood as the external forces to development problems in Zimbabwe. For Raftopoulos, (ibid.) “the measures were introduced as a response to serious electoral irregularities and human rights abuses in the Parliamentary and Presidential elections in 2000 and 2002 respectively.” Furthermore, Raftopoulos, (ibid.) maintains, “it was also clear that these interventions were a response to the state-led land acquisition process that unfolded for much of the 2000’s, which radically transformed the property ownership structure on the land in favour of small scale farming.” The land acquisition process can be understood as an internal problem to the development of Zimbabwe as a country.

For Raftopoulos (2016: 2), “the contestation over the meaning of the ‘targeted measures’ has marked the political discourse in the country from the early years of the new millennium until the present.” The targeted measures were reduced to the cause of Zimbabwe’s development problems by the Zimbabwean government. However, Raftopoulos (ibid), points out “for the opposition MDC, the civic movement and Western countries these measures were a just response to the repressive and authoritarian politics of the Mugabe regime and the violence and irregularities that marred most of the plebiscites in the decade of the 2000’s” The opposition sees the problems in terms of internal failures that have very little to do with external forces.

While the problem of development in Zimbabwe can be seen in terms of the two radical perspectives discussed above, the fallacy of false cause occurs when some of the causes are given an exaggerated and self-serving emphasis. The oversimplified cause fallacy is usually motivated by self-serving interests. The self-serving interests are seen in the attempt by government to protect itself from any blame. Sometimes the ruling government wants to take undeserved credit for itself or give undeserved credit to some movement with which he or she is affiliated. At other times, the Zimbabwe government wants to heap blame on an opponent or shift blame from itself onto some convenient to sanctions. It differs from the other varieties of false cause fallacy in that the single factor selected for credit or blame is

often partly responsible for the effect, but responsible to only a minor degree. The false cause fallacy is often convincing because it is often difficult to determine whether two phenomena are causally related. Finally, when a causal connection is recognised, it may be difficult to determine which is the cause and which is the effect especially in connection to development which has been seen to be a multifaceted concept. In the next section, the fallacy of irrelevant appeal to authority is examined.

Fallacy of irrelevant appeal to authority of the gun

The appeal to unqualified authority fallacy is a variety of the argument from authority and occurs when the cited authority or witness is not trustworthy. There are several reasons why an authority or witness might not be trustworthy. The person might lack the requisite expertise, might be biased or prejudiced, might have a motive to lie or disseminate “misinformation,” or might lack the requisite ability to perceive or recall (Hurley, 1985:139). Each of the three reasons for the fallacy of appeal to authority is significant for the African development debate. The lack of requisite expertise is common especially when liberation war fighters claim to be in control of the economy at the expense of the common good. South Africa, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Angola are some of the African countries where liberation war fighters are still part of the ruling class and they control every opinion about the economy. The motive to disseminate “misinformation” is seen in propagandist agendas. Falsehoods are propelled against opposition parties while the “truth of liberation war” remains the guiding torch for the direction of the country. Even if a liberation war fighter may lack the ability to recall, the authority of such a person is still appealed to on the basis of the “historical achievement” which becomes the guide for the present and the future.

LaBossiere (2016:1) argues that “since a biased expert will not be reliable, an argument from authority based on a biased expert will be fallacious. This is because the evidence will not justify accepting the claim.” In the case of liberation war governments in Africa, the authority appealed to is basically that of the gun, the bush fights and

the imprisonment by colonial masters. Anyone who has not gone through the liberation war is seen as lacking authority to govern. Sibisi in an article for the *Times of Swaziland* thus notes: “For many millions of Africans across the continent liberation from colonialism has meant very little because they remain under bondage of a new kind from their own leaderships.” The kind of bondage that Sibisi is pointing at is the authority of war credentials. Alternative views from opposition parties, scholars, members of the public, and civic groups are seen as lacking the necessary war foundation and as such, they are dismissed as regime change agendas and lacking authority. For Sibisi (2016), “the promise of a new dawn in which everyone would be equal before the law and to pursue a life of happiness and fulfilment has remained just that, a promise that has never been fulfilled.” Failure to fulfil equality before the law is premised on bias and prejudice since appeal to liberation war credentials is made each time serious debates about economic progress and development are made. Sibisi (2016) adds that “the shortcomings of the African Union (AU) was its inadequacy in correcting or vilifying errant post-colonial African leaders who became worse dictators than their departed colonial predecessors.” The appeal to irrelevant authority fallacy is further strengthened by the AU protection of post-colonial African leaders. The appeal to the liberation war, makes arguments advanced by liberation war governments vulnerable to biases and prejudices. “If there is evidence that a person is biased in some manner that would affect the reliability of her claims, then an Argument from Authority based on that person is likely to be fallacious” (LaBossiere 2016:7). Even if the claim is actually true, the fact that the expert is biased weakens the argument. This is because there would be reason to believe that the expert might not be making the claim because he has carefully considered it using his expertise. Rather, there would be reason to believe that the claim is being made because of the expert’s bias or prejudice (ibid). The misguided view of liberation war fights fails to perceive the fact that bush wars are worlds apart from governance. A country cannot be governed by “bullets and threats.” Bullets and threats actually negate the necessary dialogue that is essential for economic, political and social development of a nation.

Conclusion: Clear thinking as necessary for African development

Hountondji (2011:95) asks the question, “what are the main obstacles to [African] development? Are they purely economic, political, cultural, psychological or all at the same time? *A priori*, the obstacles are of different type.” However, Hountondji accepts the said obstacles to development but he identifies a key factor as he writes: “But the foregoing draws our attention to one obstacle which is much too often neglected: the absence of thinking, intellectual passivity leading us to follow changing ideological modes like an opportunist” (ibid). As a result, Hountondji (2011:95) sees the solution in: “*start thinking again*”; in other words, we should reach today beyond the ready-made solutions proposed by international experts and look into the problems of society by ourselves.” The thinking that Hountondji points at should not just be thinking about political, social, economic, religious and cultural problems in Africa. The thinking should be self-reflective. It should be *thinking about the way we think*. Thinking about thinking demands the evaluation of our reasoning process to avoid key fallacies of composition, hasty generalisation, false dichotomy, false cause and irrelevant appeal to authority as discussed in this chapter. It is concluded in this chapter therefore that the adoption of clear thinking helps to avoid the reasoning errors that are responsible for some of Africa’s developmental problems and dilemmas.

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Breaking the Barriers to Africa's Development? The Prospects, Opportunities and Challenges of China's Approach to Development in Africa

Richard Asante

Introduction

This chapter contributes to ongoing debates about possible pathways for African development. In the past, Africa has been casted as poor, underdeveloped, and always in need of the West's assistance. In the recent years, however, this perception has changed. Africa today is touted as the place for investment and innovation; consequently, foreign investors both from the global north and from the East are flocking to the continent. China leads this charge and has been largely credited with the change in attitude towards Africa— from basket case to miracle zone.

Multiple factors such as the failure of the neoliberal model in Africa, the unprecedented economic growth and development in China, have ignited calls for Africa to experiment with the Asian/Chinese model. Faced with increased international isolation and economic crisis, President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, for example, announced a new “Look East” policy in 2005, turning the country's back to the West, and facing the East “from where the sun rises”. It is argued that even though the objectives of China's bilateral and multilateral relations in Africa are similar to those of other foreign actors in Africa, the latter's approach, terms of engagement, and the tools used to develop and leverage these relations differ from those of other actors—particularly Western actors (Bräutigam, 2011; Attuquayefio, Darkwa and Torto, 2011) – in many ways.

Since 2000, China and Africa have stepped up economic cooperation. Through the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), a mechanism of collective dialogue and mutual pragmatic cooperation, China and Africa established during Beijing Summit of

FOCAC in 2006 a new type of strategic partnership featuring political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchanges (Embassy of the People's Republic of China, 2015). In the Johannesburg Summit of FOCAC in December 2015, the new type of China-Africa strategic partnership was upgraded to comprehensive strategic and cooperative partnership. China introduced five major pillars of China-Africa relations and announced 10 cooperation plans, charting the direction for the development of China-Africa relation in the next 3 years (Embassy of the People's Republic of China, 2015).

Despite the growing recognition of china's development approach, the latter is accused of being predatory and neo-colonial, in search of mineral resources to fuel its own growth; markets to dump its excess, cheap manufactured products; and land to grow food for its growing population (Brautigam, 2009; Vickers, 2013; Clinton, 2011; Freschi, 2010; Asongu, 2016; Asongu & Aminkeng, 2013) and also to live such that some scholars like Melber (2007: 6) has argued that "the Chinese penetration only presents the ugly face of predatory capitalism and the imperialist nature of Chinese expansion into Africa" (see also Biggeri and Sanfilippo 2009). More others have come to believe that China is quickly turning Africa into its "second continent" (French 2015).

Against this backdrop, the present chapter examines the lasting development impacts of China's investments, aid and trade with Africa. It argues that while there is considerable optimism about the impact of Chinese investment, particularly in infrastructure, modernisation of agriculture and industrialisation in the medium term, the optimism could be diminished in the long term by China's active military engagements in Africa. These can trigger political instability, undermine the fragile peace, and stagnate growth in the continent.

Contestations about China's engagement and development cooperation with Africa

The rapid emergence of China as a global power and its development cooperation with Africa has been the subject of

substantial scholarly, popular and media debate and interest in recent years. China's economic cooperation in Africa, particularly, in trade, aid and investment as well as infrastructure development and assistance has generated sharp disagreement among scholars and policy makers about China's intentions and interests in the continent. On the one hand, optimists are of the view that China's development cooperation and engagements in Africa is a tantalising opportunity (Akomolafe, 2006; Freschi, 2010; Fantu & Cyril, 2010), for a more diversified openings based on symmetric relations (Diaw and Lessoua, 2013).

Based on this argument, some analysts suggest that the presence of Chinese in Africa could create spaces for new development cooperation and engagements that provide choices and opportunities to influence policies and negotiate for favourable outcomes (Fantu & Cyril, 2010). Other analysts describe China's development models as distinct from previous development paradigms rooted in colonial vestiges. It is believed that both China and Africa have experienced and struggled against colonial domination in the past. It is further argued that the Chinese model for economic growth presents an alternative to the Western orthodoxy based on strong institutions as prime instruments of growth (Tull, 2006; Wang & Zheng, 2012). Yet, other scholars are of the view that although China may have neocolonial ambitions, options or alternatives are not available or are somehow limited (De Grauwe *et al.*, 2012).

On the other hand, the pessimists label the China Africa-relations as asymmetrical and unstable (Clinton, 2011). It is argued that China's development cooperation strategy is solely driven by commercial interests and profit making while ignoring democracy, sound policy reform and good governance (Akokpari, 2011) which are pre-requisite for sustainable development in the 21st Century. In particular, Western commentators portray China's unstoppable penetration in Africa as: "New Scramble for Africa", "New Chinese imperialism," "Neo-colonialism", "New coloniser", "Trojan horse", "Yellow Peril", among others. As aptly put by Hillary Clinton, the former United States Secretary of State, in 2011:

Well, our view is that over the long run, investments in Africa should be sustainable and for the benefit of the African people. It is easy – and we saw that during colonial times – it is easy to come in, take out natural resources, pay off leaders, and leave. And when you leave, you don't leave much behind for the people who are there. You don't improve the standard of living. You don't create a ladder of opportunity. We don't want to see a new colonialism in Africa. We want, when people come to Africa and make investments, we want them to do well, but we also want them to do good. We don't want them to undermine good governance. We don't want them to basically deal with just the top elites and, frankly, too often pay for their concessions or their opportunities to invest (Clinton, 2011; Cited in Asongu & Aminkeng, 2013:264).

In short, commentators from the global north suggest that China has returned to Africa to seek energy, raw materials and trade, and to advance narrow geopolitical interests.

While China's growing engagements and development cooperation with Africa has often been received with scepticism and disapproval from the West and the United States of America (Mawdsley, 2008), some African commentators have tended to welcome it as a positive development (Akomolafe, 2006). However, the reality is far more complex than previously recognised by these scholars (Brautigam, 2009; Taylor & Xiao, 2009; Scoones, Amanor, Favareto and Qi, 2016; Amanor and Chichava, 2016; Asongu, 2016). The rise of China in global politics and its growing presence and influence in Africa is both a threat and an opportunity for Africa, depending on the latter's responses to China's development cooperation with the continent.

Trajectories of Africa's development and development cooperation with China

In the 1950s and 1960s, African nationalists' leaders were confronted with what Mkandawire described as the "unholy trinity of poverty, ignorance and disease" (Mkandawire, 2011:4). For example, Tanzania, at independence in 1961, declared total war

against three development problems: poverty, ignorance and diseases (Tanzania Development Initiative Programme (TADIP)/Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2010). In many African countries, national strategies to deal with the development problems were state-led and top-down driven. Though these strategies yielded moderate gains in per capita income and access to education, health, and water, among other social services, (Mkandawire and Soludo 1999; Eyoh and Sandbrook, 2003; Asante 2013; de Walle, 2001), the gains could not be sustained due to a combination of both domestic and external factors (Mkandawire and Soludo 1999; Asante and Aidoo, 2013). The former includes policy weaknesses and bad governance while the later includes global recession and unfair international trade, and declined in commodity prices (Eyoh and Sandbrook, 2003). These factors were further complicated by bad governance choices, particularly authoritarianism resulting in dictatorship and unlimited use of state power without checks and balances leading to alienation of the masses and lack of accountability, and political instability (Ake, 1996; Asante 2013; Asante and Aidoo, 2013).

The 1980s, were described as the “lost decade of African development”. Decades of restructuring of African economies through the structural adjustment and neoliberal policies opened up investment and business opportunities for international capital, from both the developed and “rising powers”, such as China and Brazil (Amanor and Chichava, 2016). The implementation of privatisation programme enabled many investors and foreign companies to win contracts in construction and infrastructure development, thereby taking away what was supposed to be Africa’s fortunes to the West. The emergence of the “rising powers” has coincided with the rebounding of most economies in Africa (Amanor and Chichava, 2016; Scoones, Amanor, Favareto and Qi, 2016). Since 2000, Africa has made substantial gains and rose from being the ‘hopeless continent’ to a ‘rising star’ and the next major growth pole in the world economy (see Radelet, 2010; Vickers, 2013). Largely as a result of political and economic pressures, China and other major powers have been courting Africa to gain access to abundant resources for their growing markets in order to sustain their rapid growth and economic performance. Furthermore, China and other emerging

powers require diplomatic support and backing from Africa in order to gain greater recognition and status, and influence in global governance as well as reforming the global order (Vickers, 2013). For example, in the 1970s, diplomatic and political support from Africa was critical when China gained its seat at the UN.

China's relationship with Africa dates back to the 15th century (Schiere, Ndikumana and Walkenhorst, 2011). China's engagements with the continent intensified following the Bandung Conference in 1958 (Amanor and Chichava, 2016). China established diplomatic relationship with many African countries and signed bilateral trade agreements with them. For example, during President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana's visit to China in 1961, he and Zhou Enlai signed the Ghana–China Treaty of Friendship (*Peking Review*, 1961). The two countries signed three agreements to promote and develop economic and technical cooperation, namely: the China-Ghana Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation. This agreement involved a 20 year interest free loan of 7 million Ghana pounds; China-Ghana Trade and Payments Agreement involving an annual 4 million Ghanaian pounds in volume of export for the two countries; the Cultural Cooperation Agreement to promote learning and exchange experience in the arts, science and education, and health issues (Huang, 2008: 176; Chau, 2014: 83; Odoom, 2015).

Following the reforms and go out policy introduced in the late 1970s, China's engagement with Africa has gained momentum. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), was established in Beijing in 2000 to strengthen China-Africa cooperation and also to jointly respond to global challenges especially as posed or exacerbated by the global north. The Beijing Forum adopted Action Plan for the period (2013-2015). Since the inception of FOCAC, China-Africa economic and trade cooperation has witnessed rapid growth. During the historic 6th Ministerial Conference of FOCAC, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, in December 2015, the leaders of China and Africa upgraded their relationship from strategic partnership to a comprehensive strategic and cooperative partnership, with a commitment to achieving political equality and mutual trust, economic cooperation for “win-win” results, exchanges and mutual learning between Chinese and African civilisations,

mutual assistance in security affairs, as well as solidarity and cooperation in international affairs (Embassy of the People's Republic of China, 2015).

The Johannesburg Summit, adopted two important documents, namely, the Johannesburg Declaration and the Johannesburg Action Plan (2016- 2018) spelling out the implementation of comprehensive plans for China-Africa relations and practical cooperation for the next three years through a range of policies, referred to as 1+5+10 (Embassy of the People's Republic of China, 2015). The number “one” denotes the new level of China-Africa cooperation that was elevated from strategic partnership to a comprehensive strategic partnership. The number five represents the “Five Major Pillars”, of equality and mutual trust in politics, win-win cooperation in the economy, mutually enriching cultural exchanges, mutual assistance in security and solidarity, and coordination in international affairs. The number “ten” stands for “Ten Key Cooperation Plans” in ten major sectors: industrialisation, agricultural modernisation, infrastructure, finance, green development, trade and investment facilitation, poverty reduction and people's welfare, public health, people-to-people exchanges, as well as peace and security (Embassy of the People's Republic of China, 2015).

To ensure the successful implementation of these ten cooperation plans, China pledged to provide a total of US\$60 billion of funding made up of US\$5 billion of grant and zero-interest loans; US\$35 billion of loans of concessional nature on more favourable terms and export credit line; an increase of US\$5 billion to the China-Africa Development Fund and the Special Loan for the Development of African SMEs respectively; and the China-Africa Fund for Production Capacity Cooperation with an initial contribution of US\$10 billion (Embassy of the People's Republic of China, 2015).

It is worth noting that China has been experiencing unprecedented economic transformation in the recent years. In 2015, China's GDP increased by 6.9%, which contributed more than 25% to world economic growth (Embassy of the People's Republic of China, 2015). China seeks to deepen economic reform by pursuing innovative, coordinated, green, open and shared development,

featuring steady growth and diversified driving force, which will provide a stronger impetus and broader space for China-Africa cooperation. China has announced that it is implementing its 13th Five-Year Plan and working to realise the "two centenary goals"—building a moderately prosperous society in all respects by 2021, when the country will celebrate its 100th anniversary; and building an affluent, strong, civilised and harmonious modern socialist country by 2049 (Embassy of the People's Republic of China, 2015).

Similarly, African countries are actively pursuing the ambitious goals under Agenda 2063, endorsed by the Heads of States of the African Union during their January 2015 Summit in Addis Ababa (African Union Commission, 2015). The vision of Agenda 2063 is “an integrated, people-centred and prosperous Africa at peace with itself”. The document lays out seven broad aspirations aimed at addressing: inclusive growth and sustainable development; integration and unity; good governance, democracy, human rights, justice and the rule of law; peace and security; culture and shared values; people-driven development; and Africa as a global player and partner (African Union Commission, 2015).

The “Ten Key Cooperation Plans” to be implemented by both China and Africa are consistent with both countries developmental agenda. The AU’s Agenda 2063 states that Africa needs industrialisation if it wants to achieve transformative economic development. The Agenda further states that by 2063 manufacturing should account for over 50 % of its GDP and hire over 50% of its new entrants into the labour market and highlights that Africa must further increase the added-value of its products, enhance labour skills and realise economic growth and industrialisation (African Union Commission, 2015). China and Africa have agreed to implement the China-Africa industrialisation plan, where Chinese pledged to help Africa to build industrial park zones and special economic zones, as well as assist African countries to attract investment, encourage and support the involvement of Chinese enterprises in the planning, designing, construction, operation and management of such zones (Embassy of the People's Republic of China, 2015). Towards this end, both sides agreed to establish China-Africa production capacity

cooperation fund, with an initial amount of US\$10 billion (Embassy of the People's Republic of China, 2015).

The modernisation of agriculture is central to the AU's Agenda 2063 and the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Plan (CAADP) endorsed at the African Union Heads of State Summit as a New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) programme in July 2003. The overall goal of CAADP is to "help African countries reach a higher path of economic growth through agriculture- led development, which eliminates hunger, reduces poverty and food insecurity, and enables expansion of exports" (AU, 2003). China and Africa plan to implement the China-Africa agricultural modernisation plan. By modernising agriculture, African leaders are determined to ensure that the hand hoe will be banished by 2025 and the sector will be modern, profitable and attractive to the continent's youths and women. As a major farming country, China is expected to share its experience and expertise in production, management and practical technologies in agricultural development that are suitable for African countries. In addition, China promises to carry out agricultural development projects in 100 African villages to raise rural living standards, send 30 teams of agricultural experts to Africa, and establish a "10+10" cooperation mechanism between Chinese and African agricultural research institutes (Embassy of the People's Republic of China, 2015). China also pledged to provide RMB 1 billion of emergency food aid to the countries affected by El Nino (Embassy of the People's Republic of China, 2015).

Also, lack of infrastructure is a major bottleneck undermining trade, integration and development in Africa. Agenda 2063 recognises the infrastructure deficit and plans to connect African capitals with business hubs, enhance civil aviation efficiency and strengthen port and marine shipping industry. Infrastructure development is a major area under the China-Africa development cooperation, China plans to implement the China-Africa Infrastructure Plan. The plan includes the China-Africa Railway Cooperation Action Plan (2016-2020), to promote the construction of railway networks in Africa, and also implement the Memorandum of Understanding on the Promotion of China-Africa Cooperation in the Fields of Railway, Highway, Regional Aviation Networks and

Industrialisation, making good use of existing cooperation mechanisms such as the Joint Working Group of Transnational and Trans-Regional Infrastructure Cooperation in Africa, and to promote practical cooperation between China and the African Union in priority fields (Embassy of the People's Republic of China, 2015).

Poverty reduction and inequalities are major challenges in Africa and China today. Many African countries could not meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) on poverty reduction, as a result, reducing poverty and improving people's quality of life is a major goal in Agenda 2063 where Africa target of reducing stunted to 10% of the youth population and underweight prevalence to 5% among children by 2025. China and Africa, have agreed to implement the China-Africa poverty reduction plan. The latter is expected to increase its aid to Africa and carry out 200 "Happy Life" projects as well as poverty reduction programmes focusing on women and children in Africa (Embassy of the People's Republic of China, 2015). To achieve this goal, China has promised to cancel outstanding debts in the form of bilateral governmental zero-interest loans borrowed by the relevant least developed African countries that matured at the end of 2015 (Embassy of the People's Republic of China, 2015).

As well, human capital development is a major challenge facing African countries. In the next three years, China and Africa plan to implement the China-Africa Cultural and People to- People Plan. The former plans to construct five cultural centres in Africa and provide satellite TV reception to 10,000 African villages, provide 2,000 educational opportunities with diplomas or degrees and 30,000 government scholarships (Embassy of the People's Republic of China, 2015). China pledged to sponsor visits by 200 African scholars and study trips by 500 young Africans to China, and train 1,000 media professionals from Africa (Embassy of the People's Republic of China, 2015).

Since the establishment of FOCAC, China's contribution to Africa's economic development has increased significantly. China and Africa have signed 243 cooperation agreements worth US\$50.7 billion, including US\$46 billion of Chinese direct investment in and commercial loans to Africa, accounting for 91% of the total value of the agreements (Embassy of the People's Republic of China, 2015).

In 2014, the volume of China-Africa trade was US\$ 222 billion, 21 times that of 2000, stock investment in Africa was over US\$ 30 billion, more than 60 times that of 2000 (Embassy of the People's Republic of China, 2015). For example, in recent times, China has become Ghana's largest trading partner. In 2014, "bilateral trade between the two countries reached US\$4billion and China's Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to Ghana reached US\$1.11billion the same year, accounting for 65.7% of total FDI to Ghana. Today Ghana-China trade exceeds US\$5billion" (Odoom, 2015:1).

China has announced that it carried out close to 30 economic and trade measures for China-Africa cooperation, yielding substantial benefits to many African countries in terms of infrastructural development. Under the framework of the forum, China pledged that it would provide Africa with a loan of US\$ 35 billion, to support the construction of more than 400 projects in African countries. China exempted the tariff on 97% of the commodities exported to China from the 31 least developed African countries. Chinese enterprises were encouraged and supported to construct more than 20 economic and trade cooperation zones in Africa (Embassy of the People's Republic of China, 2015). China has helped African countries with the construction of 400 facilities related to people's daily life including a demonstration centre of agricultural technology, schools and hospitals (Embassy of the People's Republic of China, 2015). China also dispatched about 20,000 agricultural experts and medical-team members, provided 55,000 scholarships for programs in China and trained 83,000 people in various skills. In 2014, 3,062,400 Chinese nationals made Africa the first stop of their trips, registering a year-on-year increase of 61.6% (Embassy of the People's Republic of China, 2015).

More so, there has been a growing bureaucratic, corporate and individual exchanges, including visits by high-profile bureaucrats such as Zhou Xiaochuan, Governor of the People's Bank of China, to Ghana in 2005 accompanied by Chinese businessmen in search of new business opportunities⁵. In early part of 2016, the Chairman of

⁵ Interview, H.E Wang Shang, Deputy Ambassador, Chinese Embassy, Accra, Ghana, July 22, 2016.

the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, Zhang Dejiang and Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference Yu Zhengsheng visited six African countries namely, Zambia, Rwanda, Kenya and Gabon, Cote d'Ivoire, and Ghana respectively⁶. The successive Chinese Foreign Ministers have chosen African countries as the destination of their first trip each year for 26 consecutive years. The high level exchanges have shored up the political mutual trust between China and Africa (Embassy of the People's Republic of China, 2015).

The implementation of the "Ten Key Cooperation Plans" has important implications for Africa. As stated, the key goal in the plan fits in well with the AU's Agenda 2063 and the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development⁷. In the past the implementation of such important developmental plans including the MDG's suffered due to lack of funding. Consequently, funding and financial assistance pledged by the Chinese government will help African countries to implement their developmental programmes. Many African countries are faced with debts and debt servicing. Debt cancellation promised by the Chinese government will free up funding for other critical sectors of the economy. As well, another major challenge confronting Africa today is a huge deficit in infrastructural development. A collaborative partnership with China in the construction of the China-Africa Railway Cooperation Action Plan (2016-2020) will facilitate regional integration and trade among African countries. Unemployment remains a major problem in Africa. The implementation of the China-Africa agricultural and industrialisation modernisation plans, especially the transfer of technology, expertise and sharing of knowledge will create more job opportunities in Africa. In short, China and Africa have reached different levels of national development and capacities, the

⁶ Interview, H.E Wang Shang, Deputy Ambassador, Chinese Embassy, Accra, Ghana, July 22, 2016.

⁷ The UN 2030 Agenda sets out to end poverty and hunger; to combat inequalities within and among countries; to build peaceful, just and inclusive societies; to protect human rights and promote gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls; and to ensure the lasting protection of the planet and its natural resources.

interlinkages and integrated nature of the plan with their own development plans is important, and by embarking on this collective journey together in the next three years, based on the spirit of sincerity, and “win win” cooperation, will contribute to creating conditions for sustainable, inclusive and sustained economic growth, and shared prosperity. Of course there are concerns that the goals and targets set out in the plan for the next three years are supremely ambitious and unrealistic. What’s more, it is unclear the role of civil society in the implementation of the plan.

China’s security and military engagements in Africa

China’s military relations with Africa can be traced back to the 1950s. Following the Asian-African Conference at Bandung, Indonesia which was dominated by issues of colonialism, imperialism and the hegemonic position of the Western powers, China became actively involved militarily in Africa. China provided military support and training for liberation groups fighting for independence across Africa (Chuka, 2011; Shinn 2008, Taylor 2006). For example, in 1964, China signed an agreement with Ghana “for the provision of military equipment and advisers for Ghana’s ‘freedom fighters’” (Chau, 2014: 89).

In recent years, China’s military engagement in Africa has gained prominence following a radical change in foreign and security policy directions by Beijing. The Reform and Open Up Policy of Deng Xiaoping’s government in the late 1970s led to a major shift on Chinese foreign and security policy. In its 2006 White Paper, *China’s National Defense in 2006*, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was tasked with the responsibility for implementing the military strategy of active defense (Chuka, 2011). As a result of the changes in China’s foreign and defense policies, China has been sending troops to UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. This policy was further bolstered when China and Africa set up the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000, with security high on the agenda.

In Africa, peace and security issues are central to the AU’s Agenda 2063, and one of the “Ten Key Cooperation Plans” under the China-Africa Cooperation. China has been an active participant,

supporter, and contributor for peace and security in Africa⁸. Under the “Ten Key Cooperation Plans”, China pledged to provide the AU with US\$60 million of free military assistance over the next three years to support the building and operations of the African Standby Force and the African Capacity for the Immediate Response to Crisis⁹. China has spoken up for Africa at the UN Security Council and is the largest contributor of peacekeepers among the five permanent members of the UNSC, with close to 3,000 Chinese peacekeepers involved in 16 peacekeeping missions in Africa (Embassy of the People's Republic of China, 2015). Since 2009, China has been engaged in escort missions in the Gulf of Aden and the waters off the coast of Somalia and has over 6,000 Chinese and foreign ships in the area (Embassy of the People's Republic of China, 2015). The China-initiated UN Security Council Debate on Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea in the Gulf of Guinea has been well received by the international community (Embassy of the People's Republic of China, 2015).

Besides, China has been supporting African countries' capacity building in areas such as defense, counter-terrorism, riot prevention, customs and immigration control, and peacekeeping training¹⁰. For example, in April 2007, Jia Qingling, the Chairperson of the CPPCC, visited Ghana and signed agreements that included a \$30 million concessional loan for the Dedicated Communications Project for the security agencies¹¹. China's security cooperation with Ghana included the construction of a \$7.5 million Chinese grant office complex for the Ministry of Defense and other investment in residential accommodation to improve the welfare of the Armed

⁸ Interview, H.E Wang Shang, Deputy Ambassador, Chinese Embassy, Accra, Ghana, July 22, 2016

⁹ Interview, H.E Wang Shang, Deputy Ambassador, Chinese Embassy, Accra, Ghana, July 22, 2016

¹⁰ Interview, H.E Wang Shang, Deputy Ambassador, Chinese Embassy, Accra, Ghana, July 22, 2016

¹¹ Interview, H.E Wang Shang, Deputy Ambassador, Chinese Embassy, Accra, Ghana, July 22, 2016

Forces¹². Furthermore, China and Ghana has been collaborating on maritime security. The former provided military equipment to Ghana to enhance maritime security. Ghana's Navy has been giving a strong support to China against piracy in the Gulf of Guinea¹³.

China has also been supportive of adherence to the UN Security Council Resolution 2033 that recognizes collaboration between the United Nations and the African Union and regional and sub-regional organizations in conflict prevention and crisis management, and in post-conflict stabilization¹⁴. Recently, China appointed H.E Zhong Jianhua, as Representative for peace and security in Africa¹⁵.

However, there are shortcomings with China's security and military engagements in Africa. Despite China's proactive role in Africa's peace and security, its military involvement such as selling of arms, construction of small arms factory and protection of Chinese oil investments have raised serious concerns among security experts, scholars and policy makers. Increasingly, China is becoming a major supplier of small arms and light weapons to Africa. Critics argue that this could worsen the conflict situation and undermine peace building initiatives in post-conflict areas. According to Ian Taylor, "unmoved by ... concerns and without fear of political consequences, Chinese government seems willing to fuel a small-arms race in sub-Saharan Africa to generate additional revenues for the PLA" (cited in Enuka, 2011:74). Other analysts contend that China employs military means to protect her economic interests while ignoring humanitarian issues. In Kordofan, a region close to Darfur, Sudan, the Chinese government was alleged to have deployed about 400 soldiers in civilian clothing, to protect its economic investment against attacks by rebels (Gertz and Rowan 2004, Enuka, 2011; Shinn 2008). A similar strategy has been adopted in other parts of Africa, including

¹² Interview, H.E Wang Shang, Deputy Ambassador, Chinese Embassy, Accra, Ghana, July 22, 2016

¹³ Interview with Deputy Chinese Ambassador, Wang Sheng, Chinese Embassy, Accra, July 29 2016

¹⁴ Interview, H.E Wang Shang, Deputy Ambassador, Chinese Embassy, Accra, Ghana, July 22, 2016

¹⁵ Interview with Wang Sheng, Deputy Chinese Ambassador to Ghana, held at the Chinese Embassy, Accra, July 29 2016.

the Niger Delta, Nigeria. It is reported that the Chinese have set up three small arms factories in Sudan that produce light weapons for use in the region as well as in Uganda and Zimbabwe (Enuka, 2011). This has the potential to worsen the tenuous security and humanitarian situations especially in war-torn zones in the continent.

China has also come under fire for cutting deals and providing arms to pariah states and African leaders with bad human rights records, including those in conflict-torn zones which have come under United Nations' and Western countries embargo. China sold 55 million dollars' worth of arms to Sudan between 2003 and 2006, flouting United Nations arms embargo (Shinn, 2008). Some Western countries imposed arms embargoes on Zimbabwe and targeted sanctions on President Mugabe and key members of the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), following concerns of political violence, human rights violations and intimidation perpetrated by security forces loyal to President Robert Mugabe. However, despite the sanctions, in 2004, China sold fighter aircraft and military vehicles to Zimbabwe and in 2005, 6 jets for its air force, and later 12 jet fighters and 100 military vehicles, valued at about \$240 million (Brown and Sriram 2008). In 2008, Chinese ship- *An Yue Jiang*, carrying weapons destined for Zimbabwe was denied by South Africa and neighbouring countries to offload the cargo (Brautigam, 2009). The sale of arms by China to Zimbabwe should be understood within a context. The sharp agreement among the five permanent members of United Nations Security Council did not allow the UN to impose the arms embargo on Zimbabwe. France and the United Kingdom (under an EU arms restriction) in 2002, and the United States in 2003, imposed arms embargoes on Zimbabwe, but China and Russia in 2008 vetoed a draft UN Security Council resolution to impose arms embargo on Zimbabwe. Since the sanctions have not been adopted universally by the UN Security Council, China and Russia continue to supply arms and military equipment to Zimbabwe (Jeuck, 2011).

While China's military engagements particularly arms sales in Africa in breach of United Nations arms embargo, is a major concern, to be sure, China's military deals with Africa is not different from that of Western countries and Russia. Some scholars are of the

view that through its military deals with Africa, China offers security alternative to the West for African states (Osei-Hwedie, 2011:111-115; Shinn, 2009, Kurlantzick 2009). For example, the Nigerian government switched to China for military equipment and assistance following US congressional interference in the delivery of patrol boats for the Niger Delta Region. China granted Nigeria \$1million in 2001 to upgrade its military facilities, and a contract of \$251 million was negotiated for the purchase twelve F-7M Airguard multipurpose combat aircraft and three FT-7NI dual-seat fighter trainer aircraft (Chau 2007). By supplying African governments with military equipment as has been the case with relatively peaceful countries including Ghana, China is helping to strengthen their military capacities. Others are of the opinion that compared to the Western countries arms sales from China to Africa are relatively small, and enhancing China's status as an important global power.

Chinese nationals in illegal mining and other illicit deals

Another troubling activity that could undermine the ambitious goals set in the China-Africa cooperation is the involvement of Chinese nationals and companies in illegal mining activities and deals in some African countries including Ghana. Africa is rich and blessed with abundant natural resources including gold, diamond, and manganese, among others. The laws of Ghana do not allow non-Ghanaians in small-scale mining activities. Section 83 of the Mining and Minerals Act (2006) forbids non-Ghanaians from doing any form of small scale mining in Ghana. Local operators are, however, not prohibited from seeking foreign partners, and they have often found willing partners in small-scale Chinese investors such as China Non-Ferrous Metals Ghana Ltd, Ying Max Ltd, Hua Xing Mining Company Ltd and Chinese Long Da Mining Company Ltd. (Idun-Arkhurst, 2008). Some Chinese nationals and firms have been directly involved in small scale mining activities, popularly known in Ghana as “galamsey”. Illegal mining activities have been extremely environmentally damaging and often have serious health and safety consequences for workers and surrounding communities. The adverse effects of illegal mining activities have been pervasive in the

Ashanti, Eastern, Central and Western Regions, which are considered the mining enclaves of Ghana include land degradation through unsafe mining practices leading to accidents and loss of lives due to the lack of safety practices.

Other effects of illegal mining include the destruction of crops and farmlands which impacts negatively on food production in the local economy, pollution of streams and rivers resulting in increased costs of water treatment, as well as encroachment of illegal miners on large scale concessions resulting in social conflicts. Some major rivers such as Ankrobra, Bonsa, Pra, Offin, Butre and Birim have been polluted as a result of dredging by the “galamsey” operators and the use of toxic mercury and cyanide. Besides, illegal gold mining, some Chinese nationals have also been involved in illegal logging activities, contributing to a high rate of deforestation. Despite efforts by the government to check illegal logging particularly the signing of the Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) with the EU in 2009 and a national timber tracking system for the control, verification and licensing of legal timber, a number of enforcement and administrative challenges persists (Chatham House, 2014; Hoare, 2014). According to Wang Sheng¹⁶ the Deputy Chinese Ambassador to Ghana, the involvement of Chinese national gives a bad image and publicity to the Chinese government, hence the government is against it. Guangxi has been identified as the province from which the majority of the illegal Chinese miners in Ghana come from. Series of meetings have been held between the government of Ghana and separate delegations from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and from the Guangxi province in April 2013 and May 2013, and 2016 respectively to deal with the issue. Important meetings have also been held delegates of Guangxi province and the country’s Inter-Ministerial Taskforce on illegal mining set up by the government to check illegal small-scale mining. Despite efforts to resolve the influx of Chinese nationals in small scale mining the practice is still ongoing. Illegal mining continues to flourish in Ghana as a result of a combination of factors such as corruption, lack of regulatory

¹⁶ Interview, H.E Wang Shang, Deputy Ambassador, Chinese Embassy, Accra, Ghana, July 22, 2016.

framework, collusion and connivance with public officials, security agencies, politicians and traditional leaders.

Conclusion

In recent years, China's presence and development cooperation with Africa has generated debate among scholars. Proponents describe the China-Africa relations as a tantalising opportunity for growth and development of the continent, but critics are of the view that it will undermine the future of Africa's growth and sustainable development. This is because China's approach is solely motivated by profit making above good governance, democracy and human rights. In short, China-Africa development cooperation is seen as either disastrous for growth and sustainable development or a blessing. This chapter has examined the prospects, opportunities and challenges of China's development cooperation with Africa focusing on the outcomes of the historic Johannesburg FOCAC Summit of 2015. China and African leaders identified "Five Major Pillars" and "Ten Key Cooperation Plans" for implementation in the next three years.

China and Africa face golden opportunities. Digging behind the two main arguments, the chapter shows that the reality is more complicated than previously recognised. China economic cooperation with Africa creates both opportunities and challenges for Africa. Some analysts have argued that the 21st century is not only a century for China and Asia, but also for Africa. China and Africa are developing countries facing common development challenges such as poverty, inequality and unemployment. They are also implementing the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. African countries are actively pursuing the ambitious goals of the Agenda 2063, to achieve its vision of "an integrated, people-centred and prosperous Africa at peace with itself" (AU, Agenda 2063). The First 10-Year Implementation Plan is underway. By 2063, it is expected that African countries will be amongst the best performers in global quality of life measures with industrialisation and modernisation of Agriculture and human development central to this plan.

At the same time, China is also implementing its ambitious goals of 13th Five-Year Plan and to realise the "two centenary goals" and the Chinese Dream of great national renewal, featuring economic transformation based on innovative, coordinated, green, open and shared' development. It is expected that Africa can benefit from the Chinese experience and expertise under the China-Africa cooperation through exchange of views, comparing notes, building consensus and promoting cooperation. By working together, sharing experiences and expertise, pooling ideas, and resources and effectively implementing the goals set out in the China-Africa cooperation plan, both sides can achieve results in a more expeditious and equitable manner. However, China's military engagements in Africa, particular, sale of arms and deals with governments bad human rights credentials could diminish the realisation of the lofty goals agreed on by both sides under the comprehensive strategic and cooperative partnership. China pledged to adhere to the principles of sincerity, practical results, affinity and good faith and the values of friendship, justice and shared interests (Embassy of the People's Republic of China, 2015). With these values in mind, Africa's agency through constructive engagements, effective policy responses of African governments, civil society and private sector groups with their Chinese counterparts could help to address the major concerns and challenges including insecurity that could undermine the comprehensive strategic and cooperative partnership between China and Africa.

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“Let My People Go!” A Contextual Reading of the Book of Exodus in Light of Political and Economic Crisis in Post-independent Zimbabwe

Nyasha Madzokere

“What stops Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe from retiring? Why will he not join the increasing number of his peers in undertaking worthy activities around Africa and elsewhere? Could he be excused his past misdemeanours and he whisked away to a large villa from where he would emerge occasionally to dispense the wisdom he is assured to have gained from his youthful exercises? If he has been offered this option, why has he refused? How has he remained in power for more than a quarter of a century?” (David Moore. 2006. *‘When I am a century old’: Why Robert Mugabe won’t Go?*)

Introduction

The catchy statement above was adopted from David Moore’s article which speaks volume on the political dilemma in post-independent Zimbabwe. This is the inspiration behind the adoption of the title of the book chapter here considered. The chapter examines the political and economic crises in Zimbabwe from the ‘glory’ early years of independence up to the ‘Zimbabwe Crisis’ in the 21st century. Why should a country suffer from such crises after the transition from “white” rule to “black” rule? Should Zimbabwe wait for a century for the change of leadership in the country? Why should the people of Zimbabwe rely on a personality who believes in himself as being the only one entitled to rule the country till death? Is Mugabe’s philosophy progressive or retrogressive in terms of the development of the country? This dilemma in terms of leadership has created a very shambolic state of the once glorious but now doomed

Zimbabwe. The country has suffered from social, economic, political and humanitarian crises commonly referred to as the “Zimbabwe Crisis” (Raftopoulos 2009; Todd 2010). Socially, the people of Zimbabwe have suffered from abject poverty where the gap between the rich and the poor remain astronomically huge and gaping. The rich are living in flamboyancy whilst the poor are living in stinking poverty. Economically, the people have experienced cataclysmic doom instead of an economic boom. Politically, the people of Zimbabwe have experienced the worst moments of the country’s leadership characterised by a multiple of political disasters, political violence and political murders (Sachikonye, 2011; Madzokere & Machingura 2016). Religiously, various religious groups in Zimbabwe have taken an ambivalent stance to try to address the crises. Some of the groups are supporting the leadership of the state whilst others are in strong opposition (Chitando & Togarasei 2010). The “Zimbabwe Crisis” was a result of an artificialized political paralysis bred and catapulted by a long serving power hungry dictator, Robert Gabriel Mugabe. This book chapter is not there to overshadow Robert Mugabe’s achievements from 1980 to 1985 but to show how he has gradually tarnished the ‘jewel of Africa’ (Matanda & Madzokere forthcoming).

This chapter adopts the recurring topos statement: “Let my people go!” in the book of Exodus which was an imperative and powerful statement uttered by Yahweh to mark the liberation of the Hebrews from Egypt—the house of bondage. The liberation of the dominated people confirms God’s preferential option for the oppressed and marginalised bunchy of Israelites slaves from the diabolic Pharaoh’s oppressive rule. This recurring thematic statement in the book of Exodus is adopted as a point of departure in this chapter. The chapter takes a contextual reading of the book of Exodus in the light of political and economic crises in the post-independent Zimbabwe. The chapter argues that Robert Mugabe who is a true ardent Christian (Roman Catholic) should utilise the message of the book of Exodus to draw lessons on the dangers of dictatorship. As a leader of Zimbabwe—a country whose approximately eighty percent population claims to be adherents of

Christianity should read the Bible to draw useful insights and lessons on good leadership.

Through the liberation-hermeneutical and reconstruction approach the chapter exposes and challenges Robert Mugabe's political rigidity, political acidity, and political aridity which serve as an impediment to the wholesome development of the nation. Firstly, the chapter defines key terms for the cultivation of a better understanding of the topic under study. Secondly, the chapter discusses the topos (thematic message) of the book of Exodus as a point of departure. Thirdly, the political and economic crises in Zimbabwe are examined focussing specifically on what this chapter refers to as, "Gabriel power tricks-political rigidity, political acidity, and political aridity". Fourthly, the liberation and reconstruction paradigm is suggested to serve as a precursor for the development of the nation. Fifthly and final, a conclusion and recommendation charter a way forward for Zimbabwe.

Conceptualisation of key terms

Key terms to be defined in this study are: political rigidity, political acidity, political aridity, development, underdevelopment, sustainable development and *TaNaK*. These terms, have various meanings, thus in this study, out of the various definitions given, working definitions would be developed to champion the focus of the topic. According to the Oxford Dictionary (2016), the term, 'rigidity' means the inability to be bent or to be forced out of shape. In this instance then, the word means unbending. It is the inability to be changed or adapt to a given situation. It can also mean an emotional inflexibility and resistance to change. The word 'rigidity' is etymologically derived from the Latin word, '*rigidus*' which means to 'be stiff'. The rhymes of the word 'rigidity' include: acidity, aridity, flaccidity, humidity, fluidity and liquidity. The synonyms of the word "rigidity" are: hardness, harshness, inflexibility, severity and rigidness (Merriam Webster Dictionary 2016). In this study, political rigidity shall be used to refer to the inability to be changed or resistance to change displayed by the political leadership of any institution in any given situation. In this case, therefore, political rigidity refers to

various ways the leadership of Zimbabwe (Robert Mugabe and his cronies) display resistance tactics to positive political change which would bring about meaningful social, political and economic development of the country. According to the Oxford Dictionary (2016), the term, ‘acidity’ means the level of acid in substances such as water, soil or wine. It also means the bitterness or sharpness in a person’s remarks or tone. The rhymes of the word ‘acidity’ are: aridity, rigidity, liquidity, humidity and flaccidity. An acid is something that has some destructive qualities. If an acid gets on some clothes they are worn out or instantly torn into pieces. In this book chapter, political acidity refers to various ways the leadership of Zimbabwe (Robert Mugabe and his apologists) apply destructive tactics to weaken their opponents in the political game in the country. The leadership is so corrosive like an acid to tear apart members of the opposition parties and their adherents, so in this case we can generally speak about political acidity. This political acidity is very detrimental to the social, economic and political development of the nation for it becomes a stumbling block to any meaningful desirable change that the country of Zimbabwe is yelling for.

The combination of political rigidity and political acidity is a thorn in the flesh of the opposition parties who are fighting for political space against Robert Mugabe and ZANU-PF party who have been in power since 1980 when the country got its independence from the former colonial masters-the British (Todd 2010). According to the Oxford Dictionary (2016), the word ‘aridity’ means being without moisture; extremely dry; parched: arid land and arid climate. It means deficiency of moisture (especially) when resulting from a permanent absence of rainfall. On another note, it means barren or unproductive because of the lack of moisture; and farmland. In short, the word points to lack of productivity of the land because of the inadequacy of water which on its own is pivotal for any farm produce to be realised. The rhymes of the word, ‘aridity’ is: rigidity, acidity, humidity, liquidity, fluidity and flaccidity. An arid place is a dry place where vegetation hardly survives the dryness of the land. The condition of the atmosphere of such a place hinders trees, grass, crops or any vegetation to grow favourably. People who

stay in such places suffer from drought and famine because they would be struggling to produce crops to sustain their lives.

In this study, political aridity refers to the cluelessness of the leadership of the country in the governance of Zimbabwe that transforms the nation from its failed status (underdeveloped) to a developed one. Robert Mugabe at ninety-two years of age has ruled the country for thirty-six years and he still vows to remain on the helm of the country's leadership as the catchy statement of David Moore above. The leadership of Zimbabwe has brought about the political, social and economic mess that the nation is suffering from at the moment. The glory years of 1980 were turned to be the gloom years of the moment in the history of Zimbabwe (Madzokere & Matanda 2015). This unproductive state of the nation's leadership of our country brings about social, economic and political oppression of the people of our 'beloved' country. The combination of the three 'Gabriel power tricks'-political rigidity, political acidity, and political aridity is enabling the long serving statesman to rule till a century but this has a long term effects to the development of the country and freedom of the people of Zimbabwe. This brings retrogression rather than progression of Zimbabwe economically, politically and socially. This is why Zhou & Makahamadze (2012) argues that Robert Mugabe should be regarded as a liability rather than an asset as he had ruined our nation.

According to Merriam Webster Dictionary (2016), the term, 'development' means the process of developing or being developed. It means an act or process of growing or causing something to grow or becoming larger or more advanced. As a working definition it means the capability of a nation to provide the holistic needs of its citizens, be it political, social, economic, physical, spiritual and psychological (Matanda & Madzokere 2015). The failure of a nation to provide its citizens with requisite needs then is underdevelopment. In economics, underdevelopment is when resources are not used to their full socio-economic potential, with the result that local or regional development is slower in most cases than it should be, and specifically compared with the investment and innovation in countries that surrounds it. An underdeveloped nation is the one that lags behind most others in industrialisation, education, standard of

living, health care, life expectancy and other technological and cultural norms (Merriam Webster dictionary 2016). An underdeveloped nation is not able to sustain its citizens and in most cases citizens are deprived of their rights. The abuse of human rights is a common phenomenon in an underdeveloped nation. The citizens do not enjoy political, social, and economic freedom, hence they are underdeveloped. The term ‘sustainable development’ means economic development that is conducted without depletion of natural resources. This kind of development meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of the future generations to meet their own needs (Matanda & Madzokere 2015). It is development which is both realised and futuristic in nature.

The *TaNaK* is the body of literature found in the Bible with numerous designations, such as Old Testament, Hebrew Scriptures, Hebrew Bible and First Testament. The Hebrew Bible is called the Old Testament by the Christians and adherents of other religions apart from Judaism. For the Jews, it is referred to as the *TaNaK* which stands for the three-fold division of the Hebrew Bible- *Torah* (Law or Pentateuch); *Nebiim* (Prophets) and *Kethubim* (Wisdom writings/literature/books). The *Torah* which is the first division of the Hebrew Bible refers to the first five books of the Old Testament which are accredited to Moses as author namely: Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers and Deuteronomy. This study would rely on the second book of the *Torah* (Pentateuch) which has a record of the story of the liberation of the Hebrews from Egyptian bondage by Moses-an agent of Yahweh (God). The message of the book inspired the writer of this book chapter to utilise it as he reflects on applicability of such a message to the Zimbabwean context where the political leadership employ almost the similar leaderships tactics as those employed by the Pharaohs of Egypt (dynasty leaders). The study makes reference to the Bible because it is a valuable document of religious importance in Zimbabwe influencing the political, social and economic well-being of the people of Zimbabwe (Chitando et.al 2013). For Gunda (2011), the Bible is utilised by both public and private institutions in Zimbabwe, so it remains a life manual for most of the citizens of the nation. After defining the key terms, the book chapter now examines the message of the book of Exodus.

“Let my people go!” The Topos of the book of Exodus

The book of Exodus as the second book of the Torah has a powerful message which can serve as an eye-opener to the contemporary leadership of any nation in Africa even beyond especially those who confess to be Christians. Zimbabwe as a country has approximately eighty percent Christians who are followers of Christianity with its diverse groupings-Mainline, Evangelicals, Pentecostals and African Initiated ones (Sibanda & Madzokere 2013). It is vital to say that most of the powerful members (opposition party members, members of Parliament, ministers, vice-Presidents, President) in the politics of Zimbabwe are Christians who profess to be followers of Christ. They adhere to the teachings of the Bible and they are ardent readers of the Bible. Even the constitution of Zimbabwe draws a lot of inspiration from the Bible as most of the laws of the nation are typically biblical. The President of the country was baptised in the Roman Catholic, educated at a Roman Catholic school, and still confesses to be a devout Catholic who values the Bible in his life (Madzokere forthcoming). This is why the message of the book of Exodus should be reflected on in this book chapter.

From the etymological meaning of the word, ‘Exodus’ we draw much about the book is all about. The word comes from the two Greek words namely: ‘*ekē*’ and ‘*odos*’ which means in short ‘out of the way’. It refers to the coming out of the children of Israel from Egypt-the house of bondage where they were slaves for four hundred and thirty years (Madzokere 2010). In the book of Exodus there is a recurring rubric phrase, ‘let my people go!’(Exodus 8:1, 20; 9:1, 13; 10:4) which was said by Yahweh to Moses to go and say that to Pharaoh-the king of Egypt. Yahweh wanted the Hebrews to be freed from Egyptian slavery which was tormenting the lives of Yahweh’s elect people. From the book of Exodus, we can deduce that Yahweh takes sides with those who suffer from political, social, economic and religious domination. He expects humanity to experience political, social, economic and religious freedom which would enable a holistic living. The fundamental confession of faith of the Hebrews reads:

Yahweh heard our voices, and saw our affliction, our toil, and our oppression, and in a never-to-be-forgotten demonstration of grace, brought us out of Egypt with a mighty hand and an outstretched arm, with great terror, with signs and wonders (Deuteronomy 26:5-9).

The Hebrews suffered from social, political, economic and religious oppression in Egypt hence, Yahweh liberated them for them to enjoy social, political, economic and religious liberty in Canaan-the Promised Land.

Politically, the Hebrews in Egypt were political slaves, so they were ruled by the Egyptian aristocracy. The Hebrews were theocratic people but because of slavery they were forced to abandon theocracy to be governed by the Egyptian Pharaoh (dynastic leadership). They were governed by Pharaoh who manipulated them to work under harsh conditions to build Egypt to be a country of splendour and great civilisation with great cities of beauty like Pithom and Raamses (Madzokere 2010). The Hebrews were political slaves who worked as farm labourers to implement irrigation projects under the Egyptian *shaduf* irrigation system. The Hebrew slaves boosted agricultural production in Egypt and that on its own brought about economic development to this nation. The Hebrews lacked political freedom hence the message of liberation was a welcome development to the elect people of Yahweh. Political freedom meant that the Hebrews would be free to govern themselves and to worship God in Canaan, the Promised Land without any political interference from other aliens. They could now pursue theocracy freely without foreign domination.

Socially, the Hebrews were dominated by the Egyptians. They worked in the various sectors of Egyptian economy but they were not benefitting from the fruits of their labour at all. They suffered from *corvee* labour but they never enjoyed the resources of their sweat (Madzokere: *ibid*). In a stratified Egyptian society, the Hebrews were the least class in a pyramidal structure of the upper, middle and lower class. The aristocracy of Egypt formed the upper class, the merchants and traders were belonging to the middle class, whilst the poor slaves (Hebrews) were in the lowest class of the society. The poor slaves

were living in stinking poverty whilst the rich aristocracy and the merchants/traders were living in flamboyancy and plenty. The Hebrews needed social emancipation for them to enjoy social and religious freedom which was a prerequisite for their development as people. Economically, the Hebrews were economic slaves for they toiled to produce food they were deprived of and never enjoyed. They brought about economic boom to Egypt through them working as slaves in various sectors of the economy of Egypt yet, they were in their economic doldrums. They were downtrodden poor yet; they were behind all production which was taking place in the country of splendour (Madzokere 2010).

Religiously, the Hebrews were deprived of their worship of Yahweh-one God (Exodus 20:1ff). They were monotheistic (worship of one God) but now in Egypt they were forced to abandon their form of worship for polytheism (worship of many gods). The Egyptians worshipped the Pharaohs and also gods of the Nile called Osiris and Horus. This is why Yahweh was angered by the Pharaoh who forced the Hebrews to abandon their God to be adherents of polytheistic gods which were false and misleading. For Yahweh that was an abomination hence, the message: 'let my people go!' They were to be liberated from the worship of this nature which was a mockery to Yahweh who chanted, 'liberation to the slaves!' Religious liberation of the Hebrews meant that they were now free to serve and worship without force or fear – freedom of worship (Madzokere 2010). The emancipation of the Hebrews meant that they were to enjoy religious, political and socio-economic freedom in Canaan rather than suffering from religious, political, and socio-economic domination as was in Egypt. The combination of social, political, economic and religious oppression of the Hebrews was detrimental to their social, political, economic and religious liberty which transforms lives for the total development of humanity.

'Gabriel Power Tricks': An impediment to development

This book chapter now examines Gabriel power tricks under the three 'dities'—political rigidity, political acidity and political aridity as President Robert Gabriel Mugabe's political power tactics that

enables him to retain power in spite of a vigilant-vigorous and most popular opposition in Zimbabwe dominated by the Movement of Democratic Change under the swift leadership of Richard Morgan Tsvangirai (Moore 2006; Hill 2003; Meredith 2002). A critical reflection of each of these power techniques employed by this powerful long-serving political luminary shows that his political rigidity, political acidity, and political aridity serves as a catalyst to the underdevelopment of Zimbabwe—an impediment to the development of the nation. Each of these would be examined taking cognisance of the complex political matrix of Zimbabwe in the 21st century characterised by worst polarisation of the political atmosphere of the deeply turbulent nation. Through his power tricks, the long serving statesman committed many political, social and economic disasters which are a stumbling block to the development of Zimbabwe—a once socially, politically and economically envied country in Southern Africa (Good 2002).

Political rigidity

From the definition of terms, the working definition of the word, ‘political rigidity’ refers to the inability to be changed or resistance to change displayed by the political leadership of any institution in any given situation. In this case, therefore, political rigidity refers to various power tricks which the leadership of Zimbabwe (Robert Mugabe and his adherents) used to retain power through evil means. Robert Mugabe’s political rigidity was displayed in many various ways and through many various political landmines. Most scholars have looked on them though they could not develop the language of speaking about ‘political rigidity’ referring to Robert Mugabe’s tactics of breeding the political disasters implemented by this political luminary (Good 2002; Kagoro 2008; Mbeki 2009; Sachikonye 2011; Zhou & Makahamadze 2012; Madzokere & Machingura 2016). The political disasters which were masterminded by Robert Mugabe from the attainment of independence to date are as follows:

(1) *Gukurahundi*: ‘*The rain that washes away the chaff*’: interpreted politically was a war of political enemies not dissidents which resulted in the massacre of civilians (approximately 20000) than the so-called

dissidents. This was a war against Joshua Nkomo and ZAPU party. To call it a war against dissidents was a political gimmick and political scapegoating by Robert Mugabe and his apologists. This was a true sign of political rigidity. This was cancerous to the political atmosphere of the country (Good 2002; Mbeki 2009; Sachikonye 2011).

(2) *Jambanja: 'The Fast-Track Land Reform Programme'*: interpreted politically was a political war against perceived perennial enemies—the white commercial farmers who lost their land and most of them were killed in cold blood during this campaign. To say it was a redress of colonial injustices instigated by the whites was a political gimmick and political scapegoating. The most powerful indigenous Zimbabwe benefitted at the expense of the peasants and this worked to the advantage of Robert Mugabe to retain power against the challenge of a swift opposition-MDC. This is a sign of political rigidity. It was detrimental to economy of the country (Machingura 2012; Madzokere & Machingura 2016).

(3) *Murambatsvina: 'Operation clear off Filthy'*: interpreted politically was a political gimmick and scapegoating to punish the urbanites who had voted overwhelmingly for the opposition party-MDC. It was operation clear-off the people not dirty. The destruction of shanty dwellings was a scapegoat tactic. The general urban dwellers were seriously affected which resulted to an urban-rural drift which would give an advantage to Robert Mugabe and ZANU-PF party for the boosting of voter percentages in their rural strongholds. This is just a sign of political rigidity (Sachikonye 2011; Madzokere & Machingura: 2016).

(4) *Kubira sarudzo kune udzamu: 'Series of rigged elections-2000, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2013'*: a series of elections in Zimbabwe took place from 2000-2013 but they were marred by violence, murders, rape, abductions, torture, and destruction of property. They were militarised and bloody to avoid a fair result which could have given an advantage to the opposition parties. The rigging of these elections was a sign of political rigidity by those in the country's leadership (Masunungure 2009; Madzokere & Machingura: 2016).

(5) *Kudzvinga Teurai Ropa Mujuru pachigaro: 'Relinquish Teurai Mujuru of a Vice-President post'*: Factionalism rocked the powerful ruling party-

ZANU-PF in the bid to succeed President Robert Mugabe from the time the woman (Teurai Ropa Mujuru) was appointed to the Presidium by Robert Mugabe in 2004. Two factions dominated in the bid-Mujuru faction and Mnangagwa. In the battle for survival, the Mnangagwa outclassed the Mujuru one by scapegoating and political gimmick. Mujuru was implicated as though she wanted to unceremoniously succeed Robert Mugabe through non-constitutional means of consulting traditional practitioners. This led to the kicking out of Mujuru from the party. The end of Mujuru was solely caused by the political rigidity of Robert Mugabe who feels threatened to lose power not only from opposition parties but also from his own cadres. The factional wars continued even after the expulsion of Joice Mujuru now being Team Lacoste of Mnangagwa versus Generation 40(G40) of First Lady-Grace Mugabe. These factional wars are tearing the ZANU-PF party apart from inside which would also negatively impact on the long serving statesman-Robert Mugabe (BBC News 2014; SABC News 2016).

(6) *Kutosvororana nevaimbova varwi verusununguko*: ‘Being at loggerheads with war veteran leaders’: interpreted politically, the war veterans have been supporting the incumbent leader from 1980 till the recent fall-out. The fall out resulted from the realisation by the war veterans that they were being used as wash out rugs in fighting the opposition parties yet they benefitted nothing in return. After such and realisation and rebellion against the Robert Mugabe, this led to the nefarious punishment of the leaders of the war veteran crew-sacking of Mutsvangwa as leader, Mahiya’s arrest and the recent violent occupation of Mutemadanda’s farm. The punishment of the leadership of the war veteran fraternity shows that Robert Mugabe does not welcome anyone who champions the regime change agenda. This is typically political rigidity by the long serving statesman (The Standard 2016, Newsday 2016).

(7) *Kuimba handiendi chero ruzhinji rwajamuka*: ‘Resisting change in spite of overwhelming uprising’: interpreted politically Robert Mugabe would not accept any agenda which disturbs his stay on power. There are series of protests (Tajamuka, Nera &Your flag cadres) going at the moment in Harare- the capital city of Zimbabwe with the recurring theme-‘Mugabe should quit!’ but the repressive response coming

from Robert Mugabe and his apologists-intelligence officers, police, youths and perennial supporters shows that Robert Mugabe wants to die in office. This is a leader who has managed to display seriousness in political rigidity to retain power even if it means ‘ruling on a wheel chair’ as utterances of his wife to her husband’s prospective successors (Tinhuh 2016; Chikowore 2016).

Political acidity

From the definition of terms, the working definition of the word, ‘political acidity’ refers to various ways the leadership of Zimbabwe (Robert Mugabe and his apologists) apply destructive tactics to weaken their opponents in the political game in the country. The leadership was very acidic and corrosive in nature for it had developed various survival tactics from 1980 till now to destroy any threatening opposition parties (Sithole 1999). The typical example of these opposition parties are: Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) led by Joshua Nkomo, Zimbabwe African National Union-Ndonga led by Ndabaningi Sithole, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) led by Morgan Tsvangirai and Zimbabwe Unity Movement led by Edgar Tekere (Mlambo & Raftopoulos 2009).

Joshua Nkomo and ZAPU did not survive Robert Mugabe’s political acidic tactics hence he decided to give in to Canaan Banana’s Unity Accord between ZAPU and ZANU-PF which bred a combined unity party called ZANU-PF. This marked the political burial of Joshua Nkomo’s party-ZAPU and its leader. Although the spirit of ZAPU is still surviving through Dumiso Dabengwa and others, the damage had already taken its toll. Ndabaningi Sithole and his party-ZANU-Ndonga was politically wounded by Robert Mugabe through unscrupulous treason accusations against him as a way of political survival (Mlambo & Raftopoulos 2009). Edgar Tekere and ZUM party was very powerful on its inception in 1995 when the political, social and economic power house of ZANU-PF began to crumble but it never survived Robert Mugabe’s political acidity. One of ZUM’s powerful luminaries-Patrick Kombayi escaped death by a whisker when he was shot contesting in Gweru urban against Simon Vengayi Muzenda-the then Vice-President of ZANU-PF and the

country. For Morgan Tsvangirai and his party-MDC the struggle continues from 2000 up to now characterised by abductions, torture, arson, political violence and treason accusations.

Robert Mugabe and ZANU-PF generally called, 'militarized and bloody party' (Masunungure 2009; Sachikonye 2011). The implementation of most of the political disasters examined above on 'political rigidity' was characterised by the shedding of blood of whoever was opposing the wishes of the ruling party. *Gukurabundi* claimed approximately twenty thousand people (Good 2002; Zhou & Makhamadze 2012). This genocide displayed how acidic a dictator can be to quell opposition forces. The Zimbabwean society was wounded because of the massacre of such people and the wounds are still licking for no meaningful efforts of reconciliation have been realised so far. Mbeki (2009:192) commented the acidic nature of *Gukurabundi*:

One of the most tragic impacts of 5 Brigade on Matabeleland was the resulting perception among those civilians who suffered that they had become victims of an 'ethnic' and political war, with an attack on the Ndebele considered to be an attack on ZAPU seen as an attack on the Ndebele. The incidence of rape under 5 Brigade also became loaded with political overtones for those in Matabeleland, with rapes committed by members of the brigade perceived as a means of creating a generation of Shona babies.

Though there are elements of exaggeration in the above statement, this shows how detrimental such genocide was to the psychological well-being of the people of Matabeleland and most of the political analysts in the country and beyond.

Jambanja- 'Fast Track Land Reform Programme' claimed approximately over forty-eight people (Human Rights Watch 2002). Operation Murambatsvina left thousands of people homeless (Madzokere & Machingura 2016). The Operation clear-off the Rubbish (*Murambatsvina*) had devastating social, political, economic, psychological and emotional long-term effects. Robert Mugabe and his cronies have the political tricks of causing mayhem among political opposition parties. The statesman has degrees of creating

fake opposition parties to pretend as though Zimbabwe observes multi-party democracy (BBC News 2016). Machingura (2010) and Madzokere & Machingura (2016) observed that the series of rigged elections in Zimbabwe characterised by the worst violence had serious negative effects to the lives of the victims namely: physical, sexual, spiritual, psychological, economic and social. The sacking of Joice Teurai Ropa Mujuru from the Presidium in 2014 was an acidic political move by the President to whoever tries to challenge his hold onto power. He does not tolerate any opposition within and outside his party because he wants to rule the country till death. This move by political expert was a calculated ploy to destroy Joice Mujuru's political career forever. If that was not enough, Emmerson Mnangagwa (Vice President) who replaced Joice is facing the same hell as that of her predecessor to date. The ruling party faction of Generation 40(G40) led by Grace Mugabe is busy championing the sacking agenda of Emmerson from ZANU-PF.

The elimination and substitution game by Robert Mugabe in the political game is a ploy to stay on power through hook and crook. His present collision with his long- time allies-the war veterans' leadership of Mutswangwa is a turning point in the history of Zimbabwe politics. The war veterans enjoyed a joyous relationship with the President of the country during the implementation of all the political disasters examined above but hell broke loose when they suggested a successor to him in the likes of Emmerson Mnangagwa to takeover power. The war veterans' leadership trod on hell ground by putting forward such a view to the incumbent-Robert Mugabe who felt threatened to his stay on power and his 2018 Presidential candidature. In the midst of political turmoil of massive uprisings in the capital city-Harare in recent days, Robert Mugabe-the President of the country instigated a ban on demonstrations by a statutory instrument 101A of the Constitution as a way of silencing the rebellion but that would never stop the winds of change from blowing (Tinhu 2016& Chikowore 2016).The political acidic nature of Robert Mugabe and his adherents have long-term effects to the social, economic and humanitarian freedom of the people which serve as an impediment to the development of the nation. This is the worst effects of political acidity.

Political aridity

From the definition of terms above, the working definition of the word, 'political aridity' means refers to the cluelessness the leadership of the country in the governance of Zimbabwe that transforms the nation from its failed status (underdeveloped) to a developed one. Robert Mugabe at ninety-two years of age has ruled the country for thirty-six years and he still vows to remain on the helm of the country's leadership as the catchy statement of David Moore above. The leadership of Zimbabwe has brought about the political, social and economic mess that the nation is suffering from at the moment. Through the implementation of various political disasters noted above, the President of the country did not only show political rigidity and political acidity but political aridity. At ninety-two years as a leader of nation, what miracles might be expected to be performed by Robert Mugabe to transform, revive or renew the country bedevilled by a myriad challenges. Robert Mugabe is now politically bankrupt to bring new ideas which would champion meaningful development to the country.

Politically, the people of Zimbabwe are suffering from the effects of many political disasters noted above which depicts Zimbabwe as a country experiencing a war-a physical one but not it is a war of political disasters that haunt the nation. The most citizens of Zimbabwe are political destitute in their own country because they can hardly claim political freedom where they are restricted from exercising their own political rights. They have the freedom to vote for their political parties but at the end the results of elections are rigged so their will is not realised at the end. There is no political change at all and that also mean no stagnation in terms of political development. The opposition forces and some radical ones within ZANU-PF party are blaming Robert Mugabe's overstay on power and his political aridity for the ruinous state that Zimbabwe had plunged into. The long serving tyrant-Robert Mugabe has now been described as, 'clueless, hopeless and retarded' leader who should leave office to pave way for young, energetic and progressive

luminaries who would rescue the country from further decay and ruin.

Economically, the country is not managing to sustain its citizens because the resources of the country are exploited by a few rich powerful connected ones at the detriment of the majority poor who languish in abject poverty. The country is in its worst economic doldrums characterised by a ballooned Parliament of two hundred and ten legislators who boggle millions of dollars from the tax-payer's money. The civil service alone takes ninety-seven percent of the country's budget but the government is on the massive drive to recruit more in the uniformed forces. Socially, the gap between the rich elites and the poor peasants is escalating daily, weekly, monthly and yearly. This is perpetrated by the aristocracy of the nation which should be on the fore front to address that anomaly. The leaders of the nation are the champions in the impoverishment of Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe is now known for a collapsed education and health system. A ruined industrial base gives a sorry sight of the country's cosmopolitan atmosphere. Looking at political, social and economic failures of Zimbabwe one can safely refer the nation to as, a 'failed state' (Madzokere & Matanda 2015). The failure by the country leadership to address the social, political and economic injustices in Zimbabwe shows the arid nature of incumbency-Robert Mugabe. The 'Zimbabwe Crisis' points to failure of Zimbabwe's political leadership to champion social, economic and political emancipation of its citizens from the worst era of social, economic, political and religious quagmire.

'A Precursor to development': Forward with liberation and reconstruction

After an examination on the Gabriel tricks of political rigidity, political acidity and political aridity, the book chapter now takes a look on the liberation-cum-reconstruction paradigm which serves as a precursor to development. This according to this study should be embraced by Robert Mugabe and his apologists to bring about meaningful change to the social, political and economic status of Zimbabwe. By liberation-cum-reconstruction approach one mean

the embracing of liberation and reconstruction traits in the country's leadership which at the moment suffers from political rigidity, political acidity and political aridity. What Zimbabwe needs at the moment is the leadership that brings peace and take development of the country to its social, economic and political well-being. The liberation paradigm as derived from the book of Exodus already examined above champion social, economic and political liberation of those experiencing domination of any nature. From the story of the Hebrews, Yahweh took sides with those who were dominated socially, economically and politically to usher in a new era of liberation, salvation, and redemption. The reconstruction paradigm has been derived from three theologians of high repute namely-J.N.K Mugambi, Charles Villa-Vincencio and Ka Mana (Chitando 2009).For the three personalities, 'reconstruction' should be the way to go for Africa where the political elites created multiple crises of poverty, corruption, extreme violation of human rights, civil unrest and underdevelopment. Such a paradigm should be embraced by Robert Mugabe and his adherents to transform the Zimbabwean society to greater heights in terms of development. Such a message counters Gabriel tricks of political rigidity, political acidity and political aridity which are a detriment to the country's political, religious and socio-economic progress in the name of development. J.N.K Mugambi says this on reconstruction:

It is reconstructive rather than destructive, inclusive rather exclusive, proactive rather than reactive, complementary rather than competitive, integrative rather than disintegrative, programme driven rather than project driven, people centred rather than institution centred, participatory rather autocratic, regenerative rather degenerative (Chitando 2009:127-130).

Chitando (ibid) observes that reconstruction agenda is the way to go for Africa to shake the evils of society that deprive people of a holistic life that is desirable and worth living. For him, reconstruction entails the revamping of oppressive government systems, rebuilding of individuals, families and communities. It means bringing renewal, revival and transformation to African leadership with an evil history

of overstay on power, deprivation of people's rights, plunder of resources, corruption dictatorship and destruction of livelihoods. Robert Mugabe should adopt the liberation message in the book of Exodus to transform the situation of Zimbabweans who are in turbulence due to social, economic and political domination caused by his rigidity, acidity and aridity. The adoption of the liberation message would not be enough without embracing reconstruction drive which brings revival, renewal and transformation of the lives of the people. The reconstruction drive enables people to live life holistically as social, economic, political and religious beings.

Conclusion and recommendations

In conclusion, this book chapter meticulously dissected through the following areas: the introduction of the topic and definition of key terms. The working definitions were also developed to propel the study. The message of the book of Exodus was examined so that it could be contextualised to the Zimbabwe situation of political, social and economic domination. The Gabriel power tricks were discussed under the three sub-headings namely: political rigidity, political acidity and political aridity which were employed to enable the long serving statesman stay on power in spite of vigorous challenge from popular opposition parties. After an analysis of the weaknesses of Gabriel tricks in the political game in Zimbabwe, the chapter developed a point of departure which foster on liberation-cum-reconstruction paradigm which calls for African leadership's renewal, revival and transformation to the advantage of the people who would live a holistic life characterised by social, political and economic freedom-a precursor to the development of any nation.

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“Poverty in the Midst of Plenty”: A Study of Poverty and Underdevelopment in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria

Odeigah, Theresa Nfam

Introduction

Niger Delta Region of Nigeria is endowed with abundant natural and human resources which explains its enormous economic potentials. Political independence held out bright prospects of sustained economic development and prosperity for the region and the country at large. Ironically, the region has lagged behind other oil producing states in the world, in terms of economic development and self-empowerment of the people in the region¹. A combination of factors account for this unsavoury situation namely, poor leadership and governance, imperial history, human and property insecurity, insurgency, terrorism, vandalism, neo-colonialism, endemic corruption, neglect of agriculture, criminality and a general lack of infrastructural development, among others.

Since the era of the trans-Atlantic slave trade through today, the Nigerian economy has been perpetually under the "bondage" of the developed Western economies, serving two primary purposes for them². These are serving as a source of raw materials for Western industries; and a market for the disposal of the West's manufactured goods. Attempts to integrate the Niger Delta economy to the global economy, have led to more pauperisation of the Niger Delta and greater external dependency of the Nigerian economy. This is a replica of what is happening at a continental level. Such a scenario has led to, in most cases, growth without development, in fact "mesmerising growth". This is because African-European relations have been grossly unequal and skewed against Africa³. One telling result of this is that since the 1980s especially, poverty has not only

spread but also deepened in Africa in relative and absolute terms. Extant statistics does not give much room for optimism. How to get the continent out of its current miasma of poverty is a legitimate subject for historical and hermeneutical inquiry. This chapter attempts to unravel this matter using multi-disciplinary approach and the case study of the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria to tackle the problem and proffer solutions to this menace.

The Niger Delta Region

The Niger Delta Region of Nigeria covers an area of about 70,000 square kilometres and is seen as the largest wetland in Africa⁴. This wetland area is made up of 36,000 square kilometres of creeks, mangrove lagoons and other natural resources. The region is rich because it is endowed with abundant natural resources and economic potentials. It has however remained one of the least developed areas in Nigeria because of a combination of factors like the destruction of ecosystem by the multinational oil corporations. The states that made up the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria are Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers. The majority of the ethnic groups in this region are made up of the Efike, Ibo, Ijaw, Ibibio, Urhobo, Itsekiri, Boki and Isoko, among other communities⁵.

The Niger Delta Region of Nigeria is one of the most important coastal marine ecosystems in Africa. The region also has massive crude oil deposits which foreign companies have been exploring and exploiting for several decades now. This region is one of the most important economic reservoirs in both the national and global economy. The exploration of crude oil has assisted the Nigerian government with some development that had taken place mainly in other parts of Nigeria, but not necessarily in the Niger Delta Region. Crude oil also has been the main source of revenue to the Nigerian government and therefore the golden goose of Nigeria⁶. The question that remains mind-boggling about this region is: “Why the region is poor in the midst of plenty?”

External factors responsible for poverty and underdevelopment in the Niger Delta Region

As previously alluded to, there are a lot of factors responsible for poverty and underdevelopment in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria and these can be looked at from the perspectives of internal and external factors. External factors can be seen from the point of view of industrialised countries of Europe dominating the so-called less developed countries economically, politically and socially, because of the economic and political interest of the European countries in the region right from inception. Because of the economic potentials of the Niger Delta Region, the European countries had developed a lot of interest in the area. This is part of the reasons why the area has remained backward and deeply impoverished⁷.

Transatlantic slave trade

Poverty and underdevelopment in the midst of abundance in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria could be traced to as far back as the arrival of the Europeans in 1444 in Africa. The Europeans domination and operations in the Niger Delta Region since the 15th century had made the indigenous economy rudimentary and stagnated. Right from the time of the slave trade to the legitimate trade era, the Niger Delta Region was dominated by the Europeans. The trans-Atlantic slave trade caused the forced movement of millions of Africans to Europe so as to provide labour on their plantations. The category of people that were moved from the Niger Delta area during this period were not the weak or frail individuals, but rather, the strong, able-bodied men and women who were capable of developing the society. The forceful movement of men and women from the Niger Delta Region during the slave trade era to Europe imposed a heavy threat to the economic growth of the region, at least considering the number of people who were forcefully moved away. Poverty and underdevelopment in the Niger Delta Region, thus, can be looked at in two broad perspectives as internal and external. Many scholars have attributed underdevelopment in Africa to colonialism, slave trade, neo-colonialism, bad leadership, crime, illiteracy among others⁸. Walter Rodney in his infamous text:

How Europe Underdeveloped Africa underlined that a combination of factors ranging from economic to political contributed to Africa's underdevelopment⁹. Some scholars have argued that underdevelopment in Africa can be traced back to the era of slave trade and colonialism, because during the slave trade, Africa lost a lot of able-bodied men and women. The political setting, economic base, social structure and cultural beliefs were devastated by the colonialists. It is estimated that about 12million people were taken across the Atlantic Ocean to work in plantations and industries during the industrial revolution in Europe¹⁰. The European subjugation and oppression in Africa was one of the factors of poverty and underdevelopment in Africa. Rodney also agree that colonialism is one of the causes of underdevelopment and that the Europeans that came to Africa had a major motive, which was mainly exploitative ¹¹

One of the major external factors contributing to poverty and underdevelopment in the Niger Delta Region has been the presence of the Multinational Oil Companies in the area. Some of these multinational oil corporations like Agip, Exxon Mobil, Shell, and Chevron, among others, are still operational in the region. While one can say the discovery of crude oil in the Niger Delta Region would have been a blessing, it has become a curse, because basic amenities such as good roads, hospitals, schools, electricity supply and employment opportunities are lacking in the region where such an important resource – oil is found in abundance. The multinational oil companies have been operating and generating billions of dollars to the detriment of their host communities. Most of the people of the Niger Delta Region are living in abject poverty¹². The multinational oil corporations are agents of imperialism and most of the activities are not beneficial to their host communities. It is also pertinent to note that in the pre- colonial and colonial periods, the Niger Delta people were noted for farming agricultural products such as palm oil and fishing besides salt production. The environmental quality is fundamental to the overall livelihood and development of the people. Pollution of the atmosphere, water and land in the Niger Delta Region through oil exploration, gas flaring, dumping of toxic wastes and environmental degradation have destroyed the land and rendered

the people's agricultural pursuits unproductive¹³. The petroleum industry in the Niger Delta Region is the main source of Nigeria's foreign exchange earnings and this has kept the economy vibrant and bouffant, this also accounts for over 90 per cent of the total foreign exchange revenue to the country. Nigeria is the 7th largest oil producer in the world and indeed the largest in Africa. Sadly, despite the importance of oil and gas to the Nigerian economy, the Niger Delta Region has witnessed many years of neglect by the government and the multinational oil companies, making the region undeveloped and even poorer¹⁴.

The developed countries of the world control the region indirectly through their companies resulting to lack of development, economic and political dependency. More often than not, the Multinational Oil Corporations are involved indirectly in the politics of the region because they influence opinion and also can give financial support to their chosen candidates for political office. The Multinationals do not support government that is very critical of them and can indirectly remove a government that is hostile to them and their interests. Through this corrupt gimmick, the multinational oil corporations have underdeveloped the Niger Delta Region through massive oil spillage and gas flaring that have systematically destroyed the ecosystem, making agricultural pursuits almost impossible¹⁵. In the Niger Delta Region, the water is also polluted as a result of chemical wastes. This has in turn destroyed aquatic life, and in addition to that, causing ill health to the inhabitants of the region. Oil explorations activities in the region have been known to cause ill health, reduced life expectancy for the inhabitants and have also necessitated relocation of some communities to other safer areas¹⁶.

The Europeans did not only plunder African's resources, but also destroyed the local thriving indigenous economy of the Niger Delta Region. In the Niger Delta Region, despite several oil spillages that destroyed the ecosystem of the area, no adequate compensation has even been given to the local people. This is unacceptable in other countries with similar problems, because the government or corporate bodies have adequate arrangement for any problem that may occur. For example, after the oil spill in Prince William Sound

Alaska in 1989, ExxonMobil Company spent about 5 billion USD on cleaning up the environment hazards and also paid physical compensation to the host communities. In the Niger Delta Region where oil spillage has destroyed the ecosystem and indigenous occupations like agriculture among others, not much attention and compensation have been paid to this important region. It is only recently that the new Nigerian government has just instituted a massive plan to clean up the Niger Delta environment and this is coming more than four years after the United Nations Environmental Programme suggested a master plan to clean up the Niger Delta environment¹⁷.

One of the factors that have contributed to the underdevelopment of the Niger Delta Region is neo-colonialism through the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. International Monetary fund and World Bank are the two institutions structure to give assistance to mostly poor countries, but they are now been used to underdeveloped countries. Neo-colonialism is an ideology that was introduced in the twentieth century. This can also be seen as the continuation of an economic model of colonialism after a colonised territory has achieved formal political independence¹⁸. These agencies like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have been used to render African Countries undeveloped. This is because when countries are given loans with extreme conditionalities, economic, political power and influence by the loan recipients are ceded to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank. Even when some countries in Africa have not taken IMF loans like Nigeria, it is also known that the IMF and the World Bank will restructure the economies of such African countries in a way to tie them to the apron strings of the developed nations¹⁹. The World Bank, initially known as rehabilitation and development bank was formed for the rebuilding of infrastructure and capital projects in low and medium income to countries as well as to promote trade co-existence. The mission of the World Bank is to reduce extreme poverty and boost economic prosperity through policy prescription and execution, but today the World Bank and the IMF have brought massive poverty to a lot of poor African countries and increased their dependency on

the West. It is also pertinent to note that Nigeria's economy is still to a large extent tied to the apron strings of the Europeans. Most manufactured goods being produced by some of the developed countries like China and Britain are being marketed in Nigeria and other African countries even though some of the basic raw materials are from Africa. This has made Nigeria like other African countries a consumer nation and therefore stifling improvement of the local technology²⁰.

Climate change

Climate change, is also affecting the Niger Delta region like other parts of the world. According to Nasiru, climate change is an increase in the average global temperature. Human activities and events are contributing to the increase in the global temperatures. In Nigeria as well as the Niger Delta Region, the negative impact of global warming can be seen particularly in the agricultural sector arising from climatic deterioration. Flooding is common in the Niger Delta and in Nigeria as a whole resulting in gully erosion and destruction of farmlands. Flooding has destroyed communities, farmlands and the ecosystem generally and this over the years has negatively affected the economy of the people ²¹.

Internal factors responsible for poverty and underdevelopment in the Niger Delta Region

Indigenous exploitation

The Niger Delta Region with its abundant natural resources has been witnessing an increasing level of poverty as a result of indigenous Exploitation. Many factors have contributed to this menace in the region. The concept of indigenous exploitation of the Niger Delta Region cannot be over emphasized. Exploitation was a word used to describe the unjust treatment of the Africans by the Europeans but today, African leaders are now playing the same role the Europeans played in Africa during the colonial period, if not worse²². Indigenous exploitation can be said to be the root cause of the various kinds of exploitation that have engulfed the region as well as Nigeria as a whole. Indigenous exploitation in Nigeria has always

been blamed on the Europeans, however, since 1960 when Nigeria got her independence, there has been the perception that Nigerian leaders have been the major exploiters of the country's resources and that leadership has been the mechanism used to exploit the country's resources. Nigerian leaders are to some extent, largely tied and embedded in a systematic form of taking national wealth and diverting government funds into their private accounts because of greed and self-ambition.

Poor governance

Poor governance can be said to be the breeding ground for poverty in the region, because people aspire and get into leadership positions not with the desire of improving the living conditions of the people, but rather to enrich themselves at the expense of the masses. The Niger Delta Region with its abundant natural resources has witnessed a lot of poverty and underdevelopment. It is no longer news that due to bad leadership and massive corruption by the Niger Delta leaders, the region has remained in abject poverty. The leaders, because of their flamboyant lifestyle have made the people not only to see corruption as fashionable activity but also a good way to enjoy several privileges. The expectation of the Nigerian citizenry was very high when Nigeria embraced democratic system in 1999 after several attempts in the past²³. It was generally believed that with the coming in of democracy, a lot of problems would be solved like unemployment, insecurity and absence of the rule of law. Nigeria for example had enjoyed oil boom in the past, but the leaders failed to save for periods when oil prices fell and to judiciously use the windfalls from high oil prices to develop crucial sectors like education, agriculture, health, power and transportation.

Corruption

Corruption is a fraudulent conduct by those who use power or leadership positions to embezzle public funds for their personal use²⁴. This is a major impediment to the development of the Niger Delta Region and it is indeed a major challenge hindering development in the whole country. The menace has been linked to the government conniving with the multinational oil corporations to deny the people

their rights and benefits, thereby contributing to the staggering growth of development in the area. The root cause of corruption in the Niger Delta lies in the fact that the leaders view government funds and property as their new devices of acquiring their own share of the national cake. This corruption is all-pervading and has affected all sectors like the economy, the, political and the social life of the people. It is unfortunate that several anti-corruption agencies set by government, like the Corrupt Practices Decree of 1975 which was promulgated by the regime of Murtala / Obasanjo, War Against Indiscipline by Buhari/ Idiagbon regime, Code of Conduct Bureau of 1990, Advanced Fee Fraud and other related offences of 1995, Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission ICPC and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission EFCC, have not be enable to curb corruption in the Niger Delta and in Nigeria as a whole. Several government projects have been abandoned like construction of roads, health, refineries, water project and uncompleted government buildings. These abandoning projects are due to corruption by government officials. In the Niger Delta region government officials see it as a common habit in siphoning government funds into their private accounts in foreign banks. There is a very high level of corruption in governance which has brought poverty in the land. The impact of corruption has been mainly on the ordinary citizens resulting in poverty and underdevelopment²⁵.

The problem of godfatherism in Nigerian politics, is another form of political corruption that has destroyed good governance in Nigeria and the region. Godfathers are men and women with enormous financial and political influence to determine who gets nominated to contest an election, and who eventually wins and gets top political positions. For instance Chief Olusegun Obasanjo the former Nigeria President was godfather to Dr Goodluck Jonathan when he became governor of Bayelsa state in the Niger Delta region and Chief Chris Uba was a political godfather to Dr Chris Ngige of Anambra State in Nigeria. This has led to most leaders failing to achieve their primary objective of coming to serve in the region. Nigeria's political class are only after personal aggrandisement and not development. It is another evil way of corruption, godfather

always has much influence in the socio-economic and political will of a nation ²⁶.

The problems of mono product economy

Another internal factor that has contributed to poverty and underdevelopment in the Niger Delta Region is “mono-economy”. The non-diversification of the Niger Delta economy has rendered the Niger Delta economy undeveloped. The Niger Delta Region is one of the most important regions in the world, with massive natural oil and gas reserves of great economic potentials. Before crude oil was discovered in 1956 in the Niger Delta Region, the region was known for agriculture, salt production and fishing. Palm oil was one of the most important crops before the discovery of oil in the region and it is an indigenous crop that has always contributed to the development of the area till the advent of exploration of crude oil²⁷. Palm oil plantations were grown in abundance in the hinterland and the coastal areas as well. There was no component of the palm tree that was not economically viable as palm trees were good in the production of palm oil, brooms and palm kernels, and some of these items were used domestically and externally. Some of these components of the palm trees were used in the production of pomades and soap, while the oil was a very important and necessary ingredient for preparing soups of various kinds in the region and beyond. The kernels shell was used for fuelling firewood and the shaft and husks saved as illuminates among other things. The Niger Delta Region produced several thousand tons of palm oil and the palm oil export from the region is said to have risen from 4700 tons in 1827 to 13,945 tons in 1845 and export of palm oil reached as far as 25000 tons, and at the end of the century the volume had increased tremendously²⁸.

However, during the colonial and postcolonial periods, the region suddenly neglected its agricultural heritage and followed what was believed to be the “new” and “fashionable” trend of depending on oil for the survival of the region. Thus, over the years there has been no improvement in agriculture, no new technology has been added to what was obtained in the past. Agriculture was abandoned and it remained stagnated because all the attention was focused on

crude oil to the extent that even the young school leavers have been orientated to believe only in white collar jobs in the rich oil companies. This is despite the fact that these so-called “cream jobs” are no more forthcoming resulting in a lot of youth restiveness, unemployment, poverty, violence and criminality in the region²⁹. Further, it is worth noting that in the Niger Delta Region, fishing was a highly skilled occupation for both men and women. People from Oron, Calabar, and the Urhobos, among many other communities, were all involved in fishing activities. Fishing activities were so important to the extent that the culture of the Ijaws, permitted a new born baby to be taken to the stream and dipped in water, allowed to float for a few seconds, as a sign that every child born of the Ijaw community had to be acquainted with water and swimming right from birth. The Ijaws lived on fishing and salt production, because the ecosystem was not suitable for arable farming and food cropping. In 1508, a Portuguese sea captain, soldier, explorer and also a cartographer, Pachecho Pereira visited the region and reported that the Ijaws exported fish and salt to the hinterland areas in exchange for agricultural produce³⁰. All these occupations were vibrant and businesses took place peacefully and poverty was well managed until the time the activities of the multinational oil corporations destroyed, the ecosystem and the fishing business in the region. Since then, the Niger Delta Region economy has never again been diversified because the oil companies have primarily dominated the economy with their foreign partners. This is the main source of foreign exchange in Nigeria with 75 percent the Nigerian’s revenue gotten from crude oil. Sadly, even developing infrastructural facilities in the region have proved difficult. That is why the region found itself in poverty and deprivation despite enormous natural resources. With the rate of oil spillage, the ecosystem is no longer fertile for the production of indigenous crops³¹.

Political instability and lack of continuity in governance

After 1960 the first few years of independence and democracy, governance in Nigeria was dominated by the military rule in 1966 with a coup d’état that over threw the Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. Nigeria witnessed several corrupt military regimes

that came to power through coup-d'état promising to do better than the government they overthrew. Military regimes by their very nature are prone to corruption, dictatorship and making of empty promises, yet military rule could not address basic issues of governance and this further impoverished the Niger Delta Region³².

Many poverty alleviation programmes have been instituted since 1972 like the National Accelerated Food Production Programme, the Nigeria Agricultural and Co-operative Bank and the Operation Feed the Nation in 1976, aimed at teaching and empowering the rural framers on how to use new technological tools and techniques in farming. The National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) of 2001 was designed to boost and sustain poverty alleviation in Nigeria, but all these programmes failed woefully because of poor leadership and massive corruption³³.

Insecurity and criminality

Insecurity and criminality in the 21st century has become a major issue in Africa and Nigeria especially with the new wave of insurgency in Nigeria. Insecurity in this general sense means when there is no adequate guard or protection in the society³⁴. This could be in the form of job, economic, food, political, financial or social insecurity to mention a few. No matter what form of insecurity a state might have, the genesis is usually traceable to bad governance³⁵. In Nigeria the Boko Harm and the Niger Delta militants have worsened the state of insecurity and criminality. The rising new wave of violent crimes and the associated widespread insecurity in the Niger Delta region and indeed the entire Nigeria has become worrisome³⁶. The pervading poverty and underdevelopment in the Niger Delta Region can also be attributed to insecurity and increased crime rate in Nigeria. Nigeria has become a ravaged by insecurity and crime which have extended to other part of Nigeria like the Niger Delta Region, and this has become worrisome. The region has witnessed many cases of kidnapping, pipeline vandalism, terrorism, armed robbery, murder, human trafficking, rape, cyber fraud, and oil theft. Unemployed youths are used as thugs to cause electoral violence and mayhem during elections. Due to the large number of unemployed youths, politicians are known to have taken advantage of poverty in

the region to recruit them as political thugs. This has fuelled high level of insecurity and criminality in the region. Due to the failure of the law enforcement agencies to curtail the problem, many oil companies have stopped production and some have even moved out of the region further worsening the unemployment situation. The oil corporations that are still operating in the Niger Delta Region are producing at low capacity and no new investments are being made in the oil and gas industry because of the very hostile business environment. Nigeria daily oil production has reduced by over 800,000 barrels per day from an average of 2.2 million barrels per day, because of insecurity, criminality and especially increased of crude oil pipelines vandals in the Niger Delta Region ³⁷. Youth restiveness has metamorphosed into proliferation of arms and the emergence of militia groups that have constituted a threat to the region and the country at large ³⁸. According to Balabola, the struggle for revenue allocation formula is a manifestation of a collective sense of deprivation on the part of the people whom themselves are producers of the entire federation's wealth. It should however be noted that in the Niger Delta Region, the oil exploration activities have a profound negative impact on the domestic economy. Exploration and exploitation of the region right from 1956 has resulted in environmental degradation, poverty and unemployment. Many individuals have lost their lives and farmlands because of the installations of equipment for the production of oil and gas³⁹. Most of the unemployed youths do not have marketable skills due to a poorly structured educational system and even attempt to retrain these youths for engagement in the agricultural sector has been rebuffed severally because of the wrong perception that they can only be successful in life by working in rich oil corporations⁴⁰. Many attempts have been made by the federal government of Nigeria to develop the Niger Delta Region by establishing some agencies, such as the Niger Delta Development Board formed in 1960, the Niger Delta Basin Development Authority (NDBDA) formed in 1976, the Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission (OMPADEC) formed in 1992, the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) formed in 2000, and the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs formed in 2008. President Yar'Adua, for example,

created the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs in September 2008 to specifically support development in the region⁴¹. According to the then Nigerian president, the Ministry was the last attempt by government to find a lasting solution to the problem in the Niger Delta Region ranging from poverty, underdevelopment, environmental degradation and unemployment, among others⁴². Between 1985 and 1993, the military regime of Ibrahim Babangida increased the derivation funds from 1.5 per cent to 3 per cent of the total oil revenue to be given to oil producing states. All these were to a large extent white elephant projects because there was no proper funding and political will power to see these projects through. Insincerity on the part of government, bad leadership, mismanagement, misappropriation of funds and corruption rendered the region undeveloped⁴³.

Recommendations

One of the most important interventions that the Federal Government of Nigeria could put in place to bring about development in the Niger Delta Region is to have and implement an agreement with the multinational oil and gas companies on how to protect the environment to reduce the negative impact of their exploration activities on their host communities.

Government should enforce rules and regulation on oil spill and make the Multinational Oil Cooperation responsible and accountable for their actions. The multinational oil companies should be mandated to sign agreements with the host communities in respect of employing the youths of their host communities. The Multinational Oil Companies should keep cordial relation with their host communities and to improve communication among them.⁴⁴

Adequate compensation should be paid to the communities by the multinational oil corporations and such funds should be judiciously utilise in providing infrastructure such as roads, portable water, schools and health centres among others.

The indigenous people should be made stakeholders in the oil business so as to protect the national assets of the country. It is appropriate for indigenous people to given employment in top

management position and to also to receive salary in dollars. Most decisions in the oil companies should be made by the indigenous people.

Different skills should be introduced to the youths and training schools should also be established to curb youth restiveness and criminality in the region. This will help the empowerment programme to better the lives of the people. Rehabilitation for the female unemployed youths who are being trafficked as sex slaves across international boundaries and also the rehabilitation of the various armed groups. Implementation of amnesty programmes for all the militant youth who are addicted to criminal activities and prostitution

Corruption in all ramifications should be genuinely addressed to ensure that funds for economic growth and development of the Eastern Niger Delta area are judiciously used for the welfare of the citizens.

All anti corrupt agencies like Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) should be transparent.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Niger Delta region of Nigeria despite its enormous oil and gas reserves that is the main foreign exchange earner for the country has suffered neglect from various government regimes in Nigeria. Poor leadership, corruption, pipeline vandalism and the resulting increase in the wave of crime and criminality in the region have further impoverished the region and its people. The neglect of agriculture and the abandonment of the indigenous technology by the people in the region have also contributed to further impoverishment of the region. The pollution of the ecosystem through oil exploration activities and the failure of the multinational oil and gas companies and governments at various levels can as well not be underestimated. They have also contributed tremendously to poverty and underdevelopment in the region in many ways as have been explicated in this chapter.

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“Jungle” Education Curriculum and Language of Instruction as Hindrances to the Development of Science and Technology in Africa: Insights from Nigeria

Okewande Esther Oyenibe

Introduction

Development has been conceived as “multi-dimensional,” referring to positive changes which affect a people with regards to the social, economic, political, education and cultural spheres of societal life. Educational development, which is the focus of this chapter, has been one of the keys, with which development of a nation is measured and unlocked. Therefore, this chapter primarily discusses the idea that any endeavour of humans, science, technology and mathematics education inclusive, without any dialectical and logical considerations rooted in indigenous culture is built on “sinking sand”. Therefore, there is need to design science and technology education curriculum that satisfactorily meets the indigenous needs of the citizens before Africa can develop. Using Nigeria as a case study, this chapter reveals that the content of science taught in Nigeria schools is devoid of local environmental input. For example, there are curriculums for primary and secondary schools developed by the Nigerian Educational Research and Development Council [NERDC]. It has been argued that problem of Nigerian curriculums is that it is too theoretical and regimented. Students are only interested in certificates but not what they can do with their hands. However, Nigerian curriculums need to move from a class-based to field-based teaching which will widen students’ horizon and further exposed them to science and technology development. To stakeholders, this is an issue that must be thrashed out to save Nigeria education in particular and Africa in general.

It is observed in Nigeria that most private schools, particularly those that serve the elite, run foreign curriculums to appeal to their market segment. It has become fashionable for private schools to mix Nigerian curriculum with whatever foreign curriculum they find attractive. The practice of mixing curriculum in the name of internationalisation can be described as doing a “disservice” to the learners, who would become misfits in the Nigerian society. On this note, I argue that curriculum is a necessity developed around a culture, which the learners must imbibe. The use of mixing curriculum indicates lack of confidence and semi-literacy. Education builds confidence, makes oneself reliant, and appreciate one’s culture. Language factor is another cankerworm of Nigerian curriculum. English has over the years grown to accommodate scientific words by borrowing and importing from other languages especially Latin and Greek to invent new words. This has made many people in Nigeria to believe that science can only be taught and learnt in English language.

This chapter further argues that, any Nigerian language can be so developed to be used in scientific writings and more so, it will make science learning more meaningful to the students. The use of foreign language to teach science is inimical to students. Library method will be employed because it gives room for the review and discuss previous education science curriculum, with aims to study the weaknesses and the strengths in relation to science and technology education in Nigeria. These reviews, among others, are Nigerian curriculum, criticisms of Nigerian curriculum, the mixing of curriculum and language factor in implementing science curriculum. It found out from this study that running a foreign curriculum and using foreign language as a medium of instruction in developing countries such as that of Africa in general and Nigeria in particular will not promote African value system, an indication that continent of Africa mode of education is inferior to that of the developed nations of the world.

The meaning and nature of curriculum

Curriculum has been defined differently by different scholars. For example, Fafunwa (1975) opines about curriculum, that, a good curriculum is the total environment in which education takes place, that is the child, teacher, subject, content, method, and the physical and psychological environment. Elaborating further on this, Fafunwa provides us with some criterion with the following definitions of curriculum:

- i). It must have definite and dynamic objectives based on the value of the society and the need of the child as a criterion and a skilled individual;
- ii). It must be flexible and must provide for the growth that is essential in order to meet the stated or implied objectives;
- iii). It must have built into it a process of constant evaluation to help determine the extent in terms of end products.

The concept of the curriculum, thus, is one which remains relatively unclear to many people including the educated elites. The basis of this lack of clarity arises from the absence of agreement on the definition of curriculum by the various schools of curriculum theorists. There is therefore a tendency by current authors to avoid outright definition of curriculum in order to stay clear of this controversy. This is an objectionable tendency because it conceals the perspective of curriculum which discuss centrally in this chapter.

The work of various curriculum theorists such as Smith, Stanley and Shores (1957), Richmond (1971), Saylor and Alexander (1974), reveal that the field of curriculum may be considered as possessing several faces, which present themselves to the various curriculum theorists. Such a position explains the differences which are found among the definitions of curriculum in text books. However, the various definitions agree that curriculum is concerned with the process of education which in turn is aimed at optimally harnessing life-long development and change of ideas, ideas, and accomplishments of men and women in their environment.

Two illustrations of the definition derived from theory and practice are contained in Saylor and Alexander (1974). The opinion of Saylor and Alexander about curriculum is that it is a plan for providing sets of learning opportunities to achieve broad educational goals and related specific objectives for an identifiable population served by a single school centre. On another notes, (Gowin 1981 and Ivowi 1993) are of the opinion that curriculum is logically connected set of conceptually and pedagogically analysed knowledge and value claims.

The two definitions above, highlight the complexity of curriculum as a field of study, which has many elements or parts. These definitions and several others, highlight four very outstanding and important elements of the curriculum: objectives, content, methodology and evaluation. Various curriculum models have merged as a consequence of how groups of curriculum theorists view these elements. Three prominent groups of models include the objectives, the process models and the interactions models. In the objective models, the objective is viewed as the most important element that determines what the content, methods and evaluation processes would be. The model is viewed as being rigid and “traditional”.

The interactions models regard the curriculum field containing these elements as field and interacting. No element is more important than the others and the process of curriculum planning could start from any convenient element since any element may manifest itself first. The interactions models and objectives models are regarded as belonging to the two extremes on the curriculum continuum. In between the two extremes lie the process models. The process models view content and methods as being basic to curriculum planning, although methods are considered more important than content. Also, they believe that objectives do not need to be considered first. In addition, they did not base evaluation entirely on pre-specified objectives (Brady 1983: Ivowi 1993).

Science curriculum development in Nigeria

With the introductory examination of the curriculum earlier discussed, it is imperative in this section to examine the state of the art of science curriculum development in Nigeria. Between 1842 – when the first missionary school was established in Nigeria – and 1960 – when Nigeria attained political independence-, there was no systemic science curriculum development effort in the country. During this period, Nigerian educational system experimented with the wholesale importation of the science curriculum of the British Grammar school. Thus, the science curricula of Nigerian schools in this period lacked the realistic and relevant objectives for the people of Nigeria: it heavily relied on what I refer to as “Jungle Education Curriculum”. The methodology of implementation of the curriculum content failed in most cases to meet the requirement of the British authorities from which it was modelled. Consequently the level of achievement of the colonial science curriculum in Nigeria was very low.

Some remarkable curriculum development initiatives occurred in Nigeria soon after political independence in 1960. These initiatives were catalysed by the presence of favourable conditions, which included:

- i) The establishment of the university college, Ibadan, in 1948 which had become too small to accommodate the large number of students who sought admission to science based courses in the 1960's.
- ii) The rising number of science graduates in teaching careers during the early 1950's.
- iii) The formation of the Science Teachers' Association of Nigeria in 1957.
- iv) The science of the National Curriculum Conference of 1969.

The interaction of these conditions together with the national aspiration for technological growth gave impetus to the development of a number of science curricula programmes. These are:

- i) General Science for the Comprehensive Secondary School at Aiyetoro Nigeria 1968.

- ii) Primary Education Improvement Project (PELP) 1968 and;
- iii) Bendel State of Nigeria Primary Science Project (NISP).

All these three curricula programmes have been phased out of the educational system in Nigeria. The main reasons are because they all had very limited and localised objectives. As a result of this, they could not be easily adapted or adopted for a national curriculum (Ayo 1999).

There are two national science curriculum projects which are available at the Nigerian secondary school level today. These are: The Nigerian Integrated Science Project (NISP) and the Nigerian Secondary Schools Science Project (NSSSP). The NISP is for the Junior Secondary School while the NSSSP is for the Senior Secondary School. However, despite the fact that these projects are making significant contributions presently towards the national effort of providing scientific literacy to the citizens, some schools still prefer using foreign curriculum for reasons I will explain in the paragraph below.

The use of foreign curriculum in Nigeria

In African countries generally, there are bodies responsible for curriculum development. For instance, in Nigeria, one of the services provided by Nigerian Educational Research and Development Council (NERDC) is curriculum development. NERDC was established in 1998. The body designs curriculum for all levels of education. It draws from the national policy on education (NPE) of 1977 (last reviewed in 2004), which stipulates that Nigerians must be educated for self- reliance, individual, and national development. However, despite the laudable relevance of Nigerians curriculums, the issue of acceptability is difficult. Many school owners and administrators feel that using the Nigerian curriculum alone is inadequate preparation for pupils that may seek for furthering their education outside Nigeria later in life. For instance, Ogunkanmbi in *The Nation* (one of the Nigerian national dailies) of May 21, 2015, said his school, Green Springs School, Lekki Campus, Lagos, runs Montessori curriculum. The primary school runs the British National

curriculum, while the secondary school works with the Cambridge international General certificate of secondary education. It also runs the international Baccalaureate curriculum after secondary school. He believes that the school should be free to run whatever curriculum they like. According to Ogunkanmbi:

My school is an international school and those are the international programmes we run. We do not write the senior secondary school certificate (SSCE), but if our students are interested in that, they can register for that on their own outside the school. The individual school should determine the kind of curriculum they would like to run, based on their direction, because you cannot tell me what you want me to run in my school being an international school (p. 26).

For many other schools, mixing the local and foreign curriculum is the best way to make children more rounded for the international market. Ifuneya, supervisor of Christ and Schools, Victoria Garden City Lagos in *The Nation* of May 21, 2015 also says that her school runs both Nigerian and British curriculum to prepare them for both local and foreign education. According to her:

We are raising international children who have tendency to travel out of the country. So this would broaden their scope, and with the British curriculum, those who spend their holidays abroad can go for summer lessons and the method of teaching would not be too strange to them. Limiting them to only Nigerian curriculum would not do them any good (p. 26).

In Nigeria, my field research shows that among the private schools that are using foreign curriculum are:

1. American International School Lagos
2. Avi-Canna International School, Lagos
3. British International School, Lagos
4. Children's International School, Lagos
5. Grange School, Lagos
6. Lekki British School, Lagos
7. Lycee Francais, Lagos
8. St. Saviour's School, Ikoyi, Lagos
9. Regent International School, Abuja

10. Safehands School, Abuja

11. Tender Years Preparatory School, Abuja

Nevertheless, the view that curriculum is the total environment in which education takes place (Fafunwa 1975) disagrees with the practice of mixing the curriculum in the name of internationalisation. A curriculum is rooted in a given society. That means, learning programme reflects the needs of the society of the learners not outside the learner's country (foreign land). When you start training learners' with foreign curriculum, they would not be able to fit into their own respective societies and would become misfits in the long run. National curriculum is developed taking into consideration the overall development of a child and is a necessity developed around a culture, which learners imbibe. On this background, African government should curb the mixing curricula and the adoption of foreign curriculum which could lead to confusion for the learners.

Sakwa, in *The Punch* of 24th August, 2016, describes the adoption of foreign curriculum as an "insult" to the nation. The NERDC boss added:

The country is confused. Are they using the Nigerian curriculum in Britain? Are they using Nigerian curriculum in Greece?. Our curriculum must essentially drive our culture. You want to teach pupils how to speak English and they do not know how to greet elders, the value system is collapsing all around us. If our curriculum was not good enough, then pupils from Nigeria would not have fitted into foreign system when they travel abroad for their Master's and PhDs.

From this assertion, it is my opinion that local curriculum should be retained because you cannot teach student completely out of their environment. For instance, you cannot teach 'pounds' when 'naira' is the legal tender in Nigeria. You have to create a curriculum that suits your environment. Nigeria curriculum reflects a sound National Policy on Education, but the society is not consistent on the adoption of the curriculum. Curriculum should be reviewed to respond to issues in the society. The use of foreign curriculum by some schools therefore tempts one to think that either the owners of the schools

are brainwashed or are on a nefarious mission to eradicate from the scene the value systems and cultures of the people of Africa.

There are some hindrances to implementing foreign curriculum in Nigeria at the moment. This is as a result of the political challenges the country is facing. For instance, the Boko Haram (a terrorist group) and Almajiri (the street beggars) who are not the case in the countries from where Nigeria copies its curricula. The best curriculum for a country is the one that considers the needs of a society. Foreign curricula are a catalyst for the disappearance of African culture. Disenchantment has set for many of African youths because they have lost touch with their African culture and history. That is just a small part of the damage done by teaching foreign curricula in our schools. It obliterates our culture. Chinese philosophers developed China and, they are ruling the world now. Charity begins at home. If you want a global education, you have to be rooted in your own educational system first. After who calls global education global? Doesn't that imply that Western or American education systems are the one that is global while all others are local?

English Language as official language in Africa

English language is a language that has the highest number of speakers in the world. This is because it is being spoken as the first or second language in almost all the countries of the world (Baugh and Cable, 1978). In fact, it will not be an exaggeration if we refer to English language as the language of the world. The 26 African countries that currently utilise English, as, at least, one of its official languages include but not limited to the following: Botswana, Cameroon, Eritrea, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Only nine percent of the global population are native speakers (mother tongue), but most one third of the population speaks English (World Fact book, 2013; Gordon, 2005). Most recently, Rwanda, Burundi and Gabon, French-speaking countries, have switched to English as an official language.

English Language got to Nigeria as early as the fifteenth century through the Portuguese who were traders. Later, it became the language of colonial masters as well as missionaries who later came to Nigeria. It has become domesticated, since then and has today become the language of science and technology, commerce and trade, administration and a means of national and international communication (Olagoke 1973 and Adetugbo, 1980). The language was initially being used with indigenous language in education before it eventually became a compulsory subject as well as the language of instruction in Nigerian primary and secondary schools. It is not uncommon in most Nigerian secondary schools (especially in the Western part) to see the statement “speaking vernacular is prohibited in the school”, boldly inscribed on the wall, chalkboard or any other place the writer can find space. This is done to encourage students to speak English language and not their indigenous languages. Self-expression in local languages is therefore an offence. Many researchers such as (Ajayi (2007) and Sunny (2015) have criticised the global dominance of English for suppressing other languages and monopolising the world’s information.

The spread of the English language is caused by many factors, one of them having been colonialism. The other factors are trade, missionary, education, globalization and technology. The dominance of English language is caused by the use of the language by millions of speakers in different nations of the world. The dominance of English language has truly suppressed other languages, particularly indigenous languages across the globe. In every period of globalisation, the principal hegemonic power has promoted its own language as a tool for unity across time and space (Ding and Saunders 2006). In the past centuries, Latin was the global Language. It was promoted by the Catholic Church. In the recent past, French was once a global Language. It was promoted by the French government. The British government promoted English in the 19th and 20th centuries. The English has for all this time remained the global language without a serious contender. This is linguistic/language imperialism.

Language imperialism has aided the springing up of English as a global language. Language imperialism refers to the transfer of a

dominant language of the time to people of different language(s). The transfer is essentially a demonstration of power-traditionally, military power but also, in the modern world, economic power. During this process, aspects of the dominant culture are usually transferred along with the language. The first stage of global spread of the English language was the result of the empire building of British, otherwise known as imperialism. The second stage was the result of cultural, political and economic pre-eminence of the United State of America otherwise known as neo-imperialism. The global reach of America's cultural, political and economic influence has contributed significantly to bolstering the dominant position of the English language in the 20th and 21st countries. Mark Warschauer, a professor of education and informatics at the University of California quoted by Phillipson (1992: 46) as saying:

English has become the second language of everybody. It's gotten to the point where almost in any part of the world to be educated means to know English. The primary aim of education in the British colonies became the acquisition of the English language, and the future academic and financial success of those living in colonised countries came to depend mainly on their English language ability. After World War II, when the colonised countries started to gain independence, the English language maintained its influence by being selected as an official or national language by leaders who were themselves the product of colonial education.

The fact that English now belongs to 'everyone or to no one' (Wardhaugh, 1987) would seem to imply that English will maintain its position as the global dominant language throughout the 21st century and beyond. English dominates the world as no language has ever, and some linguists are now saying it may never be dethroned as the king of languages. Some insist that linguistic evolution will continue to take its course over centuries and that English could eventually die a common language as Latin did. It is theoretically possible that English itself will, at some future time, be succeeded by another language, promulgated by the economic, political and cultural might of its native speakers (Raine 2012).

Language and understanding of science and technology in Nigeria

Language has been defined by many researchers, for instance, according to Sunny (2015: 35), “language is the human ability to acquire and use complex systems of communication, and a language is any specific example of such a system. It is also defined as a human system of communication that uses arbitrary signals, such as voice sounds, gestures, or written symbols. A language is a system of words and grammar used by a group of people. When we write or speak, we are using language”. Larsen- Freeman and Freeman (2008) say that language is the tool that everyone uses in leaning and teaching. Without communication, teaching and learning cannot occur. At the heart of the relationship between the teachers and students is the teacher’s ability to communicate. Effective communication skills are not only the perquisite work in the classroom, they also contribute to make the classroom environment lively and enjoyable to students. Apart from the peculiar operational languages, that is, languages relating to different disciplines, there are general communication skills in verbal (verbal learning and vocal learning) and non-verbal (facial language, body, space and motion, language of time and listening) communication. Everyone is born with the ability to learn a language and good language learning said to depend on at least three variables, aptitude, motivation and opportunity (Rubin 1975).

Human language is unique in comparison to other forms of communication, such as those used by non-human animals. Communication systems used by other animals such as bees or apes are closed systems that consist of a finite, usually very limited, number of possible ideas that can be expressed (Hockett 1960). In contrast, human language is open-ended and productive, meaning that it allows human to produce a vast range of utterances from a finite set of elements and to create new words and sentences. This is possible because, human languages is based on dual code, in which a finite number of element which are meaningless in themselves (e.g. sounds, letters and gestures) can be combined to form a theoretical infinite number or larger units of meaning (words and sentences) (Trask1999).

The significant role which science, technology, and mathematics (STM) play in the development of a nation in contemporary times is obvious to us all. The world-wide movement towards science for all underscores this. However, the intended positive outcomes derivable from the science for all philosophy might be doomed to naught in Nigerian and Africa as a whole, if the trend of underachievement in STM is not arrested. The truth is that, many students claim that STM is hard to learn as taught in schools. The language barrier presents difficulty from two angles: unfamiliar technical words and misconceptions. An alarming number of English words are understood as having the opposite meaning by 12-14 year olds even in Britain. For example, a “volatile compounds” can mean at least four things to as many students. Volatile has left the realm of science with its meaning easily “vaporised” and entered everyday conversation where it is applied to markets, people, countries and hostile situations. It then creeps back into STM with misconstrued meanings which to the student makes nonsense of a science discussion. A “volatile compound” is understood as a flammable, explosive, unstable, and dangerous compound. Unless the teacher carries out a vital check(s) he and the student may be using different meanings for a technical word. Casels and Johnstone (1985) found about a hundred common STM words of this kind which are transmuted as they pass to and fro across the science/common speech interface. It is against this background, that this chapter recommends indigenous language in teaching and learning of science and technology. Language marks the difference between the lower and higher cognitive skill. The beginning of the language is when a child starts crying, then babbling. Cooing and the real language starts at age 2. All children whether they live in a ghetto or in a wealthy suburb manifest similar pattern of speech development at about the same age. Language is the same experience for all humans, no matter what language they speak, where they live or how they interact with their language models. Teachers should be concerned about youngsters who consistently miss the milestone. Understanding the spoken words on their own indigenous language prepare children for meeting words on the private page. Science is a discipline in which student experiences in the home can be effectively utilised to enhance

their learning experience in the school. A barrier in the form of medium of expression can be imposed to make the home-school interaction in science learning unrealizable. As a matter of fact, this has been the experience in Nigeria to date. The lingua franca of the country is English. Hence it is the language of business, government and education. Attempts are made at every level of the country's education to ensure that the standard of written and spoken English of students is relatively high but the realization of this objective is still a mirage. One of the reasons of enforcing the use of English language in schools may be that the students are examined in all subjects in English language and it will be wise to get them accustomed to the use of the language while in school. Hence, the expected results are not obtained. For instance, in *The Nation* of June 11, 2016, it reveals that in year 2014, the total number of students that sat for West Africa Senior School Certificate Examination (WASSCE) was 1,692,435 out of which only 529,425 passed with five credits, including English and mathematics, representing about 31.28 percent as shown below:

It is discovered from the 2014 WASSCE result that it is one of the worst results the organisation has realised in the last 10 years.

Science, being part of the school subjects, is affected by this rather unfortunate development to the extent that, science and some non-science subjects can only be taught in English language. Olarawaju (1991) explained that he had experiences in some schools in Ondo and Oyo States of Nigeria. He asked the student in Junior Secondary School (J3), whether it was possible to offer science in their indigenous languages. The students laughed in derision and chorused an answer that it was not possible. They however changed their minds (so they made him believe) after he had demonstrated how science could be taught in their indigenous languages. There appears to be confusion in the use of "language" in an ordinary sense and in a metaphoric sense. In the ordinary sense, language means "human and non-instinctive method of communicating ideas, feelings and desires by means of a system of sound symbols. In the class room setting, the language referred to in different subjects. Mathematics, Chemistry, Physics, Biology, etc. are expressed in the form of a system of sound symbols by the teacher to the student and

vice- versa. By historical accident, the language of the immediate environment is not used as a medium of instruction in Nigerian schools but instead English language is predominantly used.

Source: *The Nation*, June 11, 2016 (p.30).



THE WEST AFRICAN EXAMINATIONS COUNCIL

RESULT STATISTICS FOR WASSCE 2014 SUMMARY

S/N	State/Name	TOTAL NO OF CANDS.			5 Credits & above including English & maths			
		Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Percentage
1	ANAMBRA	23,009	28,709	51,718	14,985	15,108	30,093	58.22
2	ABIA	26,688	29,818	56,506	15,347	17,600	32,947	58.32
3	EDO	33,079	31,330	64,409	18,479	18,783	37,262	57.82
4	BAYELSA	10,585	9,345	19,930	5,582	4,957	10,539	52.83
5	RIVERS	31,887	32,461	64,348	18,566	17,402	35,968	55.76
6	ENUGU	20,425	25,688	46,113	10,787	13,148	23,935	51.91
7	LAGOS	71,700	74,854	146,554	32,334	34,885	67,219	45.86
8	IMO	21,900	24,459	46,359	8,514	10,325	18,839	40.64
9	DELTA	25,449	25,911	51,360	10,064	10,301	20,365	39.66
10	KADUNA	58,149	42,213	100,362	20,484	19,030	39,514	39.38
11	EBONYI	12,761	12,877	25,638	4,652	4,518	9,170	35.75
12	EKITI	11,373	10,905	22,278	3,570	3,960	7,530	33.80
13	ONDO	20,323	18,474	38,797	5,439	6,133	11,572	29.82
14	AKWA-IBOM	29,143	29,987	59,130	8,729	9,743	18,472	31.23
15	ABUJA	8,433	9,720	18,153	2,612	2,956	5,568	30.67
16	KWARA	19,302	15,543	34,845	5,658	4,941	10,599	30.44
17	KANO	42,089	23,990	66,079	10,892	7,611	18,503	28.00
18	OOGUN	35,156	35,318	70,474	9,313	9,561	18,874	26.92
19	BENUE	29,339	21,794	51,133	7,884	5,851	13,735	26.86
20	KOGI	24,230	18,785	43,015	5,976	4,746	10,722	24.93
21	CROSS-RIVER	24,781	21,805	46,586	5,561	4,918	10,479	22.49
22	OSUN	24,421	23,251	47,672	4,665	4,551	9,216	19.34
23	PLATEAU	28,805	23,847	52,652	5,850	4,359	10,209	19.40
24	OYO	39,340	38,332	77,672	7,491	7,263	14,754	19.00
25	NASSARAWA	27,881	18,307	46,188	4,891	3,730	8,621	18.66
26	NIGER	31,025	20,790	51,815	4,982	4,229	9,211	17.78
27	TARABA	15,481	6,107	21,588	2,329	1,433	3,762	17.43
28	BORNO	19,360	12,833	32,193	2,845	2,021	4,866	15.11
29	KATSINA	30,298	13,245	43,543	2,868	1,691	4,559	10.45
30	ADAMAWA	17,700	12,535	30,235	1,510	1,136	2,646	8.75
31	JIGAWA	13,648	4,247	17,895	944	399	1,343	7.47
32	SOKOTO	18,321	7,070	25,391	1,183	616	1,799	7.12
33	ZAMFARA	21,976	7,391	29,367	1,337	617	1,954	6.65
34	KEBBI	19,074	7,541	26,615	1,366	320	1,686	6.33
35	GOMBE	12,358	7,146	19,504	593	514	1,107	5.68
36	BAUCHI	19,601	9,831	29,432	896	652	1,548	5.28
37	YOBE	11,049	4,281	15,330	487	256	743	4.85
Total		929,045	763,330	1,692,375	268,047	261,432	529,479	31.29

Much emphasis has been laid on English language to the detriment of the science subject areas. For instance, if students pass their science subjects with distinction but fail English language, they are in most cases refused admission into higher institutions of learning for they will be judged to be at a serious disadvantage because they are incapable of understanding scientific information imparted by the teachers. Even though, they wrote and passed their papers with distinctions in that same language (Ukoli 1985). In the

metaphoric sense, language refers to “words”, phrases etc. used by a profession or class.” Science as a discipline has its own set of words, phrases terms, which have different languages or tongues that can interact meaningfully on matters relating to science and technology. The English language, as a medium of expressing or stating information in science, has metamorphosed, as a result of constant use, to its present status. It has the capacity to accommodate scientific words from other sources, especially Latin and Greek into its vocabulary. For instance, words like bacillus, cerebellum, cloaca, flagellum, meniscus, nucleus, saliva, stamen, vertebra etc. were imported from Latin into English language without any change except that necessitated by (transliteration writing in the letter of another alphabet). Similarly, words such as anion, cotyledon, hibiscus, iris, stigma, pyrites, thallus, thorax etc. were imported from Greek (Savory, 1967). These words and many others are used today in scientific writings as if they are part and parcel of the English language per se. There is little wonder then that many people refer to English language as the language of science and development or human progression.

It can be argued here that, the medium of expression (language) of any group of people or race after it has had sufficient contact with science can be used to express the language of science. Such contact brings about the growth and development of such a language. Growth is realised in the sense that the vocabulary of the language increases, and development is brought about because with its acquired status the language can accommodate some expression which are hitherto foreign to it. If the language of a people is developed, it will be less difficult for students in such an area to learn science as they will not have to wrestle with understanding the language first before learning the content of science, which obviously is time consuming and demanding on the part of the students.

Understanding science and effectiveness of mother tongue as a language of instruction

Language of instruction is an important tool in the teaching and learning of science. Accordingly, teaching is vastly facilitated by the

medium of instruction, which ends by being not only the medium of exchange but the instrument that the learner can use himself/herself in bringing order into the environment (Bruner 1966). In other words, science can be regarded as the study of environment with the aim of making meaningful explanations and deductions. If science is the study of the environment, then the young learner should be equipped with the language with which he/she can “bring order into the environment”. This is because a child develops his recognition of nature by acquiring language (Mori *et al* 1974). The child, therefore, should be afforded an opportunity of studying science in a language that forms a very intimate part of his/her personality and in which he/she learns to express the first taught language and develop relationships with those upon whom his/her early life depends (Tugwangye, 1979). The language that is being referred to here, which is natural to the child meant the language in which the child grows to express oneself.

Understanding science involves the ability of the child to freely express himself/herself, ask question to clarify some issues and reorganised his/her thoughts. It needs to be noted that the development of self- expression and creativity is a different kind of exercise from the learning of English language (Fyle, 1976). Hence, the learning of English language should not be made ‘a clog in the wheel’ of progress in the learning of science in Nigeria and Africa as a whole. The child should be taught science in the indigenous language (mother tongue) he/she already knows.

For meaningful understanding of science, it is necessary for students to know the processes of science. These processes are careful and thorough observations, reporting completely and accurately what is observed, organising information acquired, generalising on the basis of acquired information, predicting as a result of generalisation, designing experiments (including controls where necessary) to check predictions, manipulating and controlling variable and continuing the process of inquiry when new data do not conform to predictions. Several science educators and scholars have outlined the rationale for the teaching/learning of science processes. Awodi (1984), for example, pointed out that science teachers cannot teach science effectively without employing the processes of science:

neither can the student learn science effectively without the use of processes of science. Eruin (1967) and suchman (1966) have also argued along similar lines, based on the premises that the search for and acquisition of scientific knowledge are inseparable from the acquisition of science processes. Part of the reasoning behind this emphasis has been the implicit assumption that if students are helped to acquire science processes and skills, they will in the process, develop the ability to apply them to a wide range of problems that they encounter in real life – scientific as well as social. A number of studies have been deducted into student's acquisition of process skills and their relation to academic achievement. Padila *et al* (1983), for example noted that one major outcome of such studies is an implied correspondence between acquisition of science process skills and intellectual development. Carrying out the activities of science processes demands a relatively high degree of self-expression on the part of the student, and the easiest medium for him/her to do this is through the mother tongue.

Relating child language to the acquisition of concepts, Piaget (1959: 46) says that – “the earliest substantives of child language are very far from denoting concepts, but rather express commands or desires”. If the earliest substantives of a child's language (which seems to be universal) are very far from denoting concepts, and concepts constitute part of the language of science, it would seem to mean that any child (of any race) brought up in a particular culture will learn the language of the adults in that culture. The language of such adult culture will affect the child's acquisition of concepts and hence science learning. Any attempts to impose a foreign language on the child in learning another subject content (particularly, science and technology) will lead him/her into confusion. The learning of science in Nigerian secondary schools consists primarily of laws, theories, and definitions which are unrelated to the experiences of students but only serve the West Africa School Certificate Examination (Abdulahi 1976) and, hence the expected result are not obtained. This does not imply that science is not related to student's life but that there is an unfortunate cleavage between the student's school and outside the school environment, due significantly to the medium of instruction used in both worlds. It means that the

students are presented to the product of science without being given tools for arriving at the products. The resultant effect is that they are very deficient in understanding the laws, concepts, principles, theories and definitions, more so that they are couched in foreign language, used mainly in the school. If they cannot understand it, then they memorise it for the purposes of passing an external examination. Thus, they are exposed to the processes and ethics of science. The position of Nigerian students' conception of science is further explicated by the results of a nation-wide study carried out by Bajah and Okebukola (1984). They investigated the popular views about science held by primary school pupils, secondary and post-secondary school students, science teachers and others. It was found out that most of the subjects in the study considered science as being concerned with the study of living and non-living things into which school subjects such as Biology, Chemistry, and Physics can be grouped. To them, the learning of science begins and ends with the acquisition of such accumulated facts. This view of science was called the static view of science because it keeps the revisionary nature (using the processes) of science a secret. Bajah and Okebukola (1984: 33 & 56) further note that:

Holding the static view therefore implies that one may suffer obsolescence or be left behind when present day theories or concept seize to be valid. With members of the schooling community in Nigeria holding this view implies that the education in science is not geared towards preparing the learner for the future of unknown dimensions...In order to understand science, the student must not only have some understanding of the concepts, theories, principles and laws of the particular discipline, the student must also appreciate how this knowledge is obtained and how it fits into a structural framework.

Being able to do this involves mastery of the language in which the student expresses himself/herself and it is only in exceptional cases that few students are able to express themselves confidently in a foreign language. The wise thing to do at this point in time is to

teach science and technology in the language that the child is familiar with.

Effectiveness of mother tongue as language of instruction and impetus for national development

The relevance of indigenous languages to local and national development of any nation cannot be overemphasized. This is because the indigenous or mother tongue languages provide the impetus and platform for community and national development of any given country. This is the major reason that countries like Britain, United States of America, China, Portugal, and France developed faster than was anticipated. They are regarded as developed countries along with their languages. Therefore, no country is referred to be developed with the use of foreign languages.

Language of instruction (LOI) is defined as the language in which subject matter is taught in a public or private school setting. UNESCO defines language of instruction as language(s) used to convey a specified curriculum in a formal or non-formal education setting (UNESCO 2013). The National Policy of Education (NPE 2013) of Nigeria stipulates that the medium of instruction in the primary school shall be the language of the immediate environment for the first those years. It further spells out that during the period, English shall be taught as a subject from the 4th year. It has been experimentally demonstrated in Nigeria, in the area of classroom interaction that the group taught in the mother tongue, for instance, (Yoruba: one of the major three languages in Nigeria) is superior to the group taught in English in the more creative aspects of student behaviour such as initiating activities, giving interrelationships and seeking inferences (Obanya 1982). It is worthy of note here that these aspects of student behaviour form part of the processes of science. Obanya (1982) further points out the relatively superiority of the quality and quantity of learner participation of the group taught in mother tongue (Yoruba). According to him, participation by children taught in mother tongue (Yoruba) did not involve incorrect use of language at all and which highlight the high quality of their participation in classroom activities, particularly in discussions.

According to Emeka (2002: 208) : “Igbo (Nigerian language) music education greatly emphasizes character formation and starts early to accumulate the young into those values, behaviour, attitudes, speech action and traditions that are considered necessary for the making of person in a given environment”. Today, the reverse is the case as many parents are crazy about ensuring that their children speak English fluently and even embrace it as a medium of communication at home.

On another note, Okewande (2015: 86) points out that in Nigeria, English language is the official language. Its dominant power on the indigenous language has equally been deeply felt beyond the official domain to unofficial aspects of life. In order words, the use of English language has robbed the indigenous languages in places such as the market, churches and the mosques, social gathering, and even at homes. This has made the indigenous languages to be more vulnerable to the threats of extinction and ranking as second class languages. Science learning is greatly enhanced when the curriculum is developed in the mother tongue and the mother tongue also used as the medium of instruction has exemplified by some researchers. Ajayi (2007) observes that the students taught using English – Yoruba bilingual instructional medium, achieved significantly better than students taught either using English or Yoruba language as instructional medium. He then recommends that the bilingual nature of our education system stated in National Policy of Education should be enforced by the federal government and all the stakeholders in the education sector. Ojo (2002) also buttressed that the use of English – Yoruba bilingual medium of instruction should be positively encouraged and adopted in the primary and junior secondary schools. He also recommends that the teachers’ education curricula at all levels should be further expanded and developed to accommodate the bilingual nature of the Nigerian system of education. However, research evidences by scholars such as (Olawaju and Akinwumi(1988), Ajayi(2007), Ojo(2002) and Obanya (1982) have all shown that the language problem in science and technology is not limited to primary schools but extend to the two tiers of the secondary school education.

Conclusion

This chapter has provided evidence that it is possible and very profitable socially and development-wise, too, to teach science using the mother tongue as the medium of instruction and local curricula. This is the practice in many parts of the world except in Africa, South of Sahara (Fafunwa 1975: Fyle 1976: Gordon 2005: Sunny 2015), where references are still to explain why such African countries are yet to take- off in the realm of scientific and technological development. If the overall goal of science teaching is to encourage intellectual development of each individual to the fullest of his or her capabilities (UNESCO 2013) and language influences intellectual development (Piaget, 1959), then using a foreign curriculum and a foreign language as a medium of instruction in science and technology teaching and learning are inimical to the child's intellectual development in African countries generally and in Nigeria in particular.

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Indigenous Epistemologies, Disasters and Development: In Search of Africa-based Mechanisms for Disaster Risk Reduction and Socio-economic Development

Munyaradzi Mawere

Introduction

Indigenous knowledge from which indigenous mechanisms for disaster risk reduction are drawn, is a topical issue in many countries across the world. Due to its lasting impacts on human progression, social transformation, and the natural environment, indigenous knowledge is discussed across disciplines. Besides, since the recognition of indigenous knowledge systems by international organisations such as United Nations and the World Bank in the past few years, indigenous knowledge is fast emerging as a critical area of focus for research on disaster risk reduction and for the promotion of sustainable development in human society.

Nevertheless, while the utility of indigenous knowledge cannot be underestimated, the role and efficacy of indigenous mechanisms in disaster risk reduction and the promotion of sustainable development in Africa as elsewhere in the world is yet to receive adequate attention. This chapter focuses on selected indigenous mechanisms for both disaster risk reduction and promotion of development that can be sustained by human society – sustainable development – but with a bias on Africa.

Drawing on selected case studies and examples from around Africa, I argue that if properly utilised, indigenous mechanisms could mitigate the tapestry of challenges posed by vicissitude of weather patterns and disaster risks that Africa is prone to such as floods, famine (food crisis), drought, storms, and climate change, among others. On the same note, indigenous mechanisms have the capacity to instil and propel the spirit of development in Africa given that they

are people-based and locally convenient. In this view, the present chapter explores pathways through which some communities around Africa are coping with a plethora of natural and human induced disaster risks. The chapter is premised on interventions by ‘outsiders’ who, more often than not, entice local communities to abandon their own indigenous adapting strategies, thereby leaving the communities even more insecure and vulnerable to food insecurity and other such disaster risks than ever before. In view of these observations, this chapter discusses a number of indigenous mechanisms that can help building lasting resilience, mitigate disaster risks, and promote sustainable development in Africa.

Disaster mitigation through indigenous mechanisms

It is generally agreed that since time immemorial, indigenous knowledge systems (IKSs) were used by societies in Africa and the rest of the world for various purposes depending on the needs of the society in question (Altieri 1995: 114). One of the purposes that indigenous knowledge (IK) served was to mitigate disaster risks. By mitigation, I mean an effort or response that seeks to lower the risk posed by the consequences of disasters. Yet, I should admit, however, that indigenous knowledge in whose domain indigenous mechanisms falls, is a term that means different things to different people. As such, a number of interpretations have been conjured and due to limited time, I will not go a step further to critically dissect and analyse each of them but only give what I think is the working definition of IK. By IK, I mean a set of practices and skills acquired over time by indigenous communities through experience and daily interaction with their immediate environment as they try to solve their problems and cope with change therein. This means that IK, contrary to what some scholars such as David Turnball and Paulin Hountondji refer to as immovable knowledge and static knowledge respectively, is dynamic and never static. It is from indigenous knowledge understood as such that indigenous mechanisms for disaster risk reduction are derived. By indigenous mechanisms for disaster risk reduction, I mean locally generated knowledge for

dealing with difficult moments that result from certain catastrophic events such as floods, cyclones, earthquakes, and others.

Although indigenous knowledge has failed to die as a result of colonial onslaughts, such as the racial and colonial blitzes during colonialism in Africa, they continue to be marginalised even in contemporary society, mainly because of the colonial education that the continent embraced after the formal demise of colonial administration. It is sad to note that people generally tend to fall back on IKSs only as a rescue package in some difficult moments. That is, it is during moments of desperation that rural communities resort to the long forgotten age-old techniques to cope with hunger and food shortages (Taruvunga 2014), for example, simply because hunger will have bitten mercilessly on people.

Over the course of history, and to date, the people of Africa have more often than not resorted to the use of indigenous knowledge as a way of mitigating the adverse effects of disaster risks. These strategies and mechanisms of managing and mitigating disaster risks are however being negatively impacted by the unapologetic waves of the so-called ‘modernity’ and globalisation, hence some of them are either being weakened or gradually daunting; sinking deep into the miasma of amnesia. Of paramount importance to note is the fact that the indigenous practices exhibit a deep understanding and ability to cope with disasters through local actions or practices. As such human practices that evolved over centuries have been tested through time and proven to be sustainable and effective in both reducing disaster risks and managing unavoidable hazards. In fact, human beings, through, an intricate and successful interdependence relationship with nature and the broader cultural landscape over time, enabled them to devise practices and measures of mitigating and averting various disaster risks such as drought and famine through their practical and constant interaction with nature (Mukwada 2000). Such practices and measures were considered as part and parcel of their rich cultural heritage hence, they were handed down from generation to generation through the process of socialisation chiefly through oral mode and practical means. By and large, the various indigenous mechanisms were first and foremost in conformity with the ethos of nature. Adding to that, they were both user-friendly and sustainable.

They were sustainable in the sense that since their adoption and subsequent use way back, they could still be utilised in contemporary Africa to address the challenges of disaster risks without compromising and endangering the needs of the present and future generations. There are a myriad of these practices and measures across the continent, but for purposes of this presentation, I will only zero on five of these:

Use of local early predictors

In traditional Swazi society (of Swaziland), people used (and some continue using) early predictors such as behaviour of some birds that are endowed with the gift of predicting weather changes – what others call biotic weather forecasting – to foretell the weather pattern of a particular year. The Swaziland bird known as Emahlokohloko (*Ploceus spp*) is used for predicting floods (see for instance Manyatsi 2011; Mwaura 2008). In his study of Emahlokohloko, Manyatsi reports that these birds have a tendency of building their nests at low positions during years when there are no floods. But on years when there will be floods, the birds build their nests at higher positions, hence people would know of an impending flood well before it strikes. Yet, I should underline that the use of bird behaviour to predict weather changes is not unique to the indigenous people of Africa. The Aborigines of Australia are also reported to foretell weather patterns for a particular season using the behaviour of a bird known as Tatihari (Lapwing bird) (FAO 1998). When the bird lays its eggs on the upper part of the field, it is an indicator for good rain season and drought when it lays its eggs on the lower part of the field. Again, if the same bird (which under normal circumstances lay 4 eggs) lays one egg, it is an indicator that rains will fall only for one month in that season. If it lays 2 eggs, it is an indicator that rains will fall only for two months instead of the 4 months expected for the Australian rain season. Such early warning signals allow people to prepare for the impending disaster risk accordingly.

In western Mozambique, the Ndaue people still make use of behaviour of some animals like tortoises. If they see tortoises crawling speedily upland, they know a rainstorm likely to result in

floods is coming. The Shona of south-eastern Zimbabwe also used to observe yields of certain trees such as Muchakata (*Parinari curatellifolia*) and Muhumbukumbu (*Lannea discolor*) to predict drought. When the yields of these trees are abundant, it was an indicator of an impending drought. The Maasai people of Tanzania also predict drought and weather related diseases by watching the movements of celestial bodies and date of emergence of certain plant species. Both the Swazi and the Maasai use ‘early warning signals’ of an approaching disaster to determine preventive measures or to prepare for mitigation. In the case of the Maasai, they would migrate to other areas or destock their livestock as a way to lessen the severity of drought on them. *Unfortunately, this knowledge is little researched though its utility among the Swazi and the Maasai has been proven beyond doubt over the years.*

Innovative use of locally available resources

During time of crisis or when disaster hits hard, communities normally devise their own indigenous coping mechanisms to counter or lessen the severity of the disaster. Due to outages of electricity in Nigeria (as currently being experienced in Zimbabwe), communities in Jigawa State of northern Nigeria developed an efficient electricity-free ‘refrigerator’ – what has come to be better known as “the Jigawa Pot-in-Pot Cooling System.” The system consists of two different-sized earthenware pots, one inside the other. The space between the pots is filled with water-retentive sand. Perishable food such as tomatoes, green pepper, eggplants etc. is placed in the smaller pot (inside) and covered with a cloth. The pots are placed in a dry, ventilated place and the sand is periodically watered. As the water in the sand evaporates, into the drier air outside, it cools the pots and their contents. Using this method, it is said that tomatoes and green pepper can be kept fresh for up to 3 weeks while eggplants can be kept fresh for up to a month (see Mawere 2014). The method is helping farmers to avoid losses during time when their crops reach peak periods and face risks of rotting. It is also said that $\frac{3}{4}$ of the population in Jigawa State are using this system. Figure one below shows the Jigawa pot-in-pot cooling system.




Figure 1: The Jigawa pot-in-pot cooling system

In a different case, in Mayo-Kebbi District of northern Cameroon, the Toupouri and Moundang people have come up with indigenous mechanisms of using locally available resources to fight salt crisis in the area. In fact, northern Cameroon is a leading cattle producing region in Cameroon where salt is in very high demand for feeding the cattle besides use by people. Yet in 1994, after the devaluation of the Cameroonian currency –the Cameroonian franc – the price of salt increased by 400 % resulting in many people failing to afford the resource (Mawere 2014). To deal with the crisis (which I can consider disaster for cattle farmers), the Toupouri and Moundang people came up with a technology of their own to produce salt from dry stalks of sorghum plants (which previously did not serve any purpose). In this case, the sorghum stalks are gathered and burnt. The remaining ash is dissolved, sieved and boiled in water until it becomes whitish. After cooling, the liquid is left to coagulate and form what they call “*Garlaka*”. At that stage, it is ready for

consumption as a substitute for salt. Besides, consumption at home, the salt is also sold to other regions in the country.

Zunde raMambo (Chief's Common Granary)

Zunde raMambo is a traditional mechanism used by chiefs (and continue to be used nowadays in some in) rural areas, especially among the Shona people of Zimbabwe. In traditional Shona society, there was no individual ownership of land as the chief or king was the custodian of all land in his/her area of jurisdiction (Ncube *et al* 1997; Mawere 2015). The chief as a traditional leader has to promote the welfare of his/her people, and *Zunde raMambo* (The King's common granary) is one medium through which this was realised. *Zunde* was a common field designated by a chief for cultivating food crops by the community (see also Kaseke 2006, 2013; Gudhlanga and Makaudze 2012; Mawere *et al* 2013). What this entails was that apart from his personal farming land the chief also had a separate communal field where people would work communally and the chief was the overall manager. Subjects would take turns yearly to till this land, weed it and to harvest it using their own resources and the chiefs' (Gudhlanga and Makaudze 2012; Mawere and Rambe 2012). Upon harvesting the produce would be put into the chief's granary for storage. The main objective of *Zunde raMambo*, thus, was to ensure collective well-being of humanity. It was a traditional social security arrangement designed to address the contingency of drought or famine. In case of natural calamities like drought, the Shona would also descend on the chiefs' homestead to secure grain harvested from his *Zunde raMambo*.

Nhimbe/jakwara (Collective work)

Nhimbe is the communalistic or collective work meant to protect the welfare of all community member but most especially the welfare and plight of the disadvantaged and vulnerable members. It was (and indeed is) a community-based mutual aid arrangement that specifically catered for the orphans, the widowed, and the visually and physically challenged. The word *nhimbe* comes from the Zimbabwean Shona language and culture. It means people coming together and working to achieve a common goal. Loosely defined,

nhimbe is a social practice that is usually undertaken during the weeding and harvesting season by generally most of the ethnic groups in Zimbabwe. The situation that obtains is that the community collaborates collectively in their agricultural activities and then later on drink traditional beer locally known as “*ndari/doro*” or “7 days” (Dodo *et al* 2012; Mudavanhu and Chitsika 2013; Gukurume 2013) hence, *nhimbe* is also known as beer cooperative party. *Nhimbe* was more of a way of teaching people to cultivate a sense of an African ideal of the individual’s communal responsibility, while at the same time an indigenous mechanism or strategy to mitigate disaster risks such as drought and famine.

Drought resistant crops

As noted by FAO (1997) and Chitonga (2013), communities that have lived under drought situations for many generations have developed coping strategies to minimise the impact of drought and ultimately famine. In Zimbabwe, some farmers especially those situated in regions IV and V are slowly discarding the idea of growing maize as the main crop, and are now shifting to the growing of traditional crops and or small grains such as sorghum (*mapfunde*), finger millet (*rapoko*) and pearl millet (*mbunga*). Finger millet is the third important crop next to maize and sorghum in the communal areas of Mashonaland, Midlands and Manicaland Provinces of Zimbabwe. It is referred by one of its vernacular names, such as ‘*rukweza*’, ‘*njera*’ or ‘*zviyo*’ (Seetharam *et al* 1986; Mawere *et al* 2013). The above-mentioned two semi-arid regions [IV and V] of Zimbabwe are characterised by low, erratic and poorly distributed rainfall of less than 650 mm/year (Leuschner and Manthe 1996). Sorghum, pearl millet and finger millet are drought resistant crops which are highly capable of producing good yields even with very little rain (see Shumba 2000). Sorghum and millet have been considered as staple food grains in many semi-arid and tropic areas of the world, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa because of their good adaptation to hard environments and their good yield of production (cf. Dicko *et al* 2005).

Recommendations and insights for the future

The unapologetic waves of globalisation and the so-called “modernity” have resulted in the dilution and sometimes total disregard of African values that inform and sustain the people living in rural areas. Although some indigenous knowledge systems – and indeed indigenous mechanisms – still prevail in Africa, most of these systems have failed to stand the test of time while others are gravitating towards extinction. In view of the African nations, this is quite disturbing especially if we recognise the fact that every development is anchored in and inspired by a culture. This means that the need to rescue indigenous mechanisms from extinction and undeserving pejoration and disregard is more urgent now than ever in Africa. Thus, from this understanding and cases studies presented above, we need to draw some insights in order to inform the continent’s development in a way that is sustainable and enduring. Some of the recommendations drawn from this study are discussed in the section below.

The way forward

1). African educational systems should include indigenous knowledge practices in their education curricular right from infant through the primary secondary and tertiary levels. Zimbabwe, South Africa and Nigeria are reportedly moving towards this direction but many other African countries still lag behind in ensuring that indigenous knowledge is made part and parcel of the education system.

2). There is need for African countries to revisit the issue of food preferences to include traditional drought resistant crops and small grains such as sorghum, pearl millet, and finger millet.

3). Indigenous mechanisms and strategies should be incorporated into national weather monitoring exercise to help in predicting disaster risks such as floods, rainstorms, drought and famine.

4). There is need for African countries to incorporate indigenous practices in their national environmental policies so as to

complement the scientific methodologies they are currently using since colonialism on the continent.

Conclusion

Basing on selected case studies and examples I have made reference to in this chapter, I conclude that if properly utilised, indigenous mechanisms could help African countries to adapt to and mitigate the tapestry of challenges posed by vicissitude of weather patterns and disaster risks that Africa is prone to such as floods, famine (food crisis), drought, storms, and climate change, among others.

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Africa and the Remedies to the Problem of underdevelopment

Muhammed A. Yinusa; Joseph A. Oluyemi & Raji Abdullateef

Introduction

Africa is considered to be the oldest continent in the world and records some of the earliest form of civilization ever in human history even before some other continents of the world. For instance, the oldest known alphabet was developed in Africa while the first form of irrigation system was also recorded in Africa (Abu, 2015). Today, Africa is about the least developed continent on earth, some other continents like Asia and Latin America that were formerly ranked as underdeveloped in the world are fast removing their names from the league of underdeveloped nations. The problem of underdevelopment in Africa seems to linger for so long with no end in sight despite efforts and policies put in place by African governments. Many Africans still live below poverty datum line with high level of unemployment and increased mortality as a result of persistent increase in inflation and inability of government to provide jobs and adequate health facilities for the people.

African governments are characterized by corruption, nepotism, insensitivity and political instability. The common man on the street cannot boast of basic necessities of life, like good health care, staple food, portable water, housing, good roads, electricity, education and security. The cultural values are also fast being eroded across all ages while, gender inequality is still widely practised among many African countries, placing the girl-child and women on a disadvantaged position against the men thereby impeding their contribution to the development of the society (Joseph & Muhammed, 2016).

This chapter examines the primary and secondary causes of underdevelopment in Africa and the remedies to the highlighted problem in the continent. The chapter explores the continent of

Africa from pre-historic period to date and the attendant developmental stages that have evolved within the continent to date. The chapter also explored the concept of development and underdevelopment and the causes of under-development in the continent of Africa. The problems of underdevelopment found in the chapter are broadly categorized under social-cultural factors, political factors and economic factors. The dependency theory, theories of poverty and the theory of gender inequality are employed in the chapter to explain the predicaments facing the African continent.

The African continent and its historical background

Africa is the world's second-largest and second-most-populous continent in the world spanning about 30.3 million km² (11.7 million square miles) which represents 6 percent of earth's total surface area and 20.4 percent of its total land area (Sayre, 1999). The population of Africa as of 2012 was approximately 1.07 billion comprising of people living in 54 different countries and accounting for 15% of the world's population (Gudmastad, 2013; World Population, 2013). The continent is surrounded by the Mediterranean Sea to the north, both the Suez Canal and the Red Sea along the Sinai Peninsula to the northeast, the Indian Ocean to the southeast, and the Atlantic Ocean to the west.

The history of Africa can be traced to the early period of evolution of *Homo sapiens* in East Africa evolving over the years to the present day Africa. The first history of early civilization in Africa was the *kurma civilisation* in Sudan, East Africa (Williams, 1987). Several years later, more civilization was recorded in ancient Egypt, the Sahel, the Maghreb and the Horn of Africa. During the middle Ages, Islam spread west from Arabia to Egypt, crossing the Maghreb and the Sahel. From the mid-7th century, the Arab slave trade saw Muslim Arabs enslave Africans following an armistice between the Rashidun Caliphate and the Kingdom of Makuria at the Second Battle of Dongola in 652AD. This saw African transported across the Red Sea, Indian Ocean, and Sahara desert.

In the late 15th century, Europeans joined Arabs with the Portuguese initially acquiring slaves through trade and later by force as part of the Atlantic slave trade. The Europeans transported enslaved West, Central, and South Africans overseas both east and west in the African slave trade (Slave trade, 2007). Later, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, European colonization of Africa developed rapidly in the scramble for Africa. As at this time, Africa had up to 10,000 different states and autonomous groups with distinct languages and customs before it was colonized (Meredith, 2006). These comprised of small family groups of hunter-gatherers San people of South Africa, the large Sahellian Kingdoms, and the autonomous city-states and kingdoms such as those of the Yoruba and Igbo People in West Africa, as well as the Swahili coastal people of East Africa (Mokhtar, 1990).

However, with continuous struggle for independence in many parts of the continent, coupled with the decentralization of European power in Africa after the Second World War, decolonization took place, culminating in the independence of many African countries from the mid-20th century.

The concepts of “development” and “underdevelopment”

Development has been defined by Todaro & Smith (2011) as achieving sustainable rates of growth of income per capita to enable the nation to expand its output faster than the population. Myers (1999) on the other hand defined development from the transformational perspective and considered development as a positive change in the whole of human life materially, socially and spiritually. This chapter will however consider development from social, economic and political perspectives. This is because; these three areas cover the entire human existence in the process of interaction and living in the society. Underdevelopment on the other hand can be seen as the opposite of development. Underdeveloped countries are usually characterized by a wide disparity between the rich and poor, an unhealthy balance of trade, unemployment, lack of adequate healthcare, drinkable water, food, education and housing (Frank, 2005).



Figure 1: Map of Africa showing 54 countries

Source: <http://www.mapsofworld.com/africa-political-map.htm>

Causes of underdevelopment in Africa

Colonialism

Despite many years of independence from colonialism by many African countries, there seem to be a unanimous agreement on the impact of colonialism in Africa as most African countries barely manage to exist while others are close to collapse (Chidume, 2016).

African countries were tied to the apron strings of western imperial powers thereby rendering the pre-conditions necessary for the socio-economic and political transformation unachievable (Ojo, 2015). Africa during colonial time was distributed in a manner that reflected the pattern of domination and exploitation (Rodney, 1972). Through massive exploitation of African labour and resources, colonial powers created a legacy of victimization and dependency that continues today. Colonialism destroyed many people, traditions, and cultures in Africa, and rebuilt countries solely for the benefit of the colonialists themselves, and for the benefits of their counterparts in Europe and America (Bate, 2003 & Kirby, 2007).

Political Instability

The African continent has witnessed series of political instability after the departure of colonial masters ranging from military takeover to civil wars. These political disorders have widely affected the development process of Africa, thereby enhancing the underdevelopment of Africa continent (Donasco, 2015). The military takeover for instance brought about leaders who had no idea of how leadership ought to be administered for effective development. Instead, these leaders looted the revenues which would have been used for the development of the continent (Ake, 1996). Political instability has become endemic to Sub-Saharan Africa since the early 1960s, when most of the African countries began to achieve independence as more than fifty coups have taken place in the continent and has significantly affected development (Mbaku, 1988).

Cultural Practices

Culture has often been implicated in discussions on development, especially as it concerns the African continent. In some African cultures, women and men sometimes experience different opportunities, conditions and privileges; they earn different wages, do not have the same access to education and are not always equal before the law because of the long age tradition of male dominance. Culture, according to Matsumoto (1996), includes attitudes, values, beliefs, and behaviours shared by a group of people that is passed from one generation to another. Africa is said to be rich and diverse

in culture with about 3,000 ethnic groups Ebah (2014) from the Berbers of the Sahara Desert, through the prominent Maasai Mora in Kenya to the flamboyant Yoruba culture in Nigeria and down to the mysterious San in Southern Africa. However, the patriarchy family system which is being practiced in the continent for ages places value on the man over the woman. This has a significant effect on underdevelopment of the continent.

The female child for example is relegated and reduced and made a second fiddles and therefore cannot contribute productively to the development of the society. In some cultures in Africa, the girl child is given out in marriage early in life thus becoming vulnerable to sexually transmitted infections, maternal morbidity and maternal mortality. The girl child is also subjected to child labour and as such is denied of basic education at the expense of the male child thus limiting her power of productivity and contribution to the development of the African society. Statistics have it that the ratio of men to women in the world is almost at par (CIA Fact Book) therefore the cultural practice that denies the female child of education and empowerment in the society will indirectly impede the development of the society when the number of people involved is considered.

High level of illiteracy

Illiteracy can be described as the inability to read or write. Illiteracy is a problem to development and a primary cause to the problem of underdevelopment in Africa because development generally requires some level of knowledge. Learning to read and write is a fundamental human right yet, 38 percent of African adults (about 153 millions) are illiterate in which two-thirds of these are women (UNESCO, 2016). Without literacy, people are excluded from access to, and the use of, knowledge, and even from the most basic information they may need for daily life. Illiteracy limits the earning power of an individual and affects a range of other social and economic potentials of a person. Literate people are better able to access other education and employment opportunities; and, collectively, literate societies are better geared to meet development challenges (Carr-Hill, Frostell & Pessoa, 2008).

Low technological know-how

Technology is an important tool to development and is imperative to the development of any society. The technological level of a society is significant to the level of development of such society. However, despite Africa's historical abilities in science; Africa has remained behind technologically when compared to other developed continents (Moghalu, 2014). It is sad to know that 40 percent of African-born scientists currently live in OCED countries, predominantly NATO and EU countries (Gabara, 2009). More worrisome is the fact that, many African countries are import-driven with many of their products imported from other continents like Europe, America and the Asia. African countries have also become dumping grounds for used product like machines, cars, clothes because some African countries do not have what it takes to produce these goods and meet the demands of their teeming population. This absence of technological know-how is a strong challenge bedevilling the spate of development in Africa.

Corruption

According to the Transparency International (2006), corruption is defined as the abuse of entrusted power for private benefit. Corruption is a serious cancer in Africa and seems to be eating into every aspect of life and into every socio-economic group in the continent. The attempt by African countries to break the cycle of underdevelopment has been hindered by the high level of corruption in the continent. Africa is rich in natural resources but the proceeds from the sales of these natural resources to other countries are mismanaged by African leaders through corrupt process (Owolabi, 2014).

Tiamiyu (2005) has argued that political leadership in Africa is synonymous to dictatorship characterized by insensitivity and corruption. Prince (2016) has also contended that, the corruption level of many African leaders is beyond imagination. Prince (2016) further stated that, the continent's resources are personalized by African leaders at the expense of the people. According to Ebegbulem (2012), corruption has tragically devastated African societies and made millions of people destitute. Policy experts and

other international agencies have however ranked public sector corruption or the use of public office for personal gain, as a major constraint that has hindered Africa's economic, political, and social development (Klitgaard, 1998; Gray & Kaufmann, 1998, Mauro, 1995 &, 1998; & Vogl 1998, 2004).

Civil unrest

Peace and security are prerequisites for development and all human beings aspire and deserve them yet, for the last three decades some African countries have hardly enjoyed internal peace and security. African countries have fallen victim to political unrest and civil wars for various reasons throughout their development as a result of fight for resources, colonization, and foreign influence (King and Laurence, 2005). Unfortunately, whenever conflict occurs, the development of the society is seriously affected. According to Wanyande (1997), the costs of conflicts in Africa in terms of loss of human life and property, and the destruction of social infrastructure are enormous. For example, between 1998 and 2002, some four million people died in the civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Report of the Commission for Africa, 2005). Besides, during conflict, scarce resources were inevitably diverted to the purchase of military equipment at the expense of socio-economic development.

Many countries in Africa like Nigeria, Sudan and Liberia have suffered from civil war that have led to the death of many and displacement of many from their homes while others have witnessed religious and tribal unrest that have left many dead. In the recent time the civil unrest that occurred in Northern Africa and the civil unrest caused by Boko Haram in North Eastern part of Nigeria and some part of Cameroun, Niger and Chad have left many communities in the region deserted and underdeveloped (Awortu, 2015).

Foreign aid and loans

One of the problems bedevilling Africa is sourcing of foreign loan and aids. The International Monetary Fund loans to countries especially African countries have shown negative impact on growth, but this has probably more to do with the receivers of the loans than the loans themselves (Easterly, 2008). According to Moyo (2009),

someone will always lend money to the poor meaning that the flood of money towards African countries is not likely to stop. The problem is that, borrowing from such international organizations perpetuates further slavery on Africa countries because of the past forgiving of unpaid aid/debt (Easterly 2008). The conditions that are attached to such loans continually make African countries to be dependent on the world powers which further impeded the development of Africa.

Infrastructural decay

There is massive infrastructural decay in many African countries that has affected negatively the development of the continent. Infrastructure is the basic physical and organizational structures needed for the operation of a society like industries, buildings, roads, bridges, health services, governance and so on. It is also the enterprise or the products, services and facilities necessary for an economy to function (Sullivan and Sheffrin, 2003). It is the means of achieving an objective or set of objectives and also includes the objectives. It is an important term for judging a country, region or state's and individual's developments/status. The term typically refers to the technical structures that support a society, such as roads, water supply, sewers, electrical national grids, telecommunications, and so forth, and can be defined as the physical components of interrelated systems providing commodities and services essential to enable, sustain, or enhance societal living conditions (Fulmer, 2009). These basic infrastructures are lacking and are in shambles in many African countries therefore, development becomes a mirage.

Brain drain syndrome

The migration of highly trained professionals out of Africa, often called brain drain or brain loss, has left many countries in the continent short of the skills needed to meet the demands of development. Africa daily loses her best academics, scientists, doctors, nurses, accountants, and other sought-after professionals, through brain drain, into other richer countries. This trend seems to be a continuous issue without any end in sight. According to Olumide & Ukpere (2012), brain drain of professionals from Africa is caused

by economic factors, socio-political factors and even personal reasons. It costs the countries of the continent massive amount of resources and time to train these professionals who eventually migrate through the brain drain drift. In Nigeria for example as at the year 2010, the number of Nigerian trained doctors practicing in the United States and the United Kingdom stood at 2,392 and 1,529 respectively leaving the ratio of doctor to patient in Nigeria at 39 per 100,000 people (Ogbom-Egbulem, 2010). This in no doubt will lead to underdevelopment in the health sector and ultimately the country.

Malaria and emerging diseases

Under-development in Africa can also be traceable to the incidence of Malaria and emerging diseases like Ebola and Lassa fever and HIV/AIDS that have their origin in Africa. This has reduced foreign investments in the region because of the fear of contacting these diseases. It is believed that malaria and other infectious diseases have fatal as well as debilitating effects on the human population in Africa. It negatively influences productivity, savings, and investment and directly affects economic performance of the continent (Bloom & Sachs 1998; Gallup & Sachs 2001) According to Bloom and Sachs (1998), the high incidence of malaria in sub-Saharan Africa reduces the annual growth rate of the continent by 1.3% a year and eradication of malaria in the 1950s would have resulted into a doubling of per capita income from what exists today. There are indications also that, HIV originated from Africa Gallagher (2014) and that higher incidence of HIV is found in Africa when compared to other continents (Joint United Nations Programme on HIV and AIDS, 2012). It is also believed that other emerging diseases like Lassa fever and Ebola that originated from Africa which would also discourage foreign investors as a result of fear.

Socio-cultural problems of underdevelopment

Poverty

Poverty is a multifaceted concept, which includes social, economic, and political elements (Ricardo, 2008). Poverty may be defined as either absolute or relative. Absolute poverty refers to the

lack of means necessary to meet basic needs such as food, clothing and shelter while relative poverty takes into consideration individual social and economic status compared to the rest of society (UNESCO, 2016). Poverty is endemic in Africa; 75% percent of the world's poorest countries are located in Africa, including Zimbabwe, Liberia and Ethiopia (The Borgen Project, 2014). For the past two years, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Africa's second largest country, has also been ranked the poorest in the world with a Gross Domestic Product (based on purchasing-power-parity) of \$394.25 in 2013 (Pactor, 2014). South Saharan Africa is afflicted by many forms of poverty. Africa is said to be the poorest region in the world with 28 of the 31 low human-development countries found in Africa (UNDP, 2006).

Insecurity

Another problem of underdevelopment in Africa is insecurity. The rate of insecurity in Africa is becoming increasingly high because the youth that constitute a high percentage of the population of Africa are either under employed or unemployed. Africa has the fastest growing and most youthful population in the world (MDGs in Africa, 2012). There are 200million people in Africa between 15 and 24 years of age which represents about 20% of the world population (Awosusi, 2012). Unemployed youth are therefore readily available for anti-social criminal activities that undermine the stability of society as a result of under development of the continent. People engage in violence, robbery, kidnapping and other social vices in order to be able to meet their needs (Shaw & Mckay 1972; Messner & Rosenfeld 1994; Odumosu 1999; Igbo 2007).

Child labour

One of the problems of underdevelopment in Africa is the issue of child labour. Child labour refers to the employment of children in any work that deprives them of their childhood, interferes with their ability to attend regular school, and that is mentally, physically, socially or morally dangerous and harmful (International Labour Organisation, 2012). In 2010, Africa recorded the highest incidence rates of child labour, with several African nations witnessing over 50

percent of children aged 5–14 working as child labourers (UNICEF, 2012). Many poor families in Africa trade their children especially the girl-child for child labour as a source of earning income. Many of these young girls are given out early in life and are denied of education. Sometimes they are subjected to maltreatment and exposed to rape, sexually transmitted infections and unintended pregnancy.

Human trafficking

Human trafficking is the trade of humans for money especially for the purpose of sexual slavery, forced labour, or commercial sexual exploitation for the trafficker or others (Amnesty International, 2009 and UNODC, 2011) Human trafficking is predominant in Africa as a result of hardship experienced by Africans in their home land. Many Africans especially women are exported to Europe and other developed continents to make money. Human trafficking is a form of modern slavery in which several African countries, such as Mauritania, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan are some of the world's leading countries where modern slavery is rife. According to Jurist (2015), African countries account for 15 of the top twenty countries in the world that engage in this modern day slavery.

Economic problems of underdevelopment in Africa

Import dependent for manufactured goods

Underdeveloped countries do not exist in isolation; they can only be understood in the context of the world economies. They depend on importation for equipment, capital goods, and the bulk of their consumer goods, know-how and technology. By the 1980s only five countries (Benin, Sierra Leone, Morocco, Senegal and Zimbabwe) had diversified export bases (Okigbo, 1993). Primary production still dominates sub-Saharan Africa's exports (Saul & Leys, 1999). The economies of many African countries are heavily dependent on the export of one or two commodities. As a result they are more susceptible to the vagaries of world price changes and other external

shocks than more diversified economies (Mkandawire & Soludo, 1999).

Deficit balance of payment

Underdeveloped countries are producing and exporting the primary commodities while they also import the finished and capital goods. In the international market the prices of raw material are very low while the prices of capital goods are high. So balance of payment remains unfavourable, due to this reason. Nigeria for instance export crude oil to the oil market and import finished products like petrol, diesel and kerosene which could not be produced in the country because the refineries are not working to full capacity to meet the demands of the people. This would in turn lead to deficit balance of payment.

Mass unemployment

In Africa, the rate of unemployment is very high especially among the youth who are very productive because of their age. According to data from the International Labour Organization (ILO) in sub-Saharan Africa, the youth unemployment rate hovers around 12 percent. The African region has the world's highest rate of working poverty, that is, people who are employed but earning less than US\$2 a day (African Centre for Economic Transformation, 2016). This brings untold hardship to the young population as a result of not being able to meet their daily needs and afford basic necessities of life which may result to crime and other social vices like kidnapping, robbery in order for them to make ends meet.

Unequal distribution of wealth

It is an important feature of under developed economy. The gap between the rich and the poor is often very wide in many African countries. The rich enjoy the basic necessities of life and the luxury of life because they can afford them while the poor wallow in abject poverty. According to Kenneded (2015) the wealth of many African nations are in the coffers of political leaders while many in some countries suffer gut-wrenching poverty. Kenneded (2015) contended further that in, Democratic Republic of Congo for instance, over 50 percent of the population live below the datum line, surviving on less

than a dollar a day while in Nigeria, despite being one of the top oil producing countries in the world with an estimated oil revenues in excess of US\$74 billion per year, the country is known as the power generator capital of the world, where half of the country's homes do not have electricity supply and an estimated 60 million residents use generators.

Political problems of underdevelopment in Africa

Unusual desire for political power

There is an unusual desire for political position in Africa. Politicians will do everything to get to power and when they get there they sometimes do not want to leave. Most African leaders take their position as an opportunity to amass as much wealth as they can to increase their influence among ignorant citizens which is gathered through dubious means and often atrocities are committed in their pursuit for massive wealth (Messo, 2015). General Sanni Abacha of Nigeria for instance ruled Nigeria for almost five years Paden (2005) and was reluctant to leave power until he was caught up with death (BBC News, 1998). Also, Colonel Muamar Ghadaffii ruled Libya for almost forty two years and did not want to leave power until he was forcefully ejected by the people Kafala (2011) while Robert Mugabe is still ruling Zimbabwe for about three decades now.

Poor government policies

African leaders are sometimes to blame for the predicament the continent finds itself. This is as a result of bad choices sometimes made by African rulers. Research has shown that, countries can grow their economies and develop faster if leaders take sound decisions in the national interest (Mills, 2010). He attributed the problem of development to the political elite, which benefits from the status quo.

Insensitive government decisions

Government do not operate in isolation, they are responsible to the people they govern; therefore they need to consider the people and their feelings before making major decisions in Africa. Often times the decisions that affect the common man on the street are not

negotiated with the people before they are made. The common man on the street is sometimes not consulted before major decision like foreign loans that affect them are taken. In Nigeria for example, the pump price of petrol is often increased without due consultation with the people and also putting the people's plight into consideration (Sahara Reporters, 2016). This should not however be the case, the feelings and opinion of the people should be considered when such decisions are to be made.

Human rights abuse

Human right abuses have been noted in many African countries where political leaders do not want people to question their authority. Even in some democratic societies in the region, human rights are sometimes not respected.

Remedies to the problems of underdevelopment in Africa

Respect for humanity

One of the greatest impediments to development in Africa is the lack of respect for humanity. Human rights and human dignity are sometimes grossly abused and undermined among Africans. Political leaders embezzle funds meant for developmental projects that would better the lot of the masses and would convert such funds to private use (Tiarniyu (2005) because they care less about others. While millions of people are suffering because they could not afford the basic necessities of life The Borgen Project (2014), very few are wallowing in wealth and stashing such fund in foreign bank without caring about the common man. Therefore, for meaningful development to take place in Africa there would be need for Africans to have respect for humanity and the feelings of the common man should also be a priority of the government.

Technological advancement

In order to develop Africa, there is need for massive technological advancement (Sidee, 2015). There would be a need for industrial revolution where almost everyone is a producer of something. Government should encourage technical education and

the establishment of more technological schools. Government should also give grants for massive research in technological innovations and encourage people to go into inventions. Furthermore, Government should create an enabling environment for technological innovations to thrive by granting financial aids to support Africans who are interested in moving the continent forward through technological innovation. The African society should also prioritize technology beyond all other disciplines so that people can be encouraged to go into it.

Mass literacy

Africa is backward today because many Africans are not literate and therefore cannot read or write (UNESCO, 2016). In order for Africa to be in the fore-front and a continent to be reckoned with in the world, mass literacy should be massively encouraged. Government should encourage mass literacy programmes for the teeming population especially those in the rural areas where majority of the African people live. It is important for all Africans to be literate. This will serve as the basis for education either formal or informal. Therefore, government and relevant agents should see it as a matter of urgency to embark on mass literacy programmes that will liberate many Africans from the problem of illiteracy.

Education for all

Education is key to development, it must not just be seen as a right for all but must be implemented as such. Education is imperative to the development of any society. It is education that determines the character and pace of economic and social development (Torado, 1975 & Riak, 1987). It is one of the most important creations of man on earth which has the power to change lives and bring development globally. Education bestows on an individual a disposition for lifelong acquisition of knowledge, values, attitudes, competence and skills relevant to the rapid socio-economic development of any society (Nussbaum, 2003). Education is, therefore, key to the development of Africa and equal opportunity should be given to the male and female gender for optimal benefit.

Gender equality

The earlier Africans close the gap between male and female gender, the better for the development of the continent. One of the greatest challenge facing the development of Africa as a continent is the age long disparity between men and women (The African Development Forum, 2008). Patriarchy is widely practiced in many societies in Africa where the male child is held above the female child because the male child continues with the family name when the parents die. Women are seen as baby machines and keepers of the home while the male child is allowed to go to school and work. Since the ratio of men to women in the world is almost equal CIA Fact Book, (2013), denying women from being productive would massively reduce the productive population and the productivity of such society. It will therefore be imperative for Africans to begin to see the potentials in women and recognise that women could be of immense benefits to the society.

Open and accountable government

Many African leaders are not open and accountable to the people they govern (Wangari, 1995). Political holders and the government in Africa should be open and accountable to the people they govern if Africa must join the league of developed continents. Africans holding political positions and offices should be open and must bear in mind that they would give an account of their position to their people. This will serve as a check on African leaders and serve as a guide against corruption and other activities that may be against the wish of the people which may impede development in the continent.

Cultural re-orientation

The African culture though diverse and rich needs re-orientation. Any cultural practice that is harmful to development should be eradicated if Africa must develop. The cultural practice where women are placed a second fiddle and are limited to homes to raise children and take care of the family alone without adding meaningful value to the development of the society should be discouraged. Although men

can still be regarded by culture as the head to maintain order in the family, relegating the women and not making them productive to the society will continue to impede the development of the Africa society (Enaibe, 2012). More women should also be involved in politics and decision making in African countries than ever before. Women's voice should be heard and should not be denied quality education so as to tap into their potentials for the development of Africa.

Value change

There is need for a paradigm shift in what Africans count as desirable and crave for if Africa must experience a quantum leap in development. Accumulation of wealth through corrupt practices should be seriously discouraged. Adopting values like contentment, integrity, good name and having only what you need and not what you want will go a long way in making Africa a better place. According to Adusei (2009), many tax payers' money is stashed abroad in foreign banks by some African leaders which could have been channelled towards developmental projects that would benefit the common man and the society at large. Therefore, value change is imperative if Africa must develop and enlist herself among the league of developed continents.

Improved export drive

Many African countries are import driven as a result of infrastructural decay (Kingombe, 2011). This may result in deficit balance of payment due to the weakening of local currencies and as such leading to chronic inflation in the economy. In addition, Africans should also embrace home made goods and discontinue craving after foreign goods. Apart from concentrating on production of goods and exporting them abroad, Africa can also concentrate on other industries like tourism, for example medical tourism, where African countries would deliberately promote their health care system to attract foreign patients. Some Asian countries like Taiwan and India have since dived into this and have contributed immensely to the developing of their health system and their countries (Hamid, 2012; The Economic Times, 2015). Therefore, it would be important

for the African countries to increase their export drive, if meaningful development will be recorded in Africa.

Religious and tribal tolerance

Africans should endeavour to tolerate their different religious faiths as well as tribal roots. Everyone should see their fellow men as their one Africa not minding their religious affiliation or even their ethnic background. This will help to avert religious problems and tribal wars that are found in several places in the continent. This is because conflict and civil unrest will always impede the development of any society (Wanyande, 1997).

Conclusion

Africa is a land blessed with many natural resources yet Africans wallow in poverty and the continent has remained underdeveloped when compared to other continents despite the fact that civilization began from the continent. This chapter has been able to explore underdevelopment in Africa tracing its origin from earliest civilization to the current post- independent Africa. The chapter was able to examine the primary and secondary causes of underdevelopment in Africa as well as the problems and remedies to the problems of underdevelopment in the continent. Some of the remedies to the problems of underdevelopment pointed out in the chapter include: Respect for humanity, technological advancement, gender equality, open and accountable government, cultural re-orientation, value change, and export promotion. It is believed that Africa can be a better place and rank well with other developed continents like America and Europe if these remedies given are fully adopted.

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Poverty, Natural Resources “Curse” and Underdevelopment in Africa

Takavafira Masarira Zhou

Introduction

This chapter examines the continued generation and perpetuation of poverty and underdevelopment in Africa by intricate internal and external factors since independence in spite of the continent's abundant natural resources. It rejects the Rodney, Baran, and Frank's wailing and attribution of the underdevelopment of Africa to external factors *per se* as disingenuous and intellectually deficient. The chapter calls for a historical balance sheet which should consider both internal and external factors, particularly in post-colonial Africa's development of underdevelopment and underdevelopment of development. Using the resource curse (the paradox of plenty) theory, the chapter unravels how a continent endowed with natural resource abundance and human capital of quality, diversity and potential is inexorably mired in underdevelopment, vis-a-vis, steaming poverty, squalor, misery, shambolic health care, deprivation, chaos and rudimentary infrastructure. The theory refers to the paradox that countries and regions with an abundance of natural resources like minerals and fuels such as Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Zimbabwe, among others, tend to have less economic growth and worse still staggering developmental outcomes than countries with few natural resources. This is hypothesised to happen for various reasons, including a decline in competitiveness of other economic sectors, volatility of revenues from the natural resource sector due to exposure to global commodity market swings, government mismanagement of resources, or weak, incompetent, wobbly and corrupt institutions. Brief case studies from Nigeria, DRC, Ethiopia, South Sudan and Zimbabwe are given to validate or dismiss the

resource curse theory. An attempt is made to show the complex nexus of natural resources, conflict, poverty and underdevelopment.

It is however, my argument that poverty and inequality are as much causes of conflict and underdevelopment as they are consequences of conflict and underdevelopment. The intricate relationship between poverty and inequality is prioritised taking cognisance of the fact that conflicts normally results from inequalities which might have been caused by poverty and vice versa. The interplay of factors such as low income, low investment, low savings, illiteracy and high population growth rates in producing a vicious circle of poverty, inequality, and underdevelopment are also discussed. The chapter proffers possible remedies to Africa's underdevelopment largely through a common sense internal revolution. Much as the international community should continue to help Africa, ultimately, it is African countries and African people that must craft their own durable home grown solutions to their underdevelopment, taking into consideration the comparative advantages of different African countries. Such solutions must involve corporate social responsibility, tapping and harnessing of Africa's natural resources for greater value addition, through local processing, marketing and environmental stewardship. Investment in agriculture, industrialisation, reliable energy, and infrastructural development, among many others, are imperative for the development of Africa. Equally important is peace, stability and good governance that condition development just as development conditions peace, stability and good governance. Arguably, corporate social responsibility and sustainable development are vehicles through which Africa can maximise benefits from natural resources which are in abundance in the continent.

On the whole, the chapter validates the resource curse theory and calls for sustainability as a *modus operandi* for political, social and economic development, and environmental protection. It is my argument that natural resources by themselves are not a curse but with bad stewardship of resources they become a curse. As such, the curse is the people who abuse natural resources. This therefore calls for judicious government management of resources in order to reduce conflict and human rights abuses.

The resource curse theory

The idea that natural resources might be more of an economic curse than a blessing began to emerge in the 1980s. Indeed, many African countries are blessed with mineral and oil wealth that has the potential to transform their economies, but historically, those resources have often been more of a curse than a blessing, a blockage to development instead of a source of finance to foster sustainable development. Auty (1993) first used the term ‘resource curse thesis’ to describe how countries rich in natural resources were unable to use that wealth to boost their economies and how, counter-intuitively, these countries had lower economic growth than countries without abundance of natural resources. Other scholars such as Baran (1957), Gelb (1988), and Lewis (1984), though not necessarily using the term resource curse, had earlier noted that rather than facilitating development, natural resources could pose development challenges such as the Dutch disease (undermining of the competitiveness of other sectors producing traded goods); unstable domestic demand which retards investment and growth; volatility and poor price prediction; and pauperisation of labour. Harvard economists, Sachs, and Warner (2001) studied 95 developing countries that were mineral exporters for the period 1970-1990 and found that the higher the dependence on natural resource exports, the slower the per capital growth. Similarly, O’Connell (2007: 1-45) finds strong evidence of a ‘natural resource curse’ in the period 1960-2000, “with the primary commodity exporters tending systematically to grow more slowly than exporters of manufactures and/or services.” Not surprisingly, the *Economic Report on Africa* (2016: xxi) indicates that Africa epitomises commodity dependence by exporting huge natural resources such as minerals and oil, as well as cash crops like cocoa, tobacco, cotton, coffee, rubber, etc., in raw form, thereby generating minimal benefits to the continent with the consequent increase of poverty and joblessness.

Proponents of the ‘resource curse’ theory argue that other than reaping limited rewards, African countries with significant natural wealth have experienced underdevelopment, corruption, political

instability, and in some cases, violent conflict. As such, natural resources can foster the adoption of anti-development policies. According to Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002), Collier and Hoeffler (2004), and Collier (2006), natural resource dependence is the most critical risk factor for rebellion. Fundamentally, they provide the finance for staging rebellion irrespective of the rebellion's underlying motivation. The desire to loot natural resources also motivates rebellion. Ross (2003, 2004) argues that resource dependence can generate civil wars through four types of effects: by harming a country's economic performance; by making its government weaker, more corrupt, and less accountable; by giving people who live in resource rich regions an incentive to form an independent state; and by helping to finance the rebel movements. Natural resources have not only influenced civil wars but such resource wealth has also made the countries poor. As such, the resource curse theory reflects the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few, viz, those who monopolise the collection of rents from mining or the drilling for oil, and the exclusion of the majority from deserving benefits. The ultimate result is repressive governments that cling to power, so as to monopolise the collection of resource wealth, and an impoverished population, which in essence is a recipe for conflict. In the resource curse theory, a strong nexus is therefore established between lootable resource wealth, poor governance, underdevelopment and conflict. A major weakness of the resource curse theory is the exclusion of inequality in its nexus menu in spite of its intricate resonance with poverty. A broader conception of the resource curse theory is considered in this chapter, with a strong relationship between resource plunder, poor governance, poverty, inequality, conflict and underdevelopment.

Bates (1981, 1983) blames self-seeking unconstrained elite sacrificing the public for personal interest for poor policy. Olson (1982), Levi (1988), and Ndulu and O'Connell (1999) argue that the elite actually choose policies leading to economic stagnation and decline because the political structure gives leaders a high discount rate. Above all, the divisive benefits perspective views market distortions and other inefficiencies as part of a strategy by government to remain in power by manipulating, *inter-alia*, access to

divisive benefits-rents, to induce and reward cronyism and lackeyism, and weaken and punish real and imagined political opposition. On the extreme side, the predation thesis posits that government may deliberately pursue anti-developmental policies if economic development policies reduce the government's hold on power. Ndulu and O'Connell (1999) suggest that this could explain the destructive behaviour of dictators like Mobutu in the then Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo), Idi Amin in Uganda and Abacha in Nigeria. Klare (2002, 2005), argues that while the 'resource curse' is a global phenomenon, Africa has produced some examples of the curse at its most destructive. O'Connell (2008) argues, this is so because of the association of natural resources with political autocracy in Africa. It is imperative to examine the abundant natural resources of Africa before analysing how they have become more of a curse than blessing to the continent.

Natural resource abundance in Africa

With the independence of South Sudan in 2011, the African continent boasts of 55 sovereign countries. The only exception, the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, is still under Morocco's colonial rule. The World Bank defines natural resources as "materials that occur in nature and are essential or useful to humans, such as water, air, land, forests, fish and wildlife, topsoil, and minerals" (United States Institute of Peace, 2007). As such, natural resources are stocks of materials that exist in the natural environment that are both scarce and politically, economically and socially useful in production or consumption, either in their raw state or after a minimal amount of processing. These resources can be classified as renewable and non-renewable. In most cases, renewable resources such as cropland, forests, and water can be replenished over time by natural processes and – if not overused – are indefinitely sustainable. Non-renewable resources such as minerals and oil are found in finite quantities, and their value increases as supplies dwindle. A nation's access to natural resources often determines its wealth and status in the world economic system.

It is noteworthy that Africa is blessed with a gigantic geographical size which is bigger than the land masses of the United States, China, India, Mexico, Peru, France, Spain, Papua New Guinea, Sweden, Japan, Germany, Norway, Italy, New Zealand, The United Kingdom, Nepal, Bangladesh and Greece put together (Turvill 2013). It also enjoys a demographic dividend of more than 1.22 billion population (<http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/>), 60% of which is below 35 years. This is, undoubtedly, a huge resource which if properly tapped, harnessed, adequately skilled and capacitated may propel Africa to global stardom in manufacturing, ICT and service industries. Africa is a continent with immense untapped mineral and oil wealth. Lamb (1983: 20), asserts that Africa has “40% of the world’s potential hydroelectric power supply; the bulk of the world’s diamonds ...; 30% of the uranium in the non-communist world; 50% of the world’s gold; 90% of its cobalt; 50% of its phosphates; ... 7.5% of its coal; ... 3% of its iron ore; and millions upon millions of acres of untilled farmland.” Indeed, Africa has 60% of the world’s cultivatable land. Arguably, there is no other continent blessed with such abundance and diversity. Zimbabwe for example has an estimated 25% of the global reserves of diamonds and large reserves of platinum. Similarly, Angola “contains an estimated 11% of the world’s known reserves of diamonds. Its diamonds are stunning: at an average price of about \$140 a carat, with some reaching \$350, they are second in quality only to Namibia’s, and more than 12 times more valuable than Australia’s” (*The Economist*, 14 September 1996: 68).

Kaberuka (2013:3), also notes that Africa has more than 122 billion barrels of proven oil reserves (13% of world’s oil), 500 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves (12% of global gas) and 90% of chromium and platinum group metals; 20% of the world’s copper and significant deposits of bauxite, tantalum and other minerals. In addition, it has 64% of the world’s manganese, and vast nickel, lead, tungsten and cobalt; rutile (titanium ore), emeralds, lithium and tin. Despite colonial and neo-colonial plunder, Africa is still endowed with large amounts of hitherto unknown natural wealth. According to Ayittey (1999: 6), Africa also accounts for “70% of cocoa, 60% of coffee, 50% of palm oil, and 20% of the total petroleum traded in the world market, excluding the United States and Russia.” Africa is,

therefore, blessed with more than 35% of global resources share. The tourism potential of Africa is enormous. Unrivalled wildlife, scenic grander, and pristine ecology constitute Africa's third great natural resource after agriculture and mineral wealth. Africa is also blessed with human capital of quality and strength.

Africa has huge water resources in form of large rivers and lakes such as Congo, Nile, Zambezi and Niger Rivers, and Lake Victoria and Tanganyika. Indeed, the quality, quantity and availability of fresh water impacts on the continent's social and ecological well-being. With careful planning and investment, the water can be tapped and harnessed with the consequent promotion of food production, ecosystem maintenance, access to water for drinking and domestic use, and development. Africa's total length across the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, the Mediterranean and Red Sea, including its Islands, exceeds 26,000 nautical miles. Out of the 55 African sovereign states, more than 38 African countries are either coastal or islands states. It is a historical fact that Africa's coastal zone is known for its rich biodiversity including fisheries, grass beds and wetlands, which are vital sources of livelihoods to many Africans. If properly tapped and harnessed, it will provide food security, generate valuable sources of export earnings, e.g. tourism, and support vital ecological systems. Substantial oil reserves and gas have also been discovered offshore, while the coastal sand dunes and seabed sediments along the Atlantic shores hold commercially valuable diamonds. With an appropriate strategy, Africa can arrest challenges facing the 'blue revolution' and nurture more wealth creation from Africa's oceans, seas and inland water ways.

It is, therefore, a paradox that a continent with such abundance and potential is inexorably mired in steaming squalor, misery, deprivation, underdevelopment and chaos. It is in the throes of a seemingly incurable crisis and underdevelopment. Basic food stuff has become a luxury for many Africans in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leon, Lesotho, Southern Sudan, Somalia and Zimbabwe, as hunger stares them squarely in the face. Many families cannot afford one meal a day, talk less of the ideal three square meals. Millions of African children are out of school because their parents cannot afford tuition fees or books. Not only are many Africans

clothed like destitute, but many families also do not have shelter. There is constant fuel scarcity in some African countries, while health care is in shambles. Power supply is ridiculously epileptic, while roads are rudimentary and in terrible conditions, several years after independence. Intra- and inter-state transportation is a nightmare, while border procedures have remained thick and rigid in spite of the Organisation of African Union(OAU) (1963) and African Union(AU) (2000, 2014)'s calls for greater regional and continental integration. Robbers and assassins are on the loose, while prostitution has become a pastime. Cape Verde *Crime and Safety Report* (2015) reflects significant increase robbery and assassinations since 2011. Robbers, assassins and kidnappers have assumed terrible dimensions in Nigeria, particularly in Benue state (*Nigerian Tribune*, 2016). Cuddihy (2015) has remarked that there are as many as 40000 child prostitutes in the trading city of Mombasa in Kenya. Above all, the most virile and active people of Africa – the young and healthy men and women – are roaming the streets jobless. With an estimated unemployment rate of 95 percent, Zimbabwe is the country with the highest unemployment rate in the world (Global Fact book, 2016).

Admittedly, natural resources are more of a curse in Africa, and other third world regions, than a blessing. Africa comprises some of the world's poorest countries and the continent's population of more than 1.22 billion is among the poorest people in the whole world in spite of natural resource wealth that exist in almost obscene abundance. As reflected above, coal, chrome, diamonds, gold, iron ore, oil, platinum, tantalite, uranium and a number of yet to be exploited resources are found in such vast quantities that Africa should be professed as limitlessly wealthy. Nevertheless, though the continent's natural resources hold immense economic swear for its people, few African nations have actually benefitted from their inherent riches.

Natural resources have played a negative role in many of African's bloodiest wars, from Sierra Leone (1991-2002) and Liberia (1989-1996), to Angola (1975-2002), Mozambique (1977-1992), Democratic Republic of Congo, formerly Zaire, (1960-1965, 1998-2003), Libya(2011 to present), Sudan (1983-2011), and Southern Sudan (2011 to present). Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Collier (2006),

and Ross (2003, 2004) have grimly illustrated the litany of failures among the most mineral and oil rich nations on the African continent. In Angola, foreign companies as well as Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) (used a thin veneer of ideological differences) to plunder Angola's vast diamond and oil resources at the expense of the suffering of the generality of Angolans. The tragic case of the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire) from company plunder of resources during the colonial period to kleptocratic regime under Mobutu and brutal civil wars in the 21st century in the eastern part of the country is clear validation of resource curse theory.

Ross (2003:33) and Davies (2002) have shown how the fiercest fighting over a decade long civil war in Sierra Leone was over the control of the country's diamonds fields. Diamonds smuggled from Sierra Leone also helped to finance one side in the war in neighbouring Liberia, as did illegal exploitation of Liberian timber and iron ore. In Liberia, the Americo-Liberian oligarchy was swept aside in the name of quickly-ignored grievances by kleptocratic Samuel Doe regime, and then swept aside by the crocodile liberator-cum-warlord, Charles Taylor. As stressed by Ayittey (1999: 59), Taylor took his resource-plunder one step further, spreading his turmoil into neighbouring Sierra Leone. In Burkina Faso, illegal gold mine on a hill considered sacred by the local Lobi Community has not only desecrated the community's cultural values but also rewarded them with environmental pollution, diseases and poverty. According to Maticoli (2016), in northern part of Ivory Coast, a rebel faction controlled a large open-pit diamond mine in the town of Seguela in 2008. It was one of several producing diamonds – estimated to be worth more than US\$20 million – that were smuggled into Mali and Ghana to help fund arms purchases instead of alleviating poverty and inequality in the Ivory Coast and elsewhere in Africa.

Ross (2013) traces the oil curse to the upheaval of the 1970s, when oil prices soared and governments across the developing world seized control of their countries' oil industries. He further argues that much as prior to nationalisation, the oil rich countries looked much

like the rest of the world; today, they are 50% more likely to be ruled by autocrats, and twice as likely to descend into civil war, than countries without oil. Karl (1997) uses a hybrid approach, assembling cognitive, societal, and state factors to explain why the 1973-74 and 1978-79 oil booms led to economic stagnation and political turmoil in many oil-exporting states, particularly in Algeria and Nigeria. She posits that the characteristics of a country's leading export sector tend to influence the state's capacity to promote economic development. Karl (1997:16) argues that:

Dependence on petroleum revenues produces a distinctive type of institutional setting, the petro-state, which encourages the political distribution of rents. Such a state is characterised by fiscal reliance on petrodollars, which expands state jurisdiction and weakens authority as other extractive capabilities wither. As a result, when faced with competing pressures, state officials become habituated to relying on the progressive substitution of public spending for statecraft, thereby weakening state capacity.

This effect extends even to non-African oil producing countries. Sheikh Ahmed Yamani (2000) professed dire consequences for Saudi Arabia's heavy reliance on oil in the event that oil trade comes to an end. He notes: "Thirty years from now there will be a huge amount of oil – and no buyers. Oil will be left in the ground. The Stone Age came to an end, not because we had a lack of stones, and the oil age will come to an end not because we have a lack of oil." Thus, much as natural resource exploitation in Africa have contributed to increased gross domestic product, export revenue and government annual revenue, by no means have communities in proximity to natural resource rich areas immensely benefitted. Rather they have been rewarded with protracted resource wars, poverty and underdevelopment; inequality, limited political, economic and social freedom

Debate on poverty, underdevelopment and development

In order to bring out the nexus between resources, poverty, underdevelopment and development, it is imperative to examine conceptions of these phenomena. Poverty is simply a condition of

lack, whereby people do not have access to basic necessities of life. It is characterised by inadequate shelter, viz, improperly constructed, overcrowded, and lacking in basic services such as water and sanitation, as well as homelessness (Chege, 1995: 142). It is punctuated by poor health facilities which is most felt by the most vulnerable elements of human society (the poorest of the poor), namely children and women, and resonates with low life expectancy. Poverty is also associated with lack of educational facilities and illiteracy, as well as a relatively high level of unemployment in Africa. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) (1995) defines the unemployed as persons above a certain age (generally taken to be 15 years) available for work, not in paid employment or self-employed and seeking work. Trends in employment are often indicative of a society's ability to deal with poverty. It is Griffin and Mckinley (1994: 71-72)'s view that employment provides people with a source of income, contributes to the output of goods and services and gives workers a sense of dignity, as they are able to participate in community activities. Sadly, in most African countries the destitute are often unemployed, a condition that further undermines their ability to rise above the barriers of poverty. The Brandt Report (1980: 50), emphasised that "no concept of development can be accepted which continues to condemn hundreds of millions of people to starvation and despair."

Ramlogan (2004: 140) asserts that "poverty, in its most extreme form, is the condition that exists when people lack the means to fulfil basic human needs, adequate and nutritious food, clothing, housing, clean water, and health services." Similarly, Narayan et al (2000: 4-5) define poverty as multidimensional deprivation that "includes hunger, illiteracy, illness and poor health, powerlessness, voicelessness, insecurity, humiliation, and lack of access to basic infrastructure." In this context, the identification of poor people in Africa first requires a determination of what constitutes basic needs. These may be as narrowly defined as the requirements for survival, or as broadly as those reflecting the prevailing standard of living of the developed world. The need for poverty alleviation has remained as of old, a key aspect informing development. The interaction between poverty and the environment has set off a downward spiral

of ecological deterioration in Africa that threatens the physical security, well-being and health of many of the region's poorest people. Not surprisingly, in the post-World War II period, the underlying force for poverty alleviation and modernisation was considered to be economic development, loosely defined as the process of growth and change aimed at raising people's living standards (Smith, 1994:15).

In the 1950s, development was seen within the framework of growth in economic power as measured by gross national product (GNP) or rise in per capita income (GNI). However, this emphasis of economic growth (getting the growth job done), ignored poverty, discrimination, unemployment and income distribution (George 1988:2; Jazairy, 1992: 5; Todaro and Smith, 2012:14). Development strategies in this era focused on rapid industrialisation, often at the expense of agriculture, rural development and many other dimensions of development. It was merely anticipated that the rewards of economic growth would trickle down from the top to middle income group and the masses. Lewis (1955:9) set the tone for the late 1950s and 1960s when he noted that "our subject matter is growth, and not distribution." It soon became apparent that growth in a nation's wealth did not translate into substantial benefits for the poor. This realisation led to the emergence of a new definition of development – one that emphasised the alleviation of poverty and the reduction of inequality (Jazairy et. al. 1992: 2). However, the stress of the United Nations' first development decade (1960-1970) on less-developed countries' economic growth, which many allegedly did not spread to the poorer half of the population, activated widespread disillusionment.

It was Seers (1969: 3-4) who signalled the shift away from the goal of growth by succinctly posing basic questions about a country's development:

The questions to ask about a country's development are therefore: What has been happening to poverty? What has been happening to employment? What has been happening to inequality? If all three of these have declined from high levels, then beyond doubt this has been a period of development for the country concerned. If one or two of

these central problems have been growing worse, especially if all three have, it would be strange to call the result “development”, even if per capita income doubled.

As such, Seers did not necessarily supplant the economic growth, but rather placed it within a framework of larger social objectives.

It is also important to note the emergency of dependency theory from 1950s onwards that viewed underdevelopment in Africa, Asia and Latin America as a product of development of the Western countries. Dependency theorists such as Baran (1973), Frank (1971, 1972), Furtado (1973) and Rodney (1972), strongly argue that the less developed countries should be fully comprehended as the periphery of the developed countries (centre). In Frank’s view, the underdevelopment of the periphery is an inevitable reflection of the development of the core. Dependency theory argues that global changes in demand resulted in a new international division of labour in which the peripheral countries specialised in primary products in an enclave controlled by foreigners while importing manufactured goods that were the stamina of technical progress in the central countries of the West. It is also their argument that the increased productivity and new consumption patterns in the peripheral countries benefitted a small ruling class and its allies, who cooperated with the developed countries to achieve modernisation (economic development among a modernising minority). As Furtado (1973:120) argues, the ultimate result is “peripheral capitalism, a form of capitalism that is unable to generate innovations and dependent for transformation upon decisions from outside.” While dependency theory is valid in terms of articulating external factors that have militated against progress in Africa, this chapter goes further than this by examining internal inherent contradictions in African countries that have also militated against progress.

A third definition of development does not only encompass Seers’ satisfaction of basic needs, but also emotional, spiritual and political needs. In articulating one of the most concise conception of this more expansive definition, Todaro (1992: 100-102) views it as embracing three core values: firstly, the satisfaction of basic physiological needs; secondly, self-esteem; thirdly, freedom from

man's servitude to nature, ignorance, other men, misery, institutions and dogmatic beliefs. This is what So (1990) calls the convergence of the three schools of modernisation, dependency and new world-system in the 1980s. For Sen (1999), freedom (not development) is the ultimate goal of economic life as well as most efficient means of realising general welfare. As such, overcoming deprivation is central to development. Unfreedoms in Sen's perception include hunger, famine, ignorance, an unsustainable economic life, unemployment, barriers to economic fulfilment by women or minority communities, premature death, violation of political freedom and basic liberty, threats to the environment, and little access to health, sanitation, or clean water. As such, freedom of exchange, labour contract, social opportunities, and protective security are not just ends or constituent components of development but also important means to development and freedom. Similarly, Peet and Hartwick (2009:1) conceive development as:

making a better life for everyone. In the present context of a highly uneven world, a better life for most people means, essentially, meeting basic needs: sufficient food to maintain good health; a safe, health place in which to live; affordable services available to everyone; and being treated with dignity and respect. Beyond meeting these needs, basic to human survival, the course taken by development is subject to the material and cultural visions of different societies.

Arguably, in the 21st century human development is generally considered as the ultimate goal of economic development, with the objective not being merely to produce more goods, but rather to improve the capabilities of people to lead full, productive and satisfying lives. This can be realised through good governance, participatory democracy and corporate governance that in turn guarantee equity, life serving skills and improved livelihoods. This approach has copious advantages. It adds value directly to the welfare of people; it builds from a foundation of equality of opportunity; it creates a more equitable distribution of the benefits of development; it facilitates the effective exploitation of the linkages between the various types of investment in people; and it takes advantages of what

Griffin and McKinley (1994: 6) call, the complementarities between human and physical capital. On such terms, development is understood to be about people and not roads, machines and infrastructure. Alleviating poverty requires the full participation of people in the developmental process – and this participation, as Jazaury *et.al.* (1992:22) argue, must emerge out of respect for human life, dignity and democratic values. It is, therefore, against the backdrop of alleviating poverty and inequality; good governance, astute resource management, peace and stability; political, economic and social freedom; and making a better life for everyone that natural resources are analysed as a resource curse or blessing below.

Case Studies

A brief examination of the situations in Nigeria (West Africa), Democratic Republic of Congo (Central Africa), Zimbabwe (Southern Africa), South Sudan (North Africa), and Ethiopia (East Africa) reveals that while poor Africa countries dream of finding oil and mineral wealth (like poor people fantasies about winning the lottery), the dream often turns into a nightmare. It is noteworthy that the sampled countries are microcosms of the regions they represent as I cannot adequately and succinctly look at the whole continent in just a single chapter. As much as a country's natural resources often determine its wealth and status in the world economic system, most African nations are resource trapped. Consequently, easily accessible natural resources actually hurt the growth of a national economy and the people by fostering poverty, conflict and political corruption. As such, natural resource wealth has many a times been detrimental to development by generating poverty, underdevelopment, inequality, limited freedom and worst life for many

Nigeria

Nigeria is the most populated nation on the African continent and contains a vast wealth of natural resources particularly oil and gas. Since independence in 1960, the overarching goal of Nigeria's economic development has been to achieve stability, material prosperity, peace and social progress. However, this goal has proved

elusive largely because of 'oil curse' that has generated not only coups and civil wars in the country but also mismanagement and misuse of resources, and a shocking contrast of richness and poverty.

Nigerian oil has not also brought any joy to oil producing regions with the consequent civil war (Biafra) in the period 1966-1970 and ongoing oil wars between government and communities in oil producing areas. The coup d'état of July 1966, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Murtala Mohammed, a northerner, resulted in the exclusion of the Igbos from power and established an increasingly anti-Igbo climate. The religious differences between traditionalists Igbo and Muslim northerners also came into play. It is the conviction of Nafziger (1973:529) that amidst widespread anti-Igbo sentiment and the subsequent attacks, many Igbo migrated to their home region in the eastern part of Nigeria and became a powerful lobbying group for an independent Biafra, in which they now had vested economic and cultural interest. Economic, cultural and political exclusion was further compounded by fear that without political power in the Nigerian Federation, there would be an increasingly detrimental distribution of oil revenues – by then the most vital source of government revenue. It is also noteworthy, as Nafziger (1983) argues, that the oil revenues promised an independent Biafra relative wealth.

Following the Biafran war, the government felt it necessary to secure and gain more control over the oil industry. Consequently, under the control of General Yakubu Gowon, the Nigerian federal government nationalised the oil industry in 1971 by creating the Nigerian National Oil Corporation (NNOC) via a decree. Nationalisation of the oil sector was also precipitated by Nigeria's desire to join the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which was encouraging member states to acquire 51% stakes and become increasingly involved in the oil sector. Although the Nigerian government had maintained involvement in the industry prior to 1971, this was accomplished mainly through business deals on concessions of the foreign firms in operation. The creation of the NNOC made government participation in the industry legally binding. The federal government would continue to consolidate its oil involvement throughout the next several decades.

It was during the years of Gowon and his successors Murtala Mohammed and Olusegun Obasanjo known officially known as the Heads of the Federal Military Government of Nigeria, who ruled amidst the oil boom of the 1970s that the 'oil curse' became more apparent in Nigeria. The 'oil curse' which radiated through the political economy of petroleum in Nigeria truly was punctuated by endemic patronage and corruption of the political elites, which plagues the nation to this day. Junger (2007) posits that Nigeria lost US\$300 to US\$400 billion through corruption by government officials between 1960 and 2007. A Nigerian economist, Martin Ogunbiyi (2016), estimated that Nigeria has lost between US\$350 to US\$450 billion of oil money (resource wealth) through high profile bane of corruption, cronyism and theft over the last 56 years.

At both state and federal government levels, power and therefore wealth has typically been monopolised by select lobby groups who maintain a strong tendency to 'look after their own' by financially rewarding their political supporters. At the state or community level this means that interest groups in power will reward and protect their own; this is typically based on ethnic/"tribal" or religious affiliation of the interest group. As Khan and Ahmad (1994) argue, the heavy patronage based on ethnic affiliation has fuelled ethnic unrest and violence throughout Nigeria, but particularly in the Niger Delta states, where the stakes for control of the immense oil resources are very high. At the federal level, political elites have utilised patronage to consolidate power for the ruling government, not only by rewarding their political friends in the federal government, but also by paying off major interest groups at the state or ethnic level in order to elicit their cooperation. Inevitably, these financial favours are distributed unequally and inefficiently, resulting in the concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a small minority. Khan and Ahmad (1994) assert that although Nigeria is the largest petroleum producer in Africa, and a key exporter of oil to both Western Europe and the US, its political economy remains one of gross indebtedness, inefficiency and mismanagement. Arguably, oil wealth has been used to consolidate the power of entrenched elites and regime supporters, sharpening income inequality and stifling political reforms in Nigeria from independence to present day.

The 'oil curse' has for many years reduced Nigeria's oil-rich southern delta region into a scene of incessant armed clashes among local residents, dissident groups and military and police. The fighting has claimed many lives and sporadically disrupted the country's main export sector. The civil unrest has been stocked by popular frustrations over poverty, pollution and heavy-handed security tactics. Goodhand (2001:24) argues that "uneven development processes lead to inequality, exclusion and poverty." This adds to growing complaints aggravated when poverty correlates with ethnic, religious, language and regional boundaries (Stewart 2010:7). The essential grievances may detonate into open conflict when activated by external shocks or mobilised by conflict entrepreneurs. Much as some scholars posit that poverty *per se*, causes conflict, Goodhand (2001:24) points to the importance of "extreme horizontal inequalities, as a source of grievance which is used by leaders to mobilise followers and to legitimate violent actions." Conflict in the Niger Delta largely emanates from the fact that its vast wealth has barely touched people's lives.

As much as most people think of oil states as wealthy states, oil in Nigeria has proved to be a curse rather than a blessing. Worse still, the people living in the Niger Delta, the country's oil producing region, are among Nigeria's most impoverished and underdeveloped communities, with a large percentage of the population surviving on less than US\$1 per day (Amnesty International, 2006). Boele, Fabig and Wheeler (2001:74-86) argue that poverty among many people in the Niger Delta entails finding work in a labour market which in many instances is hostile to them. Much as the labour force for the oil companies is largely coming from Nigeria, for the most part, locals are profusely discriminated against. Consequently, men in the community have to search for temporary employment, which takes the men out of the community as they go in search of work, and sets up unsustainable spending habits (Boele, Fabig and Wheeler, 2001). Oil companies are also not gender-sensitive, as they hardly employ women. For these people, oil has not brought prosperity or development. Rather, it has generated a curse epitomised by increased corruption, muffled democracy, social problems and armed conflict. The many billions of US dollars in oil revenue that have

poured into the country during its oil industry's 58-year history have completely bypassed these communities. This resonates with Ross (2013)'s findings on the same region to the effect that oil revenues are massive, opaque, and volatile, and destroy the relationship between a state and its own citizens.

While scholars like Ross (2003, 2004, 2013) and Karl (1997) focus on political economy in the strict sense, it would seem that the worst effects of oil are the 'externalities' that it passes on to impoverished local people, and to the world community, in the form of permanently ruined waters, forests, soils, and farmlands. The Delta of Nigeria comprises 70,000 km² of wetlands formed primarily by sediment deposition. This floodplain is home to more than 20 million people and 40 different ethnic groups, and makes up 7.5% of Nigeria's total land mass. Indeed, it is the largest wetland and maintains the third-largest drainage area in Africa

(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Petroleum_industry_in_Nigeria).

The Delta's environment comprises four ecological zones, viz, coastal barrier islands, mangrove swamp forests, freshwater swamps, and lowland rainforests. Arguably, it is an incredibly well-endowed ecosystem that holds one of the highest concentrations of biodiversity on the planet, in addition to supporting an abundant flora and fauna, arable terrain that can sustain a wide variety of crops, economic trees, and more species of freshwater fish than any ecosystem in West Africa. Yet, sound as this may appear, this environment has come under threat because of oil extraction. In this location of most of Nigeria's oilfields, the oil pipelines have leaked on numerous occasions destroying community water, in a state where people's main source of income is fishing. *Baird (2010) has shown how oil spills in Nigeria are routine rather than episodic, with estimates spills of between 9 million to 13 million barrels since drilling started in 1958. He further asserts that government estimates have put spills at about 7,000 between 1970 and 2000.* Causes include corrosion of pipelines and tankers, sabotage, and oil production operations that at times are done using inadequate or non-functional production equipment. Many facilities and pipelines were constructed to older standards, are poorly maintained and have outlived their estimated life span (Shell International Petroleum Company, 1995).

Arguably, oil spills have had a major impact on the ecosystem in Nigeria. Large tracts of mangrove forests have been destroyed as they are especially susceptible to oil spills because the oil is stored in the soil and re-released annually with each inundation. Spills also take out crops and aquacultures through contamination of groundwater and soils. According to Ogunbiyi (2016), drinking water in the Niger Delta is frequently contaminated, and a gleam of oil is visible in many localised bodies of water. Water pollution has caused immediate and long term health effects, with the numerous hydrocarbons and other chemicals present in oil posing a carcinogenic risk. Rowell (1994) argues that offshore spills, which are usually much greater in scale, contaminate coastal environments and cause a decline in local fishing production. As such, oil wealth has led to ‘environmental terrorism’ in the Niger Delta. Environmental effects have been exacerbated by the fact that Nigerian regulations are weak and rarely enforced, thereby allowing oil companies, in essence, to self-regulate (*Baird 2010*). The carelessness and ‘environmental terrorism’ of the oil industry is best encapsulated by a report issued by the *Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC)* in 1983, long before popular unrest surfaced:

We witnessed the slow poisoning of the waters of this country and the destruction of vegetation and agricultural land by oil spills which occur during petroleum operations. But since the inception of the oil industry in Nigeria, more than twenty-five years ago, there has been no concerned and effective effort on the part of the government, let alone the oil operators, to control environmental problems associated with the industry (Quoted in Rodwell, 1994: 10).

There is also really ugly political shenanigan of big oil. This entails outright murder on a huge scale in Nigeria, where oil companies have hired goon squads to terrorise and eliminate local protesters. According to Ogunbiyi (2016), oil companies working in cahoots with the leaders of Niger Delta Region, have helped sponsor the militant groups kidnapping innocent people and sabotaging efforts by the federal government for infrastructural development. Aiyetan (2007) argues that the leadership also appears responsible for most

of the underdevelopment in the region epitomised by large-scale corruption amongst the elected leaders especially governors. Governor of the Delta State between 1999 and 2007, James Ibori, siphoned more than N35 billion (US\$1.2 billion) from oil wealth, laundering most of it abroad at a time when the generality of the people in the state had tested positive to poverty. It is partly because of this Nigerian 'oil curse' that a terrorist group hailing from the Niger Delta has recently emerged. The reasoning behind their rebellious nature was the lack of care that is shown by the government for their towns. According to Ogunbiyi (2016), all the 36 states of Nigeria received equal allocations of national oil revenue until 2000, when the share for the oil-producing Niger Delta states was increased to 13% in an effort to assuage local grievances. However, most of the money greased the hands of elites in the cities so that the majority of poor residents did not notice any real improvement. Consequently, the governments of oil producing states are lobbying for an increase of their share to 20-25% as the majority of people in Niger Delta are adamant that oil resource accruing in their area is a curse rather than a blessing. All in all, oil wealth has left the Niger Delta people poverty stricken and underdeveloped; economically marginalised and socially disarticulated.

The UNDP *National Human Development Report 2008-2009*(2009:30-33) reveals there was marked improvement in macroeconomic management in Nigeria resulting in relative stability. Growth of real GDP driven by the non-oil sector averaged above 6% while per capita income rose steadily, crossing the \$1000 mark in 2006. Expansion of agriculture was the main driver of overall growth sustaining impressive growth in the period 2001-2007. Equally important was the expansion of communication and banking. Yet sound as this may appear, the high growth rates did not translate into equitable distribution of wealth, poverty reduction, employment generation, and improvement of the standard of living of Nigerian populace. Arguably, the growth was neither pro-poor nor inclusive.

Admittedly, poverty in Nigeria presents a very complex and difficult challenge to citizens and policy makers. The manifestations of poverty across urban and rural communities have been identified

as lack of food, money and shelter, and indebtedness. The poor in Nigeria live in unhygienic and insecure environments with limited access to medical facilities, electricity, water and other basic services. With the government officials siphoning off all the money generated from oil sales, the infrastructure has suffered in Nigeria. Most of the villages in the Niger Delta do not have electricity or even running clean water. They do not have good access to schools or medical clinics. For many, even clean drinking water is difficult to come by. Nigeria is considered to be one of the poorest countries in the world because it has some of the poorest human development indicators. Table 1, below, shows the country’s incidence of poverty, based on the percentage of people living below the poverty line.

Table 1: Incidence of Poverty in Nigeria

Year	Poverty Incidence (%)	Estimated Total Population (in millions)	Population (in millions)
1980	28.1	65	18.26
1985	46.3	75	34.73
1992	42.7	91.5	39.07
1996	65.6	102.3	67.11
2004	54.7	126.3	69.09
2010	69.0	163.0	112.47

Sources: *National Bureau of Statistics, (2007:5; 2012); and UNDP, (2000-2009).*

The table above reveals that the total poverty head count rose from 28.1% in 1980 to 65.6% in 1996, an annual average increase of 8.83% in the 16 year period. However, between 1996 and 2004, total poverty head count slightly decreased by an annual average of 2.1% to 54.4%. The numbers have continued to increase since then.

Poverty is prevalent in both rural and urban areas in Nigeria. However, the rural areas record a higher incidence of depth and severity of poverty than the urban areas. The National Bureau of Statistics’ (2007) records show that more than half of rural households are ‘absolutely poor’ (defined as those who have minimal

standards of food, clothing, healthcare and shelter), while the proportion is much lower in the urban areas (see table 2 below).

Table 2: Relative Poverty by Sector - Urban and Rural (%)

Year	Urban	Rural
1980	16.2	28.3
1985	37.8	51.4
1992	37.5	46.0
1996	58.2	69.3
2004	43.1	63.8
2010	31.8	73.2

Sources: *National Bureau of Statistics (2007: 36; 2010)*

The National Bureau of Statistics (2007: 7) attributed the high incidence of poverty in the rural areas to their dependence on low-productivity agriculture, lack of access to opportunities and poor social and economic infrastructure.

Between 1985 and 2004, inequality in Nigeria worsened from 0.43 to 0.49 (65% of assets in the hands of 20% of the population), placing the country among those with the highest inequality levels in the world (UNDP, 2008-2009: 11). Thus despite the vast resource, Nigeria ranks among the most unequal countries in the world. The poverty challenge in the country is partly a feature of high inequality which manifests in highly unequal income distribution and differential access to basic infrastructure, education, training and job opportunities. Both poverty and inequality have a gender dimension in Nigeria. The incidences of poverty and inequality are generally higher among females than males. The female gender is generally disadvantaged in access to education and employment (more so, as oil companies are hesitant to employ women), agricultural wage and access to land, among other things. Gender inequality, therefore, affects growth and perpetuates poverty among the disadvantaged groups. Clearly, inequality hurts the economy and women and girls in particular.

The fact that successive Nigeria governments have created multiple institutions for combating corruption in public and private sectors is itself a confirmation of the endemic nature of corruption

in the country. The governance model contends that corruption affects poverty in the sense that increased corruption reduces governance capacity (otherwise understood as the institutional capacity of government to deliver quality public services). It is imperative to briefly examine the link between these two phenomena in Nigeria as they are also closely related to the 'oil curse', as already reflected above. As already reflected above, corruption has a profound impact on the level of poverty due to the resulting failure by the government to use resources to deliver poverty-reduction services. Corruption is the abuse of public resources or public power for personal gain (*Transparency International*, 2016). In the worst cases, corruption costs lives. Short of this, it costs people their freedom, health or money. On the political front, corruption is a major obstacle to democracy and the rule of law. It is extremely challenging to develop accountable political leadership in a corrupt climate. Economically, corruption depletes national wealth. Corrupt politicians invest scarce public resources in projects that will line their pockets rather than benefit communities, and prioritise high-profile projects such as dams, power plants, pipelines and refineries over less spectacular but more urgent infrastructure projects such as schools, hospitals and roads. Corruption corrodes the social fabric of society. It undermines people's trust in the political system, in its institutions and its leadership. A distrustful or apathetic public can then become yet another hurdle to challenging corruption. Environmental degradation is another consequence of corrupt systems. The lack of, or non-enforcement of, environmental regulations and legislation means that precious natural resources are carelessly exploited, and entire ecological systems are ravaged. Corruption, therefore, perpetuates poverty, underdevelopment and inequality as resources are plundered for personal gains instead of fostering development of communities.

A strong resonance between corruption and poverty in Nigeria is gleaned from the performance of the country in several existing studies measuring corruption and poverty, particularly Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, and the UNDP's Human Development Index. Results of both studies for the period of 2005- 2013 exhibit that Nigeria consistently scored high in the

Corruption Perception Index and low in the Human Development Index. Consequently, the high incidence of corruption grossly limited investment in citizens’ welfare. Table 3 below reflects the correlation between corruption and poverty.

Table 3: Comparing Nigeria’s Corruption Perception Index and Human Development Index rankings: 2005-2013

Year	Corruption Perception Index rankings	Human Development Index rankings
2005	152 out of 158	158 out of 177
2006	150 out of 163	159 out of 177
2007	132 out of 147	158 out of 177
2008	121 out of 150	158 out of 177
2009	130 out of 150	158 out of 182
2010	134 out of 178	142 out of 169
2011	143 out of 182	156 out of 179
2012	139 out of 175	153 out of 187
2013	144 out of 175	153 out of 187

Sources: *Transparency International, CPI, (2005-2013) and UNDP, HDI (2005-2014)*

Undoubtedly, if the monies of the states were judiciously deployed they would have had a more positive impact on the lives of the people. In 2007, Nigeria with a Human Development Index of 0.470 was ranked 158 out of 177 countries surveyed. In terms of 2013 Corruption Perception Index, Nigeria was ranked 144 out of 175 countries surveyed, while in terms of Human Development Index it was 153 out of 187 countries surveyed. Unemployment is also growing arithmetically every year, particularly in urban areas. What is worrisome is the fact that the unemployed include some highly educated populations, who under normal circumstances would form the hard core of the productive vanguard in a developing country. It is therefore, a sad scenario that many of Nigeria’s unemployed, as elsewhere in Africa, are well educated and skilled even by European and American standards. The Nigerian situation, therefore, does not resonate with development theory. There is a total disconnection

between growth, poverty reduction and human development, let alone freedom. Corruption, high inequality, and gender disparity, limit the opportunity for the poor, women and children to benefit from the oil wealth of Nigeria.

By and large, Nigeria seems to be well set up - it produces a form of oil ideal for the United States, has huge reserves, and has increased its production to 2.8 million barrels of oil a day. Nigeria's oil revenue has totalled \$340 billion in exports since the 1970s and it is the fifth largest producer in the world. Yet in spite of such vast resources, 70% of its population lives on less than \$1 a day, and 43% have no access to clean water. Conversely, the Nigerian oil wealth is fundamentally a 'resource curse' that is hurting Nigeria and disadvantaging her people. The people of the delta states live in extreme poverty even in the face of great material wealth found in the waters by their homes. Estimates suggest that 1,000 people are still killed every year in oil wars that waste a lot of energy that could be converted to productive work if appropriate conflict resolution, management and prevention approaches are employed. While Nigeria recorded some growth in the period 2001-2007, such growth was not pro-poor and inclusive. The reward of oil wealth to Nigerians has been, corruption, poverty, underdevelopment, coups and incessant conflict; inequality, unemployment, limited freedom and environmental terrorism of the worst order. Development has been elusive in Nigeria, and so likewise has been a better life for all.

Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 1960-2016

Undoubtedly, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) greatly typifies the 'resource curse' theory in Africa, characterised by unparalleled poverty, underdevelopment of development and misery; kleptocracy, incessant conflict, and the unnecessary killings of innocent civilians as well as their forced displacements; corruption, institutional deficit, environmental carnage and gross violation of women and children's rights. The country, formerly known as Zaire, is the largest country Africa in area. Abundant mineral deposits have yielded massive resource rents which have proved irresistible to political elite who have spent the best part of the resource wealth on retaining political control, patronage, clientelism, and maintaining a

fairly rogue and ineffective army. The centralisation of resource rent has entailed that social development has remained a luxury in the country, particularly for the majority. The ensuring pitiable human and physical capital has been unable to prop up a 21st century developing economy. As such, bad governance, poverty, insecurity, underdevelopment, and lawlessness, have cumulatively generated a new unwritten law in force in DRC which entails that whoever has weapons eats first.

The DRC is one of the world's richest territorial states in regards to its natural resources. These resources include copper, cobalt, zinc, diamonds, cassiterite, wolfrate, oil, and timber; uranium, coltan (tantalum), columbium, gold and tin. Indeed, DRC should be a prosperous country, as it is blessed with such vast mineral deposits, and rich agricultural lands in the fertile Congo Basin. Yet because of the poverty of leadership and resource management, this has not been the case. The DRC has a long history of instability, resource plunder and underdevelopment that commenced under the brutal and penal Belgian colonial rule. The country attained its independence in 1960 under a democratically elected luminary president, Patrice Lumumba. However, the peace and hope envisaged by many people was short-lived, as the leader was butchered in 1961. Mobutu SeseSeko seized power through a military coup and promptly employed a defective political system of sultanism and a defective economic system of statism, which in essence meant the exploitation of the rich resources of the country for personal enrichment. Arguably, Mobutu systematically used the country's mineral wealth to co-opt potential rivals, and to enrich himself and his cronies through a patronage system so widely corrupt so that many came to view DRC as a kleptocracy – a country with a government whose principal aim was to loot public goods. As Rief (1996:C1) retorted:

Mobutu and his cronies have turned Zaire into little more than a bankrupt Kleptocracy. They beat more allegiance to their own bank balances than to their country's future. And what makes the tragedy of Mobutu's Zaire so much worse is that it is so unnecessary. The country

should be prosperous. It has fertile lands, enormous mineral resources and a talented population. Instead, it is poor, even by African standards.

Therefore, errant misrule and plunder reduced the DRC under Mobutu to tatters. Mobutu is conservatively estimated to have stolen at least US\$10 billion from his country, much of it moved to international banks and investments (Ayittey, 1999:24). Mobutu epitomises the leadership in much of Africa that has not only been a hopeless failure but also a disgrace to black people. Ayittey (1999:47-48) argues that “Africa’s bigger problem today lies with the leadership. They are so removed from the people that they are looked upon as foreigners. They are driven by self-interest, so excessive that their peoples’ interests are forgotten – hardly different from the colonial masters.” Todd (2006) stresses that Mobutu’s pattern of exploitative rule continued under his successor Laurent Kabila (1997-2001) and his son, Joseph Kabila (2001-2016). As if this is not enough, Joseph Kabila is currently mirrored in controversy over his vacillation in leaving office so as to uphold the constitutional dictates of two terms and allowing elections to take place in 2016. Constitutional changes in order to extend the reign of incumbent leaders (as the cases in Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda), is a current challenge in Africa militating against democracy and fresh developmental ideas.

There is evidence in wars in DRC (1960-1965, 1998-2003) that resource wealth led to protracted conflict as combatants had an economic incentive to avoid peace agreement. Similarly, the Liberian war lasted from 1989 to 1996 largely because the warring parties feared they would lose access to Liberia’s resource wealth. According to Alao *et.al* (1999) and Ellis (1999), several attempts to bring peace in Liberia in the period 1989-1996 were futile as warring parties or their proxy groups made profitable wartime looting. The tragic case of DRC from company plunder and wars during the colonial period to civil wars at independence in 1960 and in the 1990s is a clear validation of protracted resource wars. Profitability of resource looting by foreigners, particularly Belgians, Katanga secessionists, and American backed officers like Joseph Mobutu, fuelled civil war that broke out in DRC (then called Congo) in 1960 and raged on until

1965. Control of copper resource wealth in Katanga for self-enrichment by Mobutu fuelled the conflict. Similarly, the abundance of resource pillaging for foreign governments, rebel militias, and individual officers substantially reduced their incentive to end the war that plagued DRC beginning 1998 – which had both the qualities of civil war and an international war (Ross 2004: 53-54). Much as a peace accord was signed in Lusaka in 1999, it was not until 2002 that it was put into effect, and May 2003 that foreign forces totally pulled out of DRC because it was profitable for foreigners to loot resources of the country. Above all, conflict has persisted in eastern DRC in the period 2003-2016 because of profitability of resource looting. Prunier (2006: 103-17) lays bare the sheer theft of resources by various rebel movements acting in DRC. Among the looted goods have been coffee, coltan, diamonds, gold, copper, and timber.

It is a historical fact that resource wealth increases the likelihood of civil war by increasing the probability of foreign intervention to support a rebel movement. DRC's resource wealth partly accounts for Belgium's intervention in the 1960-1965 civil war; Ugandan and Rwandan governments' decisions to organise and fight along rebels in the country in 1998. Zimbabwe and Angola's entry into the DRC conflict in 1998 on the side of the government was cemented through resource wealth, particularly diamonds. Uganda's top military officials who had served in eastern DRC during the previous war (1996-97) and were aware of the business prospects of the area induced the country to enter the DRC conflict in August 1998 (Panel of Experts Report, 200:17-13). Rwanda's decision to back an incursion was induced by the conviction that resource looting would offset government cost of the invasion. The Reports of the Panel of Experts (2001: 29-31; 2002:14-18) show that no sooner had the Rwandan army entered DRC than entrenched disciplined procedures emerged for siphoning Congolese resources to fund military exertion.. Arguably, the intervention of foreigners in DRC in support of nascent rebel groups against incumbent governments was tailor-made to gain access to natural resource wealth, and indeed led to looting, plundering, wrecking and siphoning of DRC resources at the expense of the killings, dislocation, poverty, underdevelopment and suffering Congolese.

It is also important to note that Laurent Kabila financed his rebellion against Mobutu from the mid-1990s through gold smuggling (Guenther, 2008: 352). As already alluded to above, Ugandan border with DRC and much of the eastern region of DRC is particularly rich in minerals. United Nations estimates that 40 tons of gold (equivalent to US\$1.4 billion) is smuggled out of DRC annually via Uganda and Burundi for markets in the United Arab Emirates (Wadhams, 2009). Jensen (2012: 7) and Soderlund *et.al.* (2013) note that the human cost of conflict in DRC from the 1990s to the 21st century was between 4 to 5.4 million lives. Nkurunziza (2008: 10) has convincingly argued that the major causes of conflict in DRC is the high dependence on natural resources, poverty, low levels of education and poor level of governance. The economy of DRC is largely dominated by reliance on raw materials with very little diversification of goods produced and exported. The *Economic Intelligence Unit Report* (2010), indicates that DRC'S main exports are cobalt, copper, crude oil and diamonds, while the domestic GDP is derived mainly from agriculture, forestry and mining. Lack of corporate governance, infrastructure and resource management has further compounded the looting of resources that should have been used for the development of the country. The defective political system of sultanism (centralisation) and defective political system of statism have had a negative effect on sustainable economic growth and social development. Fundamentally, the heavy reliance on natural resources has often been accompanied with elite accumulation. The massive wealth generated from the export of natural resources has been amassed by a group in power and distributed among party loyalists in a bid to entrench control of political and economic power. This political weakness at the centre has allowed military conflicts to rankle on eastern DRC (periphery), as marginalised groups here have not benefited immensely from the natural resource wealth of the country.

The increase in military spending of Mobutu, Laurent Kabila and Joseph Kabila – all of whom gained power through military force or link – has had a detrimental effect on social spending on such crucial areas like education, healthcare and infrastructure. The decline in service delivery has a knock-on effect that exacerbate poverty and

underdevelopment that also fuel conflict and tension particularly in eastern DRC. Having learnt from Laurent Kabila that gold smuggling could be a passport to presidency, rebel groups in DRC are also using minerals to fund their battles. Not surprisingly, eastern DRC is infested with numerous rebel groups from within the country and neighbouring states. Their activities as well as military encounter with the DRC army, have led to pillage, brutal killings, destruction of villages and towns, poverty and underdevelopment of development. According to Guenther (2008:354), the human cost of the conflict in DRC transcends death to famine, malnutrition and forced dislocation. Displaced people tend to compete for scarce resources in new locations thereby causing overgrazing, deforestation and water pollution, particularly in situations of sustained and prolonged conflict, thereby causing new fault lines of conflict. Conflict has also permanently jettisoned some people from areas of their birth and separated them from their family members, a situation that has caused loss of sentimental attachment, lasting depression and despair.

Named the deadliest war in modern African history, the Second Congo War (1998-2003) and its aftermath caused the deaths of more than 5.4 people. Two million others were displaced from their homes or sought asylum in neighbouring countries (*Soderlund et.al. 2013*). As much as the war formerly ended in 2003, 1000 people were still dying daily in 2004 from easily preventable cases of malnutrition and disease (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 2004). *It is noteworthy that the majority of people who died were children. Indeed deaths through direct killing, disease and starvation* made the Second Congo War the deadliest conflict worldwide since World War II. The war was driven by (as the conflicts afterwards have been) the mineral wealth, it is safe to argue that natural resources have had disastrous effects for DRC that have and are still retarding development in the country. Meger (2016:110) shows that eastern Congo is up to now the worst place in the world to be a woman as rape is used as a weapon of war on a scale never seen elsewhere in human history. Often successful in its intent to destroy and exterminate, rape as a weapon of war is causing the near total destruction of women's humanity, their dignity, families and communities. Such callousness, monumental injustice and crimes against humanity, are the typical rewards of resource wealth in DRC

and entail permanent destruction, poverty and underdevelopment. War has also acted as a disincentive to agricultural production and food security as people cannot plan for the future due to increased insecurity in eastern DRC. Above all, rebel groups are not directly involved in high-value agricultural production but predate harvests when they are ripe. Rebel groups and armed bandits maraud and loot crop fields in eastern Congo. Bannon and Collier (2003) have shown how this looting and extortion phenomenon has been applied by rebels across Africa, with the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone resorting to levying taxes on coffee and only shifting to diamonds once the industry was well established.

The great poverty despite natural resource wealth, paradox of plenty, can be reflected by the situation in Mbuji-Mayi in central DRC. Poverty, poor governance and armed conflict seem to hinder rather than help sustainable development in spite of the abundance of resources in the area. According to Kankunta (2016) Mbuji-Mayi is often referred to as ‘the diamond capital of the world.’ Sadly, the city is little more than a slum, with buildings resonating with hovels. Its province, Kasai Oriental, has high rates of illiteracy and infant mortality, and lacks electricity and access to clean water, with 60% of its children under five suffering from malnutrition (USAID, 2015). Yet, side by side with such extreme poverty, a few Congolese and foreign diamond merchants display unimaginable opulence. Conversely, such inequalities contribute greatly to social and political tensions across Africa, and enable armed groups to easily mobilise local supporters. The correlation of poverty and weak government deserves further examination. It is noteworthy that many conflicts in developing countries originate from and are also fought out in the border regions that have historically suffered from collapse of social contract and consequent marginality, limited voice and hard core poverty. Conflicts in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo have clearly been linked to differential development and patterns of exclusion particularly of the areas bordering Rwanda and Uganda. Historically, such border areas have had an ambiguous relationship with the state and an attraction for potential insurgents. As Collier (2006) has shown, conflict entrepreneurs have been able to mobilize around a discourse of grievance. Above all, the weak presence of the

state in such remote areas has made it easier for insurgents to mobilise and establish launch pads for acts of destabilisation.

The Economist (2016:3), describes North Kivu as a lawless province in the Democratic Republic of Congo. It describes the tin mine, and recent first attempt at modern mining of tin on Bisie Hill, deep in the jungle of the province by Alphamin Resources (a Canadian-funded company) , as ‘the richest, riskiest tin mine on Earth.’ It also acknowledges that Congo’s soil is bursting with buried treasure, which nevertheless fuel civil wars which ravaged the east for the best part of a decade, financed largely by metals such as tin, tantalum, tungsten, gold and copper. The report incisively reflects how resource wealth has ensured that empirically speaking, DRC has virtually ceased to exist as a state. It states:

In much of Africa having natural resources has often proved to be a curse. Gems and minerals have funded rebel armies and kept conflicts burning. Governments that can raise big bucks from oil or mineral royalties, rather than by fostering broad-based growth and taxing people’s incomes, have had little incentive to govern well. The ruling classes have devoted their energies to divvying up the easy money rather than actually governing. In eastern Congo the state has all but collapsed, leaving vast tracts of territory lawless. The locals have discovered that even bad government is better than no government at all. It will take more than a tin mine to change that, but you have to start somewhere.

After the end of the Second DRC War, positive economic growth rate is alleged to have ensued. In 2005 the rate was 6.5% which remained fairly constant until it dramatically decreased to 2.7% in 2009 consequent of the global economic crisis (*The Economist*, 2010). The country experienced economic growth, estimated at 7.1% between 2010 and 2010, and was expected to increase to an annual average of 8.6% between 2012 and 2017 (DRC Country Report, 2012). On the surface the growth rate gives an impression of a thriving economy. However, a deeper analysis of DRC’s economy reveals that 90% of exports were in the form of extracted commodities. The fragility was exposed in the 2009 when a crash in

commodity prices coincided with an escalation in conflict in the eastern region, revealing the country's dependence on external demand to finance flows. This brings to the fore government's non commitment to poverty reduction. Above all, the visible economic growth, have not translated into corporate governance, viz, transparency, accountability and equity, let alone positive development for the Congolese people.

The UN Human Development Report (HDR) of 2011 ranked the DRC in the bottom of the table. Out of 187 countries the DRC occupied the 187th seat in the HDI. As the HDI is based on criteria such as health, education, level of freedom, gender equality, poverty, political participation, economic growth and environmental development, the DRC scored an all-time low in almost every single category. The index shows that the average life expectancy in the DRC is 47.6% years. What is more alarming is that the gross school enrolment is 48.2%. The last dimension of the HDI is Gross Domestic Product Purchasing Power Parity (GDP PPP). The GDP PPP of 298 suggests a relative poor standard of living in the country (UNDP, 2011). It confirms that mineral wealth has not been distributed equally among the people, and neither has it made life better for everyone. With high profile corruption becoming routine rather than episodic, and Joseph Kabila personally benefitting more than US\$1.25 billion from mining deals, this is not surprising (*The Economist*, 2013). While DRC's 2007 mortgaging of mining concessions to China in return for a US\$3 billion loan destined for railway construction, 31 hospitals, 145 health centres, 2 universities and 5000 low cost housing as a move as a guarantor of development, care must be taken to note its negative effects. As Zhou, Nhenge and Makahadze (2012: 110-112) argue, China's presence may be a recipe for disaster given her defence industry's role in the proliferation of large quantities of small arms and light weapons to African states that have aggravated the resource curse even in eastern DRC. China's reputation for environmental carnage, labour exploitation and resource plunder may worsen the plight of the Congolese people.

By and large, DRC is a typical country that resonates with the paradox of plenty. From the one armed banditry nature of Belgian colonialism, through Mobutu's Swiss bank socialism and grasping

kleptocracy, to Laurent Kabila's Banyamulenga war-lordism, and Joseph Kabila's mineral deals and 'power is sweet', the Congolese have endured periods of wasted years. What is worrisome is that the Congolese have sunk deeper and deeper into poverty, misery, underdevelopment, starvation, disease and denuding wars in a country with immense wealth. As such, much as DRC is a wealthy state in terms of natural resources, such riches have not translated into peace and stability, eradication of poverty, inequality and underdevelopment, and sustainable economic growth for the country. Much of the problem relates back to the centralised and self-seeking government with its weak institutions. The rent accrued from resource exports has been defectively distributed amongst the elite, party lackeys and the military, with a pittance going towards social development. Arguably, the vast mineral riches in DRC are nothing more than a geological scandal that has pushed the Congolese deeper into poverty, backwardness and misery, from which their ancestors had lifted them in pre-colonial period.

Ethiopia

Excluding a brief Italian occupation that lasted from 1936 to 1941, Ethiopia holds the distinction of being the only African country that was not subjected under colonial rule. Throughout its long historical existence that is said to date back about 2,000 years ago, Ethiopia remains the oldest independent African nation and one of the most ancient civilizations in the world. It, therefore, has a rich culture and long history both of which can be used for cultural commoditisation and tourism (Ethiopia country profile, 2016). Indeed Ethiopia is endowed with natural resources of land, forest products (logs) used mainly in construction. Deposits of coal, opal, gemstones, kaolin, iron ore, soda ash, and tantalum, gold, salt extraction from salt beds in the Afar Depression, as well as from salt springs in Dire and Afder districts in the south are part of the country's endowment (Mathews, 2012). Recent oil and gas discoveries across East Africa have seen the region emerge as a new player in the global oil and gas industry. The exploration for gas and oil is underway in the Gambela Region bordering Sudan (Ethiopia country profile, 2016).

Yet, in spite of such resources, the country has not escaped the resource curse. As much as tourism had developed in the 1960s, it declined in the 1970s and 1980s, under brutal military rule of Mengistu Haile Mariam. Ethiopia's agriculture is plagued by periodic drought, soil degradation caused by overgrazing, deforestation, high population density, high levels of taxation and poor infrastructure (making it difficult and expensive to get goods to market). Hence, inefficiencies in agricultural production intensify poverty in this country. Agricultural productivity in Ethiopia is low in 2015 because of the country's lack of agricultural technology. Ethiopian agriculture is typically low on inputs such as pesticides and fertilizer, and most farms rely on rainwater for irrigation. Crops therefore suffer greatly from droughts and other natural disasters. Lack of ability and planning to overcome droughts has resulted in periodic famines. Volatile global markets result in even less access to food supplies when global prices of food and fertilizers increase. As of 2008, some countries that import most of their food, such as Saudi Arabia, had begun planning the development of large tracts of arable land in developing countries such as Ethiopia (Blas, 2008). This has raised fears of food being exported to more prosperous countries while the local population faces its own shortage (Blas, 2008).

The impact of drought, the 1998–2000 war with Eritrea, and the specter of terrorism have cumulatively limited growth and development in Ethiopia. Equally, important is instability in Ethiopia's neighbouring countries such as Somalia and Sudan that also militates against progress and development for the region. Despite recent improvements, Ethiopia remains one of the poorest nations in the world. Other factors contributing to poverty in Ethiopia include a lack of basic services and infrastructure such as safe drinking water, health care and education. HIV/AIDS and malaria greatly damage the health of many Ethiopians and kill young people who are the most important providers for their households (Ethiopia country profile, 2016). People living in rural areas have the least access to services and awareness programs, and have reduced ability to influence policy decisions that are relevant to them. This lack of awareness and involvement reduces people's ability to change their situation.

Many properties owned by the government during the previous regime have now been privatized or are in the process of privatisation. This has not only caused gross inequality but also threatens to strip the nation of its assets and further entrenching poverty, underdevelopment and inequality. Waterpower and forests are Ethiopia's main energy sources. The country derives about 90 percent of its electricity needs from hydropower, which means that electricity generation, as with agriculture, is dependent on abundant rainfall. In general, Ethiopians rely on forests for nearly all of their energy and construction needs. This has resulted in excessive deforestation of much of the highlands during the last three decades, a situation which further may aggravate poverty, underdevelopment and inequality (Ethiopia country profile, 2016).

South Sudan (2011-present)

South Sudan that only attained independence in 2011, becoming the world's newest and Africa's 55th nation after 99% of voters in the south of Sudan favoured separation from the north (South Sudan, 2014). Since the independence of Sudan in 1956 development of country had been hampered by religious differences between the Muslim north and Christian south and protracted period of conflict. The period 1955-1972 witnessed civil war between the north and the south that killed more than 500,000 people, while the 1983-2005 war left 2 million people killed, 42,000 refugees, and 4million displaced (Alemu, 2014:145). Ross (2004) provides strong evidence that shows that resource wealth has made conflict more likely to occur, last longer, and produce more casualties when it does occur. Admittedly, resource wealth contributed to the outbreak of war in Sudan in 1983. The inauguration of myriads of measures that upset the fragile equilibrium between the largely Muslim north and predominantly Christian and Animist South by the Sudanese President, Gaafar Numeiry, led to outbreak of war in Sudan in 1983. The building of oil refinery in the north to tap and harness oil from the south was viewed by the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) as naked exploitation of the south for the benefit of the north (Anderson 1999 and O'Balance 2000). SPLA objected to the construction of a pipeline to take oil from the south to the refinery in the north, and

made a series of attacks on exploration base and workers, thereby forcing the project to be discarded in 1984. It was control and use of oil resources that soured relations and led to continued conflict between the north and south until a comprehensive peace agreement was signed between leaders of the north and south, that later paved way to independence in 2011.

With the dawn of a new era in 2011, it was the hope of many people in South Sudan that the country would tap and harness her rich oil and natural resources for economic growth and development and indeed eradicate poverty, underdevelopment and inequality. Sadly, President, Salva Kiir and his sacked deputy Riek Machar have since December 2013 allowed the country to degenerate into conflict and control of lucrative oil fields thus entrenching claims that wars are about resources. Sentry report (2016) has shown that political and military leaders in South Sudan have bled the country dry to fuel extravagant lifestyles and fund a war that has claimed tens of thousands of lives and forced millions to flee their homes. The report shows that top officials are ultimately responsible for mass atrocities in South Sudan. Not only has war destroyed towns and villages but 2.3 million people have been displaced by the conflict, while a staggering 5,1 million people almost half the country's population require food assistance (*News Day*, 2016. 16 September). Worse still, children are routinely recruited as soldiers and sent as cannon fodder into combat, while mass rape has been used as a weapon of war (Aljezira News, 2016; Meger, 2016). Indeed, South Sudan is currently one of the most horrendous human rights situations in the world.

Political leaders and generals are not only fuelling war, but also accumulating fortunes, despite modest government salaries. Some have been involved in questionable business deals while others have apparently received large payments from corporations doing business in South Sudan (Sentry:2016). Meanwhile, some top officials and their family members own stakes in a broad array of companies doing business in the country and in some cases, these commercial engagements may be in violation of South Sudanese law (*News Day*, 2016. 16 September). Members of their families often live in multi-million dollar mansions outside the country, stay in five hotels, reap the benefits of what appears to be a system of nepotism and shady

corporate deals, and drive around in luxury cars – all while much of their country's population suffers from the consequences of a brutal civil war, and in many places, experiences near-famine conditions. In short, The Sentry (2016) found that South Sudan's top officials have benefited both financially and politically from the continuing war and atrocities committed within their country. It further notes that international banks, businesses, arms brokers, real estate firms, and lawyers knowingly or unknowingly, facilitate the violent kleptocracy that South Sudan has become. A key finding of Sentry (2016:6) is that:

South Sudan's civil war is not the result of a blood feud between two men, conventional explanations notwithstanding. The key catalyst of South Sudan's civil war has been competition for the grand prize — control over state assets and the country's abundant natural resources — between rival kleptocratic networks led by President Kiir and Vice President Machar. The leaders of South Sudan's warring parties manipulate and exploit ethnic divisions in order to drum up support for a conflict that serves the interests only of the top leaders of these two kleptocratic networks and, ultimately, the international facilitators whose services the networks utilise and on which they rely.

Since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, that paved way for South Sudan's independence, US\$4 billion has been lost through politicians and generals' stupendous looting (*News Day*, 2016. 16 September). Not surprisingly 73% of adults in South Sudan are illiterate, 84% of women are illiterate, 42% of civil servants have no more than primary education, 75% of the people do not have access to health services, 43% of the total population are severely food insecure, and 309% inflation was recorded in June 2016, 1 in 7 women die giving birth (South Sudan 2016). In spite of rich oil and natural resources in South Sudan there is widespread poverty inequality and underdevelopment because the country is poorly led, and has not known peace since independence thereby confirming the resource curse theory. The country has failed to transform its natural endowments into improved infrastructure and livelihoods, because its leaders chose a wrong path to war instead of

peace, better resource management and corporate governance. In order for Africa to reap the economic and other benefits inherent in its resources' wealth it is essential to urgently address such issues as poor leadership, proper management of resources and the environmental impact of their exploitation.

Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe has been no exception to the resource curse. Zimbabwe attained its independence in 1980 and there was so much hope for better things to come in light of its abundant natural resources. In 1980 Nyerere dubbed Zimbabwe 'the jewel of Africa' and advised Mugabe to protect it (Holland, 2008:94). Such hope started to show fault lines in the early 1990s with the introduction of austerity measures (ESAP) that not only affected the ability of the country to pursue development models with social dimensions, but also impacted on the ability to pursue environmental policies, let alone generated high profile corruption. Indeed, ESAP was a wrong prescription for the disease of limited development. Zimbabwe is endowed with minerals such as emerald, gold, asbestos, chrome, copper, tin, coal, platinum, iron ore, tantalite, beryllium, diamonds and other, yet the generality of Zimbabweans hardly benefit from such mineral wealth.

Zhou (2012) has shown how asbestos, chrome, emerald, gold, iron ore and platinum mining in colonial and post-colonial periods led to forced dislocation, seizure, despoliation and pollution of farming and grazing land with the consequent destruction of the traditional and more sustainable economic foundations of local communities. As such, Mberengwa Area remain today among the poorest areas in the country – a net result of looting, plundering and wrecking of mineral resources during the colonial and post-colonial periods. According to Managing Director, Zacheus Ncube (1996), Sandawana mines (under Rio Tinto Company) were producing emerald ore worthy £200 million a month, yet the local community have nothing to show for this except poverty and land degradation. Control of mineral exports was firmly in the hands of mining companies, which exploited the mineral resources at a rate and in a manner consistent with their interests and not with those of the local

community (Zhou, 2012: 283). The surplus generated by the mineral exports accrued not to the local community but to the companies, which controlled the mining, shipping and marketing of the minerals. Thus, with the mining companies simply exporting raw materials, they lost an opportunity to add value to the locality by creating finished products, which could have provided more jobs and revenue. This confirms Ross (1999: 301-302)'s assertion that:

... resource industries were unlikely to stimulate growth in the rest of the economy, particularly if foreign multinationals dominated resource extraction and were allowed to repatriate their profits instead of investing them locally. Resource exporters would be left with booming resource enclaves that produced few 'forward' and 'backward' linkages to other parts of the economy.

While Zimbabwe is endowed with minerals, the generality of Zimbabweans hardly benefit from such mineral wealth. The years 2009-2010 witnessed excessive plundering and export of raw chrome by the Chinese in a manner that triggered panic among some officials in the mines ministry. Giving evidence before the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Mines and Energy in July 2011, Secretary for Mines and Mining Development, Thankful Musukutwa, indicated that several Chinese miners were not formerly registered with his ministry yet they were wreaking havoc along the mineral-rich Great Dyke Belt. He bemoaned, "The way these Chinese are exploiting our grounds is not the right way and we are not happy" (*News Day*, 2012). Marange (Chiadzwa) mineral field, for example, constitutes 120 000 hectares of diamond deposit (*The Africa Report*, 2012). According to Dhliwayo and Mtisi (2012: 1), "Marange has been touted as the world's biggest discovery in the last century with reports suggesting that it has the potential to supply between 20-30% of world diamond production worth over US\$2 billion per year." Yet as in the case of Africa which contributes 64% of the world's mineral wealth but remains the poorest continent, Zimbabwe has very little to show for its diamonds. When the government was involved in brutal war to cleanse the diamond fields in the period 2006-2008, there was hope that with the establishment of order the diamond sector will create

jobs, increase foreign currency and foreign direct investment; and lead to national and local economic growth and development. Sadly, these benefits seem to have evaded the nation of Zimbabwe and its populace in the period 2006-2016. The national coffers are still empty with the country crippled by a ballooning external debt as a result of corruption, poor resource management and total disregard of corporate governance.

Since its discovery in 2006, Marange's potential has been overshadowed by violence, smuggling, corruption, and most of all, lost opportunity. The then Deputy Prime Minister, Arthur Mutambara, who was part of the then Prime Minister, MorganTsvangirai's delegation during the February 2012 Marange visit, said that Chinese diamond miners were exploiting the Marange diamond fields ripping off Zimbabweans. As Mutambara stated, "We are being savaged by the players in Chiadzwa because we are signing foolish claims; we give them a claim worth billions for free" (*Daily News*, 2012). A report by a group campaigning against 'blood diamonds', Partnership Africa Canada (PAC) (2012), revealed that the then Minister of Mines, Obert Mpofu was the biggest winner, amassing an unexplained personal fortune from diamonds. The PAC (2012:3) reveals that while Mpofu's monthly salary was US\$800, he made an expenditure of US\$20 million in cash in the period 2008-2012 apart from his philanthropy which exceeded US\$500,000 in 2012 alone. It also implicated, the CEO of Mbada Diamonds, Robert Mhlanga for laundering proceeds from Marange after paying inflated prices in a series of multi-million dollar real estate deals in South Africa. PAC (2012:3) further notes that:

Many top securocrats loyal to President Robert Mugabe and his party, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), are also, in the parlance of corruption watchers, "eating well." This is particularly the case for those associated with Zimbabwe Defence Industries—a state-owned company aligned with Chinese mining company Anjin—or who oversaw military operations in Marange. Many are known to own, or be building, mansions in Harare's tonier neighbourhoods that would exceed their publicly funded salaries.

It is clear from the report that a small and tight group of political and military elites who have been in charge of Marange from the very beginning, are personally benefiting from the diamond sales at the expense of Zimbabwean people. This becomes more apparent when one considers the fact that the then Finance Minister, Tendai Biti's 2012 budget had been promised \$600 million in diamond revenue for the national treasury to help rebuild neglected hospitals, schools and other public services, only to get a quarter of that pledge. While the ministerial duties of Mpfu also required that he served the public good and best interests of the Zimbabwean people by responsibly managing Marange resources, it was unfortunate that on his watch, the world witnessed the biggest single plunder of diamonds since Cecil Rhodes. Conservative estimates place the theft of Marange diamonds at US\$2 billion between 2008 and 2012 (PAC, 2012:1). Former South African President, Thabo Mbeki (2012) also warned Zimbabwe to stop its 'predatory elite' from dining with gem dealers and criminals, and colluding with mining companies for their own benefit. It has been reported by various NGOs that the diamond sector in Zimbabwe is rife with corruption. Various local reports by Zimbabwe Environmental Association (ZELA) (2011) and Centre for Research and Development (2013) have also revealed a huge lack of transparency of diamond revenues and that Zimbabwe's elite are benefiting from the country's diamonds. Not surprisingly, during his 2012 Marange visit, the Prime Minister, Morgan Tsvangirai, demanded transparency and accountability in the mining and selling of diamonds. He insisted that proceeds from Marange operations should flow down to ordinary Zimbabweans. Tsvangirai stated: "It is a blessing, yes. But we must show for it. We have to show transparency and accountability in the way we exploit it, the way we market it and the way we benefit for all of our very wide range of challenges" (*Daily News*, 2012. 20 February, 26 October).

Diamond mining had disastrous effects to the Marange, Chiadzwa and Chimanimani communities. In 2009 it was estimated that diamond fields stretch for 70 000 hectares. However the area believed to be rich in diamond deposits had by 2012 exceeded 120 000 hectares and more explorations were still taking place, suggesting that more villagers were earmarked for relocation to pave way for

diamond mining. The period 2008-2014 saw the relocation of 5000 villagers to Arda Transau (*News Day*, 2014). Human rights activist, Farari Maguwu (2015), described this relocation as “... irresponsible and mere dumping of people without concern for their future livelihood.” Indeed relocating peasant farmers without giving them adequate land on which they would continue to farm and graze their livestock was tantamount to driving them into permanent poverty and underdevelopment. Worse still, relocation disrupted education, food security, health services and livelihoods as crops were destroyed during relocation, while relocated households found that there were no schools to enrol their children and health facilities to treat any ailment.

The relocated families have over the years been reduced to beggars dependent on food handouts from donors and well-wishers. In spite of their self-sufficiency prior to the discovery of diamonds in their area, they are now susceptible to hunger and starvation, a reality which confirms that diamonds have been a curse rather than a blessing to the people of Manicaland. While promises of employment in the diamond mines, farming plots and irrigation scheme were initially given, they never materialised. Equally elusive has been compensation for forced relocation and destruction of their homes and other properties they owned in their original homes. Worse still, the merging of diamond mines that has been carried out by the government in 2016 without consulting the relocated families has sealed their permanent poverty at Arda Transau, as hopes for compensation from respective mines has evaporated. Former mining companies have now referred the relocated populace inquiring about compensation to the government that has merged diamond mines and therefore legally inherited liabilities from the mines.

As mining started well before any environmental impact assessments were done, diamond mines contributed to environmental terrorism in Manicaland. The diamond mining companies drained mining chemical and sewage affluent into Save River's tributaries thereby polluting the river with disastrous effects for human beings, animals and riverine populace. As such, apart from worrying about an uncertain future, remaining Marange residents became more concerned about their health amidst increasing

pollution of the environment by the diamond mining companies. It is noteworthy that Save or Sabi River used to be the source of life for several villages starting from Marange and stretching several kilometres downstream. The river provided fish, drinking water for both humans and livestock and domestic chores such as laundry. Villagers also bathed in the Save river which also acted as one of the few recreational facilities for young boys and girls who flocked the mighty river for swimming escapades. In some parts food was also grown alongside the river, more so due to the fact that Marange is a semi-arid region which experiences perennial droughts. Renowned and highly successful Irrigation schemes at Nyanyadzi and Birchnough Bridge also drew water from the Save River.

However, since the commencement of commercial diamond mining activities in Marange in September 2009, villagers have watched in agony as life is rapidly being squeezed out of this once Might River by mining companies. A scientific study commissioned by the ZELA and carried out by *The University of Zimbabwe* (2012) confirmed the fears of villagers and nongovernmental organizations who have long suspected that companies were polluting Save River. The results of the study showed large scale impacts that included siltation, chemical pollution and also heavy metal pollution. All these are by products of the mining processes. Turbidity and total solids exceeded the environmental limits. As the report (2012:2-3) notes:

Water of high turbidity (hazy, murky water) cannot be used as potable water, and the high total solids also imply that it cannot be used as irrigation water as well as this will damage infrastructure. Downstream of mining activities the water has turned into a red ochre colour, thereby affecting the health of the river system. When in contact with the skin, the water and mud were itchy. It is most likely that the subsistence artisanal fishing that took place before is no longer possible at affected river sites, thereby impacting negatively on people's livelihoods. Similarly, pH was in the high alkaline range as well as C.O.D. These parameters were indicative of some chemical pollution in the rivers. The pH that is alkaline (hard water) is corrosive and can damage plumbing equipment and clothes.

The report further notes high levels of fluoride in the water which pose the risk of diseases such as dental and skeletal fluorosis. Dental fluorosis relates to the poor development of teeth, while skeletal fluorosis is a bone disease caused by excessive consumption of fluoride. Levels of heavy metals showed high concentrations of iron, chromium and nickel in the water. These elements are the major constituents of ferro-silicon, a chemical compound used in the diamond extraction process (ZELA, 2012:3). Chromium and nickel are potentially carcinogenic agents (cancer causing agents) and therefore they pose an immediate health risk to people and livestock. The high levels of iron in water suggest that the local populations could be at risk of iron poisoning, as they exceeded stipulated World Health Organisation standards. Dangerous levels of bacterial contamination (high total and faecal coliform counts) mainly of faecal origin, were detected in the water, which is indicative of the fact that mining companies were disposing raw sewage in the Save tributaries thereby posing environmental risks of dysentery and typhoid.

The results of this study clearly show the environmental and potential health risks to people and their livelihoods as a result of poor mining practices in the Marange diamond region. The problems of water quality and environmental degradation have caused irreparable damage to the environment and people's livelihoods. Apart from rampant skin diseases, Muchangana (2016) reported high levels of still births by women since the beginning of diamond mining in Chiadzwa area. A human rights activist, Freeman Boso (2016), estimated that 10 000 cattle have died in the period 2009-2016 because of diamond mining pollution. As he remarked, "the cattle died in a similar fashion. They first became clumsy, then grew enormous bellies and were eventually unable to walk before dying. We also noticed that the illness affected cows more because they all had still births." A female plot holder, in the Nyanyadzi irrigation scheme, Zaba (2016), bemoaned diamond mining's contribution to the siltation of Save River, and how the muddy water has damaged their irrigation pumps and led to siltation of irrigation canals. Save has therefore become a dead river since the beginning of extensive diamond mining in 2009. It is within this framework that Zhou and Makahamadze (2012:127-130) argue, diamond mining in Marange in

the 21st century rewarded the local community with loss of farming and grazing land, relocation, water pollution, diseases, loss of livestock, cultural decadence, environmental degradation and growing poverty. Thus, much as natural resource exploitation in Africa and many other third world countries have contributed to increased gross domestic product, export revenue and government annual revenue, by no means have communities in proximity to natural resource rich areas immensely benefitted.

The market oriented growth of cotton production (under Chinese prodding) has contributed greatly to the disappearance of traditional crops with consequent effects on the diets and nutritional status of the people of Gokwe, as well as generating 85-86% poverty prevalence (*Zimbabwe Poverty Atlas*, 2015). Tobacco producers increased production levels from 75 million kg in 2003 to 183 million kg worth US\$537 million in 2016. In 2014, total flue-cured tobacco amounted to 216 million kg earning the country US\$684 million (*The Daily News*, 2016). Yet in spite of the rave increase in production poverty has been on the increase. Tobacco production has also been at the expense of environmental protection particularly considering that the vast majority of farmers have abandoned use of electricity for firewood in processing their tobacco. There has also been a general decline in agriculture production. Total agriculture increased from 970,000 tonnes in 2012 to 1,5 million in 2014 before declining to 742,000 tonnes in 2015 (Mbanje, 2016). Productivity is generally declining in livestock and all crops especially grains, thus, worsening the food security situation, malnutrition and increasing poverty. With the land reform lacking transparency, accountability, efficiency and equity from its infancy in 2000, resettlement has only managed to transfer poverty from the communal areas to the resettled area.

High profile corruption has become routine rather than episodic, with the 2008-2013 Government of National Unity (GNU), by then fast becoming a Government of National Looting (GNL). Many corrupt Ministers are dubbed, 'President's boys.' Recently, President Robert Mugabe conceded that the country lost US\$15 billion through illicit deals by mines and some Zimbabweans, yet not a single Zimbabwean has been arrested (*News Day*, 2016). Such corruption with state impunity has ratcheted opposition against the ruling party.

Hate politics, patronage, corruption and misplaced priorities; have also led to the demise of industry in Zimbabwe, more than 90% unemployment and reduction of the country into a nation of vendors, in spite of its abundant resources - both natural and human. For these reasons, Moocraft (2011) has argued that the President, Robert Mugabe, is 'savaging rather than saving' Zimbabwe, while Zhou and Makahamadze (2012) have labelled him 'a liability rather than an asset.' By and large, mining companies and government have borrowed environmental, economic and social capital from future generation in Zimbabwe, with no prospects of paying back. Corruption and poor resource management have ensured that poverty, inequality, underdevelopment and unemployment have remained endemic in Zimbabwe.

Responsible leadership, Good governance, Sustainable development, Corporate Social Responsibility and Community Share Value approach

In light of the fore-stated negative effects, responsible leadership, good governance, sustainable development and corporate social responsibility, are possible mechanisms for maximising benefits from natural resource utilisation. Sustainable development accepts the fact that development must be geared towards meeting the basic needs of the vast numbers of the poor in the developing world. That economic growth in Africa has neither eradicated poverty nor improved the condition of the environment has already been sufficiently illustrated in this chapter. The World Commission on Environment Report, *Our Common Future* (1987:9), defined sustainable development as "a process of change in which the exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the orientation of technological development and institutional change are made consistent with future as well as present needs." While the very principle of the needs of the future generation emphasised in this report is problematic, because the interpretation of human needs itself often varies between generation and cultures, Redclift (1987, 2005) resolved the challenge by shifting focus to rights, rather than needs. The World Summit on Sustainable Development (2002) reproduced the sustainable

development discourse, upholding the concept of three mutually reinforcing pillars of sustainable development – economic development, social development and environmental protection. It follows, therefore, that natural resource use must be tailor made (under legislation or otherwise) to guarantee political, economic and social development, let alone environmental protection. Above all, an Environmental Impact Assessment should be carried out before tapping and harnessing natural resources.

An important concept stemming from sustainable development is corporate social responsibility. Zhou (2012:28) defines corporate social responsibility as “...the continuing commitment by business to behave ethically and contribute to the economic development while improving the quality of life of the workforce and their families as well as the local community and the society at large.” As such, corporate social responsibility defines what a company (or even government) has to do in order to win and benefit from the confidence of the community as it generates economic wealth and responds to the dynamics of environmental development. In order to reduce domestic conflicts over access to natural wealth, African governments must put in place responsible, just and economically productive resource management system with equitable distribution of wealth to all stakeholders, in particular, local community. With such an approach, the exploitation of natural resources can be better directed towards improving society as a whole, by reducing competition and transforming natural wealth from peace liability to a peace asset. Conversely, corporate social responsibility is a vital link to the long-term prosperity of companies, and even countries, as it provides the opportunity to demonstrate the humane face of business/government and underscores the value of creating practical partnerships and dialogue between business, government, and communities.

An important component of corporate social responsibility is the increasing application of the shared value approach to resource utilisation and promotion of community development. This is based on the application of business strategies that not only deliver commercial and operational benefits to the company, but also deliver benefits to host communities at the same time. Preferential of

employment of host community members is one way of shared value approach and involves little or no additional expenditure. Through preferential community procurement companies can also significantly increase the products and services they source from host communities. This entails company support of local skills training and enterprise development as well as encouragement of in-country suppliers to establish operations in host communities. Mogotsi and Rea (2013) argue that the greatest contribution mines can possibly make to the overall development agenda is skills development and capacity building of the local community which in turn guarantees maximum shared benefits. Investment in education, health and infrastructural development is also an appropriate shared value approach. Prevention of water pollution and increased supply of clean water not only to companies but also to host communities is a sure way of shared benefits. It follows, therefore, that the needs of communities should be aligned to the capabilities of companies exploiting natural resources so as to increase the likelihood of developmental success. Arguably, in order to counter poverty and inequality, African governments and mining and oil companies must ensure that a greater share of natural-resource wealth is used for social services and development programmes nationally, as well as to directly benefit local communities.

The fortunes of the host communities must be tied to the exploitation of natural resources in their respective communities. It is for this reason that communities must be engaged from the exploration stage to development, maturity, decline and closure stages, and their input seriously considered. Porter and Kramer (2011) argue that resource owners should participate in planning, implementing, monitoring and evaluation, as well as dividends sharing of natural resource exploitation as per community shared value approach. As such, the adoption of the community shared value approach will guarantee a sustainable and tuneable co-existence between predominantly capitalist concerns and the resource owners and solve part of the current impasse in sustainable resource utilisation and community development. Holland (2014) argues that companies that exploit natural resources often make substantial contributions to national government in form of taxes and royalties.

Sadly, such contribution hardly trickles down to host communities that expect to benefit from their proximity to revenue generating natural resources in one way or another. More often than not, proceeds are paid into central fiscal pot to fund general government expenditure, or where bad governance results in opaque and/or futile fiscal management (Mogotsi and Rea, 2013). Conversely, corporate governance, *viz.* transparency, accountability, responsibility and equity must be entrenched in many poor countries in order to maximise benefits from natural resource use.

African governments under genuine nationalists must require the companies to develop sustainable development plans to safeguard the environment, provide benefits to local communities and contribute to national development priorities. This chapter has also shown how corrupt leaders working in cohorts with foreign corporations have borrowed environmental, economic and social capital from future generations with no prospects of paying back. It is, therefore, imperative for African governments and corporations to establish special oil/mineral revenue accounts designed to benefit future generations.

The presence of a valuable natural resource is not, by itself a 'curse' destined to cause conflict. Rather, the crux of the issue is how such resources are used and the money they generate is distributed. However, when resources coincide with sultanism, statism, corruption, egocentrism, patronage, clientelism, and capital flight, the 'resource curse' becomes more real than apparent. A broad look at natural resources and conflict in Africa given in this chapter has shown that at the centre of most of the continent's problems is a poverty of leadership and governance or mismanagement. The anti-development environment that prevails in most African countries is characterised by political tyranny, instability, chaos, senseless civil wars, horrible carnage, corruption, and capital flight. The amount of capital siphoned out of Africa exceeds the amount that comes in by way of foreign aid and investment. In this case it would be more judicious to remove the environmental factor that aggravates the capital shortage problem than to seek the infusion of more capital into Africa. It would be preposterous to expect economic and social development in a country in which political structures have collapsed

and savage banditry, carnage, and chaos flourish. Nor does it make sense to talk of development when a civil war is raging, with bridges, roads, and power stations being blown up, let alone human beings being killed and natural resources looted for self-enrichment.

It is important to note that peace conditions development, just as development conditions peace. Development and peace building practices, objectives and processes have expanded to embrace one another. Both concepts refer to process of socio-economic change and stability that leads towards greater quality of life, in developing and developed countries. As already pointed above, development encompasses social and environmental aspects, and emphasises good governance as a basis for structured, inclusive and sustainable growth. Peace includes human safety and its precondition, as well as basic socio-economic cooperation capable of promoting sustainable development over a long period. As former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan (2005) stated:

In an increasing interconnected world, progress in the areas of development, security and human rights must go hand in hand. There will be no development without security and no security without development. Likewise, both development and security also depend on respect of human rights and the rule of law.

Insecurity in Angola, DRC, Sierra Leone and Liberia; Burundi, Libya, Sudan and Southern Sudan, North Africa, Central Africa and West Africa (Nigeria in particular) in recent years and the consequent effects on respective economies is a typical example of the interconnectedness of peace, stability and development.

The destiny of an African nation does not lie in the hands of one person. Indeed there are too many oppressive dictators in Africa. Wily autocrats have quickly learned new tricks to beat back the democratic challenge by inflating voter rolls, manipulating the electoral rules, and holding fraudulent elections to keep themselves in power, as in Algeria, Egypt, Angola, Gabon, DRC, Uganda, Burundi, Congo, Sudan and Zimbabwe. African leaders should re-examine themselves and adopt a paradigm shift in order to serve national interest rather than parochial self-interests. African leaders

have to be true nation builders, not sultanists, egocentricists, grasping kleptocrats, Swissbank socialists, monsters, economic bandits and tribalists masquerading as nation builders. Africa surely needs democratic pluralism and not totalitarian, dictatorial, despotic, and tyrannical regimes. At 53, neither the AU (formerly OAU) nor most of its members actually behave at that age, in terms of conflict resolution, democratic practices and acceptable governance. This chapter has shown how leaders in Africa create poverty, underdevelopment, inequality, corruption and environmental damage for their respective countries. The absence of sound mechanism for conflict resolution and a veneer of non-interference in a sovereign state, means that a minor political conflict can escalate into full-blown civil conflagration and rage for years until foreign powers intervene to impose a settlement or mediation, as in Angola, Ethiopia, Somalia, Libya and South Sudan. Unfortunately foreign intervention does not always work, as recent experience in Libya attests. It must be stated categorically that it is not the responsibility of international community to feed Africa or solve Africa's underdevelopment. As much as the international may assist, the initiative has to come from Africa itself. Eventually, it IS Africans who must craft their own durable African (home-grown) solutions to their African challenges. Moreover, apart from upholding the principle of self-reliance, African solutions are far less expensive than foreign ones. Home-grown solutions (as in the case of Botswana village court *kgotla*), can be found in Africa's own indigenous system, erroneously castigated as backward and primitive by empiricist scholars.

Indeed natural resources need not contribute to conflict. As much as there are external factors to contend with, Africa needs a common sense revolution and ability to put heads together and form a united front. Africans bear the ultimate responsibility for solving their own problems emanating from resource management and leaders need to embrace corporate governance and judicious use of natural resources. African countries should initiate internal dialogue and deal with various forms of inequality and exclusion before they blow up in our faces. Only in an atmosphere supporting the free exchange of ideas can people find internal, self-reliant, indigenous,

and efficient solutions. Africa cannot solve poverty, underdevelopment and inequality in a culture of silence, characterised by intimidation, censorship, and intolerance of alternative viewpoints. To expose corruption, human rights violations, economic mismanagement, and abuse of political power, freedom of expression is crucial. The absence of intellectual freedom prevents the search for and development of internal solutions. As Ayittey (1999:36) argues, this in turn, “has two pernicious ramifications. First, it perpetuates the offensive notion that Africans are incapable of devising their own solutions to their problems. Second, it forces the adoption of externally generated solutions, which do not always work.” What keeps Africans poor and underdeveloped is their powerlessness to rid themselves of predatory government or force existing ones to adopt the right policies in a peaceful way. The future of the continent depends largely on open dialogue and how well it manages natural resources, as well as building a critical mass of informed citizens.

In Africa’s own supposedly primitive and backward indigenous system, freedom of expression was recognised and respected. At council meetings and village assemblies, ordinary villagers participated in the decision making process by voicing their opinions freely. Above all, they took part in debating the various positions until a consensus was reached. As former president of Ghana, Kofi Abrefa Busia (1967:29) observed, “The tradition of free speech and interchange of views do not support any claim that the denial of free speech or the suppression of opposition is rooted in traditional African political systems.” Traditional African rulers did not arrest, detain, or ‘liquidate’ those who disagreed with them. There was always the need for freedom of expression to reach consensus. Ayittey (1999:36) posits that:

African governments “would do well to encourage a dialogue between themselves and the population, confront contrary views with well-reasoned arguments rather than intimidation and detention. Suppression of dissent and the denial of the right to express contrary views can only encourage sycophancy and opportunism. There must be a free press to enhance dialogue, efficiency and accountability and

to champion the cause of victims of governmental vindictiveness and arbitrariness.

Indeed, there have been commendable steps through the Kimberly Process to cleanse Africa of the 'blood diamonds.' Under the arrangement, all diamond shipments from participating countries must be accompanied by a certificate of authenticity specifying their origin. Experts at the main diamond exchanges in Belgium and elsewhere conduct scientific tests of the diamonds 'composition to try to verify where they came from. Participating countries pledge to punish violators. However, the Kimberly Process is riddled with inherent weaknesses as it is voluntary, depending on the willing co-operation of governments, companies and diamond dealers. It is therefore prudent that governments, NGOs, civil society groups and others should enhance their capacity to monitor effectively and efficiently, compliance with the certificate scheme, with governments able to penalise and punish violators. In light of the inherent weaknesses in African national institutions, UN, donor agencies and other international institutions may provide aid to African countries specifically to strengthen capacities for natural resource management. Such aid could include monitoring extractive industries and support for measures to better combat government corruption and corporate fraud. It is imperative that AU strengthen efforts to achieve better national management of natural resources, partly by incorporating specific standards into the African Peer Review Mechanism, through which African countries assess each other's governance practice. Donors must also respect and support the AU-led process, rather than attempt to impose governance-related conditions for developing assistance or supporting externally driven parallel initiatives. By and large care must be taken to ensure that external assistance does not lead to foreign domination or threaten sovereignty of African countries. Foreign assistance must be punctuated by the thrust to develop domestic accountability to ultimately make external initiative unnecessary.

Africa's agriculture sector has been critical in generating the growth that has thus far been experienced on the continent. The *Africa Progress Report* (2014: 54-83) posits that as more than two thirds

of Africans (mostly women) depend on agriculture for their livelihoods, boosting this sector is an effective strategy to reduce poverty and inequality. That African countries spent US\$35 billion on food imports in 2011 is an indicator of defective growth over the past years. An effective utilisation of Africa's 60% of the world's cultivable land would not only supply the continental deficit but also the world demand of sufficient and quality food. One major envisaged trend in African development agenda is industrialisation fostered, *inter-alia*, by agricultural development, regional and continental integration, and peace and stability. Regional integration will not only improve intra-African trade but also decrease chances of malpractices such as corruption, currently fuelled by cumbersome border procedures. Nevertheless, effective participation in these regional and global value chains requires investment in human capital (skills), transparent regulatory and business environments and effective hard and soft infrastructure including a steady source of reliable energy generation, transportation systems and information and communication technologies (ICT). Africa should be wary of importing a straight-jacket based on what has worked in different conditions or one-size-fits-all blueprints. Only new dynamic industrial policy frameworks tailored to the individual conditions of each economy will deliver the desired results.

In Africa the past decade has witnessed increased efforts to ensure sustainable utilisation of natural resources and corporate social responsibility. There are numerous opportunities for investment in mining and oil industries so that the raw materials are processed locally into mineral, petroleum and chemical products. This will surely ensure value addition, best revenue and beneficiation. Arguably, resources in the 21st century should be sustainably managed for the benefit of local communities rather than being plundered through the activities of local elites and foreign investors. This, therefore, calls not only for national, regional and continental action, but also international community to develop multilateral systems that prevent the plunder of poor African countries' resources.

Conclusion

By and large, natural resource finds have largely been a curse rather than a blessing. The exploitation of natural resources has often led to land degradation, environmental ‘terrorism’, water pollution, diseases, increased conflict, forced evictions of local people, economic disarticulation and growing poverty. African countries must take strong action to implement concrete measures to ensure that their populations benefit from natural resource use or extraction. At the same time, corporations should be more responsible and ensure that local people benefit from exploitation of resources accruing in their area and their rights and livelihoods are protected and promoted rather than being violated and jeopardised. Sustainable development punctuated by corporate social responsibility, transparency, and community share value approach can surely guarantee social and economic development, let alone environmental protection, to local communities. All in all, in order to maximise benefits from natural resource use in the 21st century, sustainability must be incorporated into the overall business process, and be aligned with ethical business practices, good corporate governance, and transparency.

Arguably, on the causes of poverty and underdevelopment in Africa, there are two schools of thought: the externalist and internalists. For decades the externalists’ position held sway, attributing the causes of almost every African problem to such external factors as Western colonialism and imperialism, the pernicious effects of the slave trade, racist conspiracy plots, exploitation by avaricious multi-national corporations, an unjust international system, inadequate flows of foreign aid, and deteriorating terms of trade. The constant wailing by dependency theorist, such as Baran, Frank and Rodney, over colonial legacies was at best disingenuous and attributing much of Africa’s crisis to external factors alone was intellectually deficient. In fact, they became standard excuses that many African leaders conveniently employed to conceal their own failures, banal corruption and incompetence. While external factors have played a determining role in present difficulties, equally important have been internal factors such as bad

leaders, corruption, neglect of agriculture and resource plunder. The resource curse argument postulated in this chapter, shift critical discourse on poverty, underdevelopment, growth and development away from previous explanations centred on imperialism, colonialism, reliance and impacts of foreign interference to the study mainly concerned with the failures and inefficiencies of national economic planning, state institutions and leadership.

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Language for National Integration, Unity and Development in Nigeria

J.O. Friday-Otun

Introduction

The Nigerian Project represents building an indivisible, solid and united Nigeria where every part combines with one another to ensure peaceful co-existence, egalitarianism and reformation. However, several socio-political convulsions have threatened the viability of the project. Volumes of write-ups and suggestions as solutions to Nigerian problems, have been published, but seldom have language options come under serious consideration as a possible solution to the problem. Language option as a vehicle for integration, unity and development is therefore the focus of this paper. The inundating literature from renown scholars on the language situation in Nigeria are so overwhelming that writing anything original in that direction looks daunting (Emenajo, 1985; Olaoye, 2013). But according to a Yoruba adage, “if the lice lodging in one’s apparel have not been fully eradicated, blood will not cease from the finger nails used in killing them”. This means, an ailment defying a cure will continue to attract ways of medication.

Though languages and ethnic stocks differ, the Federal Government of Nigeria owes the country the enormous duty of keeping it together. Hence, the term, “Nigerian project,” as introduced by the federal government, is the conception of the vision and mission of building a fully integrated and united nation, where everybody can live together in any part of the country without any fear of molestation or marginalisation, politically, socially, economically and linguistically; and this is essential for any meaningful development to take place in any multilingual society. The Federal Government of Nigeria and some state governments

have since the 1967-1970 civil war continued to address the issues of national integration, unity and development. Somehow, political, economic, educational and linguistic policies purportedly designed for national integration and unity have been put in place, though policy is one, implementation is another. For instance, language policies like National Language Policy, Rivers Language Project (the language development project of the Rivers State Government), Kaduna Language Policy, and Itsekiri Language Policy, among other language projects, have emerged on the quest to resolve the knotty multilingual problems facing the nation.

The focus of this chapter is to explore the language option in forging national integration, unity and development in Nigeria. To achieve this, the study intends to approach the topic under some sub-themes like integration, unity, development and language; language motivations and attitudes of Nigerians; the national language policy and integration; background structure of integration in Nigeria; the Nigerian Project, as well as language and national development. In this chapter, two parallel forms of integration system as a solution to the on-going language conflict between the speakers of the majority and minority languages in the country are proposed. This is believed to be a way of enhancing the integration and unity which are much needed for the overall development of the country.

Integration, unity, development and language

The *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary* (2010: 781) defines integration as an “act or process of combining two or more things together, so that they can work together”. In this sense, we can talk of economic, political or social integration. On the anthropological plane, integration can be referred to as the coming together of people of different colour, race, religion, etc. who have been previously separated. Gardner and Lambert (1972) in their socio-psychological exploration of language motivations and attitudes see integration through language as identifying with and sharing the values associated with the language and culture of other people.

Unity, the process of “being in agreement and working together” (Hornby, 2010:1631), is the focus of any integration programme;

integration then connotes unity. Both terms will be used interchangeably in this chapter. The corporate existence of any multilingual nation rests on planning and policy implementation that ensure development, proper integration and unity of every part making the nation. This is against the backdrop that “if society is to exist, it must have shared values” (Ishima, 2004: 55).

Language, as a vehicle for national integration, unity and development has been an object for comments, analysis and postulations, with some yielding illuminations towards effective language policy. Development or growth, according to *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary* (2010: 400), is a “gradual growth of something so that it becomes more advanced, or stronger”. Nigeria is a developing country, trying to make her industry and economic system more advanced or stronger. National development is often described in terms of economic growth, attainment of economic targets, growth rate, increase in Gross National Product (GNP), Gross Domestic Product (GDP), rise in *per capita* income, and so on. Other indicators include sectorial allocations and societal goals involving economic prosperity and growth, while political efficiency, political participation, environmental factors, modernization efforts, as well as individual goals involving the level of welfare in terms of private consumption, housing, freedom to choose jobs, etc. are all crucial factors in national development (Bangbose, 1991).

However, Bangbose argues further that this concept of national development is narrow and not holistic, because it fails to capture the roles of language in socio-economic development. It is a clear fact that governmental and societal activities in the sectors such as industry, defence, education, technology, environment, administration, communication, social welfare, agriculture, sports, entertainment, and power hinge on the availability of a medium of expression— language.

In environments where certain languages dominate, some modern societies, according to Appel and Muysken (1989) and Nwadike (2004) underwrite integration as the giving up by the minorities, of their own life style, culture, language and identity for those of the host societies. This notion of integration can only gain root in a monolithic society where immigrants come in their ethnic

groups. In the linguistically heterogeneous nations of the world, especially in Africa or Asia, integration is perceived as mutual existence of both majorities' and minorities' life style, culture, language and identity (Bamgbose, 1976). Any multilingual nation must as much as possible embark on language policy that safeguard the linguistic interests of all the ethnic groups making up the society in order to minimise language conflicts which "regularly relate to language attitudes, language contact, language policies and political domination" (Igboanusi, 2001 :x).

Taking into cognizance the multilingual nature of countries like Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Sierra-Leone, and others including countries like Denmark, Finland, Quebec and Switzerland, language policy cannot be dissociated from economic, social and cultural realities. In order to devise effective language policy that underscores national unity, integration and development, a thorough attention ought to be paid to the issues of motivations and attitudes of speakers of the different languages in the country.

Language motivations, attitudes of Nigerians and national development

Attempting to integrate Nigerians through language policy without an appropriate and proper understanding of their language motivations and attitudes will be a mirage. This is against the realism that language attitudes and dispositions of individuals and groups in a society constitute the assets or otherwise in evolving effective language planning programmes (Sehmied, 1991: 163). In a language planning process premised on true socio-demographic and linguistic factors, several issues crop up to account for the building of motivations needed to adopt, learn and use languages for integration and development.

Lambert (1972) gives two motives for language learning—instrumental and integrative factors. While instrumental factor marks the desire of the learner to use the language for job or career progress in the society, integrative reason reflects the desire of an individual to

understand other people in their society in order to be able to properly integrate or mix with them. According to Olaoye (2013), the motivation for development of individuals in respect of their aspirations in the society, means the motivation for the development of a nation. A nation develops educationally, socially, scientifically, technologically, politically, economically and culturally if the citizenry, or the individuals are motivated to navigate through life by their interaction and acquaintances with government and its agencies through various media in the languages that the individuals understand.

In education, people are motivated to acquire knowledge in science, arts, commerce, technology, engineering, politics, culture, law, etc. for the development of the country, when they are taught in the languages they understand. Mazrui (1999: 34) remarks that “the quest or motivation for ethno-linguistic identity among African – Americans was the attempt to re-link in a more direct manner with the continental African languages.” Close to language motivation is language attitude.

Odebunmi (2000: 122) views language attitude as the way a person or a group of persons feel about a language, and how such persons express their likes and dislikes in respect of the language, a kind of way of life that influences their judgmental and general outlook. Language attitudes of individuals are represented by Appel and Muysken (1989: 16) in a schema which stresses that “if there is a strong relation between language and identity, this relation should find its expression in the attitudes of individuals towards these languages and their users. This implies that attitudes towards a social ethnic group inform the attitudes towards the language of that group, which subsequently informs the attitudes towards individual speakers of that language. Hence, a positive language attitude among diverse social ethnic groups in a nation connotes unity and integration which are facilitators of national development. In order for national development to ensue in a society, in the areas of economy, health, education, agriculture, wealth distribution, environment, commerce and trade, culture and tourism, defence, a positive attitude towards the language (s) in use in such society is essential.

In his study on the patterns of Nigerian's language attitude, Babajide (2001:4-13) presents the analysis of attitudes towards the use of English, foreign languages (e.g. French, Arabic and Portuguese) and indigenous languages. According to him, the attitude of Nigerians to English is positive because of the heterogeneous multiplicity of languages and cultures which make English the unifying language in Nigeria with a strong instrumental significance. This view has been earlier supported by linguists such as Bamgbose (1991), Adegbija (2000) and Adekunle (1995). On why the English language is so instrumental to Nigerians, Babajide (2001:4) argue that:

Given the many important roles that English language performs, it becomes expedient for any Nigerian that wants to be relevant to his social economic and political environment to learn and acquire some appreciable knowledge of English.

While referring to English as Second Language in Nigeria, and not as a foreign language, Babajide submits that French, precipitated by instrumental factor, commands positive disposition than German and Portuguese. He also claims that because of Islamic Religion, Arabic is preferred in Northern Nigeria. On the attitudes of Nigerians to indigenous languages, it is obvious that because of "the fear of being politically dominated, economically marginalised and culturally belittled" (Babajide, 2001: 12), there can be no consensus on the use of a particular indigenous language as national language. Attitudes towards these languages, are only positive from native speaker's perspective. Babajide (2001: 4) argues further that:

As far as Nigerian indigenous languages are concerned, they draw positive attitudes only from their native speakers and a few non-native speakers who were born or have lived long enough among the native speakers of such language in their land as to have fallen in love with it.

I also want to add that the native speaker of a language can fall in love or phobia with another indigenous language due to explainable or unexplainable reasons. Several works on attitude of

Nigerians towards indigenous languages have corroborated the findings of Babajide (2001) (see Bamgbose 1991; Adekunle, 1995; Adegbija, 2000; Odebumni, 2001; and Oyetade 2001).

The national language policy and integration

Language planning, “a factual realisation of language policy” (Appel and Muysken, 1989:47), in Nigeria dates back to the days of “Education ordinances of 1882, 1886, 1916 and 1926 when the colonial government had a primary desire of training needed clerks, messengers and other supportive staff to run the colonial administration” (Oyetade, 2001:17). The ordinances were meant to accord the teaching of English the pride of place in formal schools, and also regulate the practices of education which were then in the hands of missionaries. Though the missionaries attempted training converts in their native languages to aid the spread of Christianity, the study and use of English gained an upper hand. In the post-colonial era, the situation remained the same because governments, “till well past the attainment of political independence in 1960, rarely felt that they had any duty to promote the study of the indigenous languages...” (Awobuluyi 1980: 39).

However, a positive change towards the development of indigenous languages began when according to Bamgbose (1976), parliamentarians began to canvass for the adoption of indigenous languages as national languages. Another point advanced in favour of the indigenous languages was the problem encountered in the study and use of English nationwide. Suggestions kept coming from linguists and non-linguists alike, pressures upon governments kept mounting up, from various quarters on the acceptance of the fact that, for the people’s culture to be maintained and preserved, for the much needed integration, unity and development to abound, and for the national identity of the citizenry not to be endangered, more attention should be accorded the teaching and learning of indigenous languages which are the media for sustaining the cultural legacies and development of the people. Nigeria, as a nation still wriggling to get out of mutual distrust, ethnic and linguistic conflicts, and the governments (local, state and federal) should desire to promote

Nigerian languages as part of a larger strategy for the social, economic and political development of the nation.

Of course, the federal, state and local governments in Nigeria came to this realisation, and started to focus on evolving strategies towards developing language policy that are respectful of ethno cultural characteristics, and also supportive of national development, unity and integration. To corroborate this point, Babatunde (2001: 160) notes:

The organised pursuit of solutions to language problems in Nigeria started as soon as political independence was gained. For instance, on November 21, 1961, an amendment was proposed in the House of Representative for the adoption of Hausa as Nigeria's *lingua franca*.

Although the proposal was withdrawn after ethnic meaning was read to it, it marked the beginning of serious reflections on the multilingual imbroglio facing the nation. In 1977, a bold step was taken by making policy announcements on language education known as National Policy on Education (NPE). The policy included language education which the Federal Government believed was a way of developing the learning and use of indigenous languages aimed at culminating in national integration, unity and development. Some excerpts of the policy presented in Babatunde (2001: 161) reads:

In addition to appreciating the importance of language in the educational process, and as a means of preserving the people's culture, the Government considers it to be in the best interest of national unity that each child should be encouraged to learn one of the three major languages other than his own mother tongue. In this connection, the Government considers the three major languages in Nigeria to be Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba.

Still on unity, the excerpts states further that:

The Federal Government aims, among other things, to develop and project Nigerian culture, art and languages as the world's cultural

heritage and foster Nigerian Unity with an emphasis on the common ties that unite us in our diversity.

Beyond policy statements, governments have continued to provide backings for the development of indigenous languages. As the revised NPE provides that all indigenous languages are qualified to be taught in primary and junior secondary schools, many indigenous languages, are by this policy, in the school curriculum. Brann cited by Emenanjo (1985: 125), reveals that at least, 97 Nigerian languages are used in lower primary classrooms in at least some capacity. And to lay the foundation for indigenous language education in nursery and lower primary grades, the policy states that “education in nursery and lower primary grades should be conducted through the medium of the mother tongue or the language of the immediate environment” (Babatunde, 2001: 161-162).

Besides these, language departments in tertiary institutions, language research centres such as Language Development Centre (NDC) Lagos, formerly National Language Centre, the Institute of Nigerian Languages, Aba, have impacted mainly on the development and promotion of Nigerian languages. Nonetheless, language conflicts are erupting in Nigeria. This is against the backdrop that policy is one, implementation is another. Government at various level did not demonstrate any strong will to implement the NPE. The lack of will on the part of government was perhaps, caused by the lack of language manpower to teach most of the minority languages. All this, makes it practically impossible to capture languages beyond the three “major” languages (Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba) under the ambit of the NPE.

Hence, the minority language speakers view the National Language Policy as largely discriminatory and suspicious because it focuses mainly on the development of the three “major” languages – Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba (Webb, 1994: 181 in Igboanusi and Ohia, 2001: 125). In fact, the bitterness with which some comments were passed were better imagined than real. For instance, Masha (1985) in Emenajo (1985: 126) laments:

If you speak the same language with people, they will cease to mistrust and discriminate against you. Really? Will an Igbo man stop discriminating against a Yoruba man because the Yoruba speaks Igbo language and vice versa? ... Why for goodness sake, do communities that speak the same language butcher themselves while fighting over land matters and petty issues?

But according to Emenajo (1980: 126), “arguments such as these have completely missed the spirit of the policy”. He argues further that “nothing forbids all Nigerian languages from being taught as L2 in theory, but practical considerations make this absolutely impossible” p.127).

Background structure of language integration

As earlier stated, “language attitude relates to language policy, language use and language learning” (Schmied, 1991: 163). In a multilingual society where each ethnic group uses its language and have an L2 for official, educational and other communications, the nature of integration may take the shape in Figure 1 below:

From the diagram above, the inner circle (immediate integration) refers to integration at ethnic level and the wider circle indicates integration at national level. The diagram suggests two layers of integration where a child first integrate with his immediate environment through his LI before further integration into the larger society as he grows to learn and use the L2. This is typical of the Nigerian scene where everyone first belongs to his ethnic group before belonging to Nigeria.

In Nigeria of today where integration is being pursued across ethnic boundaries, the layers of integration cannot be as loose as described above. Integrative motive for second language learning is regarded by Gardner and Lambert (1972) as function of someone’s readiness to learn and use the language of other people in the society with the aim of mixing with them. In other words, the force of national integration through language lies in the desire of individuals in such nation to learn and use the language of other ethnic groups in order to facilitate the appreciation of other people’s values and

culture for peaceful co-existence. The learner must be “psychologically prepared to adopt various aspects of behaviour which characterise members of another linguistic/cultural group” (Munkaila and Haruna, 2001: 31).




Fig. 1: A diagram showing immediate and wider integrations

Given the readiness of a learner to “integrate” in Nigeria, learning an indigenous L2 implies linguistic competence in English language, because the indigenous L2 can only be learned long after the learner has been introduced to English language as a medium of instruction. To capture the scenario here explained, the schema is presented on the next page:




Fig. 2: A schema representing integration through language

From the schema above, a Nigeria child acquires integration through his mother tongue, learns wider integration through English Language and later learns an indigenous L2 to integrate with their speakers.

The Nigerian Project

“The Nigerian Project” is a term introduced by the Federal government of Nigeria during the President Ibrahim Babangida era (1985-1993). During this regime, several ethnic and religious violence threatened the corporate existence of the country as a nation. Of course, such national experience was not peculiar to his regime, as such was the hallmark of the preceding regimes. Since the amalgamation of Nigeria in 1914, ethnic, political and religious crises characterised the country’s socio-political arena. In fact, the country fought a war of unity for three years, culminating in a huge loss of lives and property. However, governments at the local, state and federal levels have since the end of the war, been doing much to nip crises and violence in the bud with the aim of moving the country forward. Yet, not much has been achieved in this direction as crises and violence kept pervading the nation.

The Babangida administration and the regimes that followed it, see the country as a project with unity, integration and development as variables. Though Nigeria as a nation has come to stay, the frequent socio-political convulsions, such as ethnic clashes, religious upheavals and cries against linguistic domination and discrimination have not only threatened the unity of the country, but have greatly hampered the political and socio-economic development of the country. Hence, suggestions will be made in this chapter to tackle the knotty linguistic problems confronting the nation.

Language and national development in Nigeria

In this section, the terms “Development” and “National Development” will be discussed, before relating them to language in the Nigerian context. The postulations of Mabogunje (1980) and Todaro (1992) on development are suitable to crystallise our understanding of the concept, before weighing their adequacy. Although, the definitions of development are as many as the number of those conducting research on it, it is important to distinguish between development as a condition or state, and as a process of change. The dynamism of development makes it an issue embracing

a multidisciplinary approach. Mabogunje (1980) sees development in three perspectives. The first dimension borders on development as an economic growth where commodity output is placed above the people producing it. The second perspective hinges on development as modernisation where changes in social, psychological and political process are emphasised. The third aspect sees development as the distributive justice where emphasis is on improving basic needs.

However, Todaro (1992) sees development beyond a purely economic phenomenon, but rather a multidimensional process involving reorganisation and reorientation of the entire economic and social system. This approach conceives development as a process of raising peoples living levels, creating conditions for the growth of self-esteem in terms of the promotion of human dignity and respect, and increasing people's freedom to choose by enlarging the range of their choice variables. An illumination is also found in the approach of popular development and environment which recognises high opportunity cost associated with irreversible environmental degradation; this dimension deals with environmental problems requiring solutions sensitive to local, social and ecological conditions. Another theory links development with power in which the issues of empowerment, inequality and participation are challenged. The approach seeks empowerment and participation as means of engendering self-help and self-reliance in collective decision-making.

In relating all this to a nation or country, a stake is then taken on the national development. As earlier said, national development refers to the perspectives of a nation's standard of life and quality of life as expressed in terms of Gross National Product or Gross Domestic Product, economic growth, attainment of economic targets, rise in *per capita* income, etc. Indicators such as nutrition, life expectancy, birth and death rates, food distribution, creativity, innovativeness, access to education and all good things of life, originality of thinking in economic, scientific and cultural expressions, employment rates, environmental growth, political efficiency, freedom to choose jobs or belong to organisations, are all part of national development (Mabogunje, 1980; Bamgbose, 1991; Todaro, 1992; Olaoye, 2013).

However, the conception of national development above has been described as deficient because the role of language in the process of national development has been overlooked. It is assumed that development is still eluding Nigeria because language is yet to be given the national attention it deserves (Emenanjo, 1985; Ishima, 2004; Elugbe, 2006). This is because individuals develop educationally, socially, economically, politically, and culturally through their interaction with government agencies that disseminate ideas, awareness programmes and policies through various media in the languages that the individuals best understand (Olaoye, 2013). Language is the most important tool with which a society is educated, socialised, organised and governed. It is a fact that it is hardly possible to talk of national development without putting language at the front burner, because people originate and fashion their notions, ideas, concepts, thoughts and needs through language. Hence, it takes language to develop, as it takes development for language to thrive.

The importance of language in national development cannot be over-emphasised. As a result of linguistic and ethnic suspicion, the country finds it difficult to achieve most of its lofty objectives around issues of development. The call for national sovereign conference has been made several times by many interest groups in Nigeria, since the annulment of the adjudged fairest and freest election of 1993, to redefine the basis for the corporate existence of the various linguistic and ethnic groups that make up the country.

Volumes of publications have flooded the national dailies, archives and institutions of learning on the way to sustain the hard-won unity of the country. But in most cases, such publications, comments and suggestions rarely bother on language option as a tool for fostering integration, unity and development. As earlier mentioned, this is not to say that governments have not announced language policies with an ostensible aim of fostering unity in the country. Linguists and non-linguists alike have said practically almost all that can be said on ways of resolving the multilingual impasse facing the nation. For instance, Adekunle (1995) and Elugbe (2006) are of the opinion that the political, economic, social and educational objectives of government can only be achieved when the citizens are well mobilised through the languages they understand. In a similar

vein, Emenanjo (1985: 125) argues that, “the support that government programmes like mass mobilisation, the defunct War Against Indiscipline (WAI), health and education, enjoyed depended on how well people were mobilised through their indigenous languages”.

At this juncture, we want to revisit the aspect of the National Policy on Education that deals with indigenous L2 policy as it affects integration, unity and development in Nigeria. For the purpose of clarity, section 1, paragraph 8 of NPE is represented below:

a. In primary school which lasts six years, each child must study two languages, namely: (i) his mother tongue (if available for study) or an indigenous language of wider communication in his area of domicile, and (ii) English language.

b. In Junior Secondary School (JSS), which is of three years' duration, the child must study three languages viz.: (i) his mother tongue (if available for study or an indigenous language of wider communication in his area of domicile, and (ii) English language, and (iii) just any one of the three major indigenous languages in the country, namely: Hausa; Igbo and Yoruba provided the language chosen is distinct from the child's mother-tongue.

c. In Senior Secondary School (SSS), which also lasts three years, the child must study two languages viz.: (i) an indigenous language, and (ii) English language.

Though several criticisms have trailed the announcement of the policy, especially clause (b) (Emenanjo, 1985: 126), the Federal Government and some linguists believe that integration, unity and development are attainable through the policy, if well implemented (Babatunde, 2001; Oyetade, 2001; Igboanusi and Ohia, 2001). Yet, the policy (especially clause b) is far from any meaningful implementation because the attendant conflicts emanating from the perceptions of the speakers of minority languages cannot be wished aside. On this Igboanusi and Ohia (2001: 127) argue that:

One of the conflicts which have (has) hindered unity and socio political development in Nigeria is language conflict. Language conflict

in Nigeria has to be understood from the backdrop of the ethnic languages, all of which are in competition for supremacy and survival.

Bamgbose (1993: 2) had earlier seen the conflicts as a big problem when he said in Igboanusi and Ohia (2001: 127) that, the relationship of the “major” to the “non-major” languages is a constant source of language conflict in Nigeria. But since no one can be forced to learn and use language against his/her will, a realistic resolution that can avail the major and minor language equal opportunity through the language policy is essential. Hence, a thorough research into language attitudes of Nigerians is important. In line with this view, Igboanusi and Ohia (2002: 126) argue that:

Following the recognition of the role of language attitudes in developing language policies, as well as the on-going agitations for the right of minority languages, there is a great need for thorough research on the attitudes of linguistic minority speakers and the stereotyped perceptions of the speakers of major languages in order to assist in developing a comprehensive language policy for Nigeria.

In adopting a language policy aimed at fostering integration, unity and development, it is important to then suggest that:

- a. Nigerians should be psychologically motivated to develop positive attitudes towards indigenous languages other than their own.
- b. The fear of domination, discrimination and manipulation entertained by the minority language speakers should be allayed.
- c. Language associations (both linguistic and indigenous language associations) should harmonise, to form a pressure group to make practical interactions and influence the presidency, legislature and judiciary on language matters.
- d. A commissioned body to be known as the National Language Commission (NLC) should be set up to review the current language policy, advise government on language matters, co-ordinate and regulate language agencies, departments and research centres.
- e. Section I, paragraph 8 should be reviewed to reflect the integration model proposed in this chapter (see the model below).

For a realistic language integration programme, the following model is proposed:




Figure 3. The proposed structure of language for integration, unity and development in Nigeria

From the diagram above, majority and minority language integration are parallel. This indicates that majority language speakers can integrate at their level, while minority language speakers can also integrate at their own level. This does not rule out the possibility of integrating across majority and minority border lines. The majority language integration box indicates that only the major language speakers should be mandated (but not restricted) to learn one of the big three” (Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba) other than their mother-tongue. Also, the minority language speaker integration box represents integration at minority language level where a minority language speaker is mandated to learn one of the minority languages apart from his/her mother-tongue.

The model has the advantage of allowing integration at two levels. Based on personal volition, a majority language speaker can decide to learn and use a minor language as his indigenous L2. This possibility is reflected on the diagram by the bidirectional arrow linking the two boxes. Likewise, a minority language speaker can decide to integrate by learning one of the majority languages. With

this structure, the fear of linguistic discrimination, marginalisation and domination will be allayed, thereby reducing language conflicts.

It is important, at this juncture, to highlight the roles of language in the unity, integration and development process in Nigeria. Language is one of the factors uniting together the over four hundred and fifty ethnic groups that make up the nation (Omodiaghe, 1992). Nigeria remains one and united because an official language (English) is at its disposal to conduct its affairs. Nigeria runs a three – tier system of government– local, state and federal. It is a country of thirty-six states and seven hundred and seventy-four local government areas with the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), standing as a separate unit. The FCT as the seat of the federal government is headed by a mayor.

Going by the multilingual nature of Nigeria, it is practically impossible to run the affairs of government at all levels without a language or languages servicing the whole country. It goes without saying that all the programmes of government both at local, state and federal levels, be it, in freedom, politics, education, agriculture, power and energy, health, telecommunication, social life, foreign policy, trade and commerce, environment, tourism and culture, defence, etc., are all planned and executed through language. Development can only thrive when a country is united and governed as one entity- a process enhanced by language.

Integration as a tool of national development is another dimension often accomplished through language in Nigeria, just like in any other society. Integration in this sense connotes interactions at all the spectra of the society. Two types of language are used in this direction in Nigeria. They are Language of Immediate Communication (LIC), and Language of Wider Communication (LWC) which are great tools of integration through communication. Starting from the family to the speech community level, the LIC is in use. In this wise, the indigenous languages concurrently with the official language are for use both formally and informally. The LIC is useful for interpersonal communication in a mutually intelligible situation. However, in inter-ethnic situations, where languages of interaction are not mutually intelligible, interlocutors resort to either Nigerian Pidgin English (NPE), Nigerian English (NE), or any other

possible option to maintain communication (Elugbe, 2006; Ayeomoni, 2012).

In short, it takes language for integration to be facilitated, within or outside the family, groups, associations, professions, etc. Yet integration is a powerful tool of national development. In other words, development in all dimensions mentioned above can only be achieved when the citizens are well integrated. No society can develop without integration, and language is a major means of entrenching this among the populace.

Nigeria as a developing nation is still striving to grow in terms of economy, politics, equitable distribution of amenities and good things of life, provision of health care, education, housing, freedom, environment, agriculture, commerce, etc. Language has been a tool in the little efforts that the country has been able to make. For instance, language is involved in the country's economic activities, politics, information dissemination, industry, commerce, defence, individual, group and corporate choice variables, governance, environmental maintenance, etc. Significantly, the present state of relative unity, integration and development through language, has enhanced the current stability, corporate existence and democratic dispensation being experienced in the country.

Conclusion

The foregoing discussion points to the fact that the issue of integration, unity and development through language in a multilingual nation like Nigeria cannot be wished aside. The enormous role of language in building an integrated and united Nigeria has been brought to the fore in this chapter. It has been revealed that language is involved at both micro and macro levels of the Nigerian society, just like in any other nations of the world. No one can talk of all indicators of development without talking of language. It can safely be concluded that where two or three people are gathered, language is there. Whenever the indicators of development such as politics, governance, education, freedom of choice, environment, ecology, health, defence, agriculture, communication, rural and urban growth, social life, etc., are

mentioned, language is greatly involved. Any activity involving human beings, in their quest for integration, unity and development must, as a matter of necessity, involve language. Even the activities involving the dumb, who do not use vocal symbols to communicate, involve sign language.

Yet, linguistic and ethnic conflicts pervade all the human facets of Nigeria. It is no wonder that meaningful development has eluded the country for long. This implies that all hands must be on deck to checkmate or avert the consequences of language conflicts which are largely tied to ethnic conflicts. Therefore, all the suggestions or proposals made in this chapter should be implemented to the letter by the Nigerian government, and the controversial clause that suggests linguistic discrimination should be reviewed to only mandate a majority language speaker to study one of the big three other than his own mother-tongue, while a minority language speaker should be mandated to learn any of the minority languages available to him. It must also be stressed that though many of the minority languages are yet to be developed to enhance their being taught in school, a language policy effected along the suggestions in this chapter will set the country on a realistic journey to integration, unity and development through language over time.

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Education for Conquest' and Africa's Underdevelopment: A Quest for Epistemic Liberation

Dennis Masaka

Introduction

That colonial education with its attendant epistemic violence suppressed and retarded Africa's¹⁷ development is neither questionable nor contestable. Colonial education suppressed the creative geniuses and potentialities of the indigenous people of Africa. By the same reasoning, it questioned, subjugated and discarded to the periphery the indigenous people of Africa's humanity. The questioning of Africa's humanity was schemed with a purpose in mind. It enabled the hegemonic powers to plunder the knowledge frontiers and reservoirs of the indigenous people of Africa and their economic resources. It becomes imperative therefore to interrogate and reject colonial education because it inaugurated epistemicide and the underdevelopment of Africa. As argued by Bewaji (2010: 1), the epistemicide that was foisted on the colonised people during colonialism cannot be absolved for the underdevelopment that countries in the colonised world have

¹⁷ As I seek to situate Africa's present development predicament to its colonial experience, it is necessary to state that the term "Africa" itself is a colonial imposition. It has a foreign origin. It derives its meaning from what agents of conquest considered as the befitting description of the climatic conditions of the continent they called "Africa" and not the attributes of its occupants (Ramose, 2003a: 114-115; Ramose, 2010: 1). As Wamba dia Wamba (1991: 10) argues, "the term Africa came from the greek Aphrike meaning not cold; from the latin Aprica meaning sunny; and Afriga meaning land of Afrigs, the roman term for people living in the Southern part of the roman empire. Africa is thus a term which comes from a comparative awareness of differentiation from an European point of view." In this light, it becomes necessary to use the term "Africa" in the present chapter under protest.

endured. I submit that the ‘education for conquest’ that the hegemonic powers inaugurated is the primary cause for Africa’s present development predicament despite its rich natural resources that endows it. Africa’s capacity to cope with its environment and meet its needs and aspirations predate its colonisation. The epistemic paternalism that was quite consistent with colonialism distorted Africa’s enduring development that was in existence before the arrival of the hegemonic powers.

The thesis that I defend in this chapter is that the ‘education for conquest’ that the hegemonic powers imposed on the indigenous people of Africa must be replaced by an education paradigm that celebrates their creative and innovative potentials while also recognising their contribution to the global stock of knowledge and development. This, in my view, is necessary in order to restore their dignity and confidence as legitimate creators of wealth and knowledge. For this to be achieved, colonial epistemicide must be challenged and rejected altogether. It is worth reminding that the hegemonic powers curiously considered themselves as the legitimate producers of a knowledge paradigm that deserves transcultural application and acceptance. As Santos, Nunes and Meneses argue (2007: xxxiii), “this denial of diversity is a constitutive and persistent feature of colonialism. While the political dimension of colonial intervention has been widely criticized, the burden of the colonial epistemic monoculture is still accepted nowadays as a symbol of development and modernity.”

The indigenous people of Africa must become co-actors and creators of wealth in their respective nations. In pursuance of the thesis of this chapter, I submit that the ‘education for conquest’ that is still substantially in existent in the syllabi in Africa’s education system perpetuates colonial epistemicide. It also perpetuates the mythical incompetence of the indigenous people of Africa to contribute to the development of their own countries. As argued by Santos, Nunes and Meneses (2007: xix):

the epistemological privilege granted to modern science from the seventeenth century onwards, which made possible the technological revolutions that consolidated Western supremacy, was also

instrumental in suppressing other, non-scientific forms of knowledges and, at the same time, the subaltern social groups whose social practices were informed by such knowledges.

In the light of this background, the present chapter advances the argument that it is imperative to expurgate the colonial education paradigm that questions the humanity of the indigenous people of Africa and indeed their creative and innovative potentials. It must be replaced by the one that recognises the contribution of the indigenous people of Africa to knowledge and development. The chapter further calls for the epistemic liberation of the indigenous people of Africa so that they can reassert their confidence and rightful place as co-contributors to the development of their own countries.

Understanding development and underdevelopment

By virtue of the centrality of the terms “development” and “underdevelopment” in this chapter, it is imperative to attempt at defining them. I hasten to state that the definitions ascribed to these terms are contentious. They are contentious because they principally reflect the thinking and the objectives of the ones who coin them. They are also a reflection of the unique contexts and experiences of those who coin these definitions. In the case of Africa, the way in which these terms have been used to refer to Africa’s progress or lack of it reflects the hegemonic asymmetrical relations between the ones who have coined these terms and the indigenous people of Africa.

The ones who have imposed this binary way of looking at reality have an exclusive say on what these terms must mean. For Rodney (1981: 3), “development in human society is a many-sided process.” It has meant different things to different people (Todaro and Smith, 2012: 14). This is an admission that the term “development” is susceptible to different definitions and interpretations. As Rodney (1981: 3) argues, “at the level of the individual, it implies increased skill and capacity, greater freedom, creativity, self-discipline, responsibility, and material well-being.” But what is of interest in this chapter is how this term is defined in relation to the prospects of a

country or a group of countries. For Rodney (1981: 4), “development in the past has always meant the increase in the ability to guard the independence of the social group and indeed to infringe upon the freedom of others—something that often came about irrespective of the will of the persons within the societies involved.” In fact, development is multi-dimensional. It must satisfy the economic, social, political, environmental, religious and cultural needs of people (Sen, 1999: 1). This understanding of development is however contestable because it explains the success and progress of one social group through the infringement of the freedoms of others. In order to enforce the notion of “development” on those opposed to it, violence is used (Dussel and Ibarra-Colado, 2006: 496). It is “development” that is an outcome of acts of injustice. Once an activity is an outcome of injustices, it does not pass as an instance of development. In my view, this understanding of “development” speaks to the hegemonic cultures’ understanding of the term. Conquest becomes a key ingredient of “development” as conceived from the standpoint of the hegemonic powers. I seek to reject this understanding of development.

The term “development” has also tended to be understood in the economic sense as the collective capacity of a people to deal with the environment (Rodney, 1981: 4). In the view of Todaro and Smith (2012: 14):

development, in its essence, must represent the whole gamut of change by which an entire social system, tuned to the diverse basic needs and evolving aspirations of individuals and social groups within that system, moves away from a condition of life widely perceived as unsatisfactory toward a situation or condition of life regarded as materially and spiritually better.

In this chapter, the term “development” is used to denote the capacity of a country or a collection of countries to employ resources at their disposal to competently meet their needs and wants. Since the term “underdevelopment” is often used in relation to the term “development”, it is necessary to attempt at defining it. Todaro and Smith (2012: 15) define the term “underdevelopment” as a state of

national poverty. This understanding of underdevelopment can be extended to mean the failure by a country to attain its development goals, for example, in respect to freedoms, food and economic performance. I submit that Africa's underdevelopment is closely linked to the conquest and subjugation of the indigenous people of Africa by the hegemonic powers. At this point, it is necessary to state what some African thinkers think of underdevelopment and its causes. Some African leaders have blamed the underdevelopment of their countries on Europe's wars of conquest of Africa (Grundy, 1966: 63). In the view of these leaders, "...colonial rule has prevented the socioeconomic development of Africa in the interests of the indigenous masses" (Grundy, 1966: 63).

The hegemonic powers regarded Africa as an appendage of Europe (Grundy, 1966: 63). African slaves, wealth and raw materials were channelled to Europe in order to develop it at the expense of the indigenous people of Africa and their economies. By these acts of conquest, Africa was impoverished in regard to its human capital and economic resources. For Grundy (1966: 63), "the resulting conclusion is that in order to foster development in their own interests, Africans must terminate colonial political control." I agree to this prescription meant to rescue Africa from its fixation with underdevelopment. But the problem of underdevelopment has survived the assumed independence of the indigenous people of Africa from colonialism. As Rodney (1981: vii) states, "the phenomenon of neo-colonialism cries out for extensive investigation in order to formulate the strategy and tactics of African emancipation and development." This is what I seek to explore in this study.

The colonisation of knowledge

One of the key dimensions of colonialism in Africa is paternalism in matters of knowledge (Bassil, 2005: 28). The indigenous people of Africa were considered as children who necessarily required the "able" guidance of the hegemonic powers (Hegel, 1975: 183; Cohen, 1970: 427). And in order to enforce this paternalistic relationship, the indigenous people of Africa were to be physically and mentally subdued through the use of military force and epistemicide. Military

subjugation involved the physical displacement of the indigenous people of Africa from their lands and positions of authority through use of force and violence (Nkomo, 1959: 31). As a result, indigenous people lost control and stewardship of their own resources. They became subservient to the alien programme and agenda of the hegemonic powers. They ceased to be initiators of development in their own countries but were reduced to mere agents of their colonial masters.

The questionable assumption that justified this colonial violence was that the indigenous people were incapable of using their own resources for the betterment of their own lives. This is attested by Gil Scott-Heron (Moore, 2005: 131) when he argues that “first, white folks discovered Africa and claimed it fair and square. Cecil Rhodes couldn’t have been robbing nobody ’cause he said there was nobody there.” The hegemonic powers thus took it as their “burden” to exploit “Africa’s” resources for the assumed “betterment” of the indigenous people. Yet this act of questionable benevolence inaugurated the plunder, pillaging, and resource dispossession of the indigenous people by the hegemonic powers. It is imperative to state that the military conquest and land dispossession of the indigenous people by the hegemonic powers indeed put to question their humanity. The military conquest was considered as inadequate in totally dehumanising and degrading the indigenous people of Africa so that they could become “willing” agents in furthering the hegemonic powers’ agenda. The mental colonisation became imperative in order to enable the total subjugation of the indigenous people of Africa (wa Thiong’o, 1981: 8-9; Chung and Ngara, 1985: 74).

Colonial education was imposed in order to prepare the indigenous people of Africa for their new roles in the colonial project. It was indeed education for inferiority. This kind of education was never intended to enable them to endorse and enhance their creative and innovative potentials which were already in them prior to the wars of conquest. It was indeed intended to foster in them their supposed inferiority to the agents of conquest. They were conditioned to be solely good enough as supporting acts to the hegemonic powers’ conquest and exploitation of their knowledge

and resources. Education and life in general became organised in line with the objectives of conquest (Rodney, 1981: 26). Anchored on false generosity, the hegemonic powers saw themselves as extending an unsolicited favour to the indigenous people of Africa for their own “good”. As Peck (1966: 66) argues, “in regard to education, the African has everything to gain and nothing to lose-his forebears had no school whatever, and any schooling he does receives is progress, but the European has centuries of tradition to lose, nothing to gain.” This claim is contestable. Africa’s contribution to world civilisation is well documented (Van Sertima, 1984; Diop, 1984). Some renowned Greek philosophers such as Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Plato, Aristotle and Socrates who are considered to have made indelible contributions to the field of philosophy derived their philosophy from or were educated in Africa (James, 2009).

The hegemonic powers conveniently downplayed and ignored the contribution of the indigenous people of Africa to world civilisation and indeed knowledge production. As Gelfand (1981: 62) argues, “the White man, therefore, expects the African there to be grateful for all this. He has never thought of enquiring what the African considered was best for him. He had no doubt that he would learn the ways of the West. The ‘Black’ man never asked for this ‘civilisation’ but was expected to receive it with open hands.” This was intended to enable them to easily control them on the basis of this questionable generosity. However, colonial education was expressly an education meant to dominate the indigenous people in all spheres of their lives. In this light, it cannot be regarded as a “gain” for the indigenous people of Africa and a “loss” for the hegemonic powers. The reverse is true. Colonial education in fact dehumanised the indigenous people of Africa. It turned them into objects ready to be oppressed in pursuit of the colonial agenda. Such an education was unjust. One key attribute of colonial education was the deliberate suppression of the colonised people of Africa’s epistemological paradigm and the imposition of that of the hegemonic powers. In this light, I would agree with Apple’s (1993: 222) that “education is deeply implicated in the politics of culture. The curriculum is never simply a neutral assemblage of knowledge, somehow appearing in the texts and classrooms of a nation. It is always part of a selective

tradition, someone's selection, some group's vision of legitimate knowledge."

The imposition of colonial epistemicide on the indigenous people was premised on the questionable quest to introduce "modernity" to them. "Modernity" was narrowly understood by the colonists who considered it to be absent among the indigenous people of Africa. Africa was depicted as wholly engrossed in what the hegemonic cultures termed "tradition". A questionable contrast between "modernity" and "tradition" was established. They were taken as polar opposites. "Modernity" became exclusively identified with the West. It was conceived as representing progress. Such an assumed positive trait was considered to be absent in Africa. So was the capacity to reason. On the other hand, "tradition" was identified with Africa and understood as depicting a fixation with the unchanging past.

The imposition of the hegemonic epistemological paradigm on the indigenous people of Africa was premised on the West's "burden" to introduce "modernity" to them. This is contestable. There is a sense in which "tradition" informs "modernity". These terms do not admit of definitions that are uncontentious (Larmore, 1996: 1; Rengger, 2000: 3; Latour, 1993: 10). The term "traditional" has often been understood as that which is unchanging, backward and unscientific while "modernity", which is curiously and solely identified with the Western world, has been understood as a stage of human development characterised by scientific thinking and progress (Gyekye, 1997: 217). That which is considered as "modern" today mutates into "tradition" with the passage of time. By the same reasoning, that which is considered as "tradition" today could have been regarded as "modern" in the past. There is also a sense in which "tradition" subsists in "modernity" (Nhemachena, 2015: 84). It becomes contentious to attempt to regard "modernity" and "tradition" as polar opposites (Gross, 1992: 4). As Gyekye (1997: 217) argues, "the truth of the assertion that every society in the modern world inherits ancestral cultural values implies that modernity is not always a rejection of the past, but it also casts serious doubts on the appropriateness of perceiving tradition and modernity as polar opposites." In the light of the critique of the supposed

“modernity”-“tradition” dichotomy, the imposition of the hegemonic epistemological paradigm on the pretext that Africa is fixated in “tradition” becomes untenable.

Despite its outside projection as well-intentioned, “modernity” must properly be understood as form of violence on the conquered people (Dussel and Ibarra-Colado, 2006: 489). Modernity mandates itself to the use of violent means in order to gain acceptance by the targeted people for their own assumed “benefit”. As Dussel (2000: 472) argues:

the modern civilization casts itself as a superior, developed civilization (something tantamount to unconsciously upholding a Eurocentric position). The aforementioned superiority makes the improvement of the most barbaric, primitive, coarse people a moral obligation (from Ginés de Sepúlveda until Kant or Hegel). The model of this educational process is that implemented by Europe itself (in fact, it is a unilineal, European development that will eventually-and unconsciously-result in the “developmentalist fallacy”).

The deceptive attributes of the imposed hegemonic epistemological paradigm resides in its pretensions to improve the lives of its recipients when in fact it attempts at destroying the epistemological paradigm of those conquered. For Santos, Nunes and Meneses (2007: xxxiii), “from the fifteenth century onwards, the constitution of the “modern/colonial world system” rested upon multiple “creative destructions,” often carried out on behalf of “civilizing,” liberating, or emancipatory projects, which aimed at reducing the understandings of the world to the logic of Western epistemology.” In this light, the “modern” world can be equated to a colonised world. The imposition of Western “modernity” has actually resulted in the attempts at decimating the indigenous people of Africa’s epistemological paradigm and their agency as creators and contributors to knowledge generation and development. I now turn to a discussion on how colonial epistemicide attempted to decimate the creative potentials of the indigenous people of Africa through the denial of their contribution to the global stock of knowledge and human civilisation.

Colonial epistemicide and Africa's underdevelopment

One of the attributes of colonial education in Africa was the attempt at epistemicide. Epistemicide refers to the hegemonic knowledge paradigm's attempt at the partial or near total destruction of the epistemological paradigm of the colonised people (Nyamnjoh, 2012: 129). In defining epistemicide, Santos (2006: 14) argues that:

First, the expansion of Western-based global capitalism was made possible and justified by the supposedly all-powerful and only valid form of rationality and knowledge, modern science. On this basis an immense variety of non-Western, non-scientific knowledges were destroyed, suppressed or marginalized and, with them, the peoples whose lives and practices were run according to such knowledges. This destruction of knowledge I call epistemicide, and more often than not it took place concomitantly with genocide. Acknowledging this fact amounts to recognizing that the understanding of the world by far exceeds the Western understanding of the world.

The claim to transcultural application of the West's epistemological paradigm reflects its unjust dominance that is anchored on the partial destruction of the epistemological paradigms from other geopolitical centres. In the case of Africa, the destruction of their epistemological paradigm was partial and not total. The partial destruction of the indigenous people of Africa's epistemological paradigm was done in order to downplay their agency in knowledge generation and its use in the development agendas of their own societies. Colonial epistemicide prepared the way for the hegemonic powers to easily dominate the indigenous people and exploit their wealth for their own benefit. The hegemonic powers tried to downplay the indigenous people's creative potentials by imposing on them an epistemology of conquest. Quite expectedly, the same epistemological paradigm was not extended to the hegemonic powers who were supposed to occupy the position of authority in the colonies.

The epistemology that the hegemonic people imposed on the indigenous people conditioned them to be content with their foisted

low position as collaborators to the hegemonic powers in plundering their resources. I submit that the signs and effects of colonial epistemicide are still visible in the present day in Africa. The hegemonic powers' epistemological paradigm is still the dominant one in Africa's curricular. The indigenous people continue to be educated to accept their imposed inferior position in the development of their own societies. The hegemonic powers have retained their dominance over the indigenous people (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013: 16-18). The questionable incompetence of the indigenous people of Africa in advancing their development agenda continues to define the relations between the hegemonic powers and the indigenous people of Africa.

Colonial epistemicide must be questioned for its false pretences to rescuing the indigenous people of Africa from their supposed inferior knowledge potentials and abilities. Its true character as an epistemology of domination must be emphasised. Colonial epistemicide's attempt at destroying and suppressing the indigenous people of Africa's epistemology and creative potentials must be challenged and rejected. The liberation of the indigenous people from this epistemology of domination becomes necessary in order to reassert the indigenous people of Africa's epistemological paradigm and their agency as competent agents of the development of their own societies. In the following section, I submit that the liberation of the indigenous people of Africa from colonial epistemicide is necessary in order to reassert their agency as creators of knowledge and contributors to the development of their own societies.

A quest for epistemic liberation

Colonial epistemicide has outlived the "official" end of colonialism. The liberation of African countries from colonial domination is indeed liberation in name but in reality they remain under colonial domination (wa Thiong'o, 1981: 11). It is deceptive independence. The enduring presence of colonial epistemicide and its effects on the indigenous people of Zimbabwe is evidence of the cosmetic nature of independence of African countries from colonial domination. This independence can best be defined as "guided

independence” since the hegemonic powers have simply shifted from use of overt mechanism of control of the colonised people to the use of covert ones in order to retain their dominance over them. Direct colonialism has been replaced by neo-colonialism (Chung and Ngara, 1985: 58). It has become the new form of dominance. As Nkrumah (1965: x) argues, “a State in the grip of neo-colonialism is not master of its own destiny.” It is because of the deceptive nature of the independence that countries in Africa have attained that I use the term “independence” in this work with caution. It is necessary to enclose it in quotation marks.

Though Nkrumah’s (1965) views were expressed in the 1960s, they are still quite relevant in present day Africa. This is exemplified by the continued existence of colonial epistemicide despite the attainment of “independence” by countries in Africa. The mutation of colonialism into its present day disguised forms has been supported by Latin American thinkers such as Anibal Quijano (2000), Walter Mignolo (2002) and Maldonado-Torres (2007). According to these thinkers, colonialism has mutated into coloniality. Just like, neo-colonialism, coloniality refers to the covert grip of the hegemonic powers on the colonised people under the pretences of extending “modernity” to them. In fact, the hidden agenda of “modernity” is coloniality (Mignolo, 2005: 112; Mignolo, 2011: 1). Coloniality retains the basic features of colonialism. According to Maldonado-Torres (2007: 243):

coloniality is different from colonialism. Colonialism denotes a political and economic relation in which the sovereignty of a nation or a people rests on the power of another nation, which makes such nation an empire. Coloniality, instead, refers to long-standing patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that define culture, labour, intersubjective relations, and knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations.

The power relations between the hegemonic cultures and the indigenous people of Africa remain fundamentally unchanged and in some cases it has worsened. One form of coloniality is coloniality of knowledge. Coloniality of knowledge refers to the continued grip of

hegemonic epistemological paradigm on the colonised people on grounds of its assumed enduring superiority. Both neo-colonialism and coloniality of knowledge must be rejected because of their concealed attempts at perpetuating the hegemony of Eurocentrism in present day Africa. They must be rejected because they continue to suppress the agency of the indigenous people of Africa as contributors to knowledge production and development of their own societies and the global community. The epistemic liberation of the indigenous people of Africa becomes necessary in order to reassert their agency.

The liberation of the indigenous people of Africa's epistemological paradigm is not an easy task. As Chung and Ngara (1985: 51) argue, "mental colonization is one of the most difficult phenomena to eradicate." The hegemonic cultures are bound to frustrate such an endeavour because it seeks to challenge one of the pillars of colonialism, that is, the control of the sphere of knowledge. The reassertion of the indigenous people of Africa's agency and creative potentials surely put to question the hegemonic powers' contestable claim that they are the initiators of development in Africa-a feat they regard as deserving accolades and not criticisms. This assumed act of generosity was indeed not solicited but deliberately imposed. It must be duly challenged and rejected. This can be done by way of changing the curriculum at all levels so that the new one includes the knowledge paradigm of the indigenous people of Africa in addition to paradigms from other geopolitical centres. The changed curriculum must accommodate diverse knowledge paradigms. This is in recognition of the diversity of knowledge paradigms and indeed their producers. By calling for the inclusion of the indigenous people's knowledge paradigm in the changed curriculum, I am accenting to the thesis that the inclusion of diverse epistemological paradigms into the transformed curriculum is enriching to the indigenous people of Africa. Africa's development agenda can be enhanced by including what the indigenous people of Africa take as the best of the different epistemological paradigms of this world, including their own, in the transformed curriculum. Unqualified romanticism of the knowledge paradigm of the indigenous people of Africa without also considering

the meaningful contribution that other knowledge paradigms make to the development of Africa is untenable. The same can be said of the curricula in other geopolitical centres.

The educational curriculum in present day Africa fundamentally retains its colonial character.¹⁸ It principally teaches its recipients to be workers and not to be initiators and active contributors to the development of their own countries. It prepares them to be potential job seekers and not independent creators of wealth. The absence of jobs as a result the problems that the “postcolonial”¹⁹ states face has expectedly led to the flight of these job-seeking graduates to some few economically stable African countries or to the colonial capitals. Such is the indictment of the existing curriculum that churns out workers and not job creators. The absence of the so-called foreign investment is a source of anguish to these job-seeking graduates because the education that they receive prepares them specifically for that office. On top of that, this education is predominantly Eurocentric in regard to its content (Ramose, 2003b: 137).

The epistemological paradigm of the indigenous people of Africa remains sidelined from the mainstream educational curriculum. This, in my view, is problematic because it inculcates, in the indigenous people of Africa, the objectionable idea that they do not have an

¹⁸ As Mazrui (2003) argues, “the original colonial university was so uncompromisingly foreign in an African context, and was transplanted with few concessions to African cultures, its impact was more culturally alienating than it need have been. A whole generation of African graduates grew up despising their own ancestry, and scrambling to imitate the West.” This is largely true of the present day situation in Africa. In reference to the South African education, Ramose (2003b: 137) argues that the curriculum requires a change so that it includes the educational paradigm of the indigenous people of South Africa. Ramose (2003b: 137) makes such a plea because “...the dominant paradigm in the sphere of formal education in South Africa continues to be that imposed upon the indigenous conquered peoples by the colonizer in the course of the unjust wars of colonization.” I argue that this remain the *status quo* in other countries in Africa that have endured the menace of colonialism.

¹⁹ The term “postcolonial” is used with caution in this chapter because colonialism still subsists despite its deceptive end. I concur with Santos, Nunes and Meneses (2007: xxxv) that “although the “post” in post-colonialism is indicative of the end of colonialism and imperialism as direct political dominance, it does imply the demise of imperialism as a global system of hegemonic powers.”

epistemology of their own which must, as of necessity, be included in the mainline curriculum. This curriculum does not instil confidence in the indigenous people of Africa to strive to be initiators of development in their own countries. In Zimbabwe, for example, the Report of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Education and Training (1999: 24) notes that the colonial curriculum for the indigenous people “...was deliberately designed to produce poorly educated children who could be cheap labourers for the white employers and communities.” That is why I submit that the curriculum in countries in Africa requires urgent change so that its content also reflects the agency and contribution of the indigenous people of Africa to knowledge production and development.

Concluding remarks

The thesis that I have presented in this chapter is that Africa will remain mired in underdevelopment if its own indigenous people play peripheral roles to the development of their own countries. But the agency and active participation of the indigenous people in development projects has been hampered by colonial epistemology that was imposed on them and is still in existence in present day curriculum. This unjust imposition was based on the hegemonic powers’ contestable ‘right of conquest’ (Ramose, 2004: 138). This epistemology that anchored colonial education, instructed the indigenous people of Africa to accept their own inferiority to the hegemonic powers. The indigenous people were considered as a people bereft of rationality, an epistemology and capacity to exploit their own resources for their own benefit. The hegemonic powers thus imposed what they termed “development” on the indigenous people of Africa. However, this foisted paradigm was deceptive as it actually precipitated the underdevelopment of a continent that had experienced phenomenal growth and high levels of civilisation prior to colonisation (Van Sertima, 1984: 16; Smith, 2007: 23). In the light of this situation, I argued that there is urgent need for the liberation of the indigenous people of Africa from colonial epistemicide.

The indigenous people of Africa must reassert their agency by way of changing the educational curriculum so that it allows the

mutual existence of the indigenous people's epistemological paradigm and paradigms from other geopolitical centres. The elements of the hegemonic epistemological paradigm that have tended to demean the creative potentials of the indigenous people of Africa must be eliminated so that these diverse paradigms assist in the development of this continent.

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African Political Parties and the Question of Development and Underdevelopment: Insights from Nigeria

Johnson O. Olaniyi

Introduction

Historically speaking, the concepts of ‘development’ and ‘underdevelopment’ had their origin deeply rooted in the discipline of Economics. Early Economic theorists like Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill explained the growth of a nation from the perspective of economic development and underdevelopment. Furthermore, most of their definitions of Economics as a field of study were premised on development and underdevelopment. For instance, Smith (as cited by Hanson, 1977) considered his work on economics to be an inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations. Similarly, Mill (as cited by Hanson, 1977: 5) perceived economics as “the practical science of the production and distribution of wealth”. The concepts of development and underdevelopment became popular in political discourse with the era of ‘imperialism’, ‘colonialism’ and ‘neo-colonialism’. The industrial revolution in Europe in the eighteenth century precipitated imperialism and colonialism. Imperialism is explained by Roberts and Edwards (1991:61) as “the policy or practice of one state imposing its rule over another state or territory, not necessarily contiguous or ethnically similar, for the purpose of economic advantage.” In a similar vein, McLean and Mcmillan (2009:92) defined colonialism as “the policy and practice of a strong power extending its control territorially over a weaker nation or people”.

The definitions of both concepts (imperialism and colonialism) reveal a commonality. They are both a practice whereby a foreign state lords itself over a weaker state. However, the line of demarcation inherent in them is that imperialism is premised mainly

on the economic aspect of political subjugation. But to gain access to the economic power, it needs political power. This brought about the idea of colonialism which capitalises on political power by subjugating the colonised territories. Therefore, when a territory has been successfully subjugated by a foreign power, its economy will be controlled by it. This was the experience of the peoples of what later became known as the 'African Continent'.

The domination of the economic activities of Africans started witnessing resistance from some nationalists across the continent as early as late nineteenth (19th) century. For instance, in Gold Coast (now Ghana) John Mensah Sarbah founded Aborigines' Rights Protection Society (ARPS) in 1897 to protest the forceful conversion of indigenous lands in the colony to 'crown lands'. Another Gold Coaster, Casely Hayford founded 'National Congress of British West Africa' (NCBWA) which had auxiliary arms in all the four British West African territories (Nigeria, Sierra Leone, The Gambia and Gold Coast) in 1920. One of the demands of the body as reflected in its eight-point demand it sent to Sir Milverton, the then 'Colonial Secretary' in London, was increased participation of West Africans in the economic activities of the sub-region (Coleman, 1986).

Furthermore, some Pan African nationalists like William Dubois, Marcus Garvey and George Padmore anchored their nationalist struggle on the economic exploitation of the peoples of Africa. In order to actualise their aim of emancipating Africans from the clutches of colonialism, African nationalists pressed for the independence of their various countries. This they did by pressurising various colonial governments in different parts of the continent to either introduce 'elective principle' (the practice of electing representatives into public offices or increase the participation of Africans in the affairs affecting them. The strategy was aimed at guaranteeing direct participation of Africans in governance. The struggle later paid off as some colonial powers introduced elective principles which paved the way for party formation. Nigeria was the first country in British West African territories to experience the introduction of 'elective principle' and political party formation. The Clifford Constitution of 1922 which happened to be the first Constitution in British West Africa provided for 'elective principle'

and the platform by which representatives would be elected by allowing nationalists to form political parties. Consequently, the first political party in the history of Nigeria, Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) was formed in 1923 by Herbert Macaulay (Sklar, 1983). This was the only political party that contested the October 1923 election (first election to be held in the country) into the Legislative Council. Since that time, Nigerian political parties have been contributing to the political development or otherwise of the country.

One of the elements of democratic practice in a liberal state is the existence of political parties. Like any other 'political game' (any political activity involving the inter-play of two or more people) activities of political parties in any clime are usually governed by a number of rules and regulations. For instance, how they perform their constitutional responsibilities (functions) or abide by the 'Code of Conduct' governing their operations is a manifestation of their level of development. A political party that fails to play the political game in line with the code of conduct governing political parties' activities in a country will be deemed to having low 'political culture' which is a manifestation of underdevelopment. On the other hand, a political party that plays the political game in line with the rules that govern political party politicking will be adjudged as having a 'high political culture' which is a reflection of development.

This chapter focuses on how Nigerian political parties have fared so far in the area of the argument on development and underdevelopment, that is, whether they have been contributing to the development of the country or not. The analytic tool adopted for our evaluation is the traditional functions of political parties. In order to have a better understanding of our discourse and have a common parameter for measuring their (political parties) activities vis-à-vis the debate on development and underdevelopment, I shall place a greater emphasis on the 'Fourth Nigerian Republic'. In doing all these, the chapter adopts historical-cum-comparative methods as its research instrument.

The general objective of this work is to evaluate the contributions of Nigerian political parties to the development or underdevelopment of the country. The specific objectives of the

study include: (i) to assess the trend of political party politicking in Nigeria from 1923 to date; (ii) to examine the extent to which Nigerian political parties have conformed with the rule of the game governing political party activities in the country; and (iii) to determine whether Nigerian political parties have been agent of underdevelopment or development through the performance of their traditional functions.

This chapter is divided into a number of sections namely: the introduction, conceptual clarifications, Nigerian political parties and the question of development and underdevelopment, and the conclusion.

Conceptual clarifications

The main focus of this chapter is to discuss in chronological order, the activities of political parties in Nigeria vis-à-vis the debate on underdevelopment and development. In order to comprehend the research area, as common with any academic discourse, attempts shall be made to carry out an exploration of some concepts considered germane to this study. They include: political party, underdevelopment and development.

Political party

Political Party is a form of association. Associations usually take diverse forms, examples of which include: political, economic, religious, cultural and social. Associations are usually formed by a group of individuals to champion a particular course of action. This explains why ‘interest’ (a shared attitude concerning a claim or claims to be made by one group upon certain other groups in a social system) is considered as being central to the formation of any association. For example, Bentley (cited in Varma, 1982), one of the earlier major proponents of ‘Group Theory’ (an approach to the study of political phenomenon which states that rather than the individual or the society/state emphasis should be on the groups as the basic unit in the study of politics) argues that “the group and the interest are not separate”. It is the interest which leads to the

organisation of groups and that groups exist to see to their own betterment.

Political party as a form of association is differentiated from all other forms of association because it has a sole aim which is that of capturing political power. Therefore, it has political objective. All the other associations in a society cannot contest this aim with it. Although it is possible for a ‘pressure or interest group’; (an association formed by a group of individuals in a society to influence government’s policy actions) to have a political objective, it cannot field candidates for elections. Consequently, it can be argued that all other associations in a society other than political parties are either pressure or interest groups or both. The foregoing gives a picture of the indispensability of political parties in any democracy. And, unlike a pressure group whose activities can be substituted with that of another interest group, the statutory responsibilities of a political party have no replacement.

Conceptually, the term “political party” has continued to attract different definitions from scholars of diverse backgrounds. Its definition has also been polluted by the constitution engineers of various countries. But despite this challenge, as will be revealed later in this chapter what is common with virtually all definitions provided so far is that political party is the only platform through which the ruling class or the political elites of a state is constituted.

Edmund Burke (1839) cited in Lapalombara and Anderson (2001) is commonly regarded as the pioneer political theorist on political party and public interest. According to him:

Party is a body of men united, for promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest, upon some particular principle upon which they are all agreed (cited in Lapalombara and Anderson, 2001: 394).

Although this study has revealed that his definition was not a perfect one, for instance, it leaves out the main aim of a political party which is capturing political power, it touches on how a political party can contribute to the development of a state through ‘national integration’ and promotion of public interest. National integration

can be explained as all activities geared towards the cohesion of a state. When a country is united, there will be progress and development. There can be no progress and development in the absence of unity. This can be provided by a political party via its organisation and activities. Promotion of public interest (common good) is also germane to the political and economic development of a State. Towards this, party programmes/ manifestoes must reflect welfare packages for all and sundry. Most modern political theorists who have proffered explanations to the meaning of political parties improved upon the definition of Edmund Burke. For instance, they addressed the issue of the aim of a political party- capturing political power. Few of them will be cited in this chapter. Their examples include: Appadorai (2004) Lapalombara and Anderson (2001) Schumpeter (1974) Rimi (2010).

According to Appadorai (2004: 537):

A political party is a more or less organised group of citizens who act together as a political unit have distinctive aims and opinions on the leading political questions of controversy in the state, and who, by acting together as a political unit, seek to obtain control of the government.

The above definition as offered by Appadorai (2004) reflects some of the attributes of a political party and what makes it relevant to the discourse on development and underdevelopment. For instance, it stresses that a party must have 'distinctive aims and opinions on the leading political questions of controversy in the state'. What this translates to is that the positions of a political party on national issues or matters of public interest must be ones reflecting the political advancement or development of a country and not private or sectional interest. Therefore, a political party whose origin is anchored on ethnic chauvinism can hardly be an instrument of national integration or political development through its activities.

Lapalombara and Anderson (2001:394) in their own view offered what they described as 'a working definition' of political party. According to them:

A party is any political group, in possession of an official label and of a formal organisation that links centre and locality, that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections (free or non-free), candidates for public office.

Lapalombara and Anderson's (2001) definition addressed some of the attributes of a political party. Very relevant to this work is the area relating to the integrative function of a political party. Political parties, especially 'mass parties', perform integrative role better than 'elite parties' which usually have restricted membership. Furthermore, political parties should perform the task of interest aggregators by serving as the mortgage between the 'governor' and 'the governed'. Through this, public interest will be promoted thus, enhancing not only political development but development in all its dimensions.

All the positions of scholars on political parties that have been reviewed so far appreciated that political parties are indispensable institution in any political system. Consequently, they often make significant contributions to the development of a state. This notwithstanding, some scholars see the role of political parties in a society as a dysfunctional one which does not contribute much to development. One of such scholars is Schumpeter (1976) (cited in Lapalombara and Anderson 2001), a protagonist of the public interest school championed by Edmund Burke. He posits that political parties are always out to promote 'private interest'. According to him:

A party is a group whose members propose to act in concert in the competitive struggle for power... Party and machine politicians are simply the response to the fact that the electoral mass is incapable of action other than in a stampede, and they constitute an attempt to regulate political competition exactly similar to the corresponding practice of a trade association (cited in Lapalombara and Anderson, 2001:394).

Schumpeter's position is a reflection of a negative role that a political party can play in the underdevelopment of a state. When a

political party promotes private interest (those activities that will benefit itself per se) at the neglect of common good, the country will suffer a setback in political and economic development.

Development and underdevelopment

The understanding of development and underdevelopment stems from the idea of 'undevelopment' which literally connotes the state of nature. That is when nothing has been done to tamper with the nature. Development creeps in the very moment the nature is tempered with. For instance, a farmer who tills a fallow ground has set in motion the process of development. What follows is conjectural. In essence, development can only come into being as a result of a frontal clash between an individual and his/her environment. The understanding of development will give a clear picture of underdevelopment.

According to Gregory (1982:73), the meaning of development is the subject of a wide ranging debate which focuses on a discussion of strategies. He argues that "it is frequently assumed that there is agreement about goals, and that the real question is how to achieve them". The main goal of development in any clime is "self-dependence' and this explains why each state usually develop its own 'traditional' mode of achieving this end. It is lack of agreement about strategies that often bring about debates on development amongst various scholars of different geographical locations (for example, West /East or Developed/ Underdeveloped).

With the above background knowledge of the debate on development, Gregory (1982:73) posits that "a popular concept of the goal of development, with which many would agree, is that development is the change by which poor countries become more like rich ones".

Gregory adds that his definition underlies the conventional wisdom of development and is based on three assumptions:

1. Development is primarily a measure of wealth.
2. To develop is to become more like rich countries; and
3. It is poor countries that require development (Gregory, 1982:73).

The conception of development as would be seen in this chapter transcends economic understanding as being painted by Gregory (1982). To be candid, development is encompassing and it can manifest in all facets of life, politics inclusive. Furthermore, to develop is not only to be like rich countries but any nation that is more advanced than another country. His assumption that it is only poor countries that require development is far from the truth because no matter the level of development of a state, it does not rest on its oars. Instead, it constantly makes efforts to improve on its achievement. Consequently, it can be argued that development is a life-long project and this explains why developing states of the world have not been able to catch up with the developed countries.

Seers (1969), however, has a different notion of development. He bases his position on the goals of development rather than means of achieving it. He is of the view that development should lead to the realisation of the potentials of the human personality. Towards this end, he suggests three criteria for development, namely;

1. Food situation and/or the money to buy it; this furnishes energy and good health. A state that cannot produce enough to feed itself should be adjudged an underdeveloped one. Equally important is the fact that, the food must be nutritious;

2. Job –what is the unemployment rate? Or do people get satisfying employment? To depend on someone else's productivity negates self-respect; and

3. Equality of income /wealth, that is, are the resources in the society equitably shared? Or do people have access to the available resources? (Seers, 1969:206).

Shaw and Heard (1982) note that Seer's position represents a re-definition of "development" and implies the rejection of the three assumptions which previously underlie the conventional wisdom of development. These are: that development is a measure of wealth; to develop is to become more like rich countries; and that only poor countries require development. I am of the view that while Seer's effort is an improvement over the positions of some scholars who limited the understanding of development to economy, it can no longer stand the test of time because it leaves out the political dimension of development.

The frailties of Gregory (1982) and Seer's (1969) positions, for example, have been taken care of by the definitions of some scholars who are mainly from developing states of the world. One of them is an African, Rodney (1981) who advanced three different views of the definition of development. He argued that development can manifest in any or a combination of the following forms:

- (a) Development at the level of individual in the society;
- (b) Development at the level of social groups; and
- (c) Development at the level of political subjugation (Dudley, 1981:9).

According to Dudley (1981:9) development at the level of individual in the society connotes "increased skill and capacity, greater freedom, creativity, self-discipline, responsibility and material well-being". He argued that "some of these are virtually moral categories and are difficult to evaluate". Without prejudice to Rodney's latter position, I am of the view that a critical analysis of this side of development as advanced by Rodney will give insights into the plurality of development. Seeing development from the perspective of 'increased skill and capacity' suggests a situation whereby the bulk of the population of a state are in the 'professional class' as opposed to the 'generalist class'. Again, development as a measure of 'greater freedom' is a situation whereby for a state to be adjudged as being developed, it must accord greater respect to individual enjoyment of fundamental human rights. Their examples include: freedom of speech, freedom of association and assembly, freedom of worship and freedom to own property. Therefore, in line with the main thrust of this chapter, the government of a state that prohibits party formation as was the experience of Libya under Mohammed Ghadafi from 1969 to 2011, will be deemed to having a 'low political culture' which is an indice of underdevelopment.

'Creativity' suggests that for a state to be seen as a developed entity, its citizens must be innovative. However, it is one thing for the citizens of a state to be innovative but what is more important is for the government to give them encouragement. A state that kills the initiatives of its citizens is miles away from development. 'Self-discipline' connotes abstinence from acts that are detrimental to the progress of a state on one hand, and injuring the feelings of one's

fellow citizen on the other. Relating this to party-politics, political actors of a developed State should play political game with utmost respect for the rule of the game. Political parties should not be formed by them to promote sectional interest and they should be ready to abide by the outcome of credible elections. Furthermore, they should shun the assassination of the character of their political opponents and political thuggery too.

‘Responsibility and material well-being’ can be explained as putting one’s wealth into use for the development of a country. This is economic in nature. The second side of development as espoused by Rodney (1981) is at the level of ‘social groups’. What informs his position is that “each social group comes into contact with others”. He defines development at the level of “social groups” as “an increasing capacity to regulate both internal and external relationship” (Rodney, 1981:10). He finally opines that; “development in the past has always meant the increase the ability to guard the independence of the social group and indeed to infringe upon the freedom of others –something that often came about irrespective of the will of the persons within the societies involved”. The latter part of his conceptualisation of development from the perspective of ‘social groups’ to a large extent connotes political subjugation which often takes the form of colonialism. This does not fall within the preview of this study but the first part does.

The ability of political leaders and various socio-political institutions to regulate both internal and external relationships in a state is a sign of development. Their failure to achieve this will lead to political disequilibrium or disintegration. Political party is one of the political institutions in a country. It has as one of its main task, national integration. It must be seen a unifying factor where by people of different sociological backgrounds or ethnic nationalities are brought under one umbrella for the task of promoting ‘public interest’. When a political parity has a sectional outlook it will no doubt promote ‘private interest’. Consequently, it will be seen as a mechanism of national disintegration there by contributing to the (political) underdevelopment of a country.

The third view of Rodney (1981) on development is at the level of political subjugation explained as a situation in which a more

powerful state or group forcefully takes over the control of another entity and impose its administrative arrangement on it. This side of development more readily fits into the idea of colonialism. But it can also be argued to be relevant to the experience of a country where a particular section or region holds on tenaciously to the leadership position at the expense of the interest of the other sections of the country.

The three sides of development advanced by Rodney (1981) readily fall into the abstraction of ‘political development’ considered relevant to the understanding of the question of how political parties can contribute to the development of a state. Therefore, development is not only an economic term. In fact, Rodney posits that:

Development cannot be seen purely as an economic affair, but rather as an overall social process which is dependent upon the outcome of man’s efforts to deal with his natural environment (Rodney, 1981:12).

Barling and Akinrinade (1987:7) equally share Rodney’s position by positing that; “development, however, should not merely be seen as a reflection of material production or potentialities of production, it also refers to the entire process of change”. Furthermore, Todaro and Smith (2009, cited in Bandara, 2012: 4) argue that: “development in its essence represents the whole gamut of change by which an entire social system turned to the diverse basic needs and desires of individuals and social groups within that system, moves away from a condition of life widely perceived as unsatisfactory towards a situation or condition of life regarded as materially and spiritually better”. What this portends is ‘change’ which is an attribute of development. In a similar vein, Bello (2012: 73) posits that “development is the end product of social, political and economic planning which every country strives to attain”. For development to take place, political parties have a role to play in a society. They must be prepared to shed their old toga of promoting private interest and embrace public interest.

From political perspective, an underdeveloped State is a country that has among others, a low political culture which masquerades in the form of: intolerance to opposition; political parties promoting sectional interest; origins of parties being anchored on ethnic chauvinism; lack of respect for the fundamental human rights of citizens and failure to abide by the outcomes of credible elections.

Nigerian political parties and the question of development and underdevelopment

This section of the chapter addresses how Nigerian political parties have fared on issues bordering on development and underdevelopment. It is divided into two parts, namely;

1. Origin of party-politics in Nigeria; and
2. the question of development and underdevelopment vis-à-vis party-politics in Nigeria.

Origin of party-politics in Nigeria

Nationalist agitation in Nigeria gave birth to ‘elective principle’ which in turn precipitated political parties’ formation. The opposition of nationalists to the composition of the ‘Nigerian Council’ of 1914 led by Herbert Macaulay stemmed from its composition and powers. It was made up of thirty-six (36) members, all appointed by the colonial government headed by Sir Friedrich Lugard (later Lord Lugard). Of the thirty-six members, only six, all unofficial members, were Nigerians. The four Nigerians were traditional rulers (heads of communities). They included two Emirs from Northern Nigeria, the Alafin of Oyo in Western Nigeria, one member each from Lagos, Calabar and Benin-Warri area (Sklar 1983). Apart from the unrepresentativeness of the Council, the Nigerian Nationalists also criticised it on its power which was advisory in nature. Consequently, they demanded for a real legislative house that would not only possess legislative powers (power to make laws or formulate policies) but elected African members.

The nationalists’ effort at championing democratic practice in the country received impetus through the activities of a pressure group,

National Congress of British West Africa (NCBWA), which was founded by a Gold Coaster, Casely Hayford and formally established in March, 1920. The group was pragmatic in its quest for the enthronement of democratic institution in the British West Africa composed of Nigeria, The Gambia, Sierra Leone and Gold Coastal (now Ghana). This was manifested in its decision to send a delegation to London to meet the Secretary of State, for the colonies, Lord Milner in 1920 for the onward delivery of their petition to King George V. According to Coleman (1986:191-192) among other items, the Congress asked for:

- I. A legislative Council in each territory, half of whose members would be elected Africans;
- II. African veto over taxation;
- III. Separation of the judiciary from the legislative branch of the government;
- IV. Appointment and deposition of Chiefs by their own people;
- V. Abolition of racial discrimination in the civil service;
- VI. Development of municipal government;
- VII. Repeal of certain “Obnoxious” ordinances;
- VIII. Regulation of immigration of Syrians and other non-Africa;
- IX. Establishment of a University in West Africa.

According to Coleman (1986), the delegation that presented the petition remained in London from October, 1920 until February 1921 and in the process, established contacts with the League of Nations Union, the *Bureau International pour la Defense des Indigenes*, the Welfare Committee for Africans in Europe, the African Progress Union and West African students resident in London. The effort of the delegation did not pay-off immediately due to the fact that lord Milner, Secretary of State for colonies, rejected its demands. His action was predicated upon unfavourable reports on the delegation from the governors of the British West African territories. It should be noted that the rivalry between NCBWA and the Aborigines Rights Protection Society (ARPS) founded by another Gold Coaster, John Mensah Sarbah in 1887 to oppose the conversion of indigenous lands to crown land’ was actually responsible for the cold reception the

delegates of NCBWA got from the Secretary of State for colonies. NCBWA was more pragmatic than ARPS in its approach to issues.

The effort of NBWA eventually paid off when the Clifford Constitution of 1922 provided for 'elective principle'. The Constitution which was the first of its kind not only in Nigeria but British West African territories provided that four of the thirty-six members of the then Legislative Council to be established should be elected. However, since political party is the only platform through which political office holders could be recruited in an ideal democratic setting. The Colonial Governor of the territory Sir Hugh Clifford, gave a go-ahead order for political party(-ies) to be formed in the country. This was done in preparation for the election of 1923. Consequent upon this development, on June 24, 1923, Herbert Macaulay and his associates (Egerton-Shyngle, Dr. J. C., Vaughan, Eric O. Moore and Dr. C.C. Adeniyi-Jones) inaugurated the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), the first political party in the history of not only the country, but British West African territories. While Herbert Macaulay was named the leader of the party, Egerton-Shyngle was elected its first president (Sklar, 1983). Candidates contested elections into the Legislative Council seat of Lagos and Calabar in October, 1923 under the platform of the party. The first set of the elected legislators were: Egerton-Shyngle, Dr. C.C. Adeniyi-Jones, Eric O. Moore, and Kwamina- Attah Aminu.

Beginning from 1923 to-date, several political parties had been formed at different times in the country. The latest set of political parties operating in the country number forty-three (Ogunbuyi, 2015: 6). The major ones among them include: the All Progressive Congress (APC), founded in February 2013, Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) founded in 1998, All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA) founded in 2002 and the Labour Party (LP) founded in 2002. These political parties and their predecessors have had their actions and inactions affecting the quest of successive governments in Nigeria to emancipate the country and push for development.

The question of development and underdevelopment vis-a-vis party-politics in Nigeria

As noted in the introductory aspect of this chapter, my position on how Nigerian political parties have fared in the area of development and underdevelopment will be anchored on the analysis of the traditional functions of political parties in any political system.

The general functions of political parties are usually presented in divergent forms. Such presentations are however, a matter of language because when critically examined it will be seen that they portray similar understanding. This explains why their manner of presentation usually differs from one scholar to another. For the purpose of this chapter, the views of two African scholars on the fundamental functions of a political party in any state will be adopted as the basic for assessing how Nigerian political parties have contributed to the development of the country. The two scholars are: Agbaje (2015) and Zoaka (2010).

Agbaje (2015:197) lists the following as the main functions of political parties in any political system in the universe:

- i. Representation;
- ii. elite formation and recruitment;
- iii. goal formulation;
- iv. interest articulation and aggregation;
- v. socialisation and mobilisation; and
- vi. organisation of government.

Zoaka's (2010:125-126) view on the general functions of political parties is not totally different from that of Agbaje (2010) except that two of the functions the formal itemised were not captured by the latter. They are:

- a. The parties unite, simplify and stabilize the political process; and
- b. Political parties provide a link between the government and the people.

The positions of Agbaje (2015) and Zoaka (2010) represent the views of other scholars from other climes. For instance, Lapalombara and Anderson (2001: 400-406) list the following as party functions: leadership recruitment, formation of government, political identity and the vote, mobilisation and integration. As stated earlier, our

analysis will be premised on the submissions of Agbaje (2015) and Zoaka (2010) because their views are representative enough.

i. Representation

This is explained as a democratic principle whereby individuals of different shades of opinion are elected into public offices by electorate to represent their interest (Chaturvedi, 2006). Roberts and Edwards (1991:123) also explain it as “a process in which one person or group has the capacity, usually formally established, to speak and act on behalf of a larger number of other persons or groups. Very sacrosanct to representative principle in a liberal democracy is the idea that representatives must have the mandate conferred on them by electorate and they must be fielded by political parties. Their emergence as the candidates of their respective political parties must, however, follow constitutional provisions and the bye-laws of their political parties. But since the constitutions of various political parties usually take diverse forms depending on the interest of their founding fathers, our rubric of the assessment of how political parties have fared in the area of representation vis-à-vis development will be based on the constitutional provisions.

The issue of representation was not addressed by successive constitutions in Nigeria until the Second Republic. For instance, in the colonial days, all the political parties that operated in the country had sectional outlook. The National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons (later, National Council of Nigerian Citizens) (NCNC) which appeared to have a national outlook at inception in 1944 later got reduced to a regional party in 1954 when its leadership was hijacked by the Igbo speaking group from the East. The NNDP founded in 1923 had its activities confined to Lagos and Calabar (two major towns in the South). Its candidates for the elections of 1923, 1928, 1932 and 1938 were determined by the leadership of the party. In fact, it was an attempt to challenge the hegemonic policy of the leadership of the party in determining its candidates for elections, in 1943, that led to the ‘political death’ of the party. The 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria was the first Constitution that made it compulsory for governments and political parties to give consideration to ‘federal character principle’ in

appointment makings. The 1999 Constitution of the Fourth Republic also built on this. What informed the enshrinement of the representative principle in the constitution was the experience of Nigerians in the First Republic and during military rule that lasted from 1966 to 1979. Appointments were then made without giving serious consideration to the major sections of the country. Consequently, they used to be lopsided in nature. For instance, during the military regime of General Mohammad Buhari, the two most powerful public offices were occupied by Northerners/Muslims. They were General Mohammad Buhari as the Head of State and Major-General Tunde Idiagbon as the Chief of Staff Supreme Headquarters (Second in Command to General Mohammad Buhari). Section 14(3) of the 1979 Constitutions of the Federal Republic of Nigeria separately made provision for 'quota system' in appointment makings. It partly provides that:

The composition of the Government of the Federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote National Unity, and also to command national loyalty, thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few states or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that government or any of its agencies

The appropriate section of the Constitution as it applies to states and Local Government Areas is 14(4).

In the First Republic, the Coalition Government of the Northern People's Congress (NPC) and National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) shared political and executive powers between South and East. The country's President, Dr. Nnamdi Azikwe, of the NCNC was a Southerner while the Prime Minister (with executive powers), Alhaji Tafawa Balewa was of Northern extraction. This was at a time there was no constitutional provision on quota system. In the Second Republic, when there was constitutional provision on power-sharing, apart from the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) other political parties complied with power-sharing between the two major blocs in the country, North and South while picking their candidates, and their running mates. For instance, National Party of Nigeria (NPN) which later became the ruling party in the Republic, picked Alhaji Shehu

Shagari, a Northerner, and Dr. Alex Ekwueme, a Southerner, as its presidential candidate and running-mate respectively. As regards UPN, the party acted in outright disregard to the constitutional provision by picking its presidential candidate (Chief Obafemi Awolowo) and his running mate (Mr. Philip Umeadi) from the South. This nonetheless affected the party's electoral fortune in the Northern part of the country because it was seen as a sectional party by many Northerners (Ojigbo, 1981).

In the aborted Third Republic when Nigeria had two political parties created by the Military Government, despite Section 15(3) of the 1989 Constitution on the reflection of Federal Character principle in appointment – makings, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) acted in defiance of the Section of the constitution. The presidential flag bearer of the party, Chief M.K.O Abiola, was a Muslim from the South while his running mate, Alhaji Baba Gana Kingibe was also a Muslim from the North. Therefore, it was then, a Muslim- Muslim ticket. This generated tension along religious lines and perhaps, it explained one of the reasons that made the Military junta to annul the election.

Currently, in the Fourth Republic, 1999-to-date, it appears political parties and politicians have not totally freed themselves from criticisms relating to representation. Although it can be argued that there is substantial compliance when it comes to deciding parties' candidates for elections, but people often fault the process of their emergence. More often than not, candidates of some political elites have been known to have emerged victorious at the end of parties primaries (a type of election in which delegates of a political party vote for the candidate of their choice as the party's flag –bearer). For instance, the emergence of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo as the PDP's Presidential Candidate in the 1999 Presidential election did not follow democratic procedure. He was imposed as the party's flag-bearer by some powerful Northern cabals (for example, General I.B Babangida, a former Military President of the country and Lt. General Theophilus Danjuma, a former Chief of Staff Supreme Headquarters) to placate the South-West over the loss of Presidential slot occasioned by the annulment of the June, 12, 1993 Presidential election popularly believed to have been won by Chief M.K.O

Abiola, from South-West. This trend cuts across virtually all primary elections to decide gubernatorial candidates in the country. Godfathers and incumbents have been known to have imposed their choice candidates on their parties. Consequently primary elections to determine presidential governorship, legislative and Local Government Council candidates in the country have become a routine. Even, the emergence of President Muhammad Buhari as the presidential candidate of the APC in 2014 was at the instance of some influential leaders of the party most especially its national leader, Chief Bola Ahmed Tinubu. The foregoing raises the question of representation because what representative democracy connotes is the ability of electorate to determine their representatives ungagged. Therefore, it can be argued that political parties in the country have not fared well in this area. Perhaps the only area they can be given a pass mark in the aspect of representation is deciding on presidential /Governorship candidates. In 1998 when Chief Olusegun Obasanjo a Southerner was picked as his party's (PDP) Presidential Candidate, he made Alhaji Atiku Abubakar, a Northerner his running mates. Also, when late Alhaji Umaru Musa Yar'Adua, a Northerner won his party's presidential primary in 2006, he made Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, a Southerner, his running mate. At the demise of Alhaji Umaru Musa Yar'Adua on May 5, 2010, Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan became the country's President and made Alhaji Namadi Sambo a Northerner, his vice-president. Currently, the country's President General Muhammad Buhari, a Northerner, has, Mr. Yemi, Osinbajo a Southerner as his Vice –President.

ii. Elite formation and recruitment

This is all about how the ruling elite of a political party is determined. Following from our discussion on the question of representation, the procedure for determining the emergence of the political elites of a polity must be done in consonance with the Constitutional provision of a country and party's constitution. Party's constitution should not run foul of the supreme law of the land. Consequently, they must give consideration to the interest of the nation.

The experience of the colonial days up to the First Republic was nothing to write home about as candidates of political parties for elections were drawn to promote sectional interest. In fact, it can be posited that 'public interest', was missing in the (political) dictionary of political parties then. Furthermore, leaders of political parties emerged in questionable situations. For instance, the emergence of the leadership of the 'Action Group' (a political party founded in 1951) was attributed to the 'committee of friends' who were principally Chief Obafemi Awolowo's associates. Determination of the candidates of the Party in elections, used to take seniority form. This did not follow democratic procedure. This was what precipitated the crisis between Chief S. L. Akintola, the erstwhile Deputy Premier of Western Region on one hand and Chief D. S. Adegbenro, National Vice-Chairman of AG/ Chief Obafemi Awolowo on the other hand.

In the Northern Region, NPC had all the leading traditional rulers in the area as members. In fact, its National Chairman, Sir Ahmadu Bello, was the Sark of Sokoto (the Prime Minister of Sokoto Town, the headquarters of Islamic Caliphate in the country). Candidates of the party used to be decided by traditional rulers and more often than not, they belong to traditional ruling class. It was in frustration of the way the affairs of the political party were run that made Mallam Aminu Kano to leave it in 1954 and found a new Party, Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) which drew large membership from the commoners (Talakawa- Hausa word for poor people) This explained why Feinstein (1987:202) wrote that the origin of NEPU was a result of Aminu Kano's opposition to the romance between NPC and Northern Oligarchy.

Elite formation and recruitment was at lowest ebb in the First Republic, however, beginning from the Second Republic, constitutional provisions governed the actions of political parties in this area. But the extent of their compliance to the provisions is a matter of debate. Both the 1979 and 1999 Constitutions of the Federal Republic of Nigeria contain aspects relating to the qualifications and disqualifications of candidates for the various elective offices. For instance, Sections 61 and 62 of the 1979 Constitution talked about qualifications and disqualifications of

candidates for membership of the National Assembly (the name given to the central Legislative House in Nigeria).

Furthermore, Section 131 of the 1999 Constitution makes provision for qualification for election as president'. It provides that a person shall be qualified for election to the office of President if he/she:

- (a) Is a citizen of Nigeria by birth;
- (b) Has attained the age of forty years;
- (c) Is a member of a political party and is sponsored by that political party; and
- (d) Has been educated up to at least school certificate level or its equivalent.

The practice is for each political party to screen its presidential candidate before presenting same for election. Section 131 (d) on the educational qualification of a candidate was enshrined to enhance 'better' productivity and it is also applicable to all elective positions in the country. An uneducated mind or a half-baked candidate, education-wise, will not be able to contribute much to the development of the country. This may be partly accountable for the economic recession Nigeria is currently witnessing under the administration of President Muhammad Buhari, whose educational qualification generated dust during electioneering campaigns and before his inauguration as the country's President. Currently, some people (for example, the Emir of Kano- a town in the North) have called on him to hire economic experts to help fix the nation's economy (*Nigerian Tribune*, September 15, 2016:1)

iii. Goal formation

This is the template for measuring the efficiency of a ruling party. Goal formation is reflected in the form of party's manifesto which is the blue-print explaining the programme which a political party intends to implement if voted into power. The practice is that the ruling party will be drawing from its master programme, what it intends to implement at any point in time. The relevance of this to the discourse on development is that the manifesto of a political party must define in clear terms how it intends to tackle the various problems confronting a country bedevilling it from attaining

developmental status. Therefore, electorate must have a good knowledge of the manifestoes of the various political parties prior to any election. Their judgment on such programmes will shape their voting decision during any election. For this to be effective political parties are supposed to make their manifestoes readily available to voters but this is not always the case in Nigeria.

Political parties that operated in the colonial period had diverse goals. Initially, they were after freeing the people of the country from all forms of discrimination. NNDP which was the first political party in the history of the country was not out to win independence for the entire country. Rather, its stated aims include: “the attainment of municipal status and local self-government for Lagos, the provision of facilities for higher education in Nigeria, the introduction of compulsory education at the primary school level, the encouragement of non-discriminatory education at the primary school level, the encouragement of non-discriminatory, private economic enterprise, and the Africanisation of the Civil Service” (Sklar, 1983:46). Although the stated aims of the party could guarantee development in any clime but since power did not belong to the party, it could not transform them into reality.

The aims of the other two political parties (Union of Young Nigerians- UYN and Nigerian Youth Movement – NYM) that were formed after NNDP were also to fight against some of the discriminatory policies of the colonial government. While UYN was opposed to the conservative posture of the leadership of NNDP in confronting colonial policies, NYM championed educational cause. Perhaps the first political party that had political emancipation as one of its aims was the NCNC. When it held its Constitutional Conference in January 1945, the party stated the following as its main objectives:

1. To extend democratic principles and to advance the interests of the people of Nigeria and the Cameroons under British mandate.
2. To impart political education to the people of Nigeria with a view to achieving self-government.
3. To provide NCNC members with a “medium of expression in order to secure political freedom, economic security, social equality, and religious toleration in Nigeria and the Cameroons under

British mandate, as a member of the British commonwealth of Nations (cited in Coleman, 1986: 266-267).

The above-stated objectives of NCNC were pointers to development but could not be actualized due to the fact that it did not have the instrument of action, which was political power. Both AG and NCNC professed to be championing national interest but in actual fact were platforms for advancing the socio-cultural interests of the Yorubarace and Hausa/ Fulani ethnic groups. However, AG championed education cause in Western Region which it governed through the introduction of free education programme in 1955. Education, as argued earlier in this chapter, is a mechanism of development.

With the independence of the country, the ruling parties in various Regions, states, Local Government Areas and the Federal Government have had cause to introduce a number of programmes that can help promote the level of development in the country. The extent of the success of any of them is however, a factor of an analyst's sense of judgment. Their examples included: the free education programme introduced by the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) in October 1979 in all the five states- Lagos, Ogun, Oyo, Bendel and Ondo- it controlled; the Green Revolution Programme of National Party of Nigeria (NPN) controlled Federal Government also in the Second Republic. The Green Revolution Programme was aimed at making the country self-sufficient, food-wise. In the Fourth Republic various regimes had equally introduced a number of programmes aimed at bridging the gap between the country and developed States. Their examples included: the anti-graft war of the administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007), the Seven-Point Agenda and the Amnesty Programme for the Niger – Delta militants of the administration of late Alhaji Umar Musa Yar'Adua (2007-2010), the transformation agenda and war against Boko-Haram insurgency of the administration of Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan (2010-2015) the anti-graft war and the consolidation of the fight against Boko-Haram/ Niger-Delta militants insurgency of the administration of President Muhammad Buhari. The ability of the administrations of both Jonathan and Buhari to keep the country together in the face of political-cum-economic disintegration

represents their contribution to national development. This is because no state can develop in the face of insecurity.

iv. Interest articulation and aggregation

Political parties also perform the crucial role of interest articulation and aggregation in any political system. Interest articulation connotes a situation where by a political party advances a particular interest and sells same to the public. A political party must be known with a particular ideology and on the basis of that mobilizes support. The ideology of a political party which is also usually clearly stated in its manifesto will give an insight into the mode of economy it wants to adopt in tackling the economic problems in a state. This may take the form of capitalist mode of production, socialism, welfarism or mixed economic system. Each of these modes of production can enhance development but it becomes the responsibility of a political party to adopt the one that will match its manifestoes.

Most Nigerian political parties have not been known with clear ideologies thus, explaining their poor performance in the area of economy and national development in general. In the colonial period, NNDP and NPC were conservative parties with minimal approach to confronting colonial economic policies. Both AG and NEPU were known to champion socialist ideologies. AG which was the ruling party in Western Region introduced 'free education programme' in primary schools and Modern Schools (intermediate Secondary School). In the Second Republic UPN, and Peoples Redemption Party (PRP) were identified with Socialist ideology. On the other hand, both Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP) and Great Nigeria Peoples Party (GNPP) were welfares parties. The ruling party at the centre, NPN, was a conservative party or better still, a capitalist party. However, in his own view Dudley (1982:8) used Left-Right ideological positioning to describe where each of the parties stood ideologically. He placed the NPN on the Right, PRP on the Left, NPP in the centre, the GNPP Right of Centre and the UPN Left of Centre. According to him, NPN's Electoral Manifesto brought out the business orientation of the party in the following statements:

As Nigerians are energetic people they should be encouraged by themselves, or where suitable, in cooperation with foreign expertise and finance, to take a leading role in the manufacturing sector of the economy (Dudley, 1982:9).

In the aborted 'Third Republic, the two political parties created by the Military Government, had clearly defined ideologies Social Democratic Party (SDP) as its name indicated, professed socialist ideology while National Republic Convention advanced capitalist programmes. These ideologies were clearly stated in the manifestoes of both parties. For instance, part of the economic objective of the SDP was that:

A government of the SDP will strive to build a self-reliant economy that will develop on the strength of the nation's resources and by the effort of our people. In pursuit of this: (a) the state will play a leading role in the economy in order to achieve a self-reliant and just society (b) gaps between the rich and the poor will be narrowed through an equitable income distribution policy (MAMSER, 1989:6).

As a capitalist party, NRC stated this as part of its economic objective:

The central focus of our economic policy will be greater participation by Nigerians in the economic affairs of their nation by releasing individual creativeness and energies, and channelling them into productive processes. This will lead to increased efficiency, higher output and greater national income (MAMSER, 1989: 6).

Currently in the Fourth Republic, most political parties do not have clearly-defined ideologies. Borrowing a leaf from the two major political parties, APC and PDP, it will be seen that none of them can neither be said to be a capitalist party nor socialist party. In fact, going by their approaches to issues of national interest, they can be regarded as 'welfarist parties'. For example, some of the programmes introduced by the administration of Obasanjo, Yar'Adua and

Jonathan were populist ones. Their examples included: the New Pension Scheme, Health Insurance Scheme for public servants, establishment of additional Federal Universities and establishment of Alimanjir schools. All these policies have been contributing significantly to the development of the country.

Interest aggregation role of a political can be explained as a situation where by a political party serves as the platform of assembling the diverse interests in a society and process same to policy makers for authoritative actions. But the bone of contention is whether or not they will present such interests in an undiluted form. This raises the question of whether a party should promote private interest or national interest. A ruling party that fails to advance common interest cannot contribute significantly to the development of the country. More often than not, political office holders in the country do not usually promote public interest but what they consider by their own judgment to be good for the people of the country. For instance, the Amnesty Programme for the Niger-Delta Militants introduced by the administration of Umar Musa Yar'adua, sustained by the regime of Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, was abandoned by the current administration of Muhammad Buhari. His singular action has led to the resuscitation of militancy in the Niger-Delta area which has affected the exploration of crude oil in the area thus having adverse effect on the economy of the country. Currently, twenty-nine of the thirty six states in the federation are owing workers arrears of salaries ranging from three months to seven months. Furthermore, the prices of basic necessities have gone beyond the reach of common men, why because oil, which is the main say of the economy of the Federation is no longer fetching the country the desired income, all because of the insurgency in the Niger-Delta region of the country. Consequently, the economy of the country is in comatose caused by the economic policy of the ruling party, APC.

v. Socialisation and mobilisation

Socialisation in relation to political party activity takes the form of political education. However, as a sociological term, it can be explained as the process of bringing up a child (in this case an

individual) to live in conformity with the societal norms and values. To actualise this, every (older) member of the society has a role to play towards moulding the future behaviour of the young member of the society. This is where mobilization comes in. Mobilisation can be explained as the process of (re-)awakening the consciousness of a particular group of people towards the achievement of a particular goal.

Political parties have the responsibility to give political education to their members and other supporters. In fact, the success of any political party in any electoral dispensation depends largely on its ability to educate electorate on the imperativeness of their civic duties and how to go about voting procedures. For instance, when electors are not properly briefed on how to thumb-print, a high percentage of invalid ballot papers are recorded.

Our interest in this study is to examine how a political party can complement the effort of government in the development of the country through socialisation and mobilisation. A political party must communicate to its members, major government policies and programmes. More often than not opposition parties see this role as that of blind criticisms of government policies. The political disequilibrium of the First Republic was caused by the political bickering between the ruling coalition and opposition parties both at the centre and Regional levels. Understandably, political parties that operated in the colonial days had no reason to mobilise their members in support of government policies. But they socialised their members electoral –wise.

In the Second Republic, opposition parties did not complement the effort of the central government. Each party focused on its own manifesto. Currently, in the Fourth Republic the socialisation of the members of the various political parties and their supporters is now being more vigorously pursued as a result of electronic media. As regards mobilisation, the ruling party, APC, has been mobilising Nigerians towards the war against corruption considered by the administration of Buhari as the bane of the nation's economy development. On their part, all the political parties not in power see the current economic recession in the country as the APC's 'cup of tea'. For instance, the PDP through its Acting National Publicity

Secretary, Dayo Adeyeye, recently called on President Muhammad Buhari to resign from office with a challenge that he should return the economy of the country to its pre- May 29, 2015 status (the day the administration of Buhari was inaugurated (*Vanguard*, September 14, 2016:1). The Minister of Finance of the Federation, Kemi Adeosun had earlier in July 2016 declared publicly that the economy of the country was in bad shape. To an ordinary mind, such declaration calls for all and sundry to revamp the economy of the country. But since political parties outside government power have their eyes on the seat of power, all things being equal, they will do everything possible not only to discredit the political party in power but also to add to its predicament. This is with the view of reducing its electoral chance in the next election. This study is however, of the view that the task of the development of a state transcends party-politics.

vi. Organisation of Government

This role comes into play after a political party has won an election. Therefore, it can be posited that it cannot be performed by all political parties but the successful one that wins elections. Although it is possible for a political party to have zoned certain offices to some sections of the country before an election is held but the post-election victory horse-trading may truncate the arrangement. Consequently, for this to be actualized there must be ‘party discipline’ (the principle of abiding by the dictate of one’s political party). In the First Republic, after the fight between the second Premier of Western Region, Chief S.L. Akintola and the National Leader of the Party, Chief Obafemi Awolowo in 1961, he went into an alliance with NCNC and NPC and incorporated some of their members into his government. When the crisis persisted, he floated his own political party, Nigerian National Republican Party and Later Nigerian National Democratic Party which shared name with Macaulay’s moribund party, NNDP.

There were no reported cases of flouting party’s directive when it comes to forming government in the Second Republic but there were a number of them in the Fourth Republic. First was the emergence of Hon. Aminu Tambuwal, a Northerner, as the Speaker

of House Representatives in 2011. His party, PDP, had earlier zoned the office to the South-West in the spirit of reflection of 'Federal Character Principles. What guided the party's zoning formula was that the then Country's President, Alhaji Umar Musa Yar'Adua, was a Northerner while the Senate President, Senator David Mark, was also a Northerner. Therefore, going by the geographic representation of the first four citizens of the country- President, Vice-President, Senate President, Speaker of the House of only the Vice-President, Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan was of Southern extraction. Honourable Aminu Tambuwal altered his party's arrangement by contesting the election into the office of the Speaker of the House of Representatives against Hon. Mulikat Adeola, from South West, the Candidate of his Party (PDP) and won the election. Hon. Adeola was to be later compensated with the office of the 'Majority Leader' of the Legislative House. This development nonetheless generated bad blood between not only the two political rivals but North and South-West. It also affected the relationship between the presidency and the House of Representatives. In fact, it was the crisis that eventually led to the defection of Hon. Aminu Tambuwal to the then major opposition party in the House, APC, on October 28, 2014 (*Nigerian Tribune*, October 29, 2014:1-2). Despite calls on him to vacate his seat by his former party, PDP, he remained adamant. This development strained the relationship between the Presidency and the Lower House (House of Representatives) for the remaining period of the dispensation on one hand, and opposing members of the House on the other hand. For months, the legislative house was locked up thus affecting meaningful deliberations by law makers that can help facilitate the development of the country.

In the current dispensation of the eighth session of the National Assembly which was inaugurated on June 9, 2015, there was a repeat occurrence of what was similar to Tambuwal-Adeola Saga. With the defeat of DPD by the APC in the general elections particularly presidential election, the country witnessed a new political development. The APC that won presidential election formed government although it took the party about six months to conclude this because the President did not appoint his Ministers and other principal political office holders like Chief of Staff (the head of

administration at Aso Villa- Presidential Lodge) until November, 2015. Not much problem was recorded with regard to how ministers were to be appointed because there is a constitutional provision that takes care of that. Sections 147 (3) of the 1999 Constitution provides that at least, a Minister must be appointed from each of the thirty-six states of the federation. This was complied with by President Muhammad Buhari although their allocations of portfolios generated mixed reactions. Of more interest to us however, was the way the ‘principal officers’ in particular the Senate President, Speaker of the House of Representatives and his Deputy) of the National Assembly emerged.

The APC, had, shortly after winning the elections, zoned certain offices of the National Assembly to some geo-political zones of the country. For instance, the office of the Senate President was zoned to the North-East with Ahmed Lawan as the party’s candidate while the position of the Speaker of the House of Representatives was allotted to the South-West with Hon. Femi Gbajabiamila as the Party’s choice. Contrary to these pre-inauguration of the National Assembly arrangements made by APC, when elections were held in both legislative houses (Senate and House of Representatives) its choice-candidate lost out. Senator Abubakar Bukola Saraki, from North-central geopolitical zone of the country was elected unopposed as the Senate President while Senator Ike Ekweremadu, a PDP member, from South –East geopolitical zone emerged the winner as the Deputy Senate President. In the House of Representatives, Hon. Yakubu Dogara, also from the North-East, got elected as the Speaker of the Second Chamber. Sulaiman Lasun Yusuff, from South-West, won election as the ‘Deputy- Speaker’ of the legislative house. The development affected the unity of the law makers of both legislative houses and brought about strained relationships between the presidency and the National Assembly on one hand, and the leadership of the APC and the National Assembly on the other hand.

At this juncture, it must be stated that what made the ‘palace coup’ (a type of coup planned by some members of a ruling junta) to be successful was majority in the National Assembly. For instance, in the Senate, it won fifty-nine (59) seats this got reduced to fifty-eight

with the death of an elected member before the inauguration while PDP (the party it defeated in the election) had forty-nine (49) seats plus one (1) seat won by All Progressives Grand Alliance.

The presidency originally pledged to work with the newly elected Senate President, Senator A.B. Saraki, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Hon. Y. Dogara but the leadership of the party insisted that the elected principal officers would be sanctioned if they failed to vacate their seats. In fact, it was the election of a PDP member, Senator Ike Ekweremadu, as the Deputy Senate President that gave the party much concern. His emergence was however, a product of the alliance between Senator A.B. Saraki's camp and the PDP Senators. Their support to Senator Saraki earned him his post. The National Publicity Secretary of APC, Alhaji Lai Mohammed while reacting to the development on behalf of his party, described the actions of the new National Assembly leaders and their supporters as amounting to "treachery and disloyalty". He went further to say that the inauguration and the process which led to the emergence of Senator Saraki and Hon. Dogara as the Senate President and Speaker of House of Representatives respectively, represented the highest level of indiscipline. He concluded by declaring that Senator Saraki and Dogara were not the candidates of the APC (*The Punch*, 10 June, 2015:1-2).

In politics, there is a limit to how a political party can influence the actions of elected representatives under its platform. This is because party interest is just one of the several interests competing for their attention. Principal among such interests are their personal interests and those of their constituents. Again, the intrinsic desire of any political man in any situation he finds himself is to emerge victorious and maximizes his benefits. Our interest is to assess the repercussion of the 'cold war' between the executive arm of government and the legislature.

There have been allegations and counter-allegations between the Presidency and the National Assembly. First was the allegation of doctoring of Senate Rules which produced Senator A.B Saraki as the Senate President and Senator Ike Ekweremadu of PDP as the Deputy Senate President. The Nigeria Police Force had to summon Senator Ekweremadu over this on July 5, 2015. The investigations were still

on going as at the time of this research but the thinking of many people is that the target of the investigation is Senator Ekweremadu. Another by-product of the crisis is arraignment of the Senate President, Senator Saraki at Code of Conduct Tribunals over the alleged offence he committed in 2003 when he was serving his term as the Governor of Kwara State in the country. He was alleged by the Code of Conduct Bureau (the agency of Federal Government that monitors the conduct of Public Servants /Political Office holders in the country) to have falsified his declaration of assets in 2003. Many political analysts in the country however see this as political vendetta because it is retrospective in nature. The trial has since commenced. The wife of Senator Saraki (Barrister Toyin Saraki) was not spared of the big stick being wielded by the agencies of Federal Government. She was invited by the Economic Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) (one of the anti-graft agencies in the country) in August 2015 to answer charges related to some financial transactions that took place when she was the 'First Lady' (how the wife of the President or governor is addressed in Nigeria) of Kwara State between 2003 and 2011.

The presidency has not been finding it rosy with the National Assembly either. Some of the policy actions of the President have been known to have been delayed by the National Assembly. Those that have been given prompt attention were known to have been scrutinised in ways that embarrassed the leadership of APC and presidency a times. For instance, the debate and the screening of Ambassadorial nominees took embarrassing form. Some of the nominees who could not answer basic questions related to the position did not only embarrass themselves but their nominator (President). Furthermore, more, unlike the practice in the past, when a former or serving legislator who is appointed as a minister used to be asked to take a bow when he or she appeared before the Senate, the legislative house resolved to screen all and sundry. The case that generated more attention was the 2016 budget. The budget was sent to the National Assembly by the Presidency in November 2015 but was not signed into law by the President until May 6, 2016 when the financial year was almost half-way. Issues were generated during the debate. Of interest is the issue of 'padding' allegation made against

the Speaker of the House of Representatives Hon. Yakubu Dogara by a former Chairman of the Budget and Appropriation on Committee of the House, Hon. Abdulmumin Jubrin. The controversy still ranges on as at the time of carrying out this study. The late passage of the budget affected the economy of the country because the three tiers of government were over- stretched financially. Again, an average Nigerian felt the pinch as money was not in circulation due to the fact that many governments owed workers their salaries. This made the economy of the country to become crippled. The country's official currency (Naira) in the process lost value in international market. As at the time of carrying out this study, the unofficial exchange rate of Dollar (\$) via-a-vis Naira (N) in international market is \$420.00. The banking sector has been affected by this development and some of them had to resort to either reducing their workers' salaries or sack some of them out rightly.

This study revealed that what compounded the economic woe of the country was the hike in the pump price of petroleum products carried out in May 2016 by the administration of President Buhari, the pump price of petrol which was formerly N86.50k was increased to N145.00 at a go. This had multiplier effect on the prices of all items in the country house rents and transport inclusive. For instance, a bag of rice that used to sell for between N7, 000. 00 and N8, 000. 00 now sells for between N18, 000. 00 and N22, 000. 00. Consequently, many Nigerians can no longer afford three square meals.

vii. Political parties unite and stabilise the political process

One major function performed by a political party is the task of national integration which can be explained as the process of uniting different sections of a country for the purpose of forestalling political disequilibrium. In the absence of integration what we have is disunity. A political party performs this function by serving as the umbrella where people of different descent can take shade. Therefore, people from North, South, East and West with diverse socio-cultural backgrounds who are registered members of the same political parties will discuss issues affecting the progress and development of

their country under one roof. The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria recognises the important role played by political parties in the area of National integration. Section 222 (f) of the Constitution abhors formation of political parties on ethnic, religious or sectional lines.

The early political parties that operated in Nigeria did not conform to the requirement of a party serving as a platform of national integration. What informed this was that their activities were confined to the Southern part of the territory. It was not until 1944 that political party activities got extended to the North through the electioneering campaigns of the NCNC. Although before the time, the NYM was reported to have opened branches in urban areas throughout Nigeria (Sklar, 1983) but they were not functional. In addition to this, most of the early political parties in the country were conservative on issues not affecting the members of their ethnic groups. This explained why Peil (1976:101), describing the nature party politics during colonial period, argue that the necessity of winning an election in a specific area, and thus of appealing to the local interests of voters, changed many a nationalist into an upholder of ethnic prejudices.”

Most of the political parties that were founded during colonial era up to the First Republic in the country forge national unity. For instance, one of the aims of AG was to: “encourage and strengthen most sedulously all the ethnical organisations in the Western Region” (Coleman, 1986:350). Similarly, the NPC had as its motto: “One North, One People, irrespective of region, rank or tribe” (Ojiako, 1981:16). Contrary to their ethnic posture, both AG and NPC had as part of their aims, national unity but their actions and inactions portrayed them to the contrary. They made their Regions (AG and West) their stronghold and did not relate much with the other Regions of the country. AG for example, had as one of its aims the desire to “explore all possibilities for and to cooperate whole heartedly with other nationalists in the formation of a Nigeria-wide organization which shall work as a united team towards the realisation of immediate self-government for Nigeria” (Coleman, 1986:350). In its own, NPC had as its objective “the attainment of

self-government for Nigeria and the introduction of a permanent federal constitution” (Ojiako, 1981:16).

The activities of political parties in the First Republic did not leave much to be desired. They acted as an instrument of destabilisation. In fact it was the AG leadership crisis in the Western Region that snow-balled into a large scale of wanton destruction of lives and properties and the eventual collapse of the First Republic in January, 1966 (Dudley, 1978).

Political Parties’ activities were guided by constitutional provisions in the Second Republic. The provisions were the products of the experience of the people of the country in the First Republic when political parties failed to serve as a mechanism of national integration. Consequent of this development, the constitutional engineers of the Second Republic enshrined a number of sections in the constitution that define how a political party can have a national outlook. Section 202(b) (c) and (f), of the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria partly provides that no association shall function as a political party, unless:

(b) The membership of the association is open to every citizen of Nigeria irrespective of his place of origin, sex, religion or ethnic group;

(c) The name of the association, its emblem or motto does not contain any ethnic or religious connotation or give the appearance that the activities of the association are confined to a part only of the geographical area of Nigeria and;

(f) the headquarters of the association is situated in the capital of the Federation.

In line with the above provisions the five political parties, NPN, UPN, NPP, PRP and GNPP registered by Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) (then, the country’s Election Management Body- EMB) met the requirements before their registration. The outcomes of the general elections of 1979 however, contradicted the constitutional provisions because each of the five political parties had a particular section of the country as its stronghold. The NPN had the North-West as its stronghold, PDP, South-West, NPP, South-East, GNPP, North-East and PRP also, North-West. In the area of party organisation there was substantial compliance with the

reflection of Federal Character Principle. Offices were shared between different geo-political zone. For instance, while Mallam Aminu Kano, a Northerner, served as the National Chairman of PRP, Mr. S.G. Ikoku, a Southerner occupied the office of the National Secretary of the Party. With regard to representation, most of the five political parties complied with Federal Character Principle while deciding on their candidates for the elective offices. An example was seen in NPN which fielded Alhaji Shehu Shagari, a Northerner, as its Presidential candidate and Dr. Alex Ekwueme, a Southerner, his running mate. It was only the UPN that failed to meet constitutional requirement in this regard. As stated earlier in this chapter, while Chief Obafemi Awolowo, a Southerner, was presented as the candidate of the party for Presidential election, Chief Philip Umeadi, a Southerner, served as his running mate.

Another area where political parties substantially complied with the requirement of national integration was in the area of campaign activities. Unlike the experience of the First Republic when some political parties quarantined their activities, the experience of the Second Republic was better. All the five political parties took their campaign activities to the major sections of the country. But the utterances of some of them during the exercise are an issue entirely. But it can be posited that it was the constitutional provision on geographical spread of votes that spurred them in doing this. Section 125(b) of the 1979 Constitution provided that for a candidate to be deemed elected as the President of the country he must have “not less than one –quarter of the votes cast at the election in each of at least two-thirds of all the States in the Federation”.

In the current dispensation, Fourth Republic, party-politics is equally governed by constitutional provisions. Such provisions as contained in the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria are not different from those under the 1979 Constitution, the only difference being their sections. For instance, Section 222 (b) (e) (f) also provides that no association shall be allowed to function as a political party unless its membership is open to every Nigerian without regard to their ethnic and religious leanings; the name of the association does not contain ethnic or religious connotation or

confine its activities to only a part of the country; and must have its headquarters in the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja.

At the inception of the Fourth Republic, only three political parties were registered by the Independent National Electoral Commission, Nigeria's Election Management Body (EMB). They were Alliance for Democracy (AD), All Peoples' Party (APP) (after All Nigeria Peoples Party ANPP) and Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). It is instructive to note that despite constitutional provision that discouraged formation of political parties with ethnic colouration, both AD and APP had links with the past. Although the PDP was not totally free of this allegation, it was formed by individuals of different past political leanings across the country, the country AD had strong links with the AG and UPN of the Old. Its founders were mainly members of 'Awolowo School of Thoughts or better still, apostles of late Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the avowed Yoruba leader of his time, founder of 'Egbe Omo Oduduwa' (a pan Yoruba socio-cultural group) AG and UPN. Principally, the founders of AD were from Yoruba ethnic group, in the South-Western part of the country, who were mainly members of Afenifere (a Yoruba socio-cultural group founded in 1993 at the wake of June, 12, Presidential election amulment) (Simbine, 2002).

As regards APP, its origin had historical linkage with NPC and NPN (political parties) in the first and Second Republics. The two political parties had strong links with the North. According to Simbine (2002:24) the Party is an amalgam of six political associations. Of the six associations, three, the All Nigeria Congress of Umaru Shinkafi, the National Unity Forum (NUF) of Olusola Saraki and People's Congress of Mahmud Waziri, came from the North.

The number of political parties in the Fourth Republic has been witnessing astronomical increase since 2002. First, the number got increased to six in 2007, and by the time 2011 general elections were held, it got increased to sixty-five. But currently, the number has been reduced to about forty-five due to INEC's enforcement of the electoral law which provides that it should de-register any political party which fails to win at least a legislative seat in any election conducted in the country (Local Government poll inclusive).

Our discussion on how political parties in the Fourth Republic have been conforming to provisions on national integration shall depend largely on the major political parties. For sixteen years (1999-2015), PDP held sway as the 'party-in-government' in the country. In relation to the debate on representation vis-à-vis national integration, the party substantially conformed to constitutional provisions. It did not have problem with its zoning arrangement until 2011 when arrangement made in respect of the Speaker of House of Representatives was altered by Hon. Aminu Tambuwa. Electoral outcomes, however, revealed some elements of block voting in some cases. This showed that some political parties operating in the Republic like those that operated during colonial period, First Republic and to some extent, Second Republic, have not totally detached themselves from the past. For instance, between 1999 and 2003, AD, which had its origin linked to 'Afenifere' (a Yoruba socio-cultural group), held sway in the South-West. It won governorship elections in all the six states in the geo-political zone, namely; Lagos, Ogun, Oyo, Ondo, Osun, and Ekiti. Also, APP won governorship elections in nine of the nineteen northern states in 1999. In fact, the party did not win election in any of the Southern states then. APGA is branded an Igbo (a major ethnic group in Nigeria) party by analysts because its origin is often linked to Chief Odumegwu, Ojukwu, leader of the defunct Biafra Republic. The two states where it originally won gubernatorial election were of Igbo extraction. They were: Imo and Anambra. Today, the only state it controls (Anambra) is an Igbo speaking one.

With the merger of two, and factions of two other political parties to form All Progressives Congress (APC) in February, 2013, how Fourth Republican Parties have been faring in the task of national integration witnessed a new twist. The birth of APC was as a result of the coming together of some members of PDP (five of them then sitting governors) ANPP members, Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) founded by General Muhammad Buhari in 2010, and a faction of APGA led by Okorocha, the Imo state governor. It is imperative to note that while ANPP and CPC joined the coalition as political parties, only fractional members of PDP and APGA opted for its membership. This explained why despite the fact that both ANPP

and CPC have gone into oblivion, PDP and APGA still function as political parties.

APC currently rank as the foremost political party with geographical spread going by its exploits during the 2015 general elections. Its origin nonetheless served as a boost in this regard. It won election in all the six geo-political zones of the country, namely: South-East, South-West, South-South, North-East, North-West and North-Central although its stronghold was North-West. PDP which was defeated in the elections did not fare badly too. It won elections in South-East, South-West, South-South, North-Central, North-West and North-East. However, its strongholds were South-South and South-East. Its poor performance was evident in North-East where there was Boko-Haram (an Islamic militant group in the North that is opposed to Western education/civilization) insurgency as at the time the elections were held. In fact, it was only in Gombe state that the party won elections in the geo-political zone.

Despite having national outlook electorally, some analysts (for example, Ogungbuyi, 2015) were of the view that APC is the political party of the people of the North and Muslims to a large extent. Our position on this is that since it was not only Muslims that voted for the party in the election that brought it into power, it is tantamount to false claim. But on the other hand, it can be posited that perhaps what influenced their judgment was that at the birth of the party, its national leader were mainly Muslims, for example, Senator Bola Ahmed Tinubu (the avowed national leader of the party up till now) Chief Bisi Akande its first Acting National chairman and General (now president) Muhammad Buhari, the founder of CPC. Furthermore, since the inauguration of his government on May 29, 2015, most of the key appointments made by President have tilted towards the North and Muslim faithful. This has pitched the North against the South as Southerners accuse his government of marginalization. Examples of such appointments were: Chief of Army Staff, a Northerner/Muslim, national Security Adviser, a Northerner/Muslim, Chairman, Economic Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) (the nation's anti-graft agencies), a Northerner/Muslim, and Comptroller-General, Nigerian Customs Service, a Northerner/Muslim.

From the foregoing, it can be posited that the administration of President Muhammad Buhari has not complied substantially with the provisions of Sections 222(b) and 14(3) of the 1999 Constitution, on non-registration of an association that professes ethnic/religious sentiment as a political party and reflection of Federal Character principle in appointment-makings. This is a set-back to the nation's quest for development.

Conclusion

This chapter has addressed the synergy between political parties and development and underdevelopment. It examined how party activities can influence development and underdevelopment. That is, the chapter explained that the activities of political parties have a bearing on the efforts of the government of a country at developing a polity.

To achieve the aforesaid, the chapter started with an argument that although the concepts of development and underdevelopment have historical linkage with the field of Economics, their contemporary understanding transcends that. This is because development and underdevelopment manifest in all facets of life. Towards this end, the argument advanced by Rodney (1981) was used as the template of relating development to a political discourse in Nigeria and Africa in general.

The concepts of development and political parties were later discussed. The traditional functions of political parties as advanced by Agbaje (2015) and Zoaka (2010) were adopted in discussing how Nigerian political parties have fared in the area of [under]development.

The study has given insights into the following observations:

- I. That development and underdevelopment are multi-facet concepts, cutting across different fields of study.
- II. That political parties' role in the advancement of developmental efforts in a state can be accessed through the ways they perform their conventional roles.
- III. That to a large extent, pre-independence political parties in Nigeria did not contribute significantly to the development of the

territory due to the absence of constitutional provisions serving as a guide to their activities.

IV. That though, in the Second and Fourth Republics, there were constitutional provisions that guided political parties' activities in the country, most of them did not comply with the letter. They had issues to contend with in virtually all the functions they perform in Nigeria especially representation, National integration and elite formation and recruitment. All these made us to conclude that they have not performed maximally towards the progress and development of the Nigerian State.

For development to take place there should be a conducive political atmosphere which only political parties can guarantee. National integration is therefore a non-negotiable function of a political party. This is because party activities are about the cheapest means of achieving development in a political system.

Following from the above findings, the study recommends that:

a. Constitutional provisions relating to how political parties can help enhance development advancement in Nigeria should be further strengthened. This particularly affects Section 222 (b, e and f). It is hereby recommended that in view of the importance of development in a nation's history, INEC, currently the nation's Election Management Body (EMB) that regulates parties' activities in the country should be constitutionally empowered to de-register any political party that fails the litmus test of issues relating to development. These include; when a political party after getting 'Certificate of Operation' from INEC decides to become nepotistic or fanatical by championing the course of an ethnic group or religion, respectively. The type of power conferred on INEC to de-register any political that fails to win a legislative list in any election, is hereby recommended.

b. In view of the importance of goal formation in a nation's quest for development, INEC should be devoting extra energy to the draft constitution and manifesto of any would-be political party before it registers it. Where contradictions are noted, INEC should be empowered to either review or educate the would-be political party for necessary adjustments.

c. Political elites (leaders) of ruling political parties at any of the tiers of government should be constantly exposed to seminars and workshops on the synergy between party-politics and development.

d. An enduring solution is further seen in the fact that topics on development and underdevelopment should be incorporated into the curricula of schools especially 'Civic Education' which is now being offered as a course in post-primary schools in the country. Even the teaching of natural and physical sciences can be related to development. Since pupils and students are a nation's future leaders, it is our belief that they will readily key into effort aimed at developing the country in the future.

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Development Discourse and the Legacies of Pre-colonial Shona Environmental Jurisprudence: Pangolins and Political Opportunism in Independent Zimbabwe

Fidelis Peter Thomas Duri

Introduction

The pangolin or scaly ant-eater is known as *inkakha* among the Ndebele (Ndlovu, 12 November 2013) and *baka* or *harakabruka* by the Shona in Zimbabwe (Nehanda Radio, 23 February 2014). There are eight species of pangolin worldwide (Lupande, 21 March 2015). Four species are found in Asia and these are the Indian Pangolin (*Manis crassicaudata*), Philippine Pangolin (*Manis culionensis*), Sunda Pangolin (*Manis javanica*) and the Chinese Pangolin (*Manis pentadactyla*). The four species found in Africa are the Black-bellied Pangolin (*Phataginus tetradactyla*), White-bellied Pangolin (*Phataginus tricuspis*), Giant Ground Pangolin (*Smutsia gigantea*) and Temminckii Ground Pangolin (*Smutsia temminckii*) (Tikki Hywood Trust 2015). The species found in Zimbabwe is the *Smutsia temminckii* or Temminckii Ground Pangolin (Coulson 1989; Heath and Coulson 1997). In Zimbabwe, the Ground Pangolin can weigh up to 20 kilograms with a lifespan of about 20 years. It gives birth to a single offspring per annum (Tikki Hywood Trust 2015).

Pangolins are mammals that belong to the animal group of ant-eaters. They are active at night (Guynup, 24 August 2015; Pswarai, 30 September 2015). During the day, they fold into a ball and sleep which makes them very difficult to identify (Ndlovu, 12 November 2013). In fact, the term ‘pangolin’ is derived from the Malay word *pengguling* which means ‘that which rolls up,’ implying the animal’s defence mechanism of rolling itself into a ball upon sensing danger (Guynup, 24 August 2015). They have a strong sense of smell and

feed on a variety of insects like termites (Ndlovu, 12 November 2013). They also eat eggs of termites and ants (Lupande, 21 March 2015). Pangolins, therefore, contribute significantly towards environmental sustainability as valuable pest-controllers by downsizing the population of insects whose large numbers they feed on (Guynup, 24 August 2015). They have powerful claws which enable them to open up anthills. They swallow their food because they have no teeth (Ndlovu, 12 November 2013). Pangolins are not aggressive and are harmless to human beings (Lupande, 21 March 2015).

A pangolin has scales all over its body. Pangolin scales are made of the same material as rhino horns called Keratin (Lupande, 21 March 2015; Pswarai, 30 September 2015). The scales are believed to scare off predators such as lions. In many parts of Asia, the scales of pangolins are used in the medical treatment of ailments such as fibroids (News DzeZimbabwe, 6 April 2015). Pangolin meat is considered a delicacy because of its enormous amount of fat (Ndlovu, 12 November 2013).

Taboos and other customary obligations were critical environmental conservation mechanisms in most pre-colonial African jurisprudential institutions. Among the pre-colonial Shona people of Zimbabwe, for example, it was taboo to kill a pangolin. People who picked up pangolins were obliged to surrender them to the chiefs failure for which misfortunes would befall the captor, the chief and the society as a whole. Among other things, such taboos were part of environmental legislation meant to preserve rare animal species from extinction. Consequently, Shona traditional leaders imposed stiff penalties on people who violated such taboos. European colonialism and other related developments such as the disempowerment of traditional leaders, Christianity, Western education, urbanisation and labour migration had adverse effects on the adherence to taboos by a significant section of the African population. These developments, together with the wave of globalisation in the 21st century, continued to erode African cultural values in post-colonial Zimbabwe. Interestingly, some taboos survived into the post-colonial era during which they underwent modifications to suit prevailing circumstances.

This chapter explores the legacies of Shona environmental taboos regarding pangolins in post-colonial Zimbabwe. It examines the manner in which the sacredness of pangolins came to be exploited for political expediency in various ways such as presenting them as royal gifts to powerful politicians in order to be guaranteed of security and access to resources in a dispensation characterised by violence and profound poverty. The central argument of this chapter is that some pre-colonial Shona taboos, such as those pertaining to pangolins, have been politically manipulated at opportune times during the post-independence period by people whose security and general livelihood are threatened.

Picture of the Temminckii Ground Pangolin



(Source: Taringa 2014)

Pangolins, taboos, and African jurisprudence in pre-colonial Zimbabwe

In most pre-colonial African societies in Zimbabwe, the pangolin was one of the most highly valued and protected animal. It was highly valued and protected because its scales were used by traditional healers to treat various ailments (Zhou 2015). Among the pre-colonial Shona people, the discovery of a pangolin was regarded as a miracle (Kwashirai 2009). It was taboo to kill a pangolin. The law obliged ordinary people who to surrender any captured pangolins

alive and unharmed to the local chief (Garbett 1966; Kwashirai 2009). The handing over of pangolins to rulers was regarded as a show of loyalty (Orlando Sentinel, 3 January 1988). Among the Shona, for example, only traditional leaders such as chiefs and kings were authorised by law to eat pangolin meat. It was generally believed that one who captured a pangolin and the traditional leader to whom the animal was handed over were assured of a prosperous future and long life. The opposite would happen to the captor and the respective chief if this taboo was flouted. Rulers usually rewarded subjects who surrendered pangolins with several herd of cattle (Pito, 2 May 2013; Taringa 2014). As a royal gift, the pangolin is also documented in European history when King George III of England was presented with an armoured suit made from pangolin scales in 1820 (Guynup, 24 August 2015).

In pre-colonial Shona jurisprudence, the violation of environmental taboos such as those that prohibited the killing of pangolins was believed to provoke the wrath of ancestral spirits resulting in various future misfortunes. In addition, traditional leaders such as chiefs exercised the right to safeguard the environment. They also imposed severe penalties on people who violated cultural environmental laws. Defaulters risked being expelled from their areas or losing their wealth, particularly cattle, through hefty fines (Bourdillon 1982; Garbett 1966).

These judicial penalties were grounded in pre-colonial Shona custom that land and its natural resources belonged to the supernatural world (God and the ancestral spirits). The chief was regarded as the custodian and preserver of the land and its natural resources on behalf of the supernatural world for the benefit of the people (Bourdillon 1982). As Bourdillon (1982: 69) elaborated: “The chief is closely associated with the land precisely because as the senior descendant of the original owners of the land, he is the man who should intercede with their spirits.” As a result, the traditional political authorities had powers to distribute land and ensure that its natural resources were utilised in a sustainable manner.

Pangolins as protected species in colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe

In colonial Zimbabwe, pangolins were placed on the list of Specially Protected Species in 1975 (Lupande, 21 March 2015; Zhou 2015). After independence in 1980, the Zimbabwean government instituted legislation to safeguard pangolins from extinction. The Zimbabwe Parks and Wildlife Act, Chapter 20: 14, for example, listed pangolins as Protected Endangered Species or Specially Protected Animals (Kuvirimirwa 2013; Laiton 2014; New Zimbabwe, 17 April 2015). This law effectively outlawed the handing over of pangolins to African traditional leaders.

It should be noted, however, that African chiefs and their administrative subordinates were stripped of their leadership role in the preservation of the environment and its resources by the colonial government. The Southern Rhodesia Order-in-Council of 1898 deprived chiefs of the power to allocate land. It empowered European Native Commissioners to distribute land to Africans (Bratton 1978; Palley 1966; Palmer 1977). Colonial land statutes such as the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 and the Land Tenure Act of 1969 effectively disempowered African traditional leaders from distributing land (Palmer 1977). The Natural Resources Act of 1941 authorised Native Commissioners to spearhead environmental conservation measures in African areas (Murray 1970). The Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951 imposed various environmental conservation measures on Africans and forced African traditional leaders to enforce them among their subjects (Rifkind 1972). It was therefore ironic that the Land Husbandry Act compelled African traditional authorities to supervise the conservation of their areas yet they no longer had any power to allocate land to their subjects.

To make matters worse, the judicial powers of traditional leaders were curtailed by the colonial administration. The High Commissioner's Proclamation of 1910, for example, gave Native Commissioners criminal and civil jurisdiction over Africans and the power of chiefs was relegated to that of auxiliaries and policy implementers (Weinrich 1971). Traditional leaders were, however, allowed to handle civil cases among Africans but dissatisfied parties

could appeal to the Native Commissioner whose judgement was final (Mason 1960). It was only in 1937, through the Native Law and Courts Act, that some chiefs were authorised to preside over minor criminal cases such as petty theft (Bourdillon 1982).

At independence in 1980, Zimbabwean traditional leaders also lost their pre-colonial jurisprudential authority in various areas including the environmental preservation of pangolins and other endangered species. The ruling ZANU-PF party under Robert Mugabe stripped traditional leaders of most of their power over extrajudicial and administrative issues after accusing most of them of collaborating with the colonial regime during the liberation struggle. Most administrative powers over rural communities were assigned to state organs such as district and provincial councils. State organs handled criminal cases and most civil cases. The judicial authority of traditional leaders was largely confined to localised civil cases of a customary nature (Matyszak 2010). This was done through various pieces of legislation such as the District Councils Act of 1980, Communal Lands Act of 1981 and 1982, Customary and Primary Courts Act of 1981, Provincial and Administration Act of 1985, Chiefs and Headmen Act of 1988 and the Customary Law and Courts Act of 1990 (Moyo, 24 January 2016).

The Traditional Leaders Act, Chapter 29: 17, of 1998, which became effective in the year 2000 (Matyszak 2010), was an attempt to appease traditional leaders and win political support from rural constituencies at a time when many urban areas were engulfed in civil unrest over socioeconomic hardships brought about by the government's implementation of austerity measures prescribed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Bond and Manyanya 2001). The Act recognised chiefs, headmen and village heads as community leaders who were, however, answerable to the Minister of Local Government. Even though chiefs were assigned some of their traditional duties, they remained state auxiliaries. They were obliged to implement government policy with regards to safeguarding the environment, reporting illegal settlements, protecting government infrastructure and assisting local government structures in implementing development programmes. Chiefs were allowed to handle some civil cases in line with customary law while

criminal cases were dealt with by the judicial organs of the state (Matyszak 2010).

After facing threats of electoral defeat by the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) which had been formed in 1999, the ruling ZANU-PF party sought to win the rural vote by co-opting traditional leaders as political allies during the new millennium (Matyszak 2010). The ZANU-PF government privileged most substantive chiefs with various provisions such as mobile phones, farms, farm equipment, houses, motor vehicles, fuel and electricity (Moyo, 24 January 2016). As shall be noted later in this chapter, some chiefs became primarily concerned with seeking favours from the ZANU-PF party by, among other things, surrendering pangolins to President Mugabe and associating themselves with myths related to the sacredness of the pangolin in order to enhance their image in order to make them eligible to receive such state privileges.

The Zimbabwean government instituted various measures to safeguard wildlife species, particularly the pangolin. The government enacted tough wildlife legislation, owing to the escalation in the smuggling of pangolins from Africa to Asian countries, particularly China and Vietnam, where their scales are highly valued for various medicinal and other purposes from the late 20th century into the New Millennium (Shaw, 11 March 2016); Zimdaily, 18 February 2016). The quantity of African pangolin scales confiscated in Asia rose from more than 6000 kilograms in the year 2014 to 8 000 kilograms during the first six months of 2015. It is estimated that 6 000 kilograms of scales would need killing 2000 ground pangolins or 1 000 white-bellied pangolins (Pswarai, 30 September 2015). In most cases, the scales are boiled off their bodies and smuggled across national borders (All Africa, 15 May 2015). In many Asian countries, its scales are believed to be vital medicinal remedy for various ailments such as allergies and cancer (Guynup, 24 August 2015; Shaw, 11 March 2016), asthma, lack of virility (Garric, 12 March 2013; Guynup, 24 August 2015), weight loss, liver problems and poor lactation by breast-feeding mothers (Platt, 16 February 2012). In traditional Chinese medicine, the scales are also believed to treat

malaria, deafness, rheumatism, acne, nervousness, hysterical crying of babies and possession by evil spirits, (Guynup, 24 August 2015).

In some Asian countries, pangolin meat is an important part of the diet for wealthy people. Pangolin meat and fetuses are regarded as delicacies in major hotels in China (Platt, 16 February 2012). In March 2016, restaurants in Vietnam were reported to be paying between US\$300 and US\$500 for a kilogram of pangolin meat (Shaw, 11 March 2016).

The international community put in place measures to curb the rampant poaching and global trafficking of pangolins. Pangolins are protected under a global arrangement called the Convention of International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) (Platt, 16 February 2012). In the year 2000, CITES banned all international trade in three Asian pangolin species (Garric, 12 March 2013). In the year 2013, the global ban was extended to include all the four African pangolin species (Guynup, 24 August 2015). The United Nations also declared the third Saturday of every month of the year as World Pangolin Day in an effort to raise global awareness on the preservation of the animal (Coventry, 21 February 2015).

It is against this background that in 2012, Zimbabwe enacted the stiffest penalty in the world against the illegal possession of pangolins (Pswarai, 30 September 2015; Shaw, 11 March 2016; Zimparks 2015). During the year 2012, an amendment to the National Parks and Wildlife Act imposed a mandatory nine-year jail term and a fine of US\$5000 for the illegal possession of pangolins (Guynup, 25 August 2015; Zimparks 2015). The Act also criminalised the illegal removal of pangolins from their habitat for whatever motive (*Daily News*, 18 July 2014). In addition, it also prohibited the unnecessary tying up or confining pangolins (*Chronicle*, 1 September 2011). Zimbabwean law enforcement agents intercepted poachers and rescued two pangolins in 2010, two in 2011, 10 in 2012 and 18 in 2013 (Shaw, 11 March 2016). From January to March 2014, two pangolin cases implicating four poachers were handled by the courts during which four poachers were each slapped with nine-year prison terms (Zimparks 2015). In August 2014, Frank Mutanha, a man from Nyanga in eastern Zimbabwe, was jailed for nine years after being found in possession of a pangolin without a licence (Laiton 2014). From

January to March 2015, seven cases involving 12 pangolin poachers from Harare, Nyamapanda, Guruve and Kwekwe were handled by Zimbabwean courts during which eight of the criminals were each sentenced to nine years in prison (Zimparks 2015). During the year 2015, 83 pangolin poachers were apprehended and over 47 of them were each sentenced to nine years in jail (Shaw, 11 March 2016).

As will be noted later on in this chapter, these deterrent sentences made some poachers to find it expedient to claim to the law enforcement agents that they intended to surrender the pangolins that had been found in their possession to Robert Mugabe, the country's powerful head of state, with the hope of avoiding prosecution.

The efforts by the Zimbabwean government to combat pangolin poaching were also illuminated by the appointment of Kirsty Coventry, a former Olympic swimming female champion, as Zimbabwe's Pangolin Ambassador for a period of three years with effect from 1 January 2014. She was appointed to the position by Saviour Kasukuwere, the then Minister of Environment, Water and Climate (*Daily News*, 18 July 2014). Coventry (21 February 2015) urged Zimbabwe's traditional leaders to complement government efforts of combating pangolin poaching and trafficking. She also discouraged the practice of removing pangolins from their habitat and handing them over to the chiefs.

In independent Zimbabwe, there are some Non-Governmental Organisations that complement government efforts to combat pangolin poaching. Examples are the Tikki Hywood Trust (News 24 Zimbabwe, 15 May 2015) and the Matusadona Anti-poaching Project (Zimdaily, 18 February 2016).

This section has illustrated that pangolins were regarded as endangered animal species by colonial and post-colonial administrations as was the case among the pre-colonial Shona people. While pre-colonial Shona societies formulated taboos to preserve pangolins, colonial and post-colonial governments enacted legislation such as the National Parks and Wildlife Act to safeguard the rare animal species. In addition, while traditional leaders had played a leading role in enforcing environmental provisions to safeguard pangolins during the pre-colonial era, they were relegated by the colonial and post-colonial administrations to auxiliaries who

were expected to assist anti-poaching state organs such as the Department of National Parks and Wildlife. Despite these administrative changes, pangolins continued to be regarded as sacred animals by many Shona people. Among other things, their sacredness came to be exploited to suit prevailing political dictates during the post-colonial period.

In pursuit of political patronage in independent Zimbabwe: Handing over pangolins to President Mugabe

The efforts by some Zimbabwean citizens to solicit for favours from the ruling ZANU-PF party by among other things, handing over pangolins as royal gifts to its leader, Robert Mugabe, can partly be understood in the context of Zimbabwe's socioeconomic and political dynamics during the post-colonial period. Having won elections at independence in 1980, ZANU-PF gradually became intolerant to opposition politics (Duri 2010; Raftopoulos 2003). From 1982 to 1986, for example, the ruling party launched a violent onslaught against the opposition Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) whose major support base was among the Ndebele-speaking people in the provinces of Matebeleland and Midlands. During the onslaught, more than 20 000 Ndebele people, mostly Ndebele-speaking ZAPU supporters, were killed after ZANU-PF had unleashed the Fifth Brigade, an army battalion recruited from the Shona-speaking provinces of Mashonaland, Manicaland and Masvingo (Alexander, McGregor and Ranger 2000; Catholic Commission for Peace and Justice and Legal Resources Foundation 1997). After the massacres in Matebeleland and Midlands, ZAPU had no option but to merge with ZANU-PF from 1987 under the supreme leadership of Robert Mugabe (Alexander, McGregor and Ranger 2000).

The most significant opposition political party after ZAPU was the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) under the leadership of Morgan Tsvangirai. It was formed in 1999 amid widespread discontent, particularly in urban areas, as a result of tough austerity measures recommended by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund which the ZANU-PF government had been

implementing since 1992 (Bond and Manyanya 2001). As President Mugabe and his ruling party faced a legitimacy crisis owing to the rise of the MDC, they became more ruthless towards opposition supporters. Consequently, an orgy of terror, mostly state-engineered became a central aspect of Zimbabwe's political landscape from the year 2000 (Hill 2003). White farmers were also caught up in the political violence after they were accused by ZANU-PF of funding the MDC (Mamdani 2008; Masunungure 2004; Meredith 2002).

These political upheavals were aggravated by a severe socioeconomic crisis from the year 2000. The crisis was sparked off by the invasion of white commercial farms from February 2000 at the instigation of the ZANU-PF government as it sought to punish white farmers for provisioning the MDC (Hill 2003). As a result of farm invasions, severe food shortage, aggravated by persistent countrywide droughts, ensued (Richardson 2005). During the food crisis, opposition supporters were often denied drought relief aid by the ZANU-PF government (Meredith 2002; Saxon, 11 July 2013).

The invasion of white-owned commercial farms triggered a multiplicity of crises. Investor confidence was eroded and deindustrialisation set in resulting in unprecedented unemployment (Richardson 2005). The country became isolated from the international community resulting in chronic shortage of foreign currency, fuel, hospital equipment and drugs, and a wide range of basic commodities (Hammar and Raftopoulos 2003). Attempts to mitigate foreign currency shortage by printing paper money resulted in record hyperinflation, high cost of living and profound poverty during the period 2000-2008 (Chibber, 26 July 2014; Gilpin, 1 August 2008).

This socio-economic and political quagmire largely explains why it became expedient for some marginalised and vulnerable Zimbabweans to exploit some customary institutions of the past to seek favours from the ruling ZANU-PF party by surrendering pangolins as royal gifts to its powerful leader, Robert Mugabe. From independence until well into the first decade of the 21st century, Robert Mugabe remained the supreme leader of Zimbabwe largely through the use of terror tactics such as intimidation, floggings, beatings and lynching (Godwin 2010). From the year 2000, Mugabe

and ZANU-PF maintained a firm grip on power in controversial circumstances characterised by profound poverty, various forms of political violence and accusations of electoral rigging (Duri 2010; Mamdani 2008; Scoones, 5 August 2013). It is against this background that most marginalised Zimbabweans were perennially at the mercy of President Mugabe and the ruling ZANU-PF party. In such circumstances, it became expedient for some vulnerable Zimbabweans to devise ways of seeking favours from ZANU-PF with the hope of salvaging livelihood in a tumultuous dispensation characterised by political violence, insecurity and grinding poverty. One such strategy was to present pangolins as royal gifts to President Mugabe. Within ZANU-PF circles from the early 1980s, it was generally held that failure to surrender pangolins to Mugabe would provoke the spirits of the combatants who died during the liberation struggle as it was viewed as an expression of disloyalty to the newly independent state of Zimbabwe (Kwashirai 2009). It is quite apparent that these modifications to the pre-colonial Shona taboos about pangolins were crafted by ZANU-PF supporters to bolster the image of Robert Mugabe as the Head of State and monopolise political space, given the challenges posed by opposition parties such as ZAPU during the 1980s and the MDC from the late 1990s.

It therefore became common practice during the post-independence period for ordinary Zimbabweans to hand over captured pangolins to Robert Mugabe, the Head of State (Zhou 2015). On 2 January 1988, for example, Favhuke Chengeta, a peasant farmer, presented Mugabe with a pangolin (Orlando Sentinel, 3 January 1988). A total of 24 pangolins had been surrendered to Mugabe by 3 January 1988 (Orlando Sentinel, 3 January 1988). From January 1987 to mid-October 1988, Mugabe had been presented with about 100 pangolins, most of which died even after being released back into the wild (Arizona Republic, 14 October 1988). According to Kwashirai (2009: 240-241):

Mashura (miracles) occurred throughout Zimbabwe in the 1980s and 1990s when members of the public stumbled upon and surrendered more than ten pangolins to President Mugabe at State House ceremonies emblematic not only of a general awareness of

conservation ethics, but also of the widely held belief that many Zimbabweans would suffer retribution from land spirits for not paying homage to them after the liberation struggle.

These nationwide seizures of pangolins and their handovers to Mugabe during the 1980s alarmed Zimbabwean environmentalists and officials from the Ministry of Natural Resources who expressed concerns that the extinction of the animal was imminent if this practice was not stopped. In October 1988, Victoria Chitepo, the Minister of Natural Resources, ordered a stop to the practice of capturing pangolins and forwarding them to President Mugabe on grounds that they were endangered animals that were threatened with extinction (Arizona Republic, 14 October 1988). Despite the ban, the handing over of pangolins to President Mugabe continued unabated into the 21st century as some Zimbabweans sought favours from the ruling party which monopolised political space in an environment ravaged by violence, general insecurity and extreme poverty.

The claims by musician Alishias Musimbe, popularly known as Maskiri, during an interview in September 2009 that he once caught a pangolin and intended to give it to President Mugabe can be viewed in the context of political opportunism considering the socioeconomic hardships he was facing. During the interview, Maskiri claimed that he had picked up a pangolin on his way from the town of Beitbridge in 2006 and thought of presenting it to President Mugabe as a royal gift. He stated that he ended up surrendering the pangolin to the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management after failing to access President Mugabe (Mazara 21 September 2009). Maskiri's claims can hardly be sustained considering that, being a popular musician and celebrity at the time, his handing over of a pangolin to the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management could have enjoyed nationwide publicity in the press. It was perhaps opportune for Maskiri to make these claims of loyalty to President Mugabe in 2009 with the hope of seeking political interventions to his plight given the socioeconomic hardships he was experiencing, some of which had been caused by the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC), a state-owned institution and ZANU-PF mouthpiece, which monopolised the

airwaves. In 2002, for example, one of Maskiri's songs was banned and denied airplay by ZBC after an outcry by Christians that it was blasphemous (Pindula, 8 July 2015). In November 2004, Maskiri lamented that most of his songs had been banned from the airwaves by ZBC after state radio and television authorities regarded their content as offensive and vulgar (Jongwe, 28 November 2004). The musician lost considerable publicity as a result of the ZBC ban and by September 2009, he was a destitute (Mazara, 21 September 2009). It is plausible that Maskiri decided to publicise his intention to present a pangolin to the President, or actually fabricated the story, belatedly though, in order to solicit for sympathy and political intervention in an effort to resuscitate his waning fortunes.

In January 2011, Badza and Mohammed, male villagers from the small mining town of Mashava in Zimbabwe's central province of Masvingo, captured a pangolin. Youths from the area belonging to the ruling ZANU-PF party ordered that the pangolin be presented to President Robert Mugabe during festivities to mark his 87th birthday in February. These orders did not seem to have gone down well with the two men. The pangolin, together with its two captives, vanished before it was presented to Mugabe. ZANU-PF youths in Mashava embarked on an intensive search for the animal, harassing local villagers in the process. Talent Majoni, a ZANU-PF Deputy National Youth Commissar, stated:

The pangolin was captured in Mashava and we thought of going with it to our dear President on his special day. However, we were embarrassed when those who were in custody of the animal disappeared with it. They phoned me indicating that the pangolin destroyed the cage and ran away but we are surprised that since their last call on February 25, the two's (Badza and Mohammed's) whereabouts are not known. It was purely a youth initiative so we are now mobilising each other to raise another gift if we can (Radio Voice of the People, 13 April 2011: 1).

In November 2013, Chief Sigola of Umzingwane District in Matebeleland South Province was handed over a pangolin by Zimbabwe National Army soldiers at Imbizo Barracks who had

caught it during a training session. Instead of releasing it back into the wild or surrendering it to the Department of National Parks and Wildlife as prescribed by Zimbabwean law, the chief decided to hand it over to President Mugabe on grounds that:

This is a royal creature that cannot be possessed by an ordinary person. It is very rare to catch this animal and we know the President would appreciate it...We have to give it to the President as a gift. The problem is that we do not know the channel of taking this gift to our head of state (Ndlovu, 12 November 2013: 3).

On 11 November 2013, a Parks and Wildlife Management Authority of Zimbabwe official explained the official position regarding what should have been done with the pangolin:

In any environment, an animal establishes its own habitat and for people to remove it from its habitat is not proper. Doing so disturbs the animal and people should always let it go on its way when they see it (Ndlovu, 12 November 2013: 3).

In February 2014, some ordinary Zimbabweans also criticised the handing over of pangolins to President Robert Mugabe arguing that Zimbabwe was not a monarchy (Nehanda Radio, 23 February 2014).

During the 2014 national celebrations of President Robert Mugabe's birthday, the cakes were in the shape of a pangolin. This was a symbolic expression to wish the 90-year-old President many more years in line with the pre-colonial Shona custom of associating pangolins with the long life of chiefs (News 24 Zimbabwe, 15 May 2015).

This section has illuminated how the pursuit of patronage with the ruling ZANU-PF party became a critical survival tool for some Zimbabweans at a time when political violence, poverty and general insecurity engulfed the country. One way of expressing loyalty to the ruling party was to present pangolins to President Robert Mugabe. This was in line with the pre-colonial custom of surrendering pangolins as royal gifts. Even though the presentation of these rare animal species to President Mugabe violated the National Parks and

Wildlife Act, constituting what Kwashira (2009: 251) termed “state-sponsored poaching,” it reflected creativity and political opportunism on the part of some vulnerable Zimbabweans to align themselves with powerful constituencies in order to be guaranteed of security and access to resources such as food aid during times of crisis.

In pursuit of immunity from prosecution: Pangolin poachers and political opportunism in independent Zimbabwe

After being arrested for being found in illegal possession of pangolins, some poachers attempted to seek immunity from prosecution in Zimbabwean courts of law by arguing that they intended to forward the animals to President Robert Mugabe.

On 8 April 2011, Blackmore Mutandadzi, a 58-year-old man from Budiriri suburb in Harare, escaped a prison term for pangolin poaching at the Mbare Magistrate’s Court after successfully using the name of President Robert Mugabe. The state’s case was that on 29 March 2011, the police received a tip-off that Mutandadzi was keeping a pangolin at his home in Budiriro suburb. When the police searched his premises, they discovered the pangolin and apprehended Mutandadzi. He admitted capturing the animal at his rural home in the Nyabira Communal Lands while harvesting maize (*Herald*, 13 April 2011). He pleaded guilty to illegally possessing a pangolin but in mitigation, he stated:

I meant no harm to the sacred animal but I brought it here to Harare because I wanted to consult my brothers on the procedures to be followed to get access to His Excellency, the President of Zimbabwe, Comrade Robert Gabriel Mugabe. I wanted to honour him personally as he is a deserving leader of the nation. If what I did was not in line with the law, Your Worship may I be punished for it (*Herald*, 13 April 2011: 5).

The mention of President Mugabe was enough for him to escape a prison sentence. The magistrate cautioned and discharged him and

ordered that the pangolin be surrendered to the Parks and Wildlife Management Authority (*Herald*, 13 April 2011).

It becomes quite apparent that the mention of the name of President Robert Mugabe during mitigation in court cases involving pangolin poaching was adequate to guarantee one's immunity from prosecution. Whether the version of the accused was authentic or not is not the issue. The crux of the matter is that the accused person violated the National Parks and Wildlife Act and could have purported to be ignorant about its provisions. It should be noted, however, that ignorance of the law does not constitute a defence in Zimbabwe's criminal justice system.

On 30 August 2011, Stephen Chizema, a 37-year-old man, also used President Mugabe's name in an effort to escape a prison term for pangolin poaching (*Telegraph*, 1 September 2011). He appeared together with Prince Muusha, his 30-year-old alleged accomplice, before Mr Archie Wochiuga, a Harare magistrate facing charges of illegal pangolin possession. It was the state's case that on 1 July 2011, the two were driving along Robert Mugabe Road in Harare with a pangolin in the car boot which they intended to sell for US\$7 000. After conducting a search, the police discovered the 15.4 kilogram pangolin in the car boot. Chizema pleaded guilty to possessing a pangolin without a permit but stated that he intended to take it to the State House to give it to President Mugabe "following Shona culture, which entails that if one finds a pangolin, he gives it to the king" (*Chronicle*, 1 September 2011: 3). The two poachers got away with a light sentence of US\$300 or 30 days in prison each on the first count of possessing a specially protected animal. Each one also had US\$200 or 30 days suspended for three years on account of good behaviour. They were also found guilty on a second count of cruelty and each fined US\$50 10 days in prison. According to the Tikki Hywood Trust (29 September 2011: 1): "The reason for this seemingly light sentence was that the guilty parties did not benefit from the crime, they did not kill the pangolin and it was only by chance that they found the pangolin and unlawful possession and cruelty were done out of ignorance." By implication, the extenuating circumstances, which the magistrate acknowledged, were the ignorance of the law on the part of the two poachers to arrange to take the pangolin to President

Mugabe. The mention of the name of the President therefore contributed to the lighter sentence given to the two poachers. The Tikki Hywood Trust (29 September 2011: 1) was understandably disappointed with this light sentence and was quite diplomatic in its protest: “This conviction most certainly does not do justice for what this male pangolin was put through over what we believe is at least a week of immense stress.”

On 6 October 2013, Tatenda Gunguwo confronted police officers at Mabelreign Police Station in Harare demanding the pangolin which he had captured together with his friends on their way from a traditional healer in Mutoko District in north-eastern Zimbabwe. His friends had surrendered the pangolin to the police. The Mabelreign police had handed over the animal to the Department of National Parks and Wildlife. Gunguwo insisted that the police give him back the pangolin because:

The traditional healer told me that things were going to be well for me in Harare and on our way back, I found the pangolin and thought that was the turning point in my life. I heard that you can take it to President Mugabe or there is a huge amount of money that I can be given since I am the one who picked the animal. My friends surrendered the animal behind my back and they gave me beer so that they would take advantage of that. I am not going anywhere without the animal (Kuvirimirwa, 7 October 2013: 4).

This incident clearly illustrates how some individuals attempted to use the name of President Robert Mugabe in order to circumvent the provisions of the National Parks and Wildlife Act regarding the preservation of pangolins. What is clear from the words of Gunguwo is that he wanted to hold on to the pangolin for two reasons. The first reason was his belief in pre-colonial Shona customs which associated pangolins with good luck as the traditional healer had articulated. The other reason had much to do with the post-colonial efforts to accumulate wealth through trafficking in pangolins. In order to achieve both ends, it seems Gunguwo saw it expedient to embark on political opportunism by using President Mugabe’s name in order to convince the police to release the animal to him.

Guguwo's efforts were, however, in vain. A senior official from the Department of National Parks and Wildlife informed him about the provisions of the National Parks and Wildlife Act, Chapter 20:14, which classified pangolins as protected animals. Gunguwo sounded convinced but insisted that "he wanted to be informed of what would happen to the animal" (Kuvirimirwa, 7 October 2013: 4).

Pangolins as image-enhancing resources for traditional leaders in independent Zimbabwe

Narrating events of late October 2012 which the *Sunday Mail* (6 October 2012: 6) regarded as "bizarre," Joseph Chigariro, the 81-year-old Chief Chundu from Mashonaland Central Province, described how sacred animals that included baboons, a fish eagle, lions and a pangolin visited his area and verbally communicated with a local spirit medium soon after a rain-inducing ceremony. According to Chief Joseph Chigariro, the visit by the animals symbolised great things to come. He claimed that the animals came to the place where they had just held a rain-inducing ceremony and communicated with Katombo Kanyai, a local spirit medium, using a language he could not understand (*Sunday Mail*, 6 October 2012).

The reality of this event is very problematic to authenticate but Kanyai's interpretation of the 'visit' by the pangolin and other animals was clearly meant to boost the image of Shona traditions and the power of traditional secular and religious leaders in independent Zimbabwe. Kanyai's interpretation of the events went as follows:

The message these happenings are bringing is that people must go back to traditional ways of doing things to stop starvation which is currently bedevilling the nation. In this era, the judgements of chiefs are reviewed by young magistrates educated by the colonial system which is a far cry from the chiefs of the older days, who were the custodians of the law and all liberties...I will be approaching the authorities to deliver this message...We fought the (liberation) war and attained independence, but there is a danger that the enemy will reverse

the gains we made, so it is for the good of every Zimbabwean to take heed of what the ancestors are saying (6 October 2012: 6).

In May 2013, Abel Mbasera, the 43-year-old new Chundu chief from the Hurungwe Communal Lands, claimed that many pangolins were being found in the area from the time he assumed chieftainship in October 2012. According to Chundu traditions, the prevalence of pangolins is a symbolic endorsement of a reigning chief by the ancestral spirits (Pito, 2 May 2013).

These claims by Mbasera seem to have been crafted to bolster his image as a new chief in view of the controversial circumstances in which he had ascended to the Chundu throne. Since the death of Borewa, his predecessor, in 2008, succession disputes had erupted during which acting chiefs refused to hand over power after successive two-year mandatory periods in order to pave way for the selection of a substantive monarch. During the disputes, Picture, Borewa's son, had attempted to wrestle power before Mbasera was installed (Pito, 2 May 2013).

In addition to this volatile background of succession struggles, it is also plausible to suggest that Mbasera's relatively young age of 43 years made it expedient for him to capitalise on the Chundu traditional beliefs about the prevalence of pangolins during his tenure to win acceptance and respect from his subjects. Mbasera cited a recent incident during which one of his elderly subjects from the Nyamakate village had refused to answer charges of eating a pangolin at the traditional court on grounds that the chief was too young to prosecute him. Without mentioning his name, Mbasera alleged that after the man had eaten the pangolin and refused to come and answer charges at the village court, he died after suffering from a headache, an implication that the ancestral spirits had penalised him for violating environmental taboos and disrespecting traditional jurisprudential institutions presided over by chiefs (Pito, 2 May 2013).

On 20 February 2016, Chief Nembire of Mount Darwin District in north-eastern Zimbabwe stated that the pangolin is "a preserve for traditional chiefs, therefore there is need to revere it to fulfil and support cultural values bestowed on it" (Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation, 20 February 2016: 1). These sentiments were echoed by

Esther Chipashu, an official from the National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe, at the same occasion as Zimbabwe marked the Pangolin Day (Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation, 20 February 2016).

Some traditional healers also associated their rise to fame with good luck brought about by their coming across pangolins. This explanation was presented in November 2010 by Friday Chesanyi, a famous traditional healer from Harare's Sunningdale suburb, who owned a fleet of personal vehicles, ambulances, clinics and herbal pharmacies. He also went on to open a surgery and a herbal pharmacy in the town of Chitungwiza, south of Harare. Chesanyi attributed his rise to fame and prosperity to events during his young age in the rural areas in Hurungwe Communal Lands when he captured pangolins. He stated that his picking up of pangolins at an early age and his compliance with traditional Shona customs of surrendering them to chiefs constituted the background to his prosperous future (Guvamombe, 20 November 2010). He explained:

It all started when I was in Grade Four. I picked up pangolins in six consecutive days, which I gave to Chief Chundu. Pangolins are consecrated and sacred animals in my tradition. Chief Chundu consulted the spirit mediums for interpretation. All the spirit mediums endorsed that I was becoming a *n'anga* (traditional healer) (Guvamombe, 20 November 2010: 5).

It is difficult to prove Chesanyi's interpretation scientifically. What is apparent from these sentiments, however, is that the Shona traditional belief in the sacredness of pangolins continued to be closely linked to the institutions of chieftainship and traditional medical practice in some quarters in post-colonial Zimbabwe.

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Theorising Agency in ICT4D: Epistemic Sovereignty and Transformation-in- Connection

Ineke Buskens & Mirjam van Reisen

Introduction

This chapter considers the international development project through the lenses of theories of women's empowerment and gender equality, recognizing the need for a radical epistemological underpinning of the field. The question is posed within the area of ICT for Development (ICT4D), an area that has gained increasing relevance in the past decade and draws upon practical experiences in this area.

We have recognized the need for an alternative theorizing, in a world where 'gender equality' has been increasingly accepted within the framework of a normative and hegemonic cultural rights perspective, but excludes the ontological perspectives of self within the social of women, the very women who are often regarded as the object of study, intervention and purpose. In this chapter the authors review available concepts and propose a conceptualization based on radical epistemological sovereignty.

This chapter comprises two parts: in part I, a revisiting of the concept of women's empowerment, the self and its possibility to understand and nurture epistemic, critical and creative agency is explained forming a concept that can explain change in gender relations; in part II, two case studies conducted by researchers of the GRACE Network²⁰ are described which give insight into how this

²⁰ The GRACE Network, short for the Gender Research in Africa and the Middle East into ICT for Women Empowerment Network, comprises 28 research teams who have conducted 35 research projects in 18 countries in Africa and the Middle East in the period 2005 – 2013. The two case studies described here are

approach has worked in practice and what kind of results it has delivered. This approach is taken from the area of women's engagement with ICT innovation, which is regarded as a crucial new area of global social transformation, which equally effects gender relations (Buskens 2015a; Buskens 2015b; UN 2005). It is therefore regarded in this chapter as a priority area for the study of women's empowerment.

The chapter concludes that research for women empowerment and development in Africa should be grounded in epistemic sovereignty and be open to the dynamics of 'transformation in connection' (Buskens 2014a). Development approaches which individualise women as independent, isolated actors disembedded from their webs of social relations, frame social norms and cultural beliefs as agency constraints and introduce external understandings of development, empowerment and the public good may be able to form and inform gender just policies but will not be able to inspire and guide processes of personal and social transformation that can address intricate and complex problems of gender discrimination and transform them into new and sustainable social life forms.

1. Revisiting concepts for women empowerment and change

This chapter argues that a solid theoretical foundation is needed to underpin social change processes and identifies some of the concepts available to research ICT related development programmes connected to aims of women's empowerment.

1.1. Spivak and what we may never know

A theoretical perspective on global women's empowerment has to begin with a recognition of Spivak's ground-breaking work, which poses the question to what extent perspectives outside the definition of cultural and social hegemony are knowable when they appear outside the existing given paradigm of language and understanding. Yet feminist global inquiry has as object of study to understand the diversity of ontologies of women's realities as well as to achieve

grounded in two chapters of the second GRACE book: Women and ICT in Africa and the Middle East: Changing Selves, Changing Societies.

understanding of epistemologies of women's empowerment within these contexts. If this is so, then a first task is to understand the theoretical concepts used for such inquiries and develop a perspective on what they allow us to see, as well as their limitations (Spivak 1988).

1.2. Agency, Capabilities and the Power to Think

Pertinent to efforts of women empowerment and development is the concept of women's agency (Sen 1999; Nzegwu 2002; Buskens, I & Webb A. 2009; Buskens, I & Webb A. 2014; Buskens, I. 2010; Buskens 2014a, 2014b). In "Questions of Agency: Development, Donors, and Women of the South," Nzegwu argued that Northern donors who fail to recognize the agency of women in the South miss out twofold: Not taking into account the experiences, options, choices, dreams, and perspectives of women in the South will compromise the quality, effectiveness, and success rate of North-funded development aid projects, and furthermore, an invaluable source of learning and inspiration will be withheld from Northern actors (Nzegwu, 2002; Buskens, I. 2010).

In "Development and Freedom," Amartya Sen emphasises how important women's empowerment is to development: "the extensive reach of women's agency is one of the more neglected areas of development studies, and most urgently in need of correction." He considers "an adequate recognition of political, economic and social participation and leadership of women" to be a crucial aspect of "development as freedom" (Sen, 1999, p. 203). Agency can be understood in this context as the human capacity to make choices and impose those choices on the world. This definition evokes the acknowledgment of individual responsibility as an expression of personhood (Buskens, I. 2010). In Sen's words, "Understanding the agency role is thus central to recognizing people as responsible persons" (ibid., p. 190). Sen also acknowledges that women's ability and willingness to question received values is a prerequisite for women developing meaningful agency: "Indeed, in dealing with the new – "high tech" – face of gender disparity, in the form of natality inequality, there is a need to go beyond just the agency of the women, but to look also for more critical assessment of received values. When

anti-female bias in action (such as sex-specific abortion) reflects the hold of traditional masculinist values from which mothers themselves may not be immune, what is needed is not just freedom of action but also freedom of thought – in women’s ability and willingness to question received values. Informed and critical agency is important in combating inequality of every kind. Gender inequality, including its many faces, is no exception” (Sen 2001).

In the 2014 World Bank Report, entitled ‘Voice and Agency, Empowering Women and Girls for Shared Prosperity’, agency is defined as “the ability to make decisions about one’s own life and act on them to achieve a desired outcome, free of violence, retribution, or fear. The ability to make those choices is often called empowerment” (World Bank 2014, p.1). Introducing the concepts of ‘deprivation’ and ‘freedom from deprivation’ at the onset (p 2.) these concepts are then linked to agency and result in ‘agency deprivation’, ‘multiple disadvantages’ and ‘multiple deprivations’ (p. 2 - 12). Via a discussion on how norms shape agency (p.15), the scene is then set to discuss how policy makers, donors and development agents can ‘enhance women’s agency’.

This World Bank policy oriented definition of agency is deeply problematic. It identifies the capabilities normatively associated with gender equality as defined from the outset. As is argued in this chapter, the essence of a sovereign agency lies in the ability to determine the capabilities within their own normative perspective and to recognize how these are embedded in underlying worldviews. Thus agency is not and cannot be located within the policy bureaucracy, but is located in the inner self.

Hanna Arendt (1958) exposed the error to leave the idea of a good society to bureaucracies. She explicitly refers to the epistemological ability as the most fundamental human condition, which is the ability to think in consciousness. The recognition of the ability to think freely is not only a necessary philosophical recognition in any discussion related to ‘freedom’, it is also the only way in which the existence of different epistemologies of gendered social realities can be recognized, researched, understood (Buskens, 2014c; Zaidi 2014; Nakazibwe 2014; Nakazibwe 2016; Van Stam 2014) and explained (Foucault 1968). For the purpose of this chapter women’s

agency is therefore defined as the ability of women to understand, define and explain their world from their own positionality as women who are socially, culturally and politically situated and who relate, act, emote and construct knowledge on the basis of these understandings. Agency is not exclusive to women and can be set next to human agency or men's agency. The concept is an interdisciplinary construct, requiring the recognition of agency as an intersectional concept if studied in social contexts and as a psychological concept if studied in the context of self-realization and empowerment.

The recognition of epistemological freedom – as described by Arendt as the essence of what connects us in our humanity, requires an additional conceptualization in masculinity and femininity if applied in the area of gender. The concepts of masculinity and femininity have been described as fluid spectrum like definitions of what is regarded as masculine and feminine at any one point in time in a certain situation, within a certain social context. The definitions 'masculinity' and 'femininity' are not necessarily linked to the genders, but they help to describe the social world from a perspective of gendered imagery. These are not static and these images can change within the social setting as well as within individuals over time (Klein 2003; Clarke 2008).

A layered conceptualization of agency, understood within a radical epistemological human ability to think and recognize as an intersectional concept if applied in social sciences and as, as a psychological concept if studied in the context of self-management, linked to the twin concepts of femininity and masculinity, provides a possible basis to study social realities and how they produce certain gendered settings.

1.3. Understanding the power of change

The theoretical inquiry of how to conceptualise the study of gendered social situations does not yet provide a normative objective of women's empowerment. Yet the objective of global feminist postcolonial studies is not only to identify how gendered relations can be studied and understood, but also to study how they can be changed to enhance women's abilities to fully participate in society and enjoy their human rights.

In this regard what is needed is a theoretical framework that allows the understanding of processes and directions of change. This needs to be set on a foundation of understanding radical positive change processes in society and how these occur. We can borrow here from the field of social sciences and the notion of agenda setting. The agenda is the definition of policy activity around a defined area, the agenda setting is the recognition of the sets of problems that are incorporated and accepted as being part of the agenda within a certain policy. If applied to the question of change the question is not what is on the agenda, but the question is how new ideas enter onto an agenda.

Kingdon (2011) proposed the concept of the policy window as a moment in time when an opportunity arises, a window which usually opens unexpectedly and closes within a relatively short given time. During the window new ideas can enter onto the policy agenda. These ideas are imagined as floating in a soup of ideas and many studies have inquired which ideas have a chance to enter onto a policy agenda and what conditions enhance the possibility of certain ideas to emerge.

More fundamentally important are the questions where new ideas come from, how a policy window emerges and what constitutes a policy window in a more ontological sense. For the purpose of this discussion the essence is to note that ideas as presented within the context of policy windows may not have rational or problem related intent, but simply happen to be around. The policy window can be understood as a moment in time where social paradigms shift and consequentially new definitions of what the world is, how it functions and what its problems are, can be framed and discovered. Within this paradigmatic shift a possibility for consideration of new ideas occurs and hence the possibility for positive change is enabled (Reisen, 2009). This can be true for societies and the world order at large, but this can also help to think through changes and how they occur within communities and smaller-scale social or political units, even to the level of the individual self. The concept of a policy window is generally acknowledged and applied within political realities where political strategies are intentionally on the lookout for windows of opportunities. The question is whether this theory of change also has

value within the context of gendered social realities in providing a perspective of how these may change and why and how personal intent and empowerment can bring about and possibly be mobilised to effect change. In order to consider these possibilities we need to return to the concept of agency as an epistemological concept of self-definition in a foundational (paradigmatic) sense aligned with a purpose of change intended to contribute to a better life.

1.4. The Capacity to Aspire

Key to understanding women's agency as self-determination embedded within social and cultural being, doing, knowing and relating is the 'capacity to aspire', a concept developed by Arjun Appadurai (2004). Framing the posture of "voice," as the capacity to debate, contest, inquire, and participate critically' (2004: 70), Appadurai brings the 'capacity to aspire' into dialogue with Sen's concept of capability (Sen 1999) and Hirschman's concept of voice (Hirschman 1970). The capacity to engage social, political, and economic issues in terms of the ideologies, doctrines and norms that are widely shared, is reflexively related to the capacity to aspire: 'It is through the exercise of voice that the sinews of aspiration as a cultural capacity are built and strengthened, and conversely, it is through exercising the capacity to aspire that the exercise of voice by the poor will be extended' (2004: 83).

Whilst Appadurai focuses on the poor, his reflections are also relevant for women (Buskens 2014a, Buskens 2014b). Just like the poor have less of the 'capacity to aspire' than the elites, women will have less of the 'capacity to aspire' than men, the dominant gender. Women's 'capacity to aspire' towards concrete realization of gender equality and empowerment in male-dominated communities, is a complex endeavour and must, amongst other elements, entail the following: women have to (allow themselves to) aspire to more than what they may be accustomed to; they may have to (learn how to) negotiate the change of limiting gender norms with significant social actors and learn how to navigate their societies' rules. Women's capacity to aspire is thus in and of itself an act of personal and social change.

Whilst Appadurai treats the capacity to aspire as a cultural meta-capacity, formed and informed by cultural learning and positionality, on a personal level it is also a function of will power, intentionality and the individual determination to get things done. As such this capacity can be linked to the concept of ‘conation’ (Buskens, 2014a). Together with ‘cognition’ and ‘affect’, ‘conation’ used to be recognized as the human tripartite mental capacity in western psychology (Militello *et al.* 2006: 240; Pratim Das, P. 2015). As conation is linked to intrinsic motivation and the capacity to exercise will, one’s conative capacity is also linked to an expression of one’s values, beliefs and desires to accomplish meaningful and purposeful action (Campbell 1990). In the capacity to aspire, the personal and the social meet and are inextricably intertwined: cultural navigation, negotiation and co-creation depend as much on cultural competence and positionality as on personal will power towards purposeful action on the basis of personally defined values and culturally recognized lexicon.

What is important for the context of women empowerment and ICT projects – in fact ‘development practice in general’, is that the capacity to aspire, whilst a function of cultural learning and environment, can be strengthened on a personal and social level by purposeful action towards change and transformation (Huitt, W and Cain, S. 2005). If the project of development is precisely to enhance this capacity, then development is only successful when it results in such empowerment. As Appadurai worded it: “empowerment has an obvious translation: increase the capacity to aspire” (Appadurai 2004: 70). This is often a neglected dimension in ICT innovation connected to development; much ICT4D practice seems grounded in a deterministic theory which presupposes that introducing ICTs will help overcome development gaps. Based on our analysis we contend that access to ICTs in and of itself is not the transformative agent in development projects. A successful development practice will not only have to be inclusive of women, but also allow women to understand and formulate their own aspirations, design, use and governance of these new technologies. If development is in essence an aspirational programme of change, then women’s aspirations, at an individual and social level, need to be acknowledged and

understood and, when needed, the realization of their aspirations facilitated. If then the introduction of ICTs in and of itself will not suffice to facilitate or motivate women's empowerment, an approach at social and policy level needs to be constructed that is explicit of the aspirational component. Moreover, a theory of change that can explain how the aspirational objective is linked to individual and social change needs to be formulated. The absence of this theoretical and practical dimension of understanding and facilitating change may explain why so many ICT for Development projects lack a transformative capacity or fail to explain change when it does emerge. The aspirational objective requires a radical epistemological sovereignty. This is the one element that the hegemonic rights culture has had much difficulty in articulating so far. The result of the failure to recognize the need for a radical epistemological sovereign perspective is the basis of much of the misunderstanding of purpose of development programmes. The aspirational objective is grounded in the capacity to aspire, which, as a function of cultural positioning makes epistemic sovereignty so pertinent. But as conative capacity, it is also formed and informed by the intrinsic motivation, values, beliefs and desires that inspire meaningful and purposeful action. It is therefore imperative to acknowledge the pivotal importance of conation, next to 'cognition' and 'affect' in a conceptualization of women's agency in the context of women empowerment and development. Making visible the dynamic interplay between personal intentionality and the cognitive and affective elements of cultural environments which have been internalized as parts of the self, can facilitate an understanding of much it will take for women in a male dominated world to develop their will power and use it to develop their selves and their societies.

1.5. The concept of epistemological agency and the self

In the context of the Gender Research in Africa and the Middle East into ICT for Empowerment Network, an understanding of agency has been used that a) was grounded in an understanding of the Self that is multiple, dialogical and intentional; b) formed and informed by social relations and cultural context and c) can be graphically represented as a trajectory towards a desired state of being

or doing (grace-network.net; Buskens 2009, Buskens 2014a, Buskens 2016). As such, this concept of agency makes visible the dynamics of women supporting, identifying with and adapting to the male dominated status quo and at the same time, of challenging and transcending it and co-creating new more gender just and empowered realities. This approach towards theorizing agency differs from the agency conceptualisations discussed in the Introduction in the sense that it acknowledges and incorporates social and relational dimensions in addition to, and forming and informing the personal and individual space for choice and decision. And whilst it acknowledges the possibility (and sometimes imperative) for developing and expressing critical agency, it also creates the space for creative agency grounded in epistemic sovereignty and as part of conative capacity, for creating new realities. The approach towards development and development research in which this concept of agency is embedded is characterized by 6 methodological imperatives or researcher privileges: 1) epistemic sovereignty for the research team, 2) dialogue as main *modus operandi*; 3) non-judgment towards all research participants and stakeholders, 4) alignment with purpose by all participants and stakeholders, 5) the knowledge quest is formed and informed by values (the axiological dimension forms and informs the epistemological, methodological and arguably even the ontological dimensions) the concept of the dialogical, intentional self as a trajectory towards a desired state is used by all for self-management and self-care (Buskens 2014a , 2014b, 2016).

1.6. The concept of the self


The self-concept used in GRACE is grounded in the acknowledgment of intentional human agency whilst making visible internal and external barriers and resources, which are brought to bear on the journey of personal and social change. It is multi-layered, heterogeneous and capable of fluid agency. It makes visible how human beings can adapt to certain concepts, practices and behaviours that challenge cultural hegemony, just as they conserve and conform to ideas, emotions and values that are inherently part of their cultural ambit. The various parts of the self are in dialogue with each other and with society, the boundaries between the self and the

social are porous and the dialogue is multi-dimensional and ongoing. Because the model shows the various parts of the self in dialogue with each other, in relationship with the environment and in alignment to the dream, women's choices and decisions can be understood in terms of their own rationality, whether they conform to traditional male hegemony or the hegemonic culture of international development in its many expressions, live it, strengthen it, defend it as their own identity or alternatively reform it and transform it. As such, the concept of agency deprivation does not have conceptual and practical meaning in this model. Whilst women's repertoire of dreams to aspire to as well as the building blocks to create new understandings of self and society with, will be formed and informed by their cultural education, positionality, wellbeing and economic prosperity, their capacity for agency is not merely a function of those factors. Even though their capacity to aspire is partly defined by their potential to navigate their cultural communities and negotiate change, their agency is an intricate part of their inherent human personhood and not something an external party or factor can deprive them off.

1.7. The Dialogical, intentional self in purposeful alignment with dreams

Because this self is known in movement, in alignment with a desired dream, the graphic representations are known as the Personal Trajectory Map 1 and 2.

Personal Trajectory Map 1




Source: *Ineke Buskens, 2014*

Figure 1: *Personal Trajectory Map 1*

The graphic represents the various parts that ‘make up’ this concept of the self. The centre houses unconscious programmes and habits. The ring immediately around the centre, the ‘iron ring of safety and security’, represents the part of the self where one holds one’s sense of identity: beliefs and value systems. In the ring around that, the environment is pictured with its institutions, rules, regulations, structures and so on. Intent or intentionality is understood as vectored will that can embody itself in any of the other four elements of the self, eliding as it were, with one’s dreams or dream-self, one’s identity as a constellation of the values and characteristics constituting the known self, one’s environment as one perceives and experiences it, or one’s unconscious programmes and habits, which may reveal themselves on the journey towards realising the dream. Taking Intent as one of the elements of self, this map thus portrays five elements of our mental capacity, of ‘how we know ourselves’. Intent and therefore intentional agency are not

understood as only actively embodied when the self-acts, thinks, relates and emotes in direct alignment with the dream. Strengthening one’s identity and its known, culturally accepted values, projects and thoughts and supporting ones environment by endorsing it or challenging it, are also considered expressions of agency (Buskens 2014; Buskens 2016). When intent is not consciously focused on any of the three knowable (or known) aspects of self, the vectored will and thus one’s intent may elide with one’s reservoir of unconscious fears and desires. This may evoke unexpected attitudes, inclinations and behaviour, of which one was not aware of before. One could understand that the unconscious then also has agency.



Source: Ineke Buskens, 2014
Figure 2: Personal Trajectory Map 2

During the period where the self has become more embedded in the dream but still inhabits part of the old self, and thus resonates with two different selves – a future self and a present self –, the window is open, the self not yet reframed and defined and the self

may experience this as uneasiness and experience even anxiety. The part of the identity self that was known as familiar and recognized as the foundation of self, may feel 'broken into' or even 'falling apart'. This is the paradigmatic shift necessary for a process of change. In the process of expanding to new experiences and a new 'self', one may also become aware of some unconscious habits and programmes. The moment one starts to change the idea of oneself, embraces the dream as a new idea and occupies a new self, one has a better perspective on what the old self 'was'. When the self makes what was the dream now part of daily reality and adds a new dimension to the identity ring, the self will feel expanded and may also simultaneously feel the excitement of this expanded state, and start adding new ideas, experiences and habits to its actions, thoughts and emotions. And so newer, more expanded ideas of self-emerge, resulting in a new daily reality, constituted on a new paradigm, creating a new sense of identity within a new environment (Buskens 2014b).

By creating these graphic representations (Personal Trajectory Map 1 and 2) one can map the emotions, thoughts and experiences that can be understood as internal barriers as well as the challenges within one's environment, as also the strengths and the resources which one brings to the journey, both internal and external. The project thus serves as the policy window, the window of opportunity that creates the possibility to shift the paradigm of self and embed the dreams within the agenda of the self.

Theoretically, this understanding of the self-endeavours to stride across many disciplinary boundaries and the various dimensions and parts of this self-concept resonate with reflections by feminist philosophers (Willett, Anderson, and Meyers 2015; McNay 2000), psychologists (Hermans 2015; Hermans 2001), educationalists (Huitt and Cain 2005; Pratim Das 2015) and phenomenologists (Moddel 2009). McNay's efforts focus on restoring a positive dimension to the concept of agency in feminist theory so that the creative aspect in action can be more fully understood (McNay 2000). The dimension of intentional agency is described as conation (Huitt and Cain 2015), purposeful action and will-power (Campbell 1999), intent (Moddel

2009; Buskens 2011, 2013, 2014a, 2014b) and (volitional) agency (Buskens 2010, Sen 1999, 2004).

2. The case studies

The case study from Sudan describes and analyses how the introduction of ICT in Sudan exacerbated the problem of extra-marital pregnancies and the innovative ways in which ICT has at the same time been used to address the problem. The case study from Egypt describes how, in a context where 97% of female land owners are not managing their own land because of traditional gender roles and expectations, the GRACE team leader, herself an agricultural scientist, supported female landowners to become more empowered and effective as managers of their enterprise through a participatory developed ICT based extension programme and got herself empowered enough to negotiate “getting her own land back” whilst maintaining the social relationships within the family.

2.1 Case study 1: Pre-marital sex in Sudan and ICT

Introduction

This case study is grounded in the project, which Ikhlas Nour Ibrahim undertook to explore the role of ICT in premarital sexual relationships in Khartoum, the capital of Sudan – officially the Republic of the Sudan, in the period 2009-2013 (Nour Ibrahim I. A. 2014).²¹ Discussing sex in this traditional Muslim country is a social taboo and young men and women do not receive sexual education; neither are they permitted to meet unsupervised. This silence around sex is grounded in the belief that talking openly about sex will encourage unmarried youth to engage in premarital sex and this is forbidden. In this context, exposure to Western TV programmes and the use of mobile phones could and did create a social revolution: suddenly information about sexuality would become available outside of the traditional ambit of parental authority and responsibility; mobile telephone would make communication

²¹ The description of this case study by the first author of this chapter is grounded in frequent personal contact with Dr. Ikhlas Nour from the conceptualization of her project up to the present day).

between the sexes possible in a way that would have been unthinkable before, in secret and unfettered. In quite a few cases such mobile phone conversations have led to romantic meetings, sexual encounters and pregnancies. Islamic Sudan is a patriarchal society where men decide on the punishment of their female relatives: when an unmarried girl or woman is accused of having illicit sexual relations, or when she is found to be pregnant, she may be killed by her father, brother or other male relatives, as such punishment is considered within their rights. This situation has resulted in young women dying of illegal abortions or suicide and their unwanted children being killed or thrown away. A more than 100% increase in 'throw-away babies' was reported in Kalthoum in the period between 2004 and 2008, which is a significantly higher increase than would be expected on the grounds of the increase in population due to the migration of people from the South, East and West of Sudan because of the drought and war. In 2008, the number of babies accepted for shelter at The Mygoma Orphanage had risen from about 400 babies per year to a thousand. To attribute this increase in 'throw-away' babies to an increase in un-supervised sexual relationships facilitated by mobile phone use, was not an unreasonable hypothesis and it was widely discussed in the newspapers.

Is ICT to blame for the increase in throwaway babies?

At that time, certain influential parties in Sudan thus got convinced that Information Communication Technology contributed directly to the rising immorality and the increasing divorce rate in Sudan. The researchers however realised that ICT would have to become part of the solution since young people in Sudan were making more and more extensive use of these new technologies. They, therefore, designed a two-phase research project with the exploratory first phase testing the hypothesis whether ICT was indeed contributing to the increase in pre-marital pregnancies“?” In the second phase, the, intervention phase, the knowledge quest was designed to answer the question: “How can ICT be used to empower young women in their decision-making pertaining to sexual engagement and reproductive health?” On the basis of the research results of the first phase (grounded in survey findings, informal

interviews and participant observation in the shelter), the team concluded that there was indeed a causal link between the use of ICT and the increase in premarital pregnancies.

The first radio talk show about sex in Sudan

As the next step, the principal researcher Dr. Ikhlas Nour organized a national workshop, in which the research results were presented and experts and religious leaders were invited to speak. Grounded in a deeper understanding of the issues at stake, the team designed a multi-layered and internally coherent intervention with radio as the main medium and the principal researcher started a Facebook page and a blog. After establishing which radio shows were popular amongst young people, the team approached a well-known radio host to present the show. The radio series was called “Shame and Culture” and it was the first of its kind in Sudan. The programme was very well received; it sparked a lot of telephone calls from the audience asking for more information and discussion. The public’s general consensus was that lack of sex education and awareness are the main problems that led to the current sexual and moral crises. The Facebook page also proved to be highly successful, especially amongst young people because they could participate without giving their name and identity up front. Having no trusted adult to turn to regarding these matters, and fearing harsh punishment in those cases where they had engaged in sexual experimentation, the Facebook page became a space of information, discussion and learning about taking responsibility for oneself and one’s actions.

Changing Society...

The way forward for Sudan as a society in the light of this research would seem to be to break the culture of shame and silence that is so tightly woven around sex, and enlighten or educate the youth on these matters. However, sex education without a concerted effort to change the gender relations, will not change the double standard where the shame and the blame is put on the girl or woman and where the boy or man can escape the situation unscathed. Placing all the responsibility for sexual behaviour including its unintended results such as pregnancies and unwanted children on young

women's shoulders, who actually are the most disempowered and vulnerable group in this society, is neither realistic nor fair and therefore not socially sustainable.

Since it was the constellation of cultural gender beliefs, values and assumption (i.e. that women can bring shame on their families – especially on their male relatives and community members - through their behaviour; that men have the right to kill their female relatives when they feel it to be necessary) that created the environment in which the lack of sex education could bring such harm to young women and their unwanted children, the research team realised that sex education would have to involve questioning of this underlying gender ideologies. Giving young women merely technical reproductive and sexual health information would not necessarily empower them to stand up for their rights. Sex education would have to be grounded in a questioning of the values, assumptions and implicit rules which support (and are supported by) the core set of gender beliefs, customs and practices in Sudan. As such, this ICT and women empowerment action research project was understood to be part of a wider national movement towards more gender equality and respect for women and girls (Nour Ibrahim, 2014).

Process, findings and social impact

The principal researcher chose this topic because she personally cared about the plight of young women. She is a well-known and respected veterinarian, specialising in camel health and she plays a leading role in Sudan and the wider African region. She had never conducted social research and was not an expert in sex issues or their education, but she leads a research institute at the University of Khartoum and is a good teacher. She was also the first female veterinarian in Sudan and a trailblazer.

What proved essential in the success of this study is that she was able to communicate with all the parties that had a stake in this process, which appeared to be, not surprisingly, all of Sudanese society – old men and women, and young girls and boys, all included. With the persons that were taking on the plight of the young women (which made them controversial in Sudanese society) she shared compassion for the young women and took on co-responsibility to

make their lives better; with the Islamic religious leaders she shared their concern that the moral values of respect and modesty needed to be upheld. In her relationships with the young women who had engaged in pre-marital sex and were either pregnant or had already given birth, she was neither judgmental nor matronising, but compassionate, respectful, and understanding. Focused on a way forward that would include all voices and allow for people to discuss their differences, their aspirations and their fears, she opened up the way for Sudan as a country to breach the taboo on conversations about sex education and got 'discussing sex' accepted as a necessary step forward. More important therefore than expertise in terms of sex education and or health education and social science research methodology, were her focus, determination, compassion and respect for both her culture and for the victims of the imbalanced culturally informed gender relations. Having found her own position in relation to society, religion, gender and ICT, and using the respect she commands in Sudan as a female scholar, she was able to initiate and facilitate the ICT-based interventions this dilemma needed, to be taken to the next level in an inclusive and culturally respectful way. A year after her work was published she was invited to share her experiences at a conference on ICT and Sexual Health Education in Egypt, which indicated that her research writing had effectively rendered her learning transferable to other contexts which had similar problems.

2.2 Case Study 2: Female landowners, land management and ICT in Egypt

Introduction

This case study is grounded in a project, which was undertaken by Saneya El-Neshawy in the period 2009-2013, to understand why female land-owners in Egypt often do not have full control over their land and to explore how they could become more effective and 'hands-on' farmers (El-Neshawy, S. 2014). Being an Egyptian agriculturist, specializing in post-harvest pathology, El-Neshawy built in this project on her extension work with female farmers in the

Ismailia Governorate. When women inherit land in Egypt, their inheritance comes as part of a collective property rights' package, which they share with other relatives: 'shuyu'. Whilst women inherit half of a man's rightful share, they also often feel compelled to allow the part they do inherit to be 'managed' by their male relatives, even when they are very capable of this themselves. Through this unquestioned and seemingly 'unquestionable' succumbing to male authority, women farmers miss out on the self-empowerment that comes with effective management of one's land but also on personal income, food security and public status in their communities. Ninety seven per cent of female landowners do not manage their own land in Egypt, despite encouragement from the government.

ICT and participatory agricultural extension

The study set out to investigate whether and how the use of ICTs, in the form of a web-based agricultural extension programme, could support women in claiming the right to manage their own land. The training programme was designed in consultation with female landowners themselves and evolved over the course of an action process with cycles of learning, implementation, sharing and reflecting. Both women landowners who were already managing their own land, as well as women who were not doing so were included in this group. This was done on purpose to create the opportunity to understand this phenomenon from a deeper perspective. Together with the women landowners, the principal researcher set out to discover whether mastering this web-based agricultural extension programme had enhanced their agricultural knowledge and marketing opportunities. More importantly however, was finding out if these women could enhance their self-confidence and self-determination as female farmers. Deference to men and male authority is deeply ingrained in women's consciousness in Egypt. Having the capacity to manage one's land might thus, whilst important, not be sufficient for women to 'break this male authority spell' that their culture has woven so tightly into the fabric of their personal and cultural identities.

Behaviour change

The following changes happened: the percentage of women actively using computers rose from 30% to 75% in the study group. These women experienced heightened self-confidence and increased access to knowledge, agricultural as well as personal. Furthermore, 40% of the research participants reported an increase in revenue because of the enhanced access to marketing opportunities, which the web-based programme made possible. It was evident that participation in this ICT-based agricultural extension programme enabled women to enhance their decision-making power and acquire more autonomy and capacity for self-determination. They had learnt to trust themselves and to value their own opinions. As the training process was documented in detailed form, this intervention can be scaled up and rolled out to other rural areas in Egypt and beyond.

A dual empowerment process

In this project, a dual empowerment process took place. For El-Neshawy, the principal researcher, this research process became an important journey of personal and social transformation, which although not planned for, was something she had held as a deep dream for herself, for over 30 years. Whilst the research participants gained new knowledge, new access to knowledge and more confidence in themselves, and because of this, also were granted more authority and independence in hitherto male fields such as buying and selling, the principal researcher's process of empowerment was of a different nature and yet related. She had chosen this particular area as her research environment because she knew it well: she owned land here. Having inherited this land from her father 30 years ago, she had, as was expected of her, let a male relative manage the land for her, despite the fact that she herself was an agricultural scientist and her cousin had not received any formal agricultural training. Now, under the aegis of her research project, which was respected by her family as part of her scientific career, she had for the first time the opportunity to (using her words), "put her own hands on her own land". Being an internationally acknowledged scholar in post-harvest pathology, and a passionate agricultural innovator had apparently not been enough for her and her family to

come to the logical conclusion that she was not only entitled to her land but also the perfect farmer for it.

Becoming aware of her intentionality

Whilst El-Neshawy thus started to bond with her land and became familiar with herself as a farmer in and through her research with her female-farmer participants, she started to acknowledge towards herself what her intention really was and she started to own it. She knew she wanted to manage and really ‘own’ her land but she also realised that she did not want to antagonise her relatives; she realised that they might see her as an educated, well-off urban woman with no need of her land and perhaps even as not deserving of the land and its produce. She also realised that in Egypt’s particular gendered environment, her cousin might lose status and social respect when he would hand over the land to her. Her journey thus became one of deep introspection and contemplation, of making dream drawings, picturing her dream vividly, of writing poetry about her love for the earth, for farming and her land. Feeling the desire ‘to put her hands in the soil and on her land’ very keenly, she realised that her first obstacle was her own inner adherence to male authority. She felt how much her culture’s norms of respecting male authority and privilege, outweighed the meaning of her rightfully inherited right to the land. How the cultural justification of this pattern: “that men were better farmers than women” was not even brought up for questioning in the light of her agricultural knowledge and expertise in all these years. Whilst her respondents thus enhanced their computer literacy and became quite adept at sourcing information and learning to negotiate directly with buyers and suppliers and not via a male relative, El-Neshawy created a website describing what the project was about and how this training programme could enhance female farmers’ capacity and confidence everywhere. In her own words: “The project website promotes my name and reputation as a scientist in agriculture among a limitless virtual community”. Could it be that she needed confirmation from the widest possible social environment before she could muster the courage and the capacity to transform her own inner self and challenge her personal, intimate social circle?

Transformation-in-connection

As El-Neshawy went about her action research with the female landowners, she embarked on paving the road towards her dream: with patience, passion and perseverance she engaged and kept engaging her male relative. Visiting him frequently and sharing with him how much she loved farming and how much it meant for her, she brought him new crops from the land, novelties which she had grown herself. Although he did not want to listen to her stories, she kept the relationship and the communication about the land, open. When she was ready to start the official registration process, he kept procrastinating and did not want to collaborate. She pursued and when it came to the point of fencing off her land from his, he consented. He wanted to do the fencing himself however, because as he explained: he did not want her present because he did not want it to be known by neighbours and friends that it was his sister that had taken the land from him (El-Neshawy 2014).

Social impact of a personal change

Having become a farmer on her own land, has enhanced El-Neshawy's prestige amongst female farmers, has increased her insights and effectiveness as an agricultural scientist by giving her direct exposure to land, so this personal empowerment dimension of her project was a positive personal spin-off. But her actions also caused a ripple effect: her example set a precedence that apparently many women had been waiting for. Many of her female friends and relatives have started to reclaim their land rights. When these women will in turn inspire their own social circles, this project could mark the beginning of a widespread and soft revolution in land reclaiming. As access to land is such a pivotal issue, the effects of these personal and social transformation processes may continue to affect the status of gender relations and the acceptance of women's human rights in rural Egypt and beyond. Furthermore, the change in attitude and behaviour of these female landowners, the principal researcher included, which inspired them to overcome their 'normal' deference to male authority, is in itself also important for gender relations. Choosing to live and act on a different gender norm is an act of personal empowerment will have wide spread ripple effects. As

access to land is such an important issue, the effects of these personal and social transformation processes will undoubtedly affect the status of gender relations and the acceptance of women's human rights in rural Egypt and beyond. Because women are known to spend their income on family needs, such as children's education, health and nutrition, women empowerment contributes directly to a country's development (Buskens and Webb 2009; Bakesha, Nakafeero & Okello 2009).

Changing selves, changing societies


Both these case studies make clear how the personal and the social are inextricably intertwined in women empowerment projects: when women aspire to more gender justice for themselves or other women, they automatically have to confront not only the inner barriers of internalized feminine identity but also the way how these norms are embedded in gender relations and embodied by other people, from loved ones in the intimate sphere, to distant officials in legal discourses (Bakesha 2014, Buskens, 2014b, Buskens 2014, Buskens 2009). When women set out to bring empowerment to their communities, they will themselves change through the processes they set in motion because of the experiences acting as change agents will present them with.

The following graphic, Social Trajectory Map 1, an exact replica of Personal Trajectory Map 1, frames the social sphere, the community in which women (and men) live and which forms and informs them, as a social life form with an agency of its own. Like an individual person, a collective can have a dream, a reservoir of unconscious programs, an identity grounded in cultural rules and norms and an environment which either confirms or challenges this at certain points in time.

Turning to the Sudanese case study, the cultural rules regarding sexual trespasses treated women very different from men and this was a point of contention in Sudanese society. It was acknowledged that this rule encouraged men to be sexually irresponsible and women to carry the shame on their own. It was thus the dream of many women and also men, to see this unfairness corrected, but such

would have to happen within the rules and norms of their society, culture and faith. Sudanese society was and is not keen on embracing the kind of sexual freedom they see displayed in western countries and sex before marriage would be unacceptable. Changing this gender-unjust rule regarding pre-marital sex would thus have been very difficult if not impossible: because according to Sudanese rules and norms, sexual trespasses should not happen in the first place. Furthermore, the opportunity for such trespasses to happen on a big scale was also prevented because young people were not able to meet each other unsupervised. There was thus no real reason to address these gendered norms regarding pre-marital sex just as there was no real incentive to advocate for sex education to young people.


Social Trajectory Map 1



Source: Ineke Buskens, 2014
Figure 3: Personal Trajectory Map 1

Social Trajectory Map 2 shows a society in transition, expanding its understanding of its self by contemplating the incorporation of new thinking and new behaviour. Mobile telephony, which had been introduced into Sudanese society, had caused upheaval and chaos: the more than 100% increase in throwaway babies and young women’s broken lives. Cherished norms regarding sexual chastity before marriage, were broken and the traditional way how to deal with these trespasses (punishing the young girls) had become contentious. Incorporating technology from the global environment without wanting to adopt sexual mores from that same global environment needed Sudanese society to find its own approach to this challenge. This created the exceptional environment where sex could be openly discussed on radio and the idea of sex education could be advocated. Before this crisis, such would have been unthinkable.

Social Trajectory Map 2



Source: Ineke Buskens, 2014
 Figure 4: Personal Trajectory Map 2

Only when mobile phones were introduced in the country, and young people used these to meet and date each other un-supervised, that a crisis of unwanted pregnancies brought this issue to the

forefront of public awareness. This moment would be the window of opportunity of which Kingdon speaks and fortunately, Ikhlas Nour was prepared to use it. A trained researcher, albeit not in human or social science, she was also familiar with sexual and reproductive health issues, albeit in camels and not human beings. Being part of the GRACE Network helped her to understand the emancipatory potential of Information and Communication Technology and design a study with both an exploratory and an intervention component. Refusing to be part of the Information Society was not an option; hence Sudan would have to adapt itself to this changing global technology environment in way, which allowed for cultural identity to be preserves, albeit in a renewed form.

The situation in Egypt was different but also here, the graphic representations can be helpful. The Egyptian government had established gender policies regarding land inheritance, which were aligned with Islamic law. These policies would have allowed women to claim their rightful inheritance and start managing their own land. Even so, 97% of female landowners were not managing their own land and were thus missing out on the income and the experiences of growth, which such would have given them. Cultural norms and beliefs, especially when they pertain to the intimacy of household and family level, are not easy to change. Such norms and beliefs are not merely thoughts or emotions, they form the fabric of relationships and hence of personal identity on a deep level. Hence the efforts Saneya El-Neshawy undertook to labour for empowerment from within the relationship with her male relative. Supported by her female research participants, who already were managing their land to certain degrees, because they were allowed to do so out of economic necessity, she was learning to be what it meant to be a female farmer. And from that initially borrowed identity, she brought her male relative the fruits of her labour, relating to him as a relative and a female farmer at the same time. Information and Communication Technology provided both for her and her research participants an expanding of horizons and belonging to a community where the new identity they were aspiring to, was already an accepted reality. The three years it took El-Neshawy may seem a long time, but crafting a new cultural identity is a complex endeavour. Looking at

Social Trajectory Map 2 makes clear how monumental her accomplishment is, not only from a personal point of view, but also from a social and cultural point of view. It would thus not come as a surprise that her personal transformation would inspire other female landowners to follow suit. And her methodology of personal change-in-connection would be an approach that would be acceptable in her cultural environment: again a process of social change that would at allow Egyptian society to still recognize itself, even when all female land owners would start farming their own land.

Standing together on shared ground, looking in the same direction

Both projects also show the effect of the GRACE Network approach's emphasis on dialogue and non-judgment: instead of women empowering themselves whilst severing their relationships with family and community members or taking an adversarial position in society, the processes that were set in motion, were inclusive and transformed relationships, making them stronger and richer in the process. The alignment with a shared purpose, whether it is making life for young women better in Sudan despite ICT and at the same time, through the use of ICT or whether it is claiming ones land back whilst retaining respectful family relationships, has opened up a pathway to social innovation through the use of ICT that can be called "Standing together looking in the same direction" (Buskens 2014a).

Such processes of social change are grounded in an understanding of the female self as a self-in-relationship (Jordan et al, 1991) and the kind of transformations, which ensue from such processes, transcend the binary opposition between the personal and the social. Understanding agency grounded in an understanding of the Self as suggested in this text, and recalling the graphical representations (Personal Trajectory 1 and 2 and Social Trajectory 1 and 2), argues for the fact that social and cultural transformation happens in and through connection.

Respecting both the cultural norms and the people adhering to or deviating from these norms, created a non-judgmental space

where people could share and debate various and conflicting perspectives. In both cases, social connections were not severed but transformed and the role of ICT was pertinent in these processes. ICT has created new personal-social spaces which facilitate the integration of thoughts, projects, experiences, which resonate with the self's aspirations, even when such (dating the other sex pre-marriage in Sudan and building up the self-confidence to challenge the dominant male authority in Egypt) are not available in one's physical, immediate, social world. Changing the way that people talk together about something, mediated by ICTs, has indeed created the social space for people to change their minds and their behaviour. Both cases illustrate that social change is only possible when the selves in all their various parts, have aligned themselves with the shared purpose and are prepared to see values, projects and thoughts be informed and transformed by the dreams they want to see become reality. On the other hand, both cases also demonstrate that epistemic sovereignty is the shared ground on which people stand, so that they can look together in the same direction. It is the shared cultural lexicon that gives the capacity to aspire, in its cultural and personal dimensions, the material to craft dreams and co-create new more gender just realities in connection with one another.

Agency as grounded in and constituted by Epistemic Sovereignty and Transformation-in-Connection

Whilst agency has been acknowledged as the key to development effectiveness, especially in relation to women empowerment, it is pertinent that the concept of agency is understood in the sense of including epistemic, critical and creative agency and that the dimension of the social is retained. These elements of agency include and constitute one another. Socio-cultural change happens in connection, it is by definition a shared project. In order to find 'the shared ground on which to stand together looking in the same direction,' there must be a shared cultural lexicon, of values, beliefs and images. Development projects should therefore not only aim to work 'from the bottom up'. They should be grounded in epistemic sovereignty so that this bottom can be co-created from shared values

and the journey ‘up towards the shared purpose’ can be guided by the aspirations for change that brings people together in a shared purpose.

A framework such as Amartya Sen’s capability approach would in principle be commensurate with such a project. However, even in Sen’s conceptualisation the concept of agency is understood in a too limited way: agency as choice, as critical agency and as critical voice resonates with action and freedom, but excludes the dimension of agency as making sense of one’s own world and needing to be in connection in order to do so. Without complete epistemic sovereignty and the acknowledgement of relationality, it is questionable whether one can speak of true and fully-realised actor agency. Absence of local actors’ perspectives will furthermore give too much space to (implicit) donor ideologies in the development relationship and thus facilitate hegemonic international development power relations of donors over their development partners. And especially in the case of development in Africa, such would be detrimental.

Conclusion

The problems facing us today of economic crises, ecological disasters and rising inequality within and between countries, bring to the fore that the conceptualisations pertaining to the human-earth and human-human relationships, which underpin development praxis and discourse are unsustainable. New modes of thinking, beyond the neoliberal ideology favouring extraction, manipulation and competition need to be explored to secure a living for a global population on a planet of finite resources (Cohen, T. 2012; Ryan-Collins, J., A. Simms, S. Spratt and E. Neitzert 2009).

And it is here where a fully realised concept of human agency becomes so pertinent for Africa: in order to create new and sustainable realities, African development actors have to craft their own dreams in and on their own terms. This they can only do however, when they fully embody their epistemic, critical and creative agency and rely on the power of the social and of connection. In their quest for empowerment African women have had learn how to

discern what elements of traditional culture to retain and what to transform in order to preserve the relationships that give their personal and social lives meaning, value and continuity. In these processes they learnt how to negotiate the terms of cultural recognition in order to change that which needed to be changed. Learning from their endeavours and successes, African development actors can take the models of learning and communicating they pioneered and transform international development culture. Creating a shared dream for a sustainable future, will necessitate that Africa and their development partners from the Global North position themselves as equals in the development relationship: standing together on shared ground and looking in the same direction, transforming-in-connection. We are after all, of one earth and are standing together on this earth we all share.

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Conflict Management, Co-existence and Development: Exploring the Impact of Conflict and Civil Unrest on Africa's Development

Munyaradzi Mawere & Costain Tandi

Introduction

The decades that followed independence in Africa has faced serious challenges that threatened the continent's political stability and economic progress. In fact for many years since independence from Western colonialism, Africa has been in a state of turmoil and atrophy due to intermittent conflicts and civil unrest over a multitude of issues. Year after year since the 1980s, one African country after another has imploded, scattering refugees in all directions. Notable examples are Ethiopia (1985), Angola (1986), Mozambique (1977), Sudan (1991), Liberia (1992), Somalia (1993), Rwanda (1994), Zaire (1996), Sierra Leone (1997), DRC (1998), Ethiopia/Eritrea (1998), Angola (1999). It can be noted that the relationship between conflict, civil unrest, and development has recently come to the forefront of the economic debate. In spite of the fact that the African continent exceeds in its size and natural resources the combined territories of Europe, the United States of America and China, most Africans due to civil unrest and conflicts are struggling for bare survival. Again, the countries of Africa, particularly, those in sub-Saharan Region are a volatile mix of insecurity, civil unrest, and conflict which produces the toxic phenomenon of underdevelopment. The problem of conflict and civil unrest is destabilising the continent's development process. This is because no continent that is bedevilled with the problem of conflict and civil unrest in its societal milieus could be expected to move forward its development wheels of progress. Thus, the dire need for peace in the African countries is a matter that calls for great and urgent concern.

The gist of this chapter is to explore the causes as well as the impact of conflicts and civil unrest on Africa's development as well as to make recommendations on how the conflicts can be resolved or at least managed peacefully on a permanent basis.

Conflict, conflict management, and development

Conflict like all social concepts cannot be boxed into a unilateral acceptable definition, as attempt to mono-conceptualise it seems to generate a lot of controversy. Some of the definitions that have been conjured in view of conflict but without succeeding in making the interpretation and understanding conflict universally are as follow:

Dougherty and Flatgraff (1971) define conflict as a condition in which one identifiable group of human beings is engaged in conscious identifiable human groups because these groups are pursuing goals. While Dougherty and Flatgraff are right in pinpointing that one of the causes of conflict is differences in goals, they failed to note that broadly "resources" – be they material or immaterial – are normally at the centre of all conflicts. For Coser (1998: 35), "a conflict is a particular relationship between states or rival factions within a state which implies subjective hostilities or tension manifested in subjective economic or military hostilities." As could be seen, Coser's definition is somehow neutral in so far as it does not reveal that the clash is normally between or amongst people in the state(s). Miall *et al* (2003) as cited in Ikayase and Olisah (2014) has posited that conflict entails an expression of the heterogeneity of interests, values and beliefs that arise as new formations generated by social change come up against inherent constraints. Yet while Miall *et al*'s interpretation of conflict is convincing, it fails to acknowledge that conflict is inevitable in human society. Part of this overlooking seems to have been corrected by Bakut. Bakut (2012:13) sees a conflict as an intrinsic and inevitable aspect of social change that can also be seen as the pursuit of incompatible interest and goals by different groups.

Though with their respective shortfalls as has been noted, the aforementioned definitions when coalescent, lend themselves to the fact that conflict is intrinsic and unavoidable in all human enforcements,

essentially due to the struggle over values, claims to status, power, resources and prestige in which the aims of the combatants are to neutralise, injure or eliminate their rivals. It is for this major reason that the Foundation Coalition (2000) has tried to come up with a wholesome understanding of conflict as a “contest between people with opposing goals, ideas, values or needs”. In more or less the same way, Rakhim (2010: 16) has come to understand conflict as “an interactive process manifested in incompatibility, disagreement or dissonance within or between social entities”. He further notes that a conflict may be limited to one individual, who is conflicted within himself (the intrapersonal conflict) or between two or more individuals (interpersonal conflict). Thus, for the Foundation Coalition and Rakhim, conflict is always centred on resource, of which the resources could be tangible or intangible. Besides, it is something that is inevitable. In a tone that agrees with the Foundation Coalition’s understanding of conflict above, Rakhim (2010) notes the following common elements in the definitions of conflict:

- there are recognised opposing interests between parties in a zero-sum situation;
- there must be a belief by each side that the other one is acting or will act against them;
- this belief is likely to be justified by actions taken;
- conflict is a process, having developed from their past interactions (p. 16).

The recent conflict in South Sudan, Mali, Eritrea, Syria and Ukraine emblematises elements noted by Rakhim. Conflict can thus be considered as a social necessity and a normal, functional and indeed inevitable aspect of the healthy functioning of all societies (Alli, 2012). However, conflict is indeed an obstacle to progress, political stability, economic prosperity and overall socio-economic development because of its destructive nature, particularly where it [conflict] is not well managed – what others call “dysfunctional conflict”. But one may wonder what it entails and requires to manage a conflict!

Conflict management, like conflict itself, has been interpreted differently. Laderach (1995) describes conflict management as a

general term used to describe efforts to prevent, limit, resolve, or transform conflicts. For Best (2012), conflict management is a process of reducing the negative and destructive capacity of conflict through a number of measures and by working with and through the parties involved in that conflict. This can involve preventing conflicts from breaking out or escalating as well as stopping or reducing the amount of violence by parties engaged in conflict. Conflict management is a more comprehensive idea than just a process for ending specific grievances. It refers to the long term management of intractable conflicts: it acknowledges that conflicts are long term and cannot be quickly resolved; the conflict is still there, and it is just being handled. Therefore, conflict management refers to the various means by which individuals and societies are able to cope with conflicts without interventions from external actors. In conflict management, individuals and groups in conflict neither give up their positions on the conflict nor do they compromise on them. It can be noted that the conflict management approach is taken when complete resolution seems to be unattainable. In cases of resolution-resistant conflict, such as where non-negotiable human needs are at stake, it is possible to manage the situation in ways that make it more constructive and less destructive. The goal of conflict management is to intervene in ways that make the ongoing conflict more beneficial and less damaging to all sides and thereby promoting co-existence as well as enhancing learning and group outcomes, including effectiveness or performance in a given situation. In other words, a well-managed conflict allows progress and development. No wonder scholars like Lippmann argue that where people think alike, there is never progress. This means that for Lippmann, conflict is necessary for transformation (or positive change) to occur in society, without which, positive change could be hardly realised. But what is this so-called “development” and how does it connect with progress and transformation?

Like conflict and conflict management, development is a problematic concept and phenomenon. As a concept in the social sciences, there is no clear all-inclusive definition of development. To Rodney (1972), development is considered to be a many-sided process. At the level of individual, it implies increasing in skills and

capacity, greater freedom, creativity, self-discipline, responsibility and well-being. Rodney further asserts that development transcends economic indicators. Aligning with Rodney but with a different perspective, Todaro (1980) opines that development is a multidimensional and co-orientation of the entire economic and social system. On another plane, David Simon (2004) contends that development means an improvement in the quality of life (not just material standard of living) in both quantitative and qualitative terms. More progressively, it is seen as culturally and temporally relative, needing to be appropriate to time, space, society and culture. In a similar vein, Abduraheem (2002) considers development as the improvement in the general standard of living of the people of a given society. This means that development does not only involve economic growth, but also a condition of people in a given country. This condition could be political, cultural or social. Confronted with many views on what development is, Seers (1969, cited in Todaro and Smith, 2005:50) poses the basic question absent in development discourse:

What has been happening to poverty? What has been happening to unemployment? What has been happening to inequality? If all these three have indicated from high to low levels, then beyond doubt this has been a period of development of the country concerned. If one or two of these central problems have been growing worse, especially if the entire three have, it would be strange to call these “development” even if per capital income doubled.

Collapsing all the above views, it is our considered opinion that development involves a process in which a system or institution is transformed into a stronger, more organised, more efficient, and more effective one that becomes capable of satisfying its human, needs, wants and aspirations in spheres such as politics, economics, health, social, and culture. It is worth underlining that, in a society where ethno-religious crisis, political struggle, contests for resources, struggle over identity, poverty, bad leadership, corruption, amongst others are rife, the developmental strides of such a society will be significantly circumscribed.

Theorising conflicts and civil unrest in Africa

There are a number of theoretical explanations for the onset of civil unrest and violent conflicts. The most prominent of these are the political, the social, the psychological, and the economic theories of conflict respectively. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this chapter only the economic theory will be explained. Though economic theories have been applied mainly to civil wars, the explanatory insights they present may be usefully applicable to the analysis of conflict and civil unrest especially with regards to Africa.

Economic theory of conflict and civil unrest

In the economic theories of civil unrest and conflict, parties in the conflict are assumed to be rational economic players, that is, they are maximising agents who are driven by the urge to maximise power in order to have access to the economic rewards of victory. Aganah (2008:33) opines that, the economic theories of conflict are made up of two main theoretical schools, “the Classical Greed School” and the “Greed and Grievance School”. In their initial formulation of the Greed Thesis, Collier and Hoeffler (1998) argue that objective political grievances have no direct link to the onset of conflict, for them it is rather the possibility of looting, that lead people to resort to violence (cited in Ballentine and Sherman, 2002: 2). Other proponents of this “Classical Greed School” provide other variants of the Theory. Hirshleifer (1994), cited in Cramer (2002: 6), for example, has opined that people are guided by the idea of trade-off. For him people choose between production and appropriation, where the opportunity cost for appropriation is lower than that for production, conflict and civil unrest will ensue. For Azam (2001) as cited in Cranmer (2002:7), though conflict and civil unrest are dangerous activities, if their pay-off outweighs calculated risk, people will choose them. Violence is therefore seen as a rational economic activity – a form of entrepreneurship (see also Bakonyi and Stuvoy, 2005: 360). We however challenge the greed theory for its emphasis on solely economic factors to the exclusion of the traditional causes of conflict and civil unrest. We further advance that violence is complex and can hardly be explained by a single theory. Besides,

some scholars have formulated other theories as the social conflict and psych-cultural conflict theories in an attempt to account for civil unrest. But like the economic theories, most of these theories have tended to over emphasise one area to the detriment of all other areas, thereby weakening their arguments too. Writing in the eightieth century, Clausewitz, (as quoted in Cramer, 2002:4), recognised that conflict and civil unrest are caused by the interplay of different factors. He argues that “a theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless.” Collier and Hoeffler have modified their initial formulation of the Greed Thesis to include social, geographic, historical factors, etcetera to make their theory more acceptable (Collier *et al.* 2001). One of the factors in the modified Greed and Grievance theory is the lack of economic opportunities in the form of employment. According to Collier, the availability of a large pool of uneducated young men with limited opportunities increases the risk of a country experiencing a civil strife. He argues that “the willingness of young men to join a rebellion might be influenced by their limited income-earning opportunities. If young men face only poverty, they might be more inclined to join a rebellion than if they have better opportunities” (ibid: 94). The lack of economic opportunities could also serve as an objective grievance to encourage young men and women to join in the rebellion in the hope that changing the existing order could lead to better political and socio-economic conditions established. This forms the basis of Gurr’ (1968, 1970) relative deprivation theory. This theory capture people’s perception of discrepancy between their value expectation (the goods and conditions of the life to which they believe they are justifiably entitled) and their value capacities (the amounts of those goods and conditions that they think they get and keep) (Cramer 2005: 4). Where such a discrepancy exists, people are likely to be more rebellious and riotous.

Flagrant economic inequalities can also make countries vulnerable to conflict and civil rebellion. Where people see that their economic woes are a direct result of a few elites sharing the bulk of the resources, it would be naturally expected that such people would

sooner or later join in on a rebellion. This is more so in countries where such inequalities coincide with religious, tribal or ethnic divisions. Inequality increases the discrepancy between people's value expectation and their value capacities. Other factors recognised by Collier and other greed and grievance theorists, as responsible for making countries vulnerable to civil rebellion, include a history of violence, geography, ethnic composition, and diaspora remittances (Agnar 2008).

The nexus between conflicts, civil unrest and development in Africa

Africa has been experiencing a plethora of conflicts endangering the continent's international order and development over the last three decades, particularly in the 1990s. The costs of conflicts are horrific, and in many cases conflicts wiped out the achievements of decades of economic and social development. Armed conflicts, in particular, involve complete economic paralysis, immense social costs and trauma, political quagmire and disintegration, as well as serious environmental degradation and dilapidation. Owing to conflicts and civil unrests, some countries are even poorer today than they were thirty years ago. The fact that whenever conflict occurs, the development of the society in most times is seriously affected cannot be dismissed by a wave of a hand. Wanyande (1997:1-2) opines that "the costs of conflicts in Africa in terms of loss of human life and property, and the destruction of social infrastructure are enormous". This resonates with Ayittey (1999) who argues that the economic costs of Africa's conflicts and civil unrests are incalculable. This is so because of the wanton destruction they wreak. Infrastructure is reduced to rubble. Roads, bridges, communication equipment are bombed by combatants, houses and building destroyed. Second, the conflicts uproot people, forcing them to flee the general atmosphere of insecurity and war. Most of the refugees are women and children but women constitute about 80 percent of Africa's peasant farmers. Refugees fleeing conflict do not produce food crops. Thus, conflicts have a direct impact on Africa's growth and development. Agricultural production is negatively affected and

this partly explains why Africa, with all its rich natural endowments, cannot feed itself and import 30 percent of its food needs. Third, conflicts create an “environment” inimical to development and deter investment. According to Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, as indicated in the *Washington Times* of July 14, 2001, Algeria’s civil war that started in 1991 has “killed 100,000 and caused \$20 billion in economic losses”. The Report of the Commission for Africa also notes with concern that conflict causes as many deaths in Africa each year as epidemic diseases and is responsible for more deaths and displacements than famine or flood. When people are forced to flee their homes, poverty associated ailments such as malnutrition and diseases follow them. Those who suffer most from conflicts are the poor and vulnerable, including children and women. Statistics reveal that there are 13 million displaced people in Africa, particularly due to conflicts and 3.5 million refugees (RCA, 2005: 107). Examples include Northern Uganda (2005), Kenya (1991/92), Rwanda (since 1994), Eritrea (since 1993), Mozambique, and others.

It can again be noted, for instance that between 1998 and 2002, some four million people died in the civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (see Report of the Commission for Africa (RCA), 2005: 107), cited in Ikejlaku (2009). Besides, once conflict occurs, scarce resources are inevitably diverted to the purchase of military equipment at the expense of socio-economic development (Ikejlaku 2009). It is pathetic to note that conflicts and civil unrests have retarded the developmental process in Africa at a sporadic pace. Studies have shown that sub-Saharan Africa has had the lowest Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for decades. Statistics confirm that Africa has a population of about 600 million, more than double that of the United States, yet it is estimated that average real GDP per capita growth is 11% in Africa, which is lower today than it was in 1970 (See Ikejlaku 2009). Marke (2007:1), reveals that “evidence shows that 200 million Africans have no access to proper health care, and proper hygiene. Another 47% are without access to safe water.” This resonates with Ayittey (1999), who laments that Africa is the least developed region of the Global South despite its immense wealth in mineral and other such natural resources. The statistics on Africa’s

postcolonial development record are horrifying. Ayittey further notes that:

Indices of Africa's development performance have not only been dismal but have also lagged persistently behind those of other Third World regions. In 1997, GDP per capita for Africa was \$560, compared to \$4,230 for Latin America and \$730 for Asia. Economic growth rates in Africa in the 1970s averaged only 4 to 5 percent while Latin America recorded a 6 and 7 percent growth rate. From 1986 to 1993 the continent's real GNP per capita declined 0.7 percent, while the average for the Third World increased by 2.7 percent. For all of Africa, real income per capita dropped by 14. 6 percent from its level in 1965, making most Africans worse off than they were at independence.

Besides, investment (both foreign and domestic) is the way out of Africa's economic miasma or the key to economic growth, poverty reduction and development. But Africa does not attract, rather it repels, investment. Increasingly, the continent has become unattractive to foreign investors. Even the donor community which supplied much of the capital for development projects, now suffers "donor fatigue" after so many failures. For example, between 1980 and 1988, sub-Saharan Africa received \$83 billion in aid from the donor community (Ayittey 1999). Yet all that aid failed to spur economic growth, arrest Africa's economic atrophy, or promote development. Africa has not attracted foreign investors because the prevailing "environment" repels even domestic investors. As Kofi Adusei-Poku, a Ghanaian student as cited in Ayittey (1999:3) observes that "Crisis, chaos, famine, diseases, civil wars, coups, dictatorships, social disorder, corruption and legitimising military regimes seem to be the most outstanding elements of post-independence Africa." The multi-million dollar questions are: Who would invest in such an "environment"? If the ruling elites and government officials prefer to invest their ill-gotten wealth in Switzerland, why should foreigners invest in Africa? This proves beyond any reasonable doubt that conflicts and civil unrest have retarded economic development in Africa.

Challenges that breeds conflicts and civil unrest in Africa

It is important to note that Africa as a continent is plangent by a plethora of challenges that breeds conflicts and constricts its development. Most of the conflicts in Africa have their links to corruption. Corruption is a worldwide phenomenon though endemic in the continent especially in sub-Saharan Africa. The monster has been responsible for the instability in the continent as most of the countries, especially Nigeria, Kenya; Congo DR, Egypt just to mention a few, have prominently been on the lowest rating of international corruption index. Corruption is not only absent stealing funds. In Nigeria especially corruption has become an endemic problem threatening the country's socio – economic and political development Ikyase (2014). This chapter aims to reveal that poverty rooted on political corruption is the major cause of Africa's conflict and civil unrests. This has precipitated poor development. This chapter proposes among other things that the denial of basic needs (poverty) by irresponsible governance in most African states have been at the heart of conflict, as well as the continent's development problems. The contention here is that political corruption by sapping the economy of Africa renders the continent poor or worsens its poverty situation. Burton's (1997) human needs theory on conflict and conflict management recognises the indispensability of these needs, by pointing out that wherever such non-negotiable needs are not met, conflict is inevitable.

The magnitude of corruption in most African countries, to say the least is alarming, terrific and disheartening. Corruption by political leaders has been identified as one of the major causes of poverty, and the failure in the development of developing countries, particularly in Africa. Corruption is worse than murder. It kills more than warfare; it takes land and money to build a hospital and buys a private jet, condemning thousands of people over multiple generations to die of curable diseases (Ukaogo, 2013). Thus, the menace of corruption has, to a large extent, been responsible for the vicious cycle of failed political leadership, political instability, economic mismanagement, and underdevelopment as well as economic and social class in Africa. The incidence of corruption

remains one of the greatest challenges of democracy in the continent as virtually all democratic experiments are associated with reports of hyper-corrupt practices (Okafor 2004). The embezzlement of public funds by unscrupulous and ineffective leaders of most African countries leads to poverty, high debts and other socio-economic associated problems in these countries. For instance, focusing exclusively on the top leadership, Transparency International estimates that Mobutu in Zaire and Abacha in Nigeria may have embezzled up to US \$5 billion each (in Azmi, Daily Times 2005). According to Global Witness (in Ibid), several current leaders in Africa are plundering their own treasuries. Among them are Angola's President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, who it says keeps large sum in bank accounts abroad, and Equatorial Guinean President Teodoro Obiang, who calls oil revenues a "state secret". The Mwai Kibaki government in Kenya, which ousted President Arap Moi in an election in 2003, is investigating embezzlement to the tune of \$1 billion by former officials, the notorious "African Big Man" the late President G. Eyadema of Togo was very corrupt. Campbell (2004) observes that Billions of pounds, enough to pay for the entire primary health and education needs of the world's developing countries are being siphoned off through offshore companies and tax havens.

Furthermore, roughly 3,000 member of African elites (the majority present and former political leaders), had Swiss Bank accounts totalling 33 billion dollars. One high official even owned a bathtub made of solid gold (Dorman, 1993: 10). In spite of these monumental accumulations, these factionalised neo-patrimonial African elites still do not constitute an ascendant bourgeoisie. They have neither the will nor the independent power base to enforce productive priorities or discipline upon the state apparatus (Okafor, 2004: 99); thereby making poverty alleviation, peace and sustainable development far from realisation in most African states. There is no comparison for corruption in Africa with those of other regions Political corruption in Africa impacts negatively to the economic development because African leaders rather than investing their stolen wealth in the continent (like their Asian counterparts), stash them abroad. Since political corruption is perpetrated by leaders

entrusted with a nation's coffers, the masses normally react by engaging in violence and civil unrest which in turn impact negatively on the development process.

Ethnicity is another crucial explanatory tool to the continent's plethora of conflicts. Some theorists believe that ethnicity underlies virtually all conflicts in Africa, since ethnic groups in their bid to compete for scarce resources such as property rights, jobs, education, and social amenities engage in violence. In his study Nnoli (1980) employed empirical evidence associating conflict to ethnic problems. However, Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) and Ikejaku (2009) questioned the ethno-cultural and linguistic explanation for conflict in the continent, rather linking Africa's conflicts to other factors, such as poverty, absence of democratisation and over dependence on natural resources. Similarly, Collier (1997) argues that Africa is not inherently prone to war as a result of ethnic disparities, but the continent's experiences of many wars, is fundamentally because it is poor and poverty is both the cause and consequence of Africa's underdevelopment jam. Whatever explanation, the fact remains that conflicts have retarded the developmental process of Africa.

It can be noted that there is a congruence of views amongst some scholars that endemic conflicts in Africa arose as a result of bad governance. As opposed to good governance, bad governance is exercised through poor leadership. Most countries in Africa such as Zimbabwe, Somalia, Eritrea, and Guinea Bissau, among others are afflicted by this cankerworm of bad governance which invariably has negatively impacted on their developmental efforts. In the words of Dike (1999), there are many complaints about waste and inefficiency in performing public services in Africa. There is lack of respect for fundamental human rights of citizens, lack of judicious use of natural resources, in short it has been said that most African countries especially South Africa, Nigeria, Zimbabwe and many others have no respect for accountability and transparency. As Kofi Annan (cited in Ikayase & Olisah 2014:8) notes, without good governance, rule of law, predictable and good administration, legitimate power and responsive regulation – no amount of funding, and no amount of charity will set us on the path of prosperity. Therefore, for development to take place in any society, there must be serious

transformation of the quality of governance and this will go a long way in minimising the various development problems haunting the continent.

Leadership dilemma and/or leadership failure is one of the primary sources of conflicts in Africa. Achebe (1984), using Nigeria as a frame of reference, stated that the trouble with Nigeria, navy Africa is simply and squarely a failure of leadership. He, thus, notes: “There is nothing basically wrong with the Nigeria character. There is nothing wrong with the Nigerian land, climate and water. The Nigerian problem is the unwillingness or inability of its leaders to rise to their responsibilities, to the challenge of personal example, which is the hallmark of time leadership.” Corruption, nepotism, official high-handedness, tribalism, maladministration and all manners of misdemeanour dominate the African landscape, thus, underdevelopment remains the chief prevailing dilemma. For instance, several African states had or still have leaders that are richer than the states they govern but this in itself is an invitation to disaster. On this, Maafa (2013) reflects thus: “A leader should not be the richest man in the country where s/he can use his leadership to get even more wealth. In Kenya, members of parliament have awarded themselves an annual salary of 100k\$ in a country with a per capita of 1.7k\$. This is equivalent to US representatives awarding themselves salaries of 2.9m\$. Yet this is a democracy the global north celebrates as the “way of the world” while it bombs Mali for choosing another president. In Eritrea, citizens are forced by the government to engage in indefinite “national service” in a manner akin to slavery. It is therefore imperative that for Africa to overcome this challenge it needs leaders that will be accountable to the people, leaders that are embed with honesty, courage, and above all, the fear of God in them.

There is no gain in saying the fact that most of the conflicts in Africa emanate from the absence of true democratic practices by the practitioners. Successive governments in some parts of the continent come to power through illegal means which provoke most of the citizens to take up arms or at engage in a revolution of some sort, thereby causing a lot of harm to societal stability. Democracy, which is a form of government in which citizens in a state have political

investments of political participation and trust have been subverted by most countries in Africa. The uprising of conflicts in Nigeria (2011), Ivory Coast (2010), Kenya (2007-2008), Libya (2012), Egypt (2013) and Zimbabwe (2016), are clear manifestations of non-adherence to democratic tenets. Consequently, modern African democracy is characterised by lack of free and fair elections, abridgement of the rule of law, lack of credible electoral commission, arson, thuggery, rigging, kidnapping, assassination of parents and other vices intended to achieve an advantage. For development to take place in Africa, there is need to adhere strictly to the tenets of democracy as enshrined in each nation's constitution.

The boundaries of all the African states were arbitrarily drawn by the colonial masters (at the Berlin conference of 1885). This development bifurcated same ethnic groups who two different countries such as the Hutus and Tutsis in Burundi and Rwanda, the Ewes in Ghana and Togo, to mention but few. Some of the conflicts in Africa are traceable to the boundaries bequeathed by the colonialist. For instance, the land disputes between Nigeria and Cameroun, especially over the Bakassi Peninsula. Morocco's claim over the Western Sahara (SADR), Libya's claim of Aozou strip with Chad and Ethiopia/ Eritrea border conflict, all arose from this historical fact. It is therefore incumbent on African leaders to evolve disputes peacefully as did Nigeria and Cameroun than resort war, which will deny it the resources that would have been channelled for development.

Conclusion

In light of the analysis made in this chapter, it is logical to conclude that conflicts and civil unrest have destroyed social cohesion and have had serious implications on economic development in Africa. The loss of lives and wanton destruction of properties, the disruption of rural economy in the areas which revolved largely around agriculture production, the internal displacement of people, have all jeopardised the progress of the continent and ultimately hampered development in its all dimensions.

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Women's Agency in the Maize and Millet Commodity Chain Analysis in Mbarara District, Uganda

Primrose Nakazibwe

Introduction

In Uganda, although women do much of the agricultural work, they depend on men for decisions as to what to grow and sometimes the quantity. Men grow crops that they feel are more economically profitable (coffee, tea, tobacco, cotton, tomatoes, sun flower), even if these crops do not contribute to food security at home. This leaves women with the burden of growing food crops, as culture places this role to them. Uganda is a patriarchal community with men taking a lead in many instances of day to day life. As part of cultural obligation, women are expected to provide labour for the 'male crops' in their households, limiting their time to engage in more economically rewarding activities at home and outside. Despite this contribution, women's access to the income generated from cash crops that they provide labour for is limited by their position in the household. Women from female-headed families also suffer discrimination from society and they cannot engage in activities outside what is generally acceptable for women.

Despite women's significant contribution to the agricultural sector in Uganda– in which they perform the bulk of agricultural labour (up to 80% of food crop production, 50% of cash crop production, undertake the majority of agricultural activities, 55% of land preparation, 85% of planting, 85% of weeding, and 98% of food processing), they remain in a disadvantaged position in this sector (FOWODE, 2012, p. 8). They are rarely involved in making important decisions regarding production, value addition, and marketing or the use of income generated from the sale of their crops in Uganda. For example, decisions on the marketing of crops are

mainly made by men (70%) or, in a few instances, jointly due market information continue to be a domain of men (15%) (Combaz, 2013, p. 5; FOWODE, 2012, p. 8). There is unequal distribution of household resources (land, labour and capital) between men and women. For example, only 7% of women in Uganda own land (Combaz, 2013). This is mainly attributed to the fact that “women farmers cannot easily access land because of the costs involved, cultural norms and overlapping land rights” (FOWODE, 2012, p. 6).

The literature review on the global commodity chain (GCC) shows that women’s participation in agro-commodity chains is rarely considered. Originally, the theory of GCC centred on analysing the manufacturing and service sectors and less attention was paid to the agro-food systems dominated by women (Ponte, 2001). This has led to omission of the significant number of farmers who in this case are women, ending up undesirable prioritisation in production with much emphasis placed cash crops affecting the national food production and security. It is only recently that the GCC has included agricultural chains in their analysis, classifying them as buyer-driven commodity chains (Gereffi, 1994; Gibbon, 2001; Barrientos *et al.*, 2003; Tallontire *et al.*, 2005). However, these studies mainly focused on the chain flow in the horticulture sector and less attention was paid to indigenous crops whose chains do not extend beyond national boundaries, such as millet.

The analyses of these chains have focused mainly on large-scale enterprise participation, with little attention paid to the participation of people living in poverty. Thus, understanding how these value chains expose people living in poverty to risks, as opposed to how they affect income opportunities, is largely overlooked (Tallontire *et al.*, 2005; Bolwig *et al.*, 2008). Bair (2014: 6) observes that “although much of this research has focused empirically on the contributions that women workers make to what are often deeply gendered commodity chains, the nexus between gender and commodity chains has not been theorised as such”. Thus, few studies have focused on gender relations (Bolwig *et al.*, 2008). Bair (2014) and Dunaway (2014) estimate that only 2% of studies have analysed agro-commodity chains from a gender perspective in view of development at both community and national levels.

Barrientos (2001) and Mayoux (2003) argue that gender is an important aspect of global value chains and development in general, but often overlooked in the analysis, despite the fact that gender relations deeply affect, and are affected by, the ways that value chains function. The few studies that have integrated gender in commodity chain analysis merely show the exact contribution of men and women, without describing the gains from the inclusion of women (Barrientos *et al.*, 2003; Riisgaard *et al.*, 2010; and Mayoux and Mackie, 2007). As a result, there are only a few academic studies that have integrated gender analysis into commodity chain studies. Hence, the contribution and conditions of women's participation in these chains and to development in general is inadequately explained.

Women are key players in the agricultural sector, but their participation is generally unrecognised and remains invisible in many chain studies. This is caused by the consideration of farmers to mean men and analysing agricultural data based on household heads who in most cases are men in the patriarchal societies. Women experience hardships and discrimination in resource use, lack a voice in decision making, and remain largely invisible in the chains they participate in. However, it remains unclear how women remain active in agricultural production with this kind of discrimination in resource use and decision making. Accordingly, this chapter is an attempt to determine how women are constrained in terms of their participation in the maize and millet commodity chains and development projects in general, and how they strategise in view of these constraints, especially at household level. The chapter sought to achieve this by comparing the participation of men and women in the maize and millet commodity chain using a gender analysis.

The central question of this study was to explain the extent to which women participate in, and receive benefits from their involvement in the maize and millet commodity chains in Mbarara District, Uganda. The main purpose of the study is to explore the constraints that limit women's participation in the two chains and to understand how women use their agency to manoeuvre and overcome such constraints, with a focus on the household level. The objectives of the study were to comparatively trace the participation of men and women in the two chains, explore the benefits and

rewards that women receive from the millet chain, compared to the maize chain, establish the obstacles that women face in participating in upgrading in the two chains, and investigate the options that women have to overcome the constraints they face, especially at the household level. Accordingly, this study attempts to determine how women are constrained in terms of their participation in the maize and millet commodity chains and how they strategize in view of these constraints, especially at household level. The study will achieve this by comparing the participation of men and women in the maize and millet commodity chain using a gender analysis framework.

Conceptual and theoretical analysis

Conceptually, the study uses commodity chain analysis, gender analysis and agency to help explain the differences between male and female participation in the two chains and also to make a comparison between the maize and millet chains. Intersectionality is additionally applied to explain the diversity among women in the different nodes of the two chains. This section provides working definitions adopted for this chapter and how these conceptually and theoretically relate to the discourse of women's participation in commodity chains and development in general.

Commodity chain

Hopkins and Wallerstein (1986: 17) define the concept of a 'commodity chain' as a "network of labour and production processes which results in the creation of a commodity". The commodity chain concept was developed out of the world-system theory (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1994). This concept specifically relates to the study of the integration and control of commercial and trade relations between interconnected firms within a sector, which remain formally independent of each other (Kanji and Barrientos, 2002). The networks of producers and firms can vary between tightly knit and integrated supply chains, to loosely coordinated and fragmented chains. Gereffi *et al.*, (1994), identify the specific processes within a commodity chain as nodes, which are linked together to form networks. The commodity chain explores how the linkages between

the production, distribution and consumption of products are globally interconnected along value chains that embody a network of activities and actors. Contextually, this study attempts to determine how women are constrained in terms of their participation in the maize and millet commodity chains and how they strategize in view of these constraints, especially at household level.

Gender and gender analysis

In this study, ‘gender’ is understood as the relations and positions of men and women, which change with time and space with existing and changing ideas of masculinity and femininity. Gender is seen as a relational concept, which varies with socio-political and cultural differentiation, such as ethnicity, class, religion and age (Chant and Pedwell, 2008). In this way, communities consider the dynamics of the interaction between femininity and masculinity (Riisgaard *et al.*, 2010). The interpretation of gender relations in a specific context plays a significant role in determining the ways in which men and women may participate in economic, social and political activities at all societal levels right from the household level.

The definition of ‘gender analysis’ in this study is adopted from Bolwig *et al.*, (2008: 27), who defines the concept as “a systematic gathering and examination of information on gender differences and social relations using sex-disaggregated data and participatory methods” or simply as a social construction. The definition of gender analysis operationalised for this study is the assessment of the gender differences and inequalities that exist in the maize and millet chains to understand their impact on women’s agency, which affects women and men’s participation in the two chains differently. The Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children (2005: 18) further explain that gender analysis looks at the position of men and women and how they cope and survive the difficult situations as actors rather than victims. The emphasis on women and men as actors instead of victims points at agency as a crucial part of the analysis.

Engendering commodity chain analysis

This section describes how earlier studies have combined gender with the agro-commodity approach and examines how these have

been able to analyse the two concepts theoretically. A number of studies were found to have included gender aspects in the study of agro-commodity chains. Notable among this is the study by Barrientos *et al.* (2003) which explored the sensitivity of the codes currently applied in the African horticultural export sector by combining the global value chain and gendered economy approaches. Nevertheless, many authors continue to ignore the gender dynamics, overlooking the fact that commodity chains are embedded in households, whose survival depends very much on the work of women (Dunaway, 2001, 2013). Dunaway (2014: 64) observed that there is a “glaring absence of women from commodity chains”. The majority of the studies that explore gender dimensions consider women as producers or family workers, who may be exploited or excluded in many chains. The feminist commodity chain approach in Ramamurthy (2004) explains this by the power division of labour and its impact on both men and women’s involvement. This chapter, suggests that a more explicit and complete methodological framework on how to integrate gender into the general agro-commodity chains approach is needed.

Agency

In attempt to understand women’s participation in the maize and millet commodity chain, this study sought to understand and contextualize agency from individual to collective perspective. The World Bank defines agency as the “the ability to make decisions about one’s own life and act on them to achieve a desired outcome, free of violence, retribution, or fear” (World Bank, 2014: 3). The definition encompasses five core elements of agency which include; women’s access to and control over resources; freedom of movement; freedom from the risk of violence; decision-making over family formation; and having a voice in society and influencing policy. This definition is based on the assumption that agency is something someone can receive from somewhere else or can be given by those in authority. Nevertheless, agency is more than observable actions, although it tends to be operationalised as decision-making, but can also take a number of forms (Kabeer, 1999). Kabeer (1999: 438) who defines agency as “the ability to define

one's goals and act upon them". Kabeer explains that agency takes many forms, including: "bargaining and negotiation, deception and manipulation, subversion and resistance as well as more intangible, cognitive processes of reflection and analysis and it can be exercised by individuals as well as by collectives" (p. 438).

Therefore, the understanding and application of agency from Kabeer's perspective in this study identifies women as chain actors who pursue conscious and unconscious goals to determine their life through interpretative and narrative frameworks that help them make sense of their world and how they relate to it in the maize and millet commodity chains and community development in general. In this chapter, the phrase 'room to manoeuvre' is used to imply the interplay between actions and competences, which is agency (Simonton and Montenach, 2013). The concept of agency draws attention to the perspective of the women involved in chains, taking their own perceptions as point of departure. Agency is explained as including the aspect of self-determination of individuals and the conscious and unconsciousness ways in which agency is exercised by women (Meyers, 2002). Meyers further add to the debate of agency by introducing the concept of 'agentic skills', which make self-determination possible. These skills include introspection, communication, memory, and imagination, as well as analytical, self-nurturing, volitional and interpersonal skills (*ibid.*). These skills put women in touch with themselves and the communities in which they find themselves and enable them to discern what they really want and care about (*ibid.*). Thus, women are not merely passive agents in commodity chains, but rather active participants who are able to improvise ways to express their own values and goals. Women's agency becomes a key factor in development efforts as it provides a direction for the household and community survival mechanism. Women's decision to invest their time and energy into development projects largely depends on their agency which makes or breaks a community or nation. Other immeasurable manifestations of agency, such as negotiation, deception and manipulation all need considered (Kabeer, 1999).

Commodity chain studies have tried to understand women's participation in the commodity chain, mainly using gender analysis

with its many structural challenges. This has been done in terms of counting and disaggregating information regarding the participation and inclusion of women with a view to establishing the underlying gender inequalities in the chain and how these can be reversed to create equality. Davids *et al.* (2014: 403), however, noted that, “although gender may be taken on board in the analysis as a cultural and structural phenomenon underlying gender inequality, the way to achieve gender equality is coined in terms of agency, detached from structural limitations”. The focus on agency in a specific social-cultural context provides a way of establishing how women have been able to manoeuvre through these challenges and find alternatives, according to what they value and believe in, which better explains their participation.

Few studies have been able to include agency in their commodity chain analysis. The most common article that has been able to integrate agency in commodity chain analysis is by Ramamurthy (2000); “The Cotton Commodity Chain, Women, Work and Agency in India and Japan: The case for feminist agro-food systems research”. Ramamurthy (2002: 553) bases her discussion of agency from a feminist perspective on “signal acts toward radical reform of systemically linked inequalities of class, patriarchy, and other culturally embedded and historically specific categories of difference and to signal the critical epistemologies through which experience is unmoored from dominant ideologies and newly acted upon to change material conditions of existence”. She was able to develop a specifically gendered commodity chain research methodology to raise new questions about process and agency (*ibid.*), which this study attempts to use to construct a more in-depth analysis without necessarily going contesting the use of the feminist concept. Hence, understanding women’s agency in commodity chain analysis means realising that women are also actors with their own goals and strategies (Simonton and Montenach, 2013). When women work with their own strategies they are able to use their room to manoeuvre to overcome the constraints that limit their ability to exercise their own agency and meaningfully and visibly contribute to the community and national economy. The concept of agency is a response to top-down approaches to development, so as to promote

the actor-based perspective in a bottom-up approach (Sen, 1999). Analysing the commodity chain from the bottom up is useful in establishing how women's abilities can be tapped to improve their participation.

Intersectionality

'Intersectionality' is defined as "the interaction between gender, race and other categories of difference in individual lives, social practices, institutional arrangements, and cultural ideologies and the outcomes of these interactions in terms of power" (Davis, 2008: 68). Intersectionality enables differentiation between women and sheds light on how age, marital status, ethnicity and other variables interact with the participation of women in different commodity chain activities and translate into how women in different circumstances may use their room to manoeuvre. Thus, intersectionality is another conceptual addition that is made to commodity chain analysis in this chapter. The assumption that all actors in a chain are homogeneous is not only wrong, but also undermines the differences that exist among actors. Women, as a group, are diverse in many aspects, which create different circumstances for their participation. Examining the differences among women would give a clearer picture of how each category of women participates differently in the chain to come up with more category specific conclusions. Analysing the different categories of women would also enable the various kinds of contribution that each category of women brings to the chain to be identified. Hence, there is a need for research to include intersectionality in analytical concepts such as commodity chain analysis, gender analysis and agency.

Upgrading

Upgrading' refers to moving from lower to higher-value activities to increase the benefits from participating in global trade and production (for example, security, profits, and improved skills and capabilities (Staritz and Reis, 2013). Upgrading can also be understood as improving a firm's or individual's position within the chain, and this is generally associated with increased competitiveness, which allows more value-addition through the production process

(Brewer, 2011). There are several types of upgrading, but, for the purpose of this study, the focus will be mainly on two types: process and product upgrading. Ponte (2008, p. 8) defines 'process upgrading' as "achieving a more efficient transformation of inputs into outputs through the reorganization of productive activities" and 'product upgrading' as "moving into more sophisticated products with increased unit value". This study is interested in identifying the possibilities available for women to upgrade (process and product) in the maize and millet commodity chains.

Methodology

The research started as an exploratory study to generally explore questions arising from the researcher's direct observations about women and men working in the maize and millet chains in Mbarara District. This design yielded a general picture of the two chains, which gave rise to the more detailed research questions. This resulted in a comparative research design to identify the gender differences in participation in the two chains. During the research, the researcher realized that the explorative comparative design was inadequate to shed light on the extent to which agency explained the differentiated participation of men and women in the maize and millet chains. Therefore, an ethnographic design was incorporated to conclude the empirical research, with a focus on small samples and in-depth interviews with follow up questions.

The study chose to examine two chains (maize and millet) to understand women's participation in commodity chains. Both crops share similar production characteristics and are the two most important cereal crops produced and have earned a special place among those food crops that the country survives on. The study included all three counties that make up Mbarara District: Rwampara, Kashari and Mbarara Municipality. These counties were selected purposively due to their proximity to rural areas or the urban centre. The rural areas were selected because these are where much of the farming takes place.

The study covered both male and female households involved in the production of either maize or millet who produced on a large or

small scale, were married, separated or divorced, and of different ages (older farmers above 50 years, medium aged 35–50 years, and young farmers below 35 years). The study then used random sampling for those households that had at least one of these characteristics. Using this criterion, ten farmers (seven female and three male) involved in growing maize or millet were selected from the study villages to participate in the study.

Different methods were employed to collect data from the respondents, including in-depth interviews, FGDs and participant observation. The study used participant observation, mainly with farmers, to obtain a deeper understanding of their involvement in the chain at the farm/household level. In-depth interviews were used to enable the researcher to explore in detail each individual respondent's perspective in the various nodes of the chains. To obtain detailed information from the identified respondents, an unstructured interview guide was used to interview different categories of respondents, including farmers, local leaders (key informants) millers and traders. The interview guide was a valuable resource in gathering more data as respondents were allowed to give as much information as they knew on different questions. To obtain more information than what could be obtained from individual farmers, FGDs were held with farmers' groups involved in the production of maize and millet.

It should be noted that the names used in this chapter for individual respondents, millers and farmers' groups are not their real names, but rather aliases to maintain the anonymity of respondents and participants (see Chapter 3). The female farmers are presented with the following names: Nyanjura, Nyanjara, Komweru, Kemitumba, Kemibyare, Komwani and Komugusha. The male farmers are presented with names starting with 'Ru': Rutatsindama, Rutabingwa and Rutasingwa. The mill stations are designated by colours: Red, Black, Blue, Green and Yellow. The observations of the researcher are marked by initials PN (Primrose Nakazibwe).

Findings and discussions

This section compares the commodity chain approach and gender analysis in explaining the participation of women in the maize and millet commodity chains.

The gendered participation of women and Men in Maize and Millet Commodity Chains

The study findings indicate that there are variations between male and female participation in the maize and millet chains in Mbarara District. These discrepancies are reflected in the different chain activities in which women and men participate, such as production, upgrading (value addition) and marketing. Women and men act in varying positions in these two chains, which have implications for the activities they undertake. From what I harvested from the field, the following are the main activities/nodes in the maize and millet chains in which men and women participate.

Production

Although men are involved in agriculture in many households, women did much of the production work for both maize and millet. In households where men were involved in farming, they mainly produced bananas. Two out of three male famers interviewed participated in maize production because it was produced at subsistence and used mixed farming with other crops such as tomatoes and banana. On the other hand all the six married and widowed female respondents interviewed in this study indicated that their husbands did not take part millet production but still made decisions over production and marketing activities. This points to earlier studies in Uganda, which indicated that women dominate the production of both cash and food crops but do not make marketing decisions (Combaz, 2013; Farnworth, 2011).

Despite the fact that male participation in production was limited, men owned land and made majority of production decisions in many households. The study found that mainly men own land in households (reported by all of the participants in the farmers' groups

and by six²² out of the ten household farmers – all married). One of the explanations offered for male ownership of land was the culture of male inheritance, which gives men/boys a chance to acquire land. When land is distributed upon the death of the head of the family (in male-headed households), women/girls are not given a share of either their husband's or father's land.

Three female individual farmers (Nyanjura, Nyanjara and Komweru) and two male individual farmers (Rutatsindama and Rutasingwa) explained that men make decisions about which crops to grow in their households. Women said that they do not argue with their husbands about such decisions because they respect their husbands as owners of the land. Their decisions are thought to be for the good of the family. However, male decision making can negatively impact on women's production, as the crops that women prefer to grow are not prioritised. Crops like banana are given priority as it is considered a commercial crop by men and associated who own it. Maize, unlike millet, is not affected by whoever makes decisions about production, as it is intercropped with other crops such as banana. The study noted that that that maize is generally grown on land held by the family. This is attributed to the mixed nature of its production which dominates the small scale production in Uganda by 40% (Gollin and Rogerson, 2010).

Millet, however, has to be grown on a separate plot of land and is often left out by male decision-makers who own small plots of land. Out ten individual households that grew millet, only two households grew it its own land and out of three male farmers, only one supported his wife to rent. Unlike the case with the household owned land, women make decisions on rented land acquisition and use. The existence of land for rent has given women an opportunity to contradict the common view that women's limited access to land hampered their participation in cash crop production (Combaz, 2013; Hill and Vigneri, 2009). Millet grown on rented land gave women an opportunity to make production, marketing and income use decisions. This further contradicts the view Hill by and Vigneri, (2009) that women make decisions about food crops and men about

22 Nyanjura, Nyanjara, Komweru, Rutatsindama, Rutabingwa and Rutasingwa

cash crops. Men generally make decisions based on which crops they think have more economic value, leaving out those that may contribute to household food security, such as millet.

The study found further that use of improved seeds and application of fertilizers was common for maize but not millet. Three out of five farmer groups and nine out of ten individual farmers did not use improved seeds or fertilizers. Three scenarios emerged on use of fertilizers and improved millet. The first scenario indicated lack of affordability and limited access as the reasons for limited use. The second scenario that emerged was quite remarkable and uncommon. This group of women acknowledged that they knew the importance of use of fertilizers but did not use them intentionally as a strategy to retain access to rented on which they grew millet. They noted use of fertilizers meant high yields that created risks that they had to avoid, such as competition on land, conflicts in the household and storage problems. They devised ways of retaining access to hired land by deliberately keeping production low to keep away competition on land from men and the land owners themselves. They did not consider increasing production and profitability as suggested by Hill and Vigneri (2009) that the application of fertilizers and sprays, use of new varieties of seeds and adopt of improved technology (management practices) increase the scale of production. They acquired seeds mainly by saving from their previous seasons and through their social network. They reported that the use of their own millet seeds gave the same rewards as improved seeds from the shops.

The study findings indicate that millet production require a lot of labour and capital which cannot easily be obtained by women. Millet is heavily still a manual crop which require a lot of time more especially at weeding and harvesting stage. Women were able to close this gap by soliciting support each other through groups or family networks. Unlike other crops, women both in female and male headed took advantage of cultural and social norms related to millet production to source labour. Women freely support each other as a symbol of friendship and their cultural obligation. Mothers and their daughters-in-law still cherished the cultural and social norms that bind them together during millet production. This is contrary to the

assumption made by Hill and Vigneri (2009) that women have difficulty mobilising labour for cash production, this study found that it is not the case for millet. Traditionally, it's a mother's in law duty to support her daughter in law to plant and harvest millet production. They supported each other to take on traditional male ascribes, such as land clearing and transportation. Saito *et al.* (1994), also found that, due to changing nature of production in Africa, tasks that were formerly associated with men, are increasingly being taken over by women.

Contrary to the argument that men are likely to take over the production of crops that become financially lucrative (Hills and Vigneri, 2009), women in this study have remained the main producers of millet at the household level, despite its economic value because men shun its production citing its laborious nature and the excessive time required for its production process. The few men who participated in millet production were members of farmers' groups that grew millet, although their involvement is still limited payment of membership fees and help out on activities that required their energy and expertise, such as securing seeds from neighbouring towns and transporting produce on their bicycles or motorcycles from gardens and for marketing. Based on this, it can be said that, compared to maize, millet production is a 'female' activity.

Further, it should be noted that commodity chain analysis cannot capture the varied priorities that women bring into a chain. The commodity chain analysis focuses on profit and food security as the main goals of participation in any chain leaving out other priorities. However, it should be noted that women's participation in the maize and millet chains is based on other priorities and values of production besides food and income. The use of gender analysis revealed that, beyond food production, women stretch further to produce millet so that they can increase food resilience for their households. Women grow millet to sustainably meet their obligation of providing food for their household. Millet has a long lifespan, which makes it important in responding to shocks, such as drought. It is also valued as a medicinal and nutritional supplement for households living in poverty, which makes it a must have for each household. Millet production of millet gives them happiness and it a source of pride.

Pedersen *et al.* (2012: 37) emphasise that “agricultural production is also influenced by gender preferences with respect to the types of crops grown”.

Value addition

From the study findings, women carry out much of the value addition work for both maize and millet at the household level. Women added value to maize and millet due to their presence at home and engagement in the production of crops. They were also found to possess the traditional skills (such as shelling, shreshing, sorting, winnowing and storage) required to add value to these crops. Women usually work on small quantities of produce because much of their work is done by hand or using rudimentary processing tools. Whenever the produce increases, women’s capacity to be involved in value addition, and hence, their profitability, is reduced because they lack the capacity to handle the large size of produce due to limited time and skills which also leads to loss of control to men who have the capacity to handle such quantities. A few women are involved in value addition away from their homes.

Compared to maize, women are more involved in millet value addition outside the home millet because it does not require advanced machinery. Despite this fact, women are employed in the maize and millet mill stations, the number of women involved in the actual machine processing of the two crops as chain actors was low. For five mill stations included in this study, all permanent machine operators were men and in each of these women were employed in maize mill stations as sorters and cooks with only two hired for professionals administrative positions. Men carry out much of the work that require physical strength and skills like lifting, machine-based cleaning and operating milling machines. This translates into gender inequality in terms of payment for value addition work done by men and women. Terms of contracts and payments based on gender division of work exploits women and discourages female participation which keeps women trapped in poverty. Although value chains are changing the gendered structure of employment in commodity chains, better educated women often compete fairly well with men for quality jobs, while gender stereotypes still keep many

poor and uneducated women in low paid, low skilled and more insecure work within the value chain.

It should be understood that women sometimes have the choice to decide on whether they want to be involved in upgrading or not. Women have to choose according to what they feel is important for them and their families, especially their children. Coles and Mitchell (2011) explain that women are likely to become involved in the upgrading process if they are able to manage their own work and income, if there are low entry capital barriers, and when physical product transformation involves simple, relatively low-cost equipment such as knives. It is also important to note that women's value of unity within the community plays a significant role in their participation in value creation. In many homes, families stay connected when they are working as a team to pluck maize off the cobs in the evening when everyone is at home.

Women participating in these chains had limited opportunities to upgrade compared to men, because of unequal power relations and time and resource constraints at the household level and unequal access to information, assets and know how to adopt the new technologies required for upgrading . Women's inability to make decisions regarding production and value addition limits their opportunity to upgrade. Women from female-headed households are more likely to upgrade compared to their female counterparts in male-headed household, where power relations determine the decisions made. Power relations determine the opportunities available to women for upgrading (Farnworth and Hutchings, 2009; Mayoux and Mackie, 2007). Men therefore, dominated the ownership of mills and wholesale trade businesses because they have access to both capital and property to invest in such business. This reinforces the assessment made by Coles and Mitchell (2011) that unequal access to capital and property by men and women propels women to participate in value addition activities as employees, while men dominate management roles.

Marketing

The purpose of this sub-section is to establish the differences between men and women in terms of their participation in maize and

millet marketing. The first part of this sub-section discusses the notion of decision-making in marketing at the household level and the second part compares the trading of the two commodities.

Decision-making in marketing

Marketing decisions within households determine women and men's participation in maize and millet chains. The decision to market is usually centred around questions such as what, when, and how much to market, at what price, and who should market. In this study, three scenarios emerged with regard to marketing decisions about maize and millet at the household level.

Men make decisions

The first scenario was that in many male-headed households, men make all of the decisions in the marketing of maize and millet without consulting their wives. . Participants reported that men are involved more in the marketing of maize than of millet at the household level. Women are more likely to market fresh maize than dried maize seeds. Men sell both maize and millet when it is produced in huge quantities, but women only market them when quantities are small (Rutabingwa and Rutatsindama). Out of the 10 farmers interviewed, only 4 (Nyanjura, Komweru, Rutatsindama and Rutabingwa) indicated that men were involved in selling millet at the household level. The studies by Combaz (2013) similarly found that although women are instrumental in household production, though it is mainly the men who make major decisions about when and how much produce to sell or how the income generated should be used or the use of the proceeds from the sale of crops. The impact of male decision-making on marketing leads to the loss of income and control over agricultural produce or products by women which discourages them from upgrading in production and also keeps women trapped in poverty in situations where men do not use the money to improve the well-being of their families (Hill, 2011). The women in these households indicated that they did not mind their husbands selling their produce as long as they can get surplus to feed their families.

Joint decision making

The second marketing scenario included women partially making marketing decisions to sell their produce (joint decision making). These married women reported that they notified their husbands or sought permission from their husbands to sell their produce, move out of the home, and speak with men (traders) as a man's opinion was vital. The study found out that there was progress in production and welfare among families that made joint decisions. Joint decision making about marketing was found to be an incentive to women to join both the maize and millet chains, because it provided them with an opportunity to improve their household welfare. For example, Rutatsindama acknowledged, without any reservation, that he jointly owned his land with his wife, as well as with his children. He is one of three men interviewed at the household level who said that his land and other household resources are jointly owned. He narrated that: *“all I have here in my home belongs both to my wife, children and I. I have registered most of my property in both my name and that of my wife and sometimes in my children's names. I love my wife and I do not want to create a gap between myself and my wife because of property* (Interviewee, Kagongi, 2013). His wife, who joined us after the interview had started, was observed to enjoy this professed love, as her husband offered her a seat immediately when she entered the room where the interview was taking place. Her husband asked her if she wanted to join us when we went to the garden to look at how the land in this particular home was used. She later demonstrated her knowledge of what is in the garden and why they had planted it (PN).

Women make decisions

The third scenario was of women making all of the decisions to market their produce on their own. This was mainly done through the community groups in which they participated in for marketing, but also as individuals. Of the few individual women who sold their produce, the majority were either single or widowed. Those who marketed their produce with groups made decisions as group members and sold to individuals or millers of their choice. Many women preferred to produce and market with farmers' groups because of the many advantages that come with group farming, such

as savings schemes, social capital investment and autonomy in income use, which paves the way for poverty reduction and provides women with an opportunity to exercise their agency.

Trading in maize and millet

Beyond the household, both men and women participate in the maize and millet chain as traders. Maize and millet trading can be categorised as small and large-scale trading. Small-scale trading in the maize and millet chains for the purposes of this study includes all those trading activities that are carried out with little capital investment. These included traders in cooked and roasted maize, sellers of fresh maize, dealers in millet beverages and retail traders. The findings of this study indicate that women dominate the small-scale trading of maize and millet in Mbarara District such as selling cooked maize and sell local brew or beverage (Bushera). Women who were involved small scale trading indicated that these business did not require much start-up capital required for large scale trading. Women also mentioned that small-scale trading enables them to fulfil other household obligation as caretakers of their families.

Wholesalers and millers constituted the large-scale traders in this study and these operated milling stations and large stores, which processed and stored maize and millet. In this study, out the five milling stations interviewed, only one was owned by a woman. It should also be noted that her station had the least capital investment (diesel operated) and a very small capacity. Her mill station did not have storage capacity and hired a man to operate the machinery. Only a few women were employed in large-scale trading of maize and millet. Thus, men dominate large-scale maize and millet trading in Mbarara District.

Comparative benefits received by women in each chain

The study findings indicate that women grow both maize and millet for various reasons including food security, income, nutrition and social reasons. However, there are differences in the benefits that women receive from the two chains. To determine the benefits that women receive from participating in these chains, this section

examines and compares the benefits that women value from being involved in the maize and millet commodity chains.

Economic benefits

This study found that women generally receive more economic benefits from participating in the millet commodity chain than the maize commodity chain at the household level. This is attributed to the fact women made more independent decisions and undertook more activities in the millet commodity chain than in the maize commodity chain. In many households, maize is grown for home consumption while millet is for both food and commercial purposes although in small quantities. Millet production takes place outside the home, often in farmers' groups, and women use this to their advantage to determine how much money they bring home from the farmers' groups or rented gardens. This makes it easier for women to put the economic benefits they derive from millet towards their personal needs and those of their families.

Nutritional and medical supplement benefits

The study by Hawkes and Ruel (2011: 12) indicates that "value-chain approaches have rarely been used explicitly as a tool to achieve nutritional goals and they have not been sensitive to nutritional concerns". Njoro *et al* (2013) thus note that the commodity chain analysis alone does not take into account this nutritional value of the agro-chains studies. Hence, the use of gender analysis in this study found that women derived nutritional and medical supplements from millet compared to maize. Women acknowledged that millet has a higher nutritional value than maize. Millet is reported to be a good remedy for malnourished children and nursing mothers as a way of boosting nutritional requirements like iron. This is reverberates with the study by Danget *et al* (2013: 1) which found out that: "millets have high nutritional and medicinal value, high dietary fibre content, easy digestibility and other uses. It has medicinal values in the management of diabetes and lowering lipids especially cholesterol. Best remedy for obese, diabetic, elders and flat belly aspirants." Millet is essential for gender equality, food security and nutritional campaigns more especially in developing countries, if government

would prioritize it and name it among the local foods which support attainment of the millennium development goals and sustainable development goals.

Social cohesion

Compared to maize, millet was found to offer women more opportunities to create social ties that result in a bond in their relationships. Maize is grown individually by women and men in their households, hence there is no relationship between maize cultivation and the social needs of the people in the community. Millet was found to be more socially binding than maize as most of the activities carried out in the millet chain are socially organised. Millet production is done with at the least family support, but mostly with the help of the rest of the community, especially women. The study found that women's participation in farmers' groups provided women with an opportunity to form networks by building social bonds among the members of these groups. These women invested time, labour and resources into farmers' groups as a way of creating a strong social base on which to fall back on in case of social or economic problems. These groups are considered an important security net for women in time of need. Just like the findings of Carr et al. (1996) in Sri Lanka, this study also found that women considered unity and solidarity to be some of the most important benefits of membership of the farmers' groups. However, compared to women, men did not have so much attachment to the groups, but appreciated the fact that their wives belonged to these groups.

Voice and societal influence

The study found out that women's participation in the millet chain gave them an opportunity to have a voice, at both the household and community levels. Women reported being able to openly discuss matters related to family wellbeing with their husbands, because they were generating income and making a contribution to the family. This is a positive indicator for women's wellbeing, as well as that of their children. The study also found out that the women in farmers' groups that men had joined (often attracted by external support provided to the group) maintained their

leadership positions in the groups. The women in these groups not only had influence over group members, but also in the community. They were able to make decisions that benefited the rest of the community, thus influencing their societies.

Freedom of movement

Many women in this study cited limited movement as an obstacle to their participation in chain nodes outside the home, such as marketing. Women's movement is limited by many factors including among others refusal by their husbands, household chores over load and financial means. However, women's participation in group production gave them an opportunity to move out of their homes and interact with other women in their communities and beyond. Men tended to restrict their wives' movement because of unclear reasons for moving about; but, within group farming, men had no objection, as the output of the groups is enjoyed by everyone, including men. Women enjoy the freedom to move around and the benefits of being with other women in the community, with whom they share their problems.

Community organisation

Millet, as opposed to maize, has become an organising factor for both men and women in the district. Millet offers a vantage point around which communities organise themselves and that development organisations can tap into. Farmers' groups formed to produce millet strengthen social capital, which leads to other types of social organisation, which are crucial for development. Farmers' groups have become a tool used by women to seek support from those in authority and even companies that have something to offer. As the study by Mayoux (2001: 441) reveals, "social capital is particularly important for poor women because this is one of the few resources which poor women have". One of the local mill stations's action to organise women's farmers' groups into social networks provided an opportunity for the mill to reach out to women relevant to their chain who required support.

Obstacles that limit women's participation and upgrading

The use of gender analysis revealed that men and women are faced with different obstacles (inequalities) both within and outside the household, which affect their ability to participate in upgrading in the maize and millet commodity chains. These include, among other things, unequal participation in decision making, unequal control of household resources, lack of control of household income, limited market access, lack of financial resources, and cultural and time constraints. Coles and Mitchell (2011: 4) note that “these gender inequities arise from disparities in access to factors of production and education, from gender disparities inequities in time budgets (‘time poverty’), gendered labour markets, and power imbalances or cultural norms that affect participation of individuals in decision making”.

Unequal decision-making power at the household level

This study found out that women from male-headed households lack decision-making power in their households. Men make decisions about the quantity and quality of crops cultivated, which has an impact on production and value addition. This means that women have to seek approval from their husbands on crucial issues regarding production, value addition and marketing. These findings are in line with the study by Combaz (2013), who found out that, generally, women and girls in Uganda lack decision-making power in their households. Lack of decision-making power impacts negatively on production, food security, household gender relations, poverty reduction, family welfare, and development in all its dimensions. Women in male-headed households lack the power to make decisions in regard to marketing their produce. Women are assumed to be unable to decide “when and how much farm produce should be sold, let alone what the income should be used for” (Alinyo and Leahy 2012, pp. 340–341). Such findings as of this study are in line with Farnworth (2012), who emphasises that decision making in a household impact strongly on its ability to attain desirable economic and social justice outcomes.

Unequal control and distribution of household resource use

This study found that maize and millet production depended on how household resources such as land were divided between what is regarded as cash crops and food crops. Bananas were regarded as a cash crop and took up much of the household resources, such as land, labour and finance. Maize and millet were regarded as food crops and the use of household resources for these crops was not given priority in many male-headed households. Men were found to be in charge of banana production, whereas women were expected to take charge of all other food crops produced in the household. Three female individual farmers (Nyanjura, Nyanjara and Komweru) and two male individual farmers (Rutatsindama and Rutasingwa) explained that men make decisions about which crops to grown in their households. Women said that they do not argue with their husbands about such decisions because they respect their husbands as owners of the land. This meant that men made decisions on cash crops production with the advantage of using available resources, while women had to produce food crops with minimal resources.

This study specifically looked at land as a key household resource to investigate household distribution of resources. It found out that men make decisions on the use of land by determining which crops to be planted and in what quantity. Despite the fact that the Land Act in Uganda contains provisions for the land rights of women, they remain disadvantaged in land ownership and control (Pedersen *et. al*, 2012). The implication of male ownership of land is that it gives men the right to decide on its use. This results in the production of cash crops by men, leaving food crop cultivation to women. However, as noted by Farnworth (2012) and World Bank (2014), when there is gender inequality in decision-making about household resources, the consequence is improper use of these resources and ultimately lack of development. Women end up with less land to grow food crops, which puts the family at risk of food insecurity. This confirms the findings of UNIDO (2013: 5) that “gender gaps in rights over land have negative consequences for household food security and nutrition and contribute to differences in productivity between male and female farmers, it is a major cause for poverty among female producers”.

Lack of control over household income

The study findings indicate that women in most of the male-headed households lacked control over their produce, as well as the income generated from its sale, because of lack of ownership of the assets used in its production. Coles and Mitchell (2011: 6) claim that “male income control is based on land rights that grant men power in decisions over its allocation, use and distribution of its products and the derived income”. Women are regarded as part of the property owned by household head. Thus, “women’s labour inputs are perceived as a property of the family under the control of the male head of household” (Pedersen *et al.*, 2012: 39). Comparing women to commodities renders them dependent on their husbands, who own all of the resources in the household. It is this self-acclaimed ‘right’ of men that pushes them to decide whether or not women should access, use and own resources in their households.

Limited access to markets

The study found out that women lack access to markets for the commodities they produce at the household level. Some of study sites are located far (15 to 20 kilometres) from the main trading centres where much of the maize and millet stores are located. The few buyers who happen to reach women’s houses cheat the women, who lack negotiating skills, by buying their produce at a low price. This leaves women with no option but to allow their husbands to market the produce on their behalf. Women sometimes lose control over the produce once they hand it over to their husbands for marketing. Men assume the right to the income from the sale of the produce and, in some instances, women do not get anything for their efforts, which also frustrates their ability to upgrade. The situation for women is made worse by poor infrastructural services in rural areas, which impacts on accessibility by traders. These findings are in line with those of Gollin and Rogerson (2010), who indicate that Uganda has low levels of, and underdeveloped, physical infrastructure and public services, especially in rural areas such as those visited during this study.

Lack of financial resources

The study found that women lack access to the financial services needed to upgrade in the upper nodes of the chains, which include processing and marketing. This finding is line with those by Carr *et al.* (1996), who also indicated that women living in poverty have limited financial resources, which are required for participation in certain nodes of the chains. Women mainly participated in those chain nodes for which there was less capital requirement, such as production and home-based processing. Women also participated in marketing activities for maize and millet products that did not require much money, such as the marketing of freshly cooked maize and home millet beverages. In another study, Coles and Mitchell (2011: 4) also mentioned that: “processing of agricultural commodities often involves equipment that represents considerable capital investment. Women are more likely to manage their own work and income where capital barriers to entry are lower and where physical product transformation involves simple, relatively low cost equipment, such as knives and bowls in fisheries or ‘rolling tables’ for incense sticks”.

Cultural challenges

Traditional cultural norms and values were found to have a bearing on male and female participation in different nodes of the chain. These social norms and traditions treat men and women differently as they shape the lives and work men and women do, the income they receive and their shared relationships. The World Bank (2014: 151) pointed out that “the extent to which women are able to participate in public decision-making and make their voices heard is shaped by social norms”. This study found that only four women owned land while the majority only accessed land through their husbands due to cultural practices that regard them as objects of men who were purchased by bride wealth. Women were also less likely to participate in community public programs as they were not regarded as household heads even when they lost their husbands. Four individual farmers explained that women may own land that they have acquired through other means, such as by inheriting or purchasing land.

A female participant from the one group cautioned that: *“When a woman acquires land it should be a secret from the husband. It should preferably be acquired at the woman’s birthplace if she is born far from her husband’s place. Men use the excuse that this is their children’s property and if you are not smart enough, then you lose it”* (Interviewee: Nyakayojo, 2013). These cultural practices have also had a negative bearing on women’s attitude to land ownership. Due to the traditions that deny women ownership of land, some of them believe that actually it is not their responsibility to own land. One of the participants of the study expressed her dismay at her fellow women who claim they want to own land as being greedy when commented that *“women put effort into taking up men’s work and obligations. It is not woman’s responsibility to own land and I want to ask you women, when your husband gives you this land what are you going to do with it? To build there a house to live in it or what?”* (Interviewee: Nyakayojo, 2013).

Time constraints

Women in this study cited time constraints as a factor that limits their participation in the maize and millet chains. Compared to maize, millet is time and labour intensive, due to the many activities involved in production. The women who did not grow millet attributed their decision not to grow millet to time constraints and excess labour demands in their households. Women complained of doing almost all the household chores and farm work, which did not leave them enough time to grow millet. Women’s time constraints impact on their productivity. In the study by Pedersen *et al.* (2012: 40), it was noted that *“women’s productivity is also hampered by time constraints, as a substantial amount of their time is taken up by household chores and care providing activities”*. The impacts of the limited time for productive works include less production, forgoing some crops which require more time like millet and on many occasions they can’t catch up with productions seasons. This means that there is general shortage of food at household level and income which affects their livelihood and purchasing power.

Strategies for overcoming these obstacles

There are many obstacles to women participating in almost all nodes of the two chains. Despite this, women have been able to manoeuvre around these problems to find a way to participate and meet their own objectives. Women used silent resistant actions to find alternatives without engaging in political forms of resistance or action against the discrimination and subordination that they encounter. Rhode (2003: 49) indicated that “this form of resistance could include extremely modest forms of counteraction inscribed in small everyday acts of defiance and a refusal of approved forms of behaviour, even if these are made within a coercive framework like patriarchy which is itself not directly challenged, but definitely subverted”. These women created room to manoeuvre, in these chains with a self-created platform from which they are capable of effecting change in the two chains (Sen, 1999). The study findings support the argument that women are not passive victims, but rather dynamic actors capable of responding to the contradictions that they face and of shaping the processes they are involved in (Ibid). Women thus undertook the several strategies to overcome the challenges they face without necessarily being confrontational to men:

Renting land

The study found out that, as it was difficult for women to access land at the household level to grow crops perceived as ‘women’s crops’, thus rented land to grow millet. Out of the ten women interviewed, only four women used their own land to grow millet. All the five groups rented land to grow millet. Women did not conflict with their husbands’ decisions on use of family land but rather found land elsewhere to grow millet. Renting land was also used as a strategy to limit male influence over the crops that women grew. The idle land in the community gave women room to manoeuvre in three ways. First, women exploited the conditions that were attached to renting the land by opting to grow a crop that met these conditions and which men were unable to grow (i.e., millet). Secondly, women exploited the fact that men were reluctant to rent land to other men, which gave women an advantage. Lastly, women did not label their

production as ‘commercial’ when they rented land to grow millet, but instead grew food for their families and, of course, sold the surplus. A study by Tripp acknowledged that “women have found ways to claim land through a wide variety of mechanism: through inheritance, gift, purchase, pledge, loan lease, and share cropping as well as through their husbands or male relatives” (Tripp, 2004: 14). In this study, three of these mechanisms were adopted by women as a means of accessing land: renting, borrowing and inheriting.

Using collective agency

Women used community-based groups to overcome the challenges they faced as individuals at the household and community levels. Interventions in the debates about women's agency have tended to focus on individual agency leaving out the opportunities created by community group (Walby, 1996). This study found that women used collective agency as a crucial way of dealing with challenges they face in participating in millet commodity chain. All the five community groups were involved in this study and studied the contribution of these groups to women's participation of these chains. Women lack the collateral to obtain a bank loan to establish a business enterprise that would earn them income. The decision to make less expensive capital investments that make use of their social unity and the resources they already have such as labour became an alternative that allowed women to manoeuvre through this challenge. Firstly, women opted to concentrate on the production node of the chain, where the capital investment is relatively small compared to other nodes such as marketing. Women also opted to sell cooked maize, because this process does not require much capital compared to roasted maize. Secondly, women used farmers' groups to mobilise their finances through group saving and borrowing. This approach actually becomes appealing to men, who decided to join these groups so that they could also access these financial opportunities. Lastly, women who did not have the ability to join these groups to save and borrow money, offered their labour as a source of finance. It is this process of finding resources with which to grow millet that gave women the right to make decisions over the resources used to produce the millet.

Women used their social networks to start groups for the purpose of improving their position in society to overcome structural limitations in the chains, such as lack of bargaining power, lack of access to markets and to improve their income. They help each other in carrying out farming activities such as planting, weeding and harvesting. Individual farmers said that this saves time in both household farming and housework and the women added that it is an opportunity to get information. From the FGDs with farmers' groups, it was established that there are several reasons why farmers participate in farmers' groups, including: to apply for government support, make friends, fight poverty, help each other, save money and improve household gender relations. One of the participants from the Abatsyaba group narrated that: *"When you are alone at home, you feel poor every time. You have no hope and no one to run to in case of problems. But today I have many friends who I can turn to and solve some of my problems"* (Interviewee, Kashari, 2013). Another participant from the Abatsyaba group noted that: *"Some of us cannot get anything when we grow crops at home. Our husbands do not allow us to keep the income from our own sweat. That is why we grow millet as a group – as a strategy to access income. You may ask your friend who may sell her own millet to take part of your produce and sell for you, because men may not know all these details, so when he takes over the portion you take home, you are able to earn some money from the sale of the millet you have kept with your female friend"* (Interviewee, Kashari, 2013). Women's approach to use groups as an option to participate in millet commodity chain a strategic approach to "counter the oppressive gender ideologies and hierarchies in their society" (Rhoda, 2003: 53).

Accessing information through groups

Women's participation in farmers' groups has also played a key role in addressing the information and communication gap that exists among rural women. Women join these farmers' groups to access information around their community, but also to communicate with the rest of the community through them. Women, through informal discussions, have learnt about many things from these groups, including family planning, nutrition, child health management, and more. These women also managed to bridge the information gap in

relation to trade information by relying on the group's connection to the wider community to establish the price of commodities sold. In these groups, women work as a network to identify the buyers and sellers of millet in their community and circulate the price of the commodity in the same way. Women with access to telephone and radio share information with those in the group without such access. For example, among the groups with contracts, the leader would call the miller or trader to come and pick up the produce when it was ready, which did not necessitate the rest of the farmers to have a phone.

Keeping productivity low

Women also use low productivity as a strategy to retain access to rented land. Much of the existing literature perceives low productivity as a problem for women, but the women in this study used it as a way to manoeuvre around the challenge of retaining access to land (Pedersen *et al*, 2012). Women renew their rental agreements on a seasonal basis, hence, the need to look for strategies to retain access to rented land. In order to keep hold of rented land, women in this study actually sacrificed productivity for accessibility by not using fertilizers or modern seeds in order to prevent the owners of land and competitors from becoming interested in it. These women reasoned that high productivity draws the attention others who may take the land away from them.

Capitalising on lack of male interest in millet

The male attitude towards millet also provides women who want to produce millet commercially with room to manoeuvre. The men in this study were less interested in millet production compared to maize, which they say is easy to grow and does not demand as much time as millet. Although men participated in farmers groups that grew millet in the three farmers' groups (Abatsyaba, Abazigaaba and Abahira), women in these groups revealed they joined with different motives. Men were not part of these groups when they started as millet growers and only came on board when the groups started attracting support from outsiders. For farmers in the Abatsyaba and Abazigaaba farmers' groups, the men joined after a miller (from Blue

Mill) showed interest and started supporting them. The other group (Abahira) reported that, after receiving support from the area member of parliament (who supplied the group with cooking utensils as a way of supporting their group to diversify into other economic activities), men came to join their group and some quit when no more support was forthcoming.

Conclusion

This study used the global commodity chain and gender analysis approaches to understand the participation of men and women in the maize and millet commodity chain. The conclusions may not be a representation of the situation across the whole of Mbarara District because of the small numbers of participants and respondents who participated in this study. However, the findings and conclusions are useful in understanding the conditions of the actors involved in these two chains in Mbarara District and Uganda more broadly.

The study findings suggest that, global commodity chains analysis, gender analysis and the question of agency are lacking, yet salient for any chain analysis. The commodity chain approach is one of those theories that “conceptualizes gender relations in terms of patriarchal structures that have often been criticized for inevitably viewing women as victims and underestimating women's agency and capacity” (Walby, 1996: 2). However, the gender analysis provides other perspectives on the chain, which are usually left out in mainstream commodity chain analysis. “It moves the focus away from the firm to the individual person” (Schumacher, 2014: 129).

The study found that millet production has as much potential as maize in combating food insecurity in the country and is a good source of income for people living in poverty. However, maize has not fully participated in millet production labelling it a woman's crop. Male involvement would lead to an improvement in the volume of production, which would earn households more income. Millet has multiple benefits compared to maize beyond food security which include its high nutritional and cultural value women.

The study findings revealed that women are involved in production of broth maize and millet while their participation in

value addition is concentrated at the household level. Men are less involved in production but more involved in value addition beyond the household. The value addition activities that women do at household level go unrecorded in commodity chain analysis which focuses on farm gate rather than the activities behind it. Many studies do not include the household in their analysis of commodity chains in which women participate. But, the use of gender analysis in this study enabled an exploration of the contribution of women in value addition at the household level by analysing the activities that take place there before the commodity is brought to market.

This study investigated the obstacles faced by women in participating in the commodity chains of maize and millet and how they managed to manoeuvre around the constraints created out of the differences in the gender defined positions they occupy. The commodity chain approach did not provide the answers sought, because the obstacles were not gender disaggregated. But the use of gender analysis explains the constraints women face and how they use their room to manoeuvre and overcome these constraints. Hence, there is a need to deconstruct the commodity chain analysis approach to include gender analysis with a focus on agency in order to obtain a more complete picture of the actors involved in chains.

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In view of the resilience of Africa's underdevelopment, what do Africans make of their determined aspirations for development? The continent of Africa has constantly drawn global attention, most especially for both human and natural evils. Underdevelopment, it appears, is one of the most eminent threatening evils. It has plunged and promises to maintain the majority of Africa in abject poverty, insecurity, and vulnerability. What perpetuates the ghost and gory of underdevelopment in Africa, despite a proliferation of development rhetoric and initiatives? How do ordinary Africans react to repeated talk and claims of development with little evidence of transformation for the better in their material circumstances? This book interrogates the tenacity of underdevelopment amid calls for Africa to rise from its slumber and reclaim its position in global affairs as the mother continent of humankind. It contributes to the ongoing debates on why Africa remains trapped in the clutch of underdevelopment many decades after the purported end of colonialism. The book comes at a critical time in human history; a time when the talk on Africa's [under-]development is louder due to the ravages of economic downturns and dysfunctional conflicts. It poses a challenge to development practitioners, civil society activists, statesmen, economists, political scientists and theorists to rethink and reconsider their role as technocrats, experts and ambassadors of positive change in Africa and the world beyond.

MUNYARADZI MAWERE holds a PhD in Social Anthropology from the University of Cape Town in South Africa. He is currently professor in the Department of Culture and Heritage Studies at Great Zimbabwe University.



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